European Strategic Autonomy and Small States' Security

This article argues that increasingly widespread proliferation of nuclear and delivery system capabilities to smaller states represents a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system away from Great Power dominance — forever altering the traditional `power politics' relationship between states first described by Thucydides. Building upon the broader security studies literature, the rapidly evolving nuclear security relationships between states in the international system are discussed and a new theoretical framework for explaining them is proposed. This new framework outlines in detail several factors critical to shaping interstate security relationships: (1) the nuclear capabilities of the state (i.e., size, differentiation, range, and interceptibility of force structure); (2) the survivability of its arsenal (i.e., redundancy, mobility, site defense, subterfuge characteristics of forces); and (3) the credibility of its nuclear threat to the decision-makers in the target nation (i.e., perception by target of opponent's capability, survivability, control over situation, and threat to central/peripheral state interests). These characteristics combine to create a variety of nuclear security relationships between states (realpolitik, nascent/local, regional, and great power) which affect the deterrent ability, crisis stability, and available nuclear strategies of small nuclear states. Finally, both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf War are discussed in order to underscore the continuing evolution of Great Power-small state nuclear security relationships. In particular, the Gulf War is argued to provide strong support for the argument that future small nuclear states will be able to deter Great Power threats because of four critical lessons demonstrated by that conflict: (1) the effectiveness and survivability of covert nuclear weapons programs; (2) the effectiveness and survivability of small state delivery systems; (3) the ineffectiveness of strategic defense systems in intercepting potential attacks; and (4) the fact that threats of unconventional weapon use by small states are taken seriously by Great Powers.

Scholarship in international studies has usually tended to focus on the great powers. Yet, studying small state behavior can in fact reveal deep-seated structural changes in the international system and provide significant insights into the management of power asymmetries. Overcoming the methodological limitations of gigantism in scholarship and case study selection is another epistemological benefit. Rather than conventional assumptions of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, research on small states has moved in fascinating directions toward exploring the various strategies and power capabilities that small states must use to manage their relationships with great powers. This means, even in some cases, attempts to forcibly shape their external environments through military instruments not usually associated with the category of small states. Clearly, small states are not necessarily hapless or passive. Even in terms of power capabilities that often define their weaknesses, some small states have in fact adroitly deployed niche hard power military capabilities and soft power assets as part of their playbook. These small states have projected influence in ways that belie their size constraints. Shared philosophies and mutual learning processes tend to underpin small state strategies seeking to maximize whatever influence and power they have. These include forming coalitions, principled support for international institutions, and harnessing globalization to promote their development and security interests. As globalization has supercharged the rapid economic development of some small states, the vicissitudes that come with interdependence have also injected a new understanding of vulnerability beyond that of simply military conflict. To further complicate the security environment, strategic competition between the major powers inevitably impacts on small states. The return of conventional interstate war to Europe with Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 serves up a stark reminder of small states’ perennial concerns that “might makes right” in international relations. How small states boost their “relevance” vis-à-vis the great powers has broader implications for questions that have animated the academy, such as power transitions and the Thucydides Trap in the international system. While exogenous systemic variables no doubt remain the focus of analysis, emerging research shows how endogenous variables such as elite perceptions, geostrategic locations, and availability of military and economic resources can play a key role in determining the choices small states make.

The concept of smallness is not only found in Island Studies but also in International Relations, a study that discusses the interaction of political units in the international world. Both Island Studies and International Relations see smallness as a characteristic that can influence the behavior of small island states. This paper tries to bring together the two studies by discussing the case of Bermuda, an island with a semi-autonomous status which has a level of sovereignty close to that of sovereign states. The authors argue that smallness does not always translate into a completely negative condition. Some small states actually depart from their weak position in the international world to then develop their soft power, or the ability to attract the attention of other international actors in a non-coercive manner. In the case of Bermuda, its limited bargaining position in the international world actually makes it more focused on developing sports as its leading sector. Through the sports sector, Bermuda develops its brand to furtherly engage with other international actors and gains economic benefits from it.

Dilemmas of export diversification in a developing economy: Mexican oil in the 1980s

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

The following paper is about the role of ‘small states’ in international (peace) operations.1 Not wanting to get lost in the quagmire of definitions what a ‘small’ state is, suffice it to say that ‘small states’ in this context refer to states other than the ‘Big Five’ (i.e. the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council), as long as they are not hegemonial powers themselves. Actually, it might be better to use Michael Handel’s concept of ‘weak states’ because the ‘smallness’ of many countries in question is defined by the size of their neighbours rather than their own: Canada is small vis-à-vis the United States, and so is Austria vis-à-vis Germany (and both suffer from their own inferiority syndromes), yet Canada is more than 100 times bigger than Austria (and, by the way, 30 times the size of Germany), with more than four times as many inhabitants. To quote Handel: ‘The weak and powerful states have many common characteristics and problems. Any attempt to separate out the weak states as a totally different “breed” is artificial. No state is all powerful and no state is completely weak.’2 KeywordsWeak StateSmall StateSmall CountryInternational OperationUnited Nations Security CouncilThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance--shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy. Keywords: 3G, G-20, global governance, informal groups, small states. Informal Global Governance As new centers of power mobilize and old institutions fall behind the curve of change, the trend in world politics has been for countries to substitute, bypass, or marginalize established institutions of global governance in favor of engagement with new forms of cooperative institutional arrangements--in short, toward informality in global governance. International relations theory has traditionally been uneasy with forms of informal global governance. (1) Realists have dismissed them as irrelevant given that powerful members can go it alone, and neoliberal institutionalists are uncertain of what to make of these forums where formal institutional structures or binding agreements are not apparent. (2) Students of rational design see the advance of centralized rather than disaggregated models of international organizations. (3) Yet this trend toward informality is not only important for extending the debate about the manner by which cooperation can be secured in the global political economy after hegemony, (4) but the manner by which small states attempt to influence bigger ones. Marked by less hierarchy and greater flexibility, informal global governance of small states is an admittedly fuzzy concept, and explaining its theoretical relevance has therefore been a challenge for dominant international relations paradigms. Moreover, the relationship between conceptualization and issue-specific international practice beyond the domain of the UN Security Council in select crisis situations has not been extensively explored. Notwithstanding Jochen Prantl's call in his 2005 International Organization article for extended studies of the dynamics between internal arrangements and formal international organizations, there has been scant research that explores the use by smaller states of informal groups to increase their leverage in the global political economy and so increase our understanding of power, legitimacy and change. (5) Thus, in functional terms, there is some considerable space for specialized and more nuanced studies. Although greater attention is devoted to multilateralism light, the focus has been to some considerable extent on the mechanisms used by bigger and stronger countries, not as tools by coalitions of the weak. (6) A major strand of literature that traces forms of informal governance does so in a mode of analysis that privileges clubs of power where informality allows for easier backroom negotiations over contested issue areas as well as the implementation of tough regulations that are monitored in the privacy of informal groups, whether on a permanent or temporary ad hoc basis. (7) Well-known groupings such as the Group of 8 (G8), the World Trade Organization Green Rooms, and the Middle East Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reflections of these informal groups, which indeed can be effective at achieving their narrow objective of furthering global cooperation. Yet although we have become accustomed to the idea that these contracting parties should have the requisite resources to back up their influence at the table, this approach should not limit our inclination or ability to perceive of alternative arrangements. …

Why do the non-aligned small states such as Sweden participate in NATO-led operations and interventions where it has no immanent interests at play? This article argues that status seeking and building a good relation with the USA plays a central role in explaining small states participation in US-led interventions. Theoretically, the article contributes to our understanding of the concept of ‘status’ in international relations by offering a new explanation of the puzzling willingness of small unaligned states to use military means in NATO-led operations. Empirically, the article contributes to our understanding of the status-seeking strategies of the Nordic countries, which indicates that the Nordic countries in some respect have departed from the traditional Nordic emphasis on soft power.

This study aims to investigate the course of international relations and the factors affecting the use of power in Kyrgyzstan’s interactions with major powers, with particular emphasis on the power dynamics of small states in the field of international relations. Historically, power interactions between states have been an important factor in a field dominated by major powers, serving as a key component in shaping how states establish their positions on the global stage. In this context, small states have often been viewed as ineffective participants in the international arena and have largely been excluded from power dynamics. However, in contemporary conditions, small states have significant potential to assert their identities and prioritize their interests, thus becoming integrated into the power dynamics at play. Consequently, analyzing the power dynamics of Kyrgyzstan, located in the heart of Central Asia, in its interactions with major powers constitutes an important area of research. This study investigates Kyrgyzstan’s ability to use force to achieve its goals and protect its interests in the context of its relations with major contemporary global powers such as Russia, China, and the United States. To this end, the four-part analysis will examine the concept of power in international relations in relation to small states, the power dynamics among small states within the international system, and provide a comprehensive examination of Kyrgyzstan in this context.

The growing use and innovation in information technology and communication in all domains of life has made the world richer but also fragile and it has led to breach of privacy and increased dependence on the internet. Thus cyber security has become one of the major global concerns a growing nontraditional security issue. We can observe that the cyber security discourse of today emphasizes the increasing set of threats ranging from cybercrime, computer viruses, and cyber espionage. Globally cyber terrorism and cyber war are also becoming major issues that are discussed on global platforms. The complexity of the digital world and increased security risk have led to overemphasis that may violate equality, freedom of speech, and fairness. The study aims to highlight the growing paranoia that comes with the growth of cyberspace through the lens of the theory of realism, understanding that the concept of security dilemma also exists in the cyber domain. Just like traditional conflicts, states are engaged in constant power struggles in cyberspace. The study highlights the major concerns related to cyber security and cyber-warfare with its relationship to foreign policy implications for China and the U.S. The methodology applied in this study includes a comprehensive exploration of the landscape of cyber-security and cyber-warfare in China and the U.S. The chapter seeks to analyze the growing landscape of cyber security and cyber warfare and the changing nature of threats with a focus on the foreign policy implications of China and the U.S. about cyber security and warfare. A detailed comparative analysis of China and the U.S. with an understanding of differences and potentials of collaboration and conflict concerning cyber policies. The chapter will contribute to the promotion of international cooperation in addressing this new emerging global challenge of cyber security and warfare. With deep insights to understand this global threat, this research aspires to have a lasting influence on national security considerations with evidence-based suggestions and recommendations. By identifying potential areas for collaboration and examining diplomatic responses to cyber incidents. This chapter seeks to foster a more collaborative approach to secure cyber security and the implication of the phenomenon on the Foreign Policies of China and the U.S. Recognizing that Cybersecurity is entwined with international relations, the research argues that findings extend beyond the specific context of China and the U.S. The chapter aims to contribute to the vast field of international relations by shedding light on the complex between national interest, diplomatic relations, and Cybersecurity. The key argument in this study is to underscore the rapidly evolving nature of cyber warfare tactics and Cybersecurity threats and emphasize the need for an adaptive policy response to effectively counter emerging challenges in both China and the U.S.

This book analyses cases of incomplete secession after separatist wars and what this means for relations between central governments and de facto states. The work explores the interplay between violence and power by examining the micro-dynamics inherent in the process of escalation between separatists and central governments. These dynamics affect not only the security interactions between these entities, but also the character of political and governance relations that are built in the aftermath of secessionist war. The book provides comprehensive analyses of the evolution of post-conflict relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria and between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Beyond these empirical and conceptual examples, the book contributes to a key debate in International Relations that addresses the relationship between democratisation, nationalism and violence, and its applicability to the study of escalation in the post-Soviet space. This book will be of much interest to students of secession, statehood, conflict studies, democratisation, post-Soviet politics and International Relations in general.

Students of international relations interested in cooperation through international regimes and organizations very often devote their attention to the role of a few big states rather than the numerous small ones. Small states tend to possess fewer administrative and financial resources back home as well as smaller and less well-equipped delegations at the international negotiation table than big states. This can easily translate into difficulties in preparing positions for all items on the negotiation agenda and in developing negotiation strategies in great detail, which might inhibit small states from successfully influencing negotiation outcomes. Yet, since international negotiation often rest on a one-state, one-vote principle and since small states can adjust priorities and redirect their limited capacities, there is a window of opportunity for small states to turn into important international actors and achieve significant outcomes in international affairs. In order to systematically shed light on the role of small states in international negotiations, this article outlines the conceptual framework to answer the following question: How, and under which conditions, can small states successfully punch above their weight in international negotiations?

This article develops a systematic account of how small states exercise influence in contemporary world politics by conceptualizing dispersed agency as a configurational capacity emerging from hierarchical positionality, network embeddedness, discursive performativity, and material–ecological affordances. Reframing Rosenau’s post-internationalism as an aspirational horizon rather than a realized condition, the analysis situates small-state agency within a multiplex order where authority is dispersed across overlapping institutional, relational, and normative sites. While hierarchy and material asymmetry persist, small states increasingly assemble distinctive forms of influence through coalition-building, role re-signification, and narrative entrepreneurship. Empirical illustrations from Bhutan’s development diplomacy, Iceland’s gender-equality leadership, and AOSIS’s climate advocacy demonstrate the possibilities and limits of dispersed agency across issue-dense regimes. The article argues that small states offer a critical vantage point for rethinking agency, power, and order in international relations, advancing a more relational, plural, and de-centered theoretical framework.

In the context of globalization, this paper explores the dialectical perspectives on national security and its implications. While globalization has fostered integration in areas such as culture, economy, and ideology, it has also introduced novel challenges to traditional concepts of national security. The paper argues that while globalization has led to a shift in security perceptions from the national to the global level, national security remains a fundamental concern. It discusses the impacts of globalization on security aspects including information technology, economy, military, social stability, and international terrorism. It concludes that a balanced approach, integrating both national and global security considerations, is crucial in addressing the security challenges posed by globalization.

This article examines the theoretical foundations of balancing strategies in international relations and their relevance for the security of small states, with particular reference to Mongolia. The study situates the concept of balancing within classical and neo-realist traditions, while also exploring liberal and constructivist perspectives that highlight the agency of small states. It reviews key theoretical approaches-balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interests-and contrasts them with related strategies such as neutrality, bandwagoning, hedging, and alliance-building. By integrating comparative insights from leading scholars, the article shows that balancing remains a vital framework for small states to navigate geopolitical competition and safeguard sovereignty. Mongolia’s foreign policy practice, notably its “third neighbor” policy and multivector diplomacy, reflects a hybrid form of external and soft balancing combined with hedging. The analysis underscores both the academic significance and practical applicability of balancing strategies for ensuring Mongolia’s national security in an increasingly complex and uncertain international environment.