Small States

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

This article argues that increasingly widespread proliferation of nuclear and delivery system capabilities to smaller states represents a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system away from Great Power dominance — forever altering the traditional `power politics' relationship between states first described by Thucydides. Building upon the broader security studies literature, the rapidly evolving nuclear security relationships between states in the international system are discussed and a new theoretical framework for explaining them is proposed. This new framework outlines in detail several factors critical to shaping interstate security relationships: (1) the nuclear capabilities of the state (i.e., size, differentiation, range, and interceptibility of force structure); (2) the survivability of its arsenal (i.e., redundancy, mobility, site defense, subterfuge characteristics of forces); and (3) the credibility of its nuclear threat to the decision-makers in the target nation (i.e., perception by target of opponent's capability, survivability, control over situation, and threat to central/peripheral state interests). These characteristics combine to create a variety of nuclear security relationships between states (realpolitik, nascent/local, regional, and great power) which affect the deterrent ability, crisis stability, and available nuclear strategies of small nuclear states. Finally, both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf War are discussed in order to underscore the continuing evolution of Great Power-small state nuclear security relationships. In particular, the Gulf War is argued to provide strong support for the argument that future small nuclear states will be able to deter Great Power threats because of four critical lessons demonstrated by that conflict: (1) the effectiveness and survivability of covert nuclear weapons programs; (2) the effectiveness and survivability of small state delivery systems; (3) the ineffectiveness of strategic defense systems in intercepting potential attacks; and (4) the fact that threats of unconventional weapon use by small states are taken seriously by Great Powers.

This book analyses whether the EU’s drift towards European strategic autonomy presents a challenge or a window of opportunity for its small member states to advance their security interests. The volume presents small states’ perceptions of European strategic autonomy, highlighting their expectations and concerns. The chapters focus on the depth and breadth of European strategic autonomy, national security considerations, assessment of the impact on transatlantic relations, the expected outputs, and its potential impact on the EU’s institutional structure. It also shows how systemic circumstances and the interests of powerful states, either belonging to the EU (France, Germany, and Poland) or having a significant say in European security architecture (the US), establish opportunities and constraints for the small states to shape European strategic autonomy. In particular, the study focuses on the diverging interests of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, and the Netherlands. It demonstrates that, in most cases, European strategic autonomy is perceived not as an alternative to NATO but as a supplementary element that could facilitate the development of national military capabilities, indigenous defence industries and resilience to non-military threats. Ultimately, the book suggests that national approaches towards European strategic autonomy mainly stem from pragmatic national security and foreign policy considerations, while largely ignoring grand strategic ideas. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, security studies, and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

While there is a burgeoning literature on cyber security, little scholarly work has been completed on how cyber security issues are affecting small states. This article attempts to contribute to the debate by exploring whether small states are facing unique or different challenges in enhancing their cyber security. Drawing on the extensive small states literature, the article begins by outlining three conceptual models of small state security, based on alliances, institutional cooperation and norms. These models are then applied to the small state cyber security context. It is argued that institutional cooperation on cyber security issues and the emergence of cyber security norms are being hindered by strategic rivalries between the United States, Russia and China and that military alliances are struggling to adapt to collective defence against cyber threats. The article then explores New Zealand’s cyber security strategy and outlines the various domestic and international challenges that exist for New Zealand policymakers. The article finds: that a globalised cyber security environment is eroding New Zealand’s geographical isolation; that the New Zealand government is struggling to formulate a tenable balance between security and privacy in responding to cyber security issues.

The prevailing wisdom in IR debates finds that neorealism is powerful tool predicting weak states' behaviour. It has been argued that systemic factors are more likely to explain foreign policy choices of small states if compared to domestic factors. This paper is an exploration of the structural realist hypotheses about small states' behaviour in the international system. It particularly questions the importance given by neorealism to structural explanations while analysing small states' behaviour, despite paying little attention to the relativity of smallness. However, the neo-realist hypotheses would become more consistent if tested on smaller states of subsystems crowded by countries considered small in global comparisons. By focusing on smaller states of the Sub-Saharan-African sub-system, this paper argues that neorealist expectations find very little empirical support.

This study aims to investigate the course of international relations and the factors affecting the use of power in Kyrgyzstan’s interactions with major powers, with particular emphasis on the power dynamics of small states in the field of international relations. Historically, power interactions between states have been an important factor in a field dominated by major powers, serving as a key component in shaping how states establish their positions on the global stage. In this context, small states have often been viewed as ineffective participants in the international arena and have largely been excluded from power dynamics. However, in contemporary conditions, small states have significant potential to assert their identities and prioritize their interests, thus becoming integrated into the power dynamics at play. Consequently, analyzing the power dynamics of Kyrgyzstan, located in the heart of Central Asia, in its interactions with major powers constitutes an important area of research. This study investigates Kyrgyzstan’s ability to use force to achieve its goals and protect its interests in the context of its relations with major contemporary global powers such as Russia, China, and the United States. To this end, the four-part analysis will examine the concept of power in international relations in relation to small states, the power dynamics among small states within the international system, and provide a comprehensive examination of Kyrgyzstan in this context.

Export diversification in low-income countries and small states: Do country size and income level matter?

There is no evidence that the vigorous political action needed to implement the recommendations of previous reports on the vulnerability of small states in the Commonwealth will be forthcoming in the near future. In matters of security, economics and particularly the environment, the collective interests of small states do not appear to have been recognized in the international community. Major donors find dealing with small individual demands from multiple small states difficult, but a regional approach simplifies matters and should be the primary area of concern. The Vulnerability Index provides an excellent measure of the economic and environmental vulnerability of all developing countries and underlines the particular vulnerabilities of small states but does not bring out their social, cultural and political vulnerabilities.

Chapter 2 interrogates modernization theory and the belief that economic growth is key to explaining why democratic regimes rise and fall. Many small states in Africa, the Caribbean, and most significantly the Pacific are poor but retain high Freedom House scores. Conversely, some small states, in Europe in particular, but also Brunei in Asia, tend to be both richer and poorly scored. This demonstrates that while economic performance is clearly relevant to the survival of regimes, the key link is not how wealthy a country is but how elites both utilize their economic resources and narrate the story of their performance. In poorer states, elites keep public expectations low while rewarding loyal followers via practices of clientelism and patronage. In wealthy states, elites link high living standards with regime stability and centralized authority. Thus, the personalization of politics can have unexpected benefits for democratization, especially in small, poorer countries.

The foreign policy process in the Netherlands has become increasingly domesticized. Globalization and European integration have intensified the transnational character of ever more policy domains. This has increased the visibility of foreign policy as well as the number of stakeholders involved in it. The end of the Cold War ended the until then dominant narrative guiding foreign policy. Combined, these developments made post-Cold War policymakers face a further politicization of foreign policy, as testified by the role that foreign policy plays in causing governmental crises and individual resignations of office holders in the twenty-first century. This constrains the freedom of manoeuvre of the Netherlands at the global level, where the country has persistently sought to exercise more influence than can be expected from a small state. Indeed, it aspires to be recognized as a middle power in specific niches by other states in the international system. This accounts for its investment in both hard and soft power capabilities. Threats to its global reputation (being branded as a tax haven, or reluctant to confront its colonial and racist past) have been an incentive to adjust specific domestic policies. At present, theory-driven explanations do not offer a comprehensive account of contemporary Dutch foreign policy.

Vision of a Void: Shifting Global Power and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

ABSTRACTThis article contributes to the literature on the international preferences, behaviours and interactions of small powers in relation to great powers. It examines the foreign policy choices of Southeast Asian states in response to China’s energy diplomacy through two case studies: the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Southeast Asian states have different interests and priorities and have attempted various forms of what Ba and Kuik refer to as complex “engagement and constrainment” in coping with China’s pursuit of energy security. Smaller Southeast Asian powers, by drawing on support from other powers (including the United States and Japan), have adopted different forms of hedging and resistance strategies in response to China’s oil-diversification plans in the region. The article examines the institutional, structural and domestic dimensions of Southeast Asian hedging strategies, arguing that these are far from uniform across the region. Ultimately, the article demonstrates that strategic competition between great powers provides new opportunities for and constraints on smaller powers as they pursue strategic autonomy, with implications for the Asian regional security order.

From the exploratory case study method that is also qualitative, this article provides a conceptual understanding of Liberia’s bid for the seat as UNSC NPM with an emphasis on its influence on the global stage. Based on the conceptualization of how small states can leverage their influence on the UNSC to substantially contribute to international peace and security, this paper doubts not the possibility for small states to leverage their influence at the UNSC but is particularly skeptical about the leverage of Liberia's influence as a small state on the UNSC. The paper argues that Liberia's prolonged absence from the UNSC since 1961 coupled with its peripheral position in the international system raised a legitimate concern that resonates with the conceptual framework adopted by this paper. Conclusively, the paper argues that if elected as UNSC NPM, Liberia's position will be similar to the ceremonial role of most African countries that exit the UNSC without a mark of significance difference. It recommends that to make a significant difference, Liberia could take a cue from Estonia and Lithuania experiences cited in this paper as small states that meaningfully impacted the UNSC.

This chapter introduces the book and lays out the main discussion in the literature to which the book aims to contribute. It overviews the current debate on small states in the international system and the role that international organisations may play in raising the capacity of small states to act externally. It also outlines the debate on Europeanisation that analyses how membership of the European Union, and to some extent NATO, affects national policies and structures in the development of their security policies. In the last part, the chapter briefly introduces the chapters in this volume.

Normative Evolution in Europe: Small States and Republican Peace