Evaluating expert-authored rules for military reasoning

Contents: R.E. Nisbett, Reasoning, Abstraction, and the Prejudices of 20th Century Psychology. Part I:Establishing the Existence of Rules for Reasoning. R.E. Nisbett, D.H. Krantz, D. Jepson, Z. Kunda, The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Reasoning. P. Thagard, R.E. Nisbett, Variability and Confirmation. D. Jepson, D.H. Krantz, R.E. Nisbett, Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill? Part II:Teaching Statistical Rules. G.T. Fong, D.H. Krantz, R.E. Nisbett, The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking About Everyday Problems. G.T. Fong, R.E. Nisbett, Immediate and Delayed Transfer of Training Effects in Statistical Reasoning. Part III:Rules for Conditional Reasoning. P. Cheng, K.J. Holyoak, R.E. Nisbett, L. Oliver, Pragmatic Versus Syntactic Approaches to Training Deductive Reasoning. Part IV:Rules for Causal Reasoning. P. Cheng, R.E. Nisbett, Pragmatic Constraints on Causal Deduction. M.W. Morris, R.E. Nisbett, Tools of the Trade: Deductive Schemas Taught in Psychology and Philosophy. Part V:Rules for Choice. R.P. Larrick, J.N. Morgan, R.E. Nisbett, Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life. R.P. Larrick, R.E. Nisbett, J.N. Morgan, Who Uses the Normative Rules of Choice? Part VI:Implications for Education. R.E. Nisbett, G.T. Fong, D.R. Lehman, P. Cheng, Teaching Reasoning. D.R. Lehman, R.O. Lempert, R.E. Nisbett, The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday Life Events. D.R. Lehman, R.E. Nisbett, A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Undergraduate Education on Reasoning. Part VII:Implications for Cognitive Science. E.E. Smith, C. Langston, R.E. Nisbett, The Case for Rules in Reasoning.

Choices that are underdetermined by reason, such as choices arising from incommensurability among values, involve an element of arbitrariness, and arbitrary choices are commonly thought to be inimical to the rule of law. In this article, I suggest that we should distinguish between two different ideals of the rule of law, and that the arbitrariness of some judicial choices has different implications for these different ideals. One ideal of the rule of law can be understood as ‘the rule of authority’, and the other ideal can be understood as ‘the rule of reason’. The latter ideal is opposed to decisions that lack reason, but not to arbitrary choices between undefeated reasons. The arbitrariness involved in choosing between undefeated reasons may be a deficit in one ideal of the rule of law (the rule of authority), but not a deficit in the other ideal (the rule of reason). Moreover, it is important to recognise that these are distinct ideals that can conflict, and not rival interpretations of a single ideal.

From a general point of view, it can be argued that legal reasoning encompasses the concept of reasonableness, since the establishment of a set of rules necessarily entails that a margin of flexibility be allowed. Such a margin may take one of several forms, ranging from exceptions and derogations to exemptions. Either way, the legislator, the executive, or the judiciary will have to make a determination by comparing and weighing different competing values. As far as competition law is concerned, the so-called “rule of reason,” a concept of elasticity making it possible to establish exceptions to a rigid rule, was developed in U.S. antitrust law long before the creation of the European Union. The aim of this paper is to determine whether this concept can play a role in the EU internal market, and to this end we will consider if, and how, it has been applied in that context. In responding to this legal conundrum, we will carry out a comparative analysis of two distinct areas of application, namely, the market rules dealing with competition and those on the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. As a starting point, however, a few introductory remarks will be made on the rule of reason in its American and European settings. In fact, considering that this rule was initially conceived under U.S. antitrust law, it is appropriate to discuss the U.S. system, drawing the necessary analogies with the European system and highlighting the inevitable differences.

This paper studies a monopolistic producer’s resale price maintenance scheme when downstream retailers simultaneously put (informative) advertisement efforts and sell final products. It posits that each retailer’s advertisement effort increases not only its own sales, but also the entire market size, because consumers, after observing an advertisement from one retailer, may purchase from another. Unless the advertisement cost is too elastic, the minimum resale price maintenance scheme is binding and welfare-enhancing. Unlike the existing literature, it supports the legal doctrine of ‘rule of reason’ rather than ‘illegal per se’ even under consumer surplus standard for competition policy.

American society and the medical profession have historically been dominated by a "single master" view that emphasizes unrestrained advocacy for individual patients and prohibits physicians, including those who work in critical care units, from being providers and rationers of health care services simultaneously. With its emphasis on universal access and cost containment, health care reform requires that society and the medical profession balance this individualistic ethic with a communitarian ethic that stresses proportional advocacy for all patients and encourages physicians and patients to help define the scope of services their health care institutions provide. Ideally, this balance will allow the transition from a "rule of rescue" in which large sums of money are spent on therapies that may have only marginal benefit to a "rule of reason" in which this money can be used for primary and preventive care.

In my paper, I comment on Rainer Forst's paper in this issue. I raise doubts as to whether the justification of democracy emerges from a fundamental moral right to reciprocal and general justification, as Forst claims. His basic argument appears questionable because democracy is different from a “hypothetical‐consent‐conception” of moral legitimacy, which limits as well as enables democratic legitimacy. The former cannot, however, justify the latter through an argument centered on self‐government: Such an argument relies heavily on the possibility of consensus, thus neglecting the crucial phenomenon of disagreement or dissent. As a result of not adequately dealing with this phenomenon, the argument is unable to account for the basic democratic principle of majority rule as the remedy at hand.

Commission for Business Competition Supervision ( Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha or KPPU) is an institution established to deal with issues related to business competition and monopoly practices. This article wants to describe the approaches to be taken by KPPU in dealing with the business competition cases. This research employed a normative research method with conceptual and case approaches. The result of research showed that there are two approaches to dealing with business competition case: rule of reason and per sel illegal . These two approaches can be selected alternatively, but they can also be used concomitantly. Rule of reason approach trials the substance of business action and its effect on community economy, while the per se illegal approach uses juridical positivistic approach. Keywords : Business Competition, Per se Illegal, Rule of Reason

Giambattista Vico’s New Science, first published in 1725, was an attempt to offer a scientific approach to the study of human society and history. Following Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687), which offered a systematic explanation of the physical world, and established “Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy”, there was a demand for a similar accounting of a science of humanity [63, p. 921]. Although Vico is notoriously obscure – he is neither as organized nor as precise as Newton – his work is brilliant nonetheless and we can extract from his work something like Newton’s “Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy” [58].KeywordsHuman MindHuman HistoryHistorical InquiryHuman ThoughtInnate IdeaThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Socialist thinking is linked to democratic thought in so far as socialist theories originated in the attempt to take liberalism at its word: not to reserve its promise of freedom and self-determination to the bourgeoisie but to extend it to ‘the people’. At the same time, German socialist thinking has always been marked by its scepticism towards democracy and its distrust of just those ‘people’. The article undertakes to trace back this distrust to prominent traditions of German political philosophy: the Kantian tradition of the ‘rule of reason’, Hegelian ideas about the ‘realm of reason’ and the ‘ethical form of life’ and the Marxist notion of ‘false consciousness’. In a second step it analyses the writings of a group of academics known as the ‘neo-Marxists’ in the 1970s who proved to be influential, especially in the social sciences in Germany. The focus is, first, on their view of the individual, its lack of ‘autonomy’ and its ‘wrong preferences’ and second, on the futility of democracy and the ‘illusion of the social state’. It concludes with a brief criticism of the turn to deliberative democratic theory recently taken by some of the authors, supporting a theory which seems bent more on reforming the individual than on reforming the circumstances which he or she has to endure.

Antitrust laws regarding the formation of health care provider networks would be eased according to AAP-backed legislation approved by the House Judiciary Committee on March 12. The Antitrust Health Care Advancement Act of 1996 (H.R. 2925), introduced by Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), would set a more lenient legal standard, known as the rule of reason, for determining whether pricing arrangements among provider networks are anti-competitive. A determination under the rule of reason would take into account all relevant factors affecting competition.

Now that the rule of reason has largely over taken per se rules of antitrust law in the United States, antitrust enforcement generally requires evaluation of a wide variety of evidence to determine the challenged conduct's effect on competition. This article provides an overview of three concepts commonly taught in MBA-level strategic management courses to evaluate much of the same evidence for purposes of determining the firm's competitive strategy: cooperative strategies, stakeholder management, and sustainable business practices. Unlike the neoclassical microeconomic view of competition commonly used in modern antitrust analysis, strategic management teaches students to view competitors not only as rivals, but also as stakeholders with whom their firms may need to cooperate. While the application of these concepts to specific antitrust issues requires further analysis, these concepts provide a basis for supplementing the understanding of business competition under the rule of reason.

Predatory pricing is a pricing strategy in which a company lowers the price of its products to a level that may be detrimental to the company itself, with the aim of driving competitors out of the market. Fixed pricing reflects a company's commitment to keep the price of its products at a fixed level or within a certain range for a specified period of time. As competition and demand change, fixed pricing provides stability and consistency in product prices. This study aims (1) to find out the practice of predatory pricing in KPPU Decision Number 03/KPPU-L/2020, and to analyze the concept of approach used by the Business Competition Supervisory Commission Panel in its consideration of deciding fixed pricing cases in KPPU Decision Number 03/KPPU-I/2003. The method used in this research is qualitative. The data sources used in this research are as follows: a) Primary Legal Texts: Legal texts that are authoritative in nature. Judges' decisions, legislative requirements, and official court documents or minutes are some examples of fundamental materials. Based on the data collection and analysis process, this study can be concluded as follows: the importance of understanding competition practices and the use of appropriate approaches in case analysis is emphasized. Predatory pricing practices can damage competition if not recognized and prevented. Similarly, understanding the notion of approaches such as "per se illegal" and "rule of reason" in case analysis can influence the way the Competition Supervisory Commission makes decisions. This is important to maintain fair and healthy competition in the market.

Deliberative democratic theorists argue that important moral questions turn on whether regimes are sufficiently deliberative. To attribute “deliberativeness” to a regime, we need an account of “deliberative integration” that connects such a holistic assessment to the acts or qualities of individuals and smaller groups. I turn to Aristotle'sPoliticsfor instruction in developing such accounts, arguing that he judges regimes according to how reliably they act pursuant to excellent common deliberation—a manner of excellent rule that I call the “rule of reason.” I then interpret Aristotle's metaphorical argument for the “wisdom of the multitude” to establish the claim that democracies may best integrate citizens’ deliberations. This interpretation illuminates Aristotle's complex evaluation of regimes, including his ambivalent views on the rule of the many. It also suggests a structure for contemporary accounts of deliberative integration helpful even for those who differ from Aristotle in their basic moral concerns.

Resale Price Maintenance after Leegin: The Curious Case of Contact Lenses

Competition authorities around the world have long tried to curb the anticompetitive practices of originator drug companies, including their anticompetitive agreements with generic drug companies that result in the delay of generic entry. Their work appears to bear fruit as the years 2013 and 2014 seem to mark a new chapter in competition enforcement in the sector. In July 2014 the Commission issued its third prohibition decision in the sector (i) against the French originator company Servier for its exclusionary conduct and for concluding a series of deals with generic companies to protect its best-selling blood-pressure medicine, perindopril, from generic price competition in violation of both Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and (ii) against five generic drug manufacturers for violation of Article 101. Through a technology acquisition and a series of reverse payment patent settlements with generic rivals, the Commission found that Servier implemented an unlawful exclusionary strategy to delay the entry of cheaper generic medicine. The Servier decision was preceded by the Commission’s Fentanyl prohibition decision in December 2013 fining Johnson & Johnson and Novartis for their respective Dutch subsidiaries’ anticompetitive agreement to delay the market entry of a cheaper generic version of the painkiller fentanyl in the Netherlands, in breach of Article 101. Earlier in June 2013 the Commission also fined the Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck and several generic producers for agreeing to delay the market entry of cheaper generic versions of Lundbeck’s branded citalopram, a blockbuster antidepressant, in breach of Article 101. In the same month the US Supreme Court issued its landmark Actavis opinion holding that patent owners do not enjoy immunity from the ‘rule of reason’ scrutiny of antitrust laws when making reverse payment settlements, even if the settlements are only for the terms of the patents. The Actavis decision ended a ‘dramatic split’ among Appellate Courts of different Circuits in the USA, and today it provides a new impetus to the FTC’s efforts to scrutinise pay-for-delay settlements. In the EEA, we know from public statements that the European Commission also presses forward with additional reverse payment and other new cases in the sector. In the past decades, in anticipation of reaching the ‘patent cliff ’ for their blockbuster medicines, originator drug companies have employed numerous measures that were aimed at ‘evergreening’ or otherwise extending the high rent-earning status of such medicines. These measures included inter alia life cycle strategies for follow-on products, complex patent strategies involving patent litigation/EPO opposition and patent settlements, prolongation of patent protection through SPCs, interventions before marketing or reimbursement authorities raising safety, bioequivalence or patent infringement issues, cooperation with potential generic competitors in the marketing of their products. Given rising healthcare costs and the budgetary constraints that followed the recent economic crisis, it is not surprising that these attempts have attracted, and continue to attract, the attention of the legislators and competition authorities alike in many jurisdictions. A review of the regulatory attempts to curb evergreening is beyond the scope of this note. Competition authorities scrutinise individual practices where appropriate to detect those that are likely anticompetitive and thus harmful to society. However, one should emphasise at the outset that in most cases many of the foregoing practices by the originator companies may well constitute legitimate business practices and should not, on balance, be deemed in violation of competition laws. In some other cases, however, the particular conducts of the originator companies have rightfully attracted competition law scrutiny. One such earlier case is, for example, the AstraZeneca case where the Commission fined AstraZeneca for abusing its dominant position in two infringements of Article 102. The first abuse