Exempt Wells: An Introduction

This article describes a grant received from the Fred Meyer Charitable Trust for the cooperative selection and deselection of science serials among five land grant libraries in the Pacific Northwest (Montana State University, Oregon State University, University of Alaska-Fairbanks, University of Idaho, Washington State University). It also briefly describes the problems science libraries have in maintaining their serials collections with costs for serials rising at such a rapid rate.

Water conflicts are rare across Michigan's history. As a result, water rights have received little attention by courts or the legislature. Traditionally, the common law of water rights in Michigan embraces the riparian doctrine for surface water and provides landowners with the right to use groundwater. However, two recent changes in common and statutory law significantly modify the legal relations among water users and others with a stake in water use decisions. A 2005 Michigan Court of Appeals decision created a new legal relation among riparian and groundwater rights holders. In 2008, Michigan's legislature passed laws aimed at regulating surface water and groundwater withdrawals. As an exercise of police power intended to protect public rights in water and associated environmental quality, the 2008 laws cap total water withdrawals. This program of restricting water withdrawals coexists with the state's common law which provides for reasonable use of surface water by riparian landowners and groundwater by owners of the overlying land. The result is a new set of legal relations, an uncertain legal environment, and a growing likelihood of water use conflicts. Because Michigan's body of water law is unique, neither courts nor legislature can rely on solutions used in other states.

Over the past decade there has been increasing alarm worldwide about water scarcity, which, it is feared, will lead to massive malnutrition and famines, thirst, and unhygienic dwelling conditions as well as to violent clashes among different users and even wars between nations. Consequently, as a way of mitigating possible conflicts over increasingly scarce water resources there has been increased attention on clarifying what water rights entail. This in itself has raised another conflict: a conflict over the way in which water rights are defined. Much of the international debate has posed the issue as a simple dichotomy between economic efficiency and basic welfare or human rights. A closer look at the multiple forms of water rights derived from state, customary, local, and religious laws, however, reveals more complexity in the principles and values underlying how rights are defined, both in terms of abstract and specific situations as well as in terms of how they are actualised or put into practice by different parties. Both water rights and the laws from which they are derived are linked to wider cultural meanings and values associated with water and notions about what are fair and just or equitable. Often, several laws and notions of equity coexist and interact in a given social field, such as a community, village, or nation state. There may, for example, be a different constellation of rights and different notions of equity concerning drinking water than concurring irrigation or environmental uses. Therefore, when discussing water rights, it is important not to speak of water in general but to disaggregate water uses and water property regimes; only thus will we understand the plurality of values, meanings and notions of equity attached to water. This paper discusses the links between water rights and the broader meanings, values, and notions of equity attached to water, as reflected in state local laws and selected religious laws. Different conglomerations of rights to water (understood broadly to include both rights to use and rights to control or make decisions) for different uses and in different water (property) rights regimes are examined. More specifically, the state laws of selected Western and non-Western countries; Hindu, Muslim and Christian laws (especially those relating to drinking water); and several local or customary laws dealing with water are discussed. The paper argues that, rather than seeking a single, hegemonic type of water law or valuation of water, recognizing the pluralistic legal frameworks, types of rights, and meanings of water is not only a more realistic viewpoint, but also one which can lead to more productive negotiations over water rights and water use. Water Nepal Vol. Vol.9-10, No.1-2, 2003, pp.37-61

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This paper reports controlled experiments on markets linking downstream water entitlement holders with upstream landholders wishing to establish large tree plantations. The present study tackles the question of whether it matters who owns the initial water rights. Coase's (1960) theorem suggests initial endowments will not affect final equilibrium outcomes, in terms of water prices and water rights held by the various parties. That theorem is tested through experiments with human subjects who blindly represent different groups of water users. These are land owners in upstream water supply sub-catchments and downstream urban, irrigation and ‘stock & domestic’ water users, each with pre-specified marginal values of water. These values and equilibrium results calculated in an earlier modelling study provide the theoretical base for evaluating the new results. In the experiment the initial endowments of water rights were shifted between the up and downstream participants. Strong ‘endowment effects’ were observed; participants who held the greatest initial endowments often traded away fewer units than predicted by the theoretical model and captured greater shares of the gains of trade. Including new tree plantations in the market for permanent water entitlements can engender positive changes in economic surpluses in all sectors, with greater levels of social equity and protection of downstream wetland assets. This is in sharp contrast with reductions in river volumes reaching downstream parties and environmental assets in the absence of regulations requiring purchase of entitlements to cover extra water use by new plantations.

The effective management of water resources in Alberta is crucial to sustainable agriculture, industrial development, and environmental management. The historical water allocation mechanism, administrative apportionment, has been viewed in recent years as ineffective and cumbersome. Accordingly, the revision of the Water Act in 1996, included an attempt to improve the efficiency of water allocation. By making the transfer of water rights possible, the revised Act provides many new options for water use and flexibility. The implications of transferable water rights in Alberta water policy must be carefully considered in order to determine the viability and suitability of such a system in the provincial context. This project examines some of the economic aspects of transferable water rights and the potential for effective water allocation by way of transfers in an Alberta setting. As a major part of this project, a hedonic price model, focusing on land values in southern Alberta, was constructed based on similar models, which have been used elsewhere to value water rights or agricultural products. The hedonic approach to market analysis uses the relationship between the price of land and the attributes of the land, such as water availability, soil quality and location, to explain differences in land prices. In this process, the hedonic model is used to estimate the implicit marginal price or value of each land attribute -- in our case, the marginal value of irrigation water. This value will provide us with an indirect estimate of the value of water rights in the region studied. An advantage of the technique is that it estimates the value that farmers express for irrigation water in the market place for land. Such values, then, give us an indication of the anticipated prices, which might prevail for water rights in southern Alberta. The focus of the study was an area of southern Alberta encompassing the counties of Wheatland, Newell, Cypress, Forty Mile, Taber, Warner, Lethbridge and Vulcan and the irrigation districts of Western, Eastern, St.Mary's, Taber, Lethbridge Northern, and portions of Raymond. Information was collected on the physical and economic characteristics of 230 land parcels, which were sold in this region in 1993 and early 1994. A crude comparison of the value of irrigated agricultural land and non-irrigated agricultural land in the sample reveals that irrigated land was worth, on average, $325 more per acre than non-irrigated land. In the ensuing analysis, it was estimated that the value of a parcel of land was determined largely by the buildings on it, the number of acres in the parcel, the proximity of the parcel to a major city (in this case Calgary or Lethbridge), and by the availability of irrigation water. In the hedonic model, the coefficient values of the variables included represent the marginal impact of each of these characteristics on land prices holding all other things constant. For example, the value of water rights represents the average difference between land values of farms that have access to irrigation and farms that do not. This study estimated that every dollar of improvements to farm buildings translates to a one cent increase in the per acre price of the land parcel, where the addition of one extra acre of land to a land parcel lowers the price per acre by $5.17 per acre. Land prices were seen to increase with the proximity of the parcel to large cities. Similarly, the results of the preferred model indicate that the implicit value of having access to irrigation water in southern Alberta is approximately $190 per acre, or, using the conventional estimate that irrigating one acre of land requires 1.5 acre feet of water, this translates to $126 per acre foot of irrigation water. Accordingly, it is revealed that the existence of water rights adds approximately 35% to the value of non-irrigated land. Since this value represents the implicit amount farmers are willing to pay for access to water, it could also be construed as an indirect measure of the value of water rights. From these results, it is reasonable to conclude that water rights do have a measurable impact on land values. Accordingly, proper incentives may be needed to ensure that water is used efficiently and not incorrectly treated as a relatively free or cheap good. One possible method of policy reform to achieve such a system would be the institution of a system of transferable water rights, permitting water to be traded, or effectively sold, at its market price or scarcity value. Further work was done to determine the potential effects of transferable water rights on the Eastern Irrigation District in southern Alberta. Farm budget information was used to gather information and create twelve representative farm types whose financial performance was analysed using linear programming with increasing water quantity constraints. The resulting productive water values were then used to imply potential reallocations of water among farm types and cropping systems. Analysis of the data gathered revealed that all representative farms faced downward sloping demand functions for water. The overall value of water for a 1% reduction ranged from $8 to $250 per acre foot, with the lowest value belonging to largely pasture operations and the highest value attributed to specialty crop producers. This large range in water values for the region indicates that there is sufficient heterogeneity within the EID to accommodate a transferable rights system. Further analysis of the data reveals that the implementation of a transfer system would result in water being transferred to specialty crop producers and the acreage devoted to specialty crops would increase. Small irrigated pasture operations and cereal crop producers would be the first to give up their water allocations under a transfer system. The analysis indicates that there is considerable potential for economic gains from water trade within this district, the main constraint being the market limitations to expanded specialty crop production. Using these two major studies and other sources, this report concludes with a brief evaluation of the economic advantages, disadvantages and other issues involved in instituting a system of transferable water rights in Alberta. Experience elsewhere, primarily in Australia and the western United States, strongly suggests that transferable water rights, despite some drawbacks and problems of implementation, can be a very worthwhile water policy tool. Now that such tradable water rights are permissible under the revised Water Resources Act of 1996, it is recommended that a pilot project involving transferable water rights be instituted in a water short basin or sub-basin in southern Alberta once a water management plan for that basin is completed.

Applying models to developed agricultural regions remains a difficult problem because there are no existing modeling codes that represent both the complex physics of the hydrology and anthropogenic manipulations to water distribution and consumption. We apply an integrated groundwater – surface water and hydrologic river operations model to an irrigated river valley in northwestern Nevada/northern California, United States to evaluate the impacts of climate change on snow‐fed agricultural systems that use surface water and groundwater conjunctively. We explicitly represent individual surface water rights within the hydrologic model and allow the integrated code to change river diversions in response to earlier snowmelt runoff and water availability. Historically under‐used supplemental groundwater rights are dynamically activated within the model to offset diminished surface water deliveries. The model accounts for feedbacks between the natural hydrology and anthropogenic stresses, which is a first‐of‐its‐kind assessment of the impacts of climate change on individual water rights, and more broadly on river basin operations. Earlier snowmelt decreases annual surface water deliveries to all water rights, not just the junior water rights, owing to a lack of surface water storage in the upper river basin capable of capturing earlier runoff. Conversely, downstream irrigators with access to reservoir storage benefit from earlier runoff flowing past upstream points of diversion prior to the start of the irrigation season. Despite regional shifts toward greater reliance on groundwater for irrigation, crop consumption (a common surrogate for crop yield) decreases due to spatiotemporal changes in water supply that preferentially impact a subset of growers in the region.

Soil Science Society of America JournalVolume 32, Issue 1 p. 128-128 Letter to Editor More on Required Use of Metric Units D. W. James, D. W. James Irrigated Agriculture Research & Extension Center, Washington State University, Prosser, Wash., 99350Search for more papers by this authorT. L. Jackson, T. L. Jackson Dep. of Soils, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Ore.Search for more papers by this authorM. E. Harward, M. E. Harward Dep. of Soils, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Ore.Search for more papers by this author D. W. James, D. W. James Irrigated Agriculture Research & Extension Center, Washington State University, Prosser, Wash., 99350Search for more papers by this authorT. L. Jackson, T. L. Jackson Dep. of Soils, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Ore.Search for more papers by this authorM. E. Harward, M. E. Harward Dep. of Soils, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Ore.Search for more papers by this author First published: 01 January 1968 https://doi.org/10.2136/sssaj1968.03615995003200010042xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume32, Issue1January-February 1968Pages 128-128 RelatedInformation

To reduce groundwater overexploitation and alleviate water shortages, market mechanisms are introduced to allocate water rights. Scientific and reasonable pricing of groundwater rights is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the groundwater market. Because of the complexity and uncertainty of water resources, this study calculates the price of groundwater rights based on the value of water resources with an evaluation indicator system. The system includes 14 indicators developed with a fuzzy mathematics model addressing three dimensions: environment, society, and economy. The weights of the indicators are determined through the analytic network process (ANP) and the entropy method. The results show that the price of groundwater rights in Ningxia, China increased from 5.11 yuan/m3 to 5.73 yuan/m3 between 2013 and 2017; this means the price was basically stable, with a slight increase. The ratio of residents’ water fee expenditures to real disposable income also remained essentially stable, fluctuating around 0.37%, far below the normal level. These data demonstrated that the current regional water price policy does not reflect the true value of groundwater resources; there is room to increase urban water prices. Local governments need speed up water price system reforms and adopt water rights systems to optimize water resource allocations.

For a long period of time, in Tanzania, the management of water resources was through informal traditional system. However, the complexities of the current nature of water resource use tend to overshadow the capacity performance of local informal institutions in managing water resources. There is an inevitable call for redesigning operational structures of the local informal arrangements to achieve good models of management and organizational standards in traditional water uses, enhance rational and efficient water uses, and hence reduce water conflicts. Using a case study of water user associations in Kimani sub-catchment, this paper reveals that water user associations (WUAs) were created so as to modify the traditional systems, in a sense that they are legally recognized, and as such, they have legal supports that ensure their enforceability. In the Kimani sub-catchment, WUAs are the major institutions owning water rights, and therefore responsible for water distribution to their members. They are instrumental in negotiations and dispute resolution between different water users. Despite the good work done by WUAs, this paper reveals that the absence of water rights and good grazing areas for pastoralists, simple penalties to some of the wrongdoers, poor leadership and general management skills of WUAs, as well as lack of conflict management skills of the committees involved in resolving water conflicts, are some of the challenges facing WUAs operations. This paper further proposes some workable recommendations to improve the performance of WUAs in the study area.

This chapter first clarifies the concept of water rights, which is used in various and confusing ways in China. Reflecting the changing philosophy of water use towards sustainability, it then investigates the three-step approach to water rights initialisation: the first step is water planning, which determines how much water can be allocated within a basin or a region as well as among multiple water use sectors. The second step of water quantity allocation distributes quotas among regions and sectors within the basin or the administrative region. It finally comes to the third step of water abstraction permits, which further defines usufruct water rights as the legal basis of tradable water rights. The current legal systems of water planning, quantity allocation, and abstraction permits are examined to understand their deficiencies that may undermine the development of tradable water rights, based on which implications for reform are articulated.

The increasing pressures of climate change, population growth, and water scarcity necessitate innovative solutions for efficient water management, particularly in agriculture. This paper explores the application of blockchain technology in the management of water rights for irrigation, presenting a novel approach to enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency in water allocation. Traditional water rights systems are often hindered by bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of real-time data, and disputes among stakeholders. By leveraging blockchain's decentralized ledger system, this study illustrates how water rights can be tokenized, enabling farmers to trade water rights in real-time while ensuring compliance with legal and environmental regulations. This research employs a mixed-methods approach, combining case studies from regions where blockchain has been piloted for water management with qualitative interviews from stakeholders in the agricultural sector. The findings reveal that blockchain can significantly reduce transaction costs, mitigate conflicts over water rights, and facilitate better allocation based on real-time water availability. The technology fosters a participatory governance model by enabling stakeholders to engage in decision-making processes through smart contracts, which automate and enforce water allocation agreements without the need for intermediaries.

We study how institutions such as water rights can complement new irrigation technologies in promoting the sustainability of U.S. agriculture. Using data from the Ogallala‐High Plains Aquifer region of Kansas, we find that water extraction moderately increases after adopting Low Energy Precise Application (LEPA) irrigation, and this rebound effect is in general higher for farmers with larger water rights. About half of the LEPA's rebound effects arise because adopters tend to irrigate more land and grow more water‐intensive crops, with the remaining half attributable to more intensive irrigation. Farmers with greater water rights use more water, with two‐thirds of the effects arising from irrigating larger land areas, and one‐third of the effects attributable to more intensive irrigation. A 10% reduction of water rights will reduce water use by 5% in the long run, and if the reduction targets the majority of the water rights, which lie between 100 and 500 AF, LEPA's rebound effect decreases by 15.4%. Finally, we find that farmers have an incentive to apply a small amount of water in order to preserve their water rights, but the associated water waste is insignificant.

IntroductionImproving the level of intensive and economical utilization of water resources is an important step towards water and food security.MethodsBased on China’s provincial panel data from 2015 to 2021, this study uses a difference-in-differences (DID) model to examine the effect of agricultural water rights trading on intensive and economical utilization of water resources.ResultsThe results show that agricultural water rights trading can significantly promote an intensive and economical utilization of water resources at the 1% level, and the results remain valid even after a series of robustness tests. Further analysis indicates that agricultural water rights trading can promote better utilization of water resources by significantly reducing agricultural water consumption at the 1% level and reducing the proportion of agricultural water consumption at the 5% level to optimize water use structure. Moreover, in regions with scarce water resources, strong water resource constraints, more farmland water conservancy projects, and greater economic development, the promoting effect of agricultural water rights trading on the intensive and economical use of water resources is more significant.DiscussionThis study provides evidence of the impact of China’s agricultural water rights trading policy and offers new ideas and experiences to improve China’s water resource utilization efficiency. The contributions of this work are mainly threefold. First, this paper clearly distinguishes the intensive conservation of water resources, presents an evaluation index system, and complements the existing literature on measuring the intensive and economical utilization of water resources. Second, the path of agricultural water rights trading is analyzed to improve the level of intensive and economical utilization of water resources, thus enriching related research on transmission mechanisms. Third, the heterogeneity of the influence of different regional conditions on the level of intensive and economical utilization of water resources is discussed to improve relevant policies.

Casey Village and the adjoining part of the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) are underlain by the Late Triassic-age Stockton Formation, which consists of a dipping series of siltstones and sandstones. The direction of vertical ground-water gradients in the Stockton Formation varies among well locations and sometimes with time. Vertical gradients can be substantial; the difference in water levels at one well pair (two wells screened at different depths) was 7.1 ft (feet) over a 32-ft vertical section of the aquifer. Potentiometric-surface maps show a groundwater divide that bisects the Casey Village area. For wells screened between 18 and 64 ft below land surface (bls), the general ground-water gradient is to the east and northeast on the east side of the divide and to the south and southwest on the west side of the divide. For wells screened between 48 and 106 ft bls, the general ground-water gradient is to the northeast on the east side of the divide and to the southwest and northwest on the west side of the divide. An aquifer test at one well in Casey Village caused drawdown in wells on the opposite side of the ground-water divide on the NAWC and shifted the ground-water divide in the deeper potentiometric surface to the west. Drawdowns formed an elliptical pattern, which indicates anisotropy; however, anisotropy is not aligned with strike or dip. Hydraulic stress caused by pumping crosses stratigraphic boundaries. Between 1993 and 1996, the trichloroethylene (TCE) concentration in water samples collected from wells in Casey Village decreased. The highest concentration of TCE measured in water from one well decreased from 1,200 μg/L (micrograms per liter) in 1993 when domestic wells were pumped in Casey Village to 140 μg/L in 1996, 3 years after the installation of public water and the cessation of domestic pumping. This suggests that pumping of domestic wells may have contributed to TCE migration. Between 1993 and 1996, the tetrachloroethylene (PCE) concentration in water samples collected from wells in Casey Village decreased only slightly. The highest concentration of PCE measured in water from one well decreased from 720 μg/L in 1993 to 630 μg/L in 1996. The distribution of TCE and PCE in ground water indicates the presence of separate PCE and TCE plumes, each with a different source area. The TCE plume appears to be moving in two directions away from the ground-water divide area. The pumping of a domestic well may have caused TCE migration into the ground-water divide area. From the divide area, the TCE plume appears to be moving both to the east and the west under the natural hydraulic gradient. Aquifer-isolation tests conducted in the well with the highest TCE concentrations showed that concentrations of TCE in water samples from the isolated intervals were similar but slightly lower in the deeper isolated zones than in the shallower isolated zones. Upward flow was measured in this well during geophysical logging. If the source of TCE to the well was from shallow fractures, upward flow of less contaminated water could be flushing TCE from the immediate vicinity of this well. This may help explain why the concentration of TCE in water from this well decreased an order of magnitude between 1993 and 1996.