How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions

This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units.

While virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge consists in having beliefs appropriately formed in accordance with epistemic virtue, they disagree regarding what constitutes an epistemic virtue. Some take epistemic virtue to be a character trait. Others take epistemic virtues to be stable naturalistic dispositions which reliably produce true beliefs. There are also other virtue epistemologists who combine character traits and stable naturalistic dispositions into a “mixed” theory. All three focus exclusively on epistemic virtues, traits that lead cognizers to truth. But, the topic of epistemic vice is typically ignored. In this paper after arguing for the importance of accounting for epistemic vice, I consider dual systems theory, drawing a parallel with Ernest Sosa’s distinction between two kinds of knowledge. I argue that information supporting dual systems theory helps explain two different kinds of epistemic vice. After pointing out important advantages for including both kinds of vice in virtue epistemology and showing how virtue epistemologies can be modified to accommodate epistemic vice, I conclude by suggesting that consideration of epistemic vice favors mixed theories of virtue epistemology.

While honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue‐ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter‐day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato's Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Iris Murdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self‐delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment.

Lawyer Competence: Epistemic Virtues in Legal Ethics This article advances a virtue epistemological account of lawyer competence. It analyses how epistemic virtues (such as curiosity, courage, temperance, humility, justice, and generosity) illuminate and structure key principles of the legal profession. Focusing on the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers and the Charter of Core Principles of the Council of Bars & Law Societies of Europe, the article reconstructs their provisions through the lens of virtue epistemology, showing how they embed commitments to epistemic virtue. It argues that this framework both clarifies the normative foundations of professional competence and provides practical guidance for strengthening reliability, trustworthiness, and lawyers’ role in the fair administration of justice.

Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies have conducted rigorous empirical investigation into the mechanisms of intellectual virtue development. In this study, we review several significant frameworks before utilizing a randomized, pretest/posttest control trial design to understand the impacts of a novel thinking disposition intervention on intellectual virtue growth. We ascertain the direct and indirect effects of the intervention on four key intellectual virtues: curiosity, humility, integrity, and tenacity. Additionally, we test theoretical mediators of virtue learning. Clear evidence favoring a theory-inspired mediator is observed, though we observe weaker signals of direct effects, with nuances across the virtues. For instance, tenacity and curiosity variables appear to respond more to the intervention than do humility and integrity. Findings are discussed in light of contemporary theoretical perspectives.

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In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.

Many machine learning (ML) systems operate as blackboxes and offer limited insight into their internal mechanisms. This opacity creates tension between two crucial objectives optimizing technical performance and fulfilling ethical obligations for transparency. As this tension intensifies, especially in domains that often require justifiable decisions, this paper hopes to reconcile the engineering drive toward higher accuracy and reliability with epistemic virtues emphasizing honesty, accountability, and intellectual rigor. Drawing on philosophical theories of explanation and virtue epistemology, this paper also reviews various principles that embed ethical considerations into ML development and deployment processes. This study adopts a theoretical analysis to reveal how certain epistemic virtues (as exemplified by honesty, thoroughness, clarity, and open-mindedness) can guide ML design choices. In addition, we outline criteria for a balanced framework and policies that honor ethical demands. Finally, we stress the practical relevance of virtue-based approaches to knowledge production in modern technology for ethicists and epistemologists.

GPS-based navigation systems have been developed to support the walking of visually impaired people. However, their use in station premises and malls presented difficulties due to radio wave interference. In such places, an indoor navigation system (IDNS) was indispensable. Recently, an IDNS using geomagnetism that did not require the installation of new infrastructure attracted our attention. It incorporated technology to detect self-position by association with a geomagnetic fingerprint (GMFP) database, which included the geomagnetic vector of the current position, stored in advance on the cloud. However, to realize navigation over an entire floor, a detailed geomagnetic map of the floor was needed, taking a lot of time and labor to measure the geomagnetic field. In this research, we proposed a novel method that limited the area of the GMFP to places above braille blocks and linked the geometric maps to braille block maps. The main features of our system were as follows: (1) Reduction of labor and time required to make the GMFP; (2) Realization of a real-time navigation system with little error in estimated position; (3) A high-resolution geomagnetic map database could be easily made by walking with a nearly fixed stride length without any specific equipment. To confirm the principal operation of our system, we made a prototype system. We then evaluated the performance of our system under various experimental conditions. Finally, we demonstrated a simple navigation system. As a result, we were able to confirm that our system could estimate self-position in real-time with little error and provide simple navigation for visually impaired people.

This chapter will provide concrete examples of a number of moral and epistemic virtues and show how they can help people in general to live better lives in the modern society. By ‘better’ it should be noted that I mean both in the sense they increase their own well-being and contribute to a broader improvement of society. The account provided here draws on scientific research into the ways in which people assimilate information and form their beliefs (as explained and exemplified in Chap. 3), as well as virtue theory. Further to this, the field of ‘Virtue Epistemology’ is introduced. While it is a relatively young field much interesting and, for the purposes here, highly applicable research has already been carried out.KeywordsVirtue EthicPractical WisdomNicomachean EthicIntellectual VirtueEpistemic VirtueThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

I defend the view that charity in interpretation is both an epistemic and a moral virtue. In the first part, I examine Donald Davidson’s version of his principle of charity and question his ascription of beliefs by raising a phenomenological objection: beliefs themselves, before being ascribed, need to be interpreted when interpreters and the subjects they try to understand do not share the same cultural and historical background. In the second section, I examine the notion of epistemic virtue as discussed in virtue epistemology and question whether an epistemic virtue can be completely separated from a moral virtue. In the third section, I show how Gregory the Great, Father of the Church and Pope in the 6th century, understands the virtue of charity in interpretation not as a motivation (in a causal process of interpretation, as in virtue epistemology) but as an attraction to the good (in a teleological process) so that the interpreter is not only a technician producing an interpretation (following a “principle” of charity, as in Davidson) but a moral agent acting in a community.

This chapter carries out an analysis of the Qur’ānic verses that pertain to the concept of taqwā in order to understand the Qur’ānic conception of virtue. It is argued that taqwā appears to be a comprehensive reflective and motivational conscience comparable to similar concepts in Kant and Butler. However, taqwā covers both the moral and epistemic spheres of human life and is constitutive of virtue in general. The chapter discusses the ways taqwā, as a stable acquired disposition for virtue built upon our natural capacity to distinguish right from wrong, is related to specific intellectual virtues that flow from it. Taqwā as the general disposition for virtue functions as a pivot for all specific epistemic and moral virtues. After identifying the basic features of taqwā, the chapter examines additional verses of the Qur’ān to highlight some additional intellectual virtues. The chapter closes by noting the concept of virtue and an overall list of intellectual virtues.

Abstract:This essay defends virtue reliabilism against a line of argument put forward by Duncan Pritchard. In the process, it discusses (1) the motivations for virtue reliabilism, (2) some analogies between epistemic virtue and moral virtue, and (3) the relation between virtue (epistemic and otherwise) and luck (epistemic and otherwise). It argues that considerations about virtue and luck suggest a solution to Gettier problems from the perspective of a virtue theory.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for the intellectual virtues in the context of online search. Intellectual virtues are dispositions and skills that enable good thinking and wise reasoning, such as intellectual humility and attentiveness. Despite their importance, today the intellectual virtues tend to be underdeveloped across society. In light of the institutional role that online search plays in life today, there is an opportunity (perhaps an obligation) for online search to facilitate the development of intellectual virtue. The framework presented in this paper locates this development in three areas: the Searcher, the System, and Society. Major issues in information ethics and virtue epistemology are discussed for each of these areas, leading to recommendations for education, design, and research. This paper provides specific suggestions in this regard along with an agenda for future research at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and online search.

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces the concept of ‘epistemic corruption’ and applies it to current debates about the negative effects of education on the epistemic character of students. Epistemic corruption occurs when an agent comes to develop or exercise one or more epistemic vices due their interaction with a social environment. The phenomenon of epistemic corruption is especially important given modern enthusiasm, among virtue epistemologists and others, for the claim that education should aim to enhance the epistemic character of students by cultivating their epistemic virtues. After presenting a working account of the concept of epistemic corruption, three case studies are offered that document epistemically corrupting educational practices and policies. I conclude that study of the forms, practices, and effects of epistemic corruption should be an important dimension of virtue and vice epistemology.