Virtuous search: A framework for intellectual virtue in online search

Previous work has suggested that the problems hindering the success of interdisciplinarity could be overcome by fostering certain intellectual character strengths in scholars. However, how to assess and cultivate the specific virtues required for interdisciplinarity among researchers is still a matter of inquiry. The general objective of this paper was to develop a psychometric instrument to assess intellectual virtues that are essential for interdisciplinary inquiry among researchers. To achieve this goal, two studies were conducted. Study 1 developed a new scale and studied its correlation with other validated measures. Study 2 focused on conducting a confirmatory analysis of the structure obtained in Study 1 and investigated the relationships between the new scale and the researchers’ levels of (i) experience and productivity in interdisciplinary collaboration and (ii) satisfaction regarding the results of their interdisciplinary inquiry. The EFA conducted for Study 1 identified four dimensions: (1) intellectual empathy, (2) open-mindedness and intellectual humility, (3) intellectual perseverance, and (4) curiosity. Indeed, the pools of items that were initially developed to measure intellectual humility and open-mindedness in a separate way converged into a unique factor or dimension. The confirmatory factor analysis conducted for Study 2 corroborated the four-dimensional structure observed in Study 1 via a new different sample. In addition, Studies 1 and 2 also analyzed convergent validity through the AVE and correlated the IVIRS with other scales that measure intellectual virtues (open-mindedness, curiosity, intellectual humility, and perseverance) in a general epistemic context. The second study demonstrated that researchers with significant experience, productivity, and satisfaction in the context of interdisciplinary investigation also presented elevated levels of the intellectual virtues that we identified as essential for such research. Our analysis demonstrates that the IVIRS is a valid measure of the intellectual virtues needed for interdisciplinarity and paves the way for the future design of interventions to cultivate these character traits in scholars.

Virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and the intellectual virtues the motivational aspects of virtue epistemology eliminative virtue epistemology justification and the intellectual virtues knowledge and the intellectual virtues the nature of the virtues the importance of the virtues.

Academic research is increasingly centering on interdisciplinary work. Strong interdisciplinary research (SIR), involving researchers from very different fields, such as scientists and humanists, is often encouraged, if not required, by funding agencies. I argue that two intellectual virtues, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, are crucial for overcoming obstacles to SIR and achieving success. In part I, I provide a primer on intellectual virtue and the two virtues in question. In part II, I distinguish SIR from weak interdisciplinary research (WIR), which involves research teams from neighboring fields, such as physics and chemistry, and from disciplinary research (DR), which involves researchers from the same discipline. I also outline what counts as success in SIR, and explain why it’s more challenging to attain than in WIR and DR. In part III, I explain how both intellectual virtues are essential for achieving success in SIR and for overcoming obstacles that can arise in its pursuit.

The main objective of this paper is to develop a scale that can facilitate a comprehensive assessment of intellectual virtues. To our knowledge, no instrument has been designed to assess virtuous intellectual character as a global construct, and this article aimed to fill this research gap through two studies. The first study aimed to investigate the construct validity and reliability of the scale, while the second study aimed to confirm the factorial structure observed in Study 1 and to analyze the convergent validity of the new scale. Study 1 included 545 college students (mean age = 19.57 years, SD = 1.41) enrolled in 33 undergraduate degree programs at Argentinean universities. Study 2 included 700 college students (mean age = 18.07, SD = 0.95). The EFA carried out in Study 1 identified five dimensions of the VICS (attentiveness, open-mindedness, curiosity, carefulness, and intellectual autonomy), and the CFA carried out in Study 2 validated the five-factor structure. A bifactor model indicated that each group of items was related to a specific virtue while simultaneously being linked to a bifactor or global construct, i.e., “a virtuous intellectual character.” Our results confirm the existence of a global construct while preserving the specificity of each virtue. The results of Study 2 indicated that the VICS total score and its five factors are associated with intellectual humility, deep thinking, bravery, academic engagement, and social and psychological well-being. However, all intellectual virtues were only weakly associated with emotional well-being. Finally, both studies indicated good reliability of the VICS.

The aim of the research: To describe the intellectual humility of a teacher as strength in the processes of forming and developing knowledge. Intellectual virtues presuppose the objective of deep, factual perception with a possibility to make mistakes. A lot of pedagogues lack the activities important for virtues without dependence on mood or similar supporting means (the total level of virtue). A teacher who distinguishes with intellectual humility, who belongs to the virtues of the first range (the initiation of learning process and its guiding towards the right direction) and has connection with other intellectual virtues, aims for coordinated learning relationship where the sense of equality is present, as well as broaden perspective, distinguishes with flexibility while re-considering convictions, fear which is felt by an intellectually humble person when he/she misses information or something is not understood. An intellectually humble teacher, developing his/her knowledge, distinguishes with the constant pursuit for development, ability to self-evaluate strengths and weaknesses, seeing relationship with others as perspective for development The definition of intellectual humility is usually related with the recognition that your convictions and opinions can be wrong. This virtue is concerned with the strengths of a teacher. Being an intellectually humble person opens possibilities to the independence of a learner while forming or developing knowledge and understanding. In this process the potential of colleagues is recognized, strong and weak points are firmly pointed out, intellectual arrogance is avoided. This presupposes more possibilities for the change of learning both to a learner and the one dependant on him/her.

Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of intellectual virtue. The kind of she has in mind is on the model of Aristotle's account of moral virtue: A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual thoroughness and intellectual courage. Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a true theory, distinguishing it from reliabilist theories of Sosa and Goldman.' These latter authors use the terminology of intellectual and but in a way that, according to Zagzebski, misuses the language of virtue. In what follows below I will argue for two theses. First, there is an important way of dividing up the landscape so that the theories of Sosa and Goldman are indeed theories. On this understanding, all three of our authors are in the same broad camp; one which can appropriately be labeled virtue epistemology, and which can be distinguished from other broad alternatives concerning the nature of knowledge. The real disagreement between Zagzebski on the one hand, and Sosa and Goldman on the other, is over the nature of intellectual virtue, or that kind of which is required for knowledge. Once the question is put this way, it is possible to argue for my second thesis. Namely, reliabilists such as Sosa and Goldman are correct in rejecting Aristotle's account of the moral virtues as the model for understanding intellectual virtue. Contra Zagzebski, the cognitive character that grounds knowledge need not be acquired, need not include the strong motivational component of an Aristotlean moral virtue, and need not be an excellence in Aristotle's sense. Rather, the essential aspect of an intellectual is its success component, or in Sosa's and Goldman's terms, its reliability.

According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standings, such as intellectual virtues. Along another axis, there is the debate about whether we should understand knowledge as being exclusively defined in terms of the subject’s cognitive skills (where this category includes the intellectual virtues), or whether there need to be supplementary conditions in one’s theory of knowledge to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. This chapter will explore these topics, and in the process offer an overview of the contemporary debate regarding issues at the nexus of knowledge, skill and virtue epistemology.

This article examines the applicability of virtue epistemology within the philosophy of science discourse. It argues that contemporary approaches in the philosophy of science often overlook the significance of subjective epistemic characteristics in scientific practice, tending to focus either on the social conditions of knowledge production (as seen in the Science and Technology Studies project) or on methodological and demarcation criteria (as emphasized in postpositivism project). Meanwhile, the recent value turn in epistemology introduces a subject-centered perspective to the philosophy of science, suggesting that disciplinary boundaries should be understood not only in terms of methodological differences, but also in terms of intellectual virtues cultivated by scientific communities. The relevance of this study arises from the need to employ conceptual frameworks from contemporary epistemology to discuss scientific disciplinary norms that encompass both value and cognitive content. The aim of this article is to propose a method for applying virtue epistemology as a theoretical framework for evaluating the role of scientists’ subjective qualities in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The author based his research on the hybrid virtue epistemology developed by Heather Battali and Christopher Hookway, which integrates reliabilist and responsibilist perspectives to defining intellectual virtue. This article discusses various levels of intellectual virtue, their impactмon scholarly activity, and the conceptual challenges associated with such integration. Theмmain findings underscore the importance of a hybrid approach to different intellectualмvirtues in achieving scientific objectives, such as obtaining verifiable truths and supportingмa shared understanding within the scientific community. Additionally, the study alsoмemphasizes the necessity of considering the values that underlie scientific inquiry, andмthe influence of personal beliefs on knowledge formation within the scientific domain.

Objectives Intellectual humility refers to a tendency to recognize and accept that one’s personal beliefs or knowledge may be fallible and limited. The purpose of this study is to examine whether preschool teachers’ intellectual humility predicts self-development needs and teamwork, which in turn, predict professional knowledge. In other words, the current study investigates the dual mediating effects of self-development needs and teamwork in the relationship between intellectual humility and professional knowledge in preschool teachers. Methods A total of 206 teachers across 32 preschools participated in this study. The participating teachers completed questionnaires on intellectual humility, self-development needs, teamwork, and professional knowledge. SPSS 25.0 was used to test the mediating effect of self-development needs and teamwork on the relationship between intellectual humility and professional knowledge in teachers. In addition, PROCESS macro version 3.4 (Hayes, 2017) was used to confirm the indirect effect. Results The teachers’ intellectual humility predicts professional knowledge via self-development needs and teamwork. In other words, teachers who acknowledge their own intellectual limits and are open to new experiences and learning opportunities have a higher level of professional knowledge in teaching, and this relation is mediated by both self-development needs and teamwork. The bootstrapping results also suggest that the indirect effect is statistically significant. Conclusion This study is the first to introduce and apply a new concept of intellectual humility in a Korean sample. By showing the relationship between intellectual humility, self-development needs, teacher teamwork, and professional knowledge, the study highlights the importance of intellectual virtue in preschool teachers. Keywords: intellectual humility, self-development needs, teacher teamwork, professional knowledge

This chapter provides accounts of four character traits: intellectual modesty and acceptance of intellectual limitations (which together constitute intellectual humility); proper pride in one’s epistemic achievements and proper concern for one’s intellectual reputation. It argues that these are intellectual virtues. The main difference between humility (as comprising of modesty and of acceptance of limitations) on the one hand, and pride and concern for esteem on the other, lies in the nature of social comparisons on which they are based. Humility relies on appraisals of the worth of one’s qualities that might be gauged by comparing oneself to other people and which are driven by a concern for accuracy. The chapter also makes a case that overlapping clusters of attitudes serving knowledge and value expressive functions are the causal bases of these character traits.

This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a massive impact on and may fundamentally change the pathways and trajectories of sustainable energy development. This article examines the impact of COVID-19 on Asia’s sustainable energy development and proposes agendas for future energy research in response to the pandemic. The review and research agendas are oriented towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7), ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. The following three key questions need to be addressed by researchers: (1) In what ways does COVID-19 make sustainable energy development more important than ever? (2) What are the short- and long-term effects of COVID-19 on sustainable energy development? (3) How can responses to COVID-19 meet the objectives of sustainable energy development? DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 184 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

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This article is an exercise in the virtue epistemology of the internet, an area of applied virtue epistemology that investigates how online environments impact the development of intellectual virtues, and how intellectual virtues manifest within online environments. I examine online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020, Episteme17(2), 141–61), exploring the conceptual relationship between these online environments and the virtue of open-mindedness (Battaly 2018b, Episteme15(3), 261–82). The article answers two key individual-level, virtue epistemic questions: (Q1) How does immersion in online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles affect the cultivation and preservation of open-mindedness, and (Q2) Is it always intellectually virtuous to exhibit open-mindedness in the context of online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles? In response to Q1, I contend that both online echo chambers and online epistemic bubbles threaten to undermine the cultivation and preservation of open-mindedness, albeit via different mechanisms and to different degrees. In response to Q2, I affirm that both a deficiency and excess of open-mindedness can be virtuous in these online environments, depending on the epistemic orientation of the digital user.