Гибридная эпистемология добродетелей для философии науки

The paper examines the integration of virtue epistemology into the philosophy of science, emphasizing its potential to deepen our understanding of scientific inquiry. The article begins by considering the limitations of traditional epistemological frameworks that focus on beliefs. The discussion is set in the context of the “value turn” in contemporary epistemology. Arguments are made to move towards recognizing the significance of intellectual virtues and the nature of epistemic agents. The current gaps in definitions of intellectual virtues about reliabilist and responsibilist approaches are examined and conceptual steps are proposed to bridge these gaps. It is suggested that the local and general epistemic goals of science should be clearly distinguished and then different ways of knowing should be attributed to these goals. These ways of knowing are proposed to be seen as exemplifying the realization of reliable skills and intellectual character traits. In sum, the article argues that adopting a virtue epistemology not only enriches the discourse on scientific knowledge but also promotes a culture of responsibility and integrity in the scientific community.

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Misunderstanding of phenomenology and positivism as perspectives upon the philosophy and practice of science has important implications for the future of geographic research and research funding in America. Positivistic perspectives on the philosophy of science appear to be seen as fundable, whereas the scientific status and the possibilities for funding of phenomenological and other perspectives on the philosophy of science seem to be in question.

This article looks at the sources of micro-tensions between the science and technology studies (STS) approach and a human perspective in virtue epistemology (VE), opening it to societal influence. It calls for a holistic approach that respects both the societal pull and the individual's moral compass in scientific activities. It ends up by pointing out the necessity of such a cross-cutting approach for a more ethically motivated and socially aware science, but it suggests an option of research to be carried out in the future about the incorporation of virtues in scientific practices and adapting science to society's needs. The review section of the literature is designed to develop concepts within the STS and VE, grounding them on seminal works from scholars like Bruno Latour, Thomas Kuhn and Donna Haraway. It sticks to things like paradigm shifts, Actor-Network Theory and "Cyborg Manifesto," among others, to stress the points of how science is linked to sociocultural systems. The paper provides the grounds for the link between ethics and scientific inquiry, arguing for a reflection of the intellectual virtues in scientific practice and suggesting a more diverse and inclusive scientific practice that is respectful of different values and standpoints.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for the intellectual virtues in the context of online search. Intellectual virtues are dispositions and skills that enable good thinking and wise reasoning, such as intellectual humility and attentiveness. Despite their importance, today the intellectual virtues tend to be underdeveloped across society. In light of the institutional role that online search plays in life today, there is an opportunity (perhaps an obligation) for online search to facilitate the development of intellectual virtue. The framework presented in this paper locates this development in three areas: the Searcher, the System, and Society. Major issues in information ethics and virtue epistemology are discussed for each of these areas, leading to recommendations for education, design, and research. This paper provides specific suggestions in this regard along with an agenda for future research at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and online search.

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent (Sosa in A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, 2007, Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, 2009, Knowing full well, 2011; Greco in Philos Studies 17:57–69, 2007, Achieving knowledge, 2010, Philos Phenomenol Res 85:1–26, 2012). In a recent set of papers, Pritchard (The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010a, Think 25:19–30, 2010b, J Philos 109:247–279, 2012, Virtue scientia. Bridges between philosophy of science and virtue epistemology, Forthcoming) has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (Erkenntnis 78:253–275, 2011, Pac Philos Q, 2014), Jarvis (Pac Philos Q 94:529–551, 2013) or Littlejohn (Synthese 158:345–361, 2006) in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency.

Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of intellectual virtue. The kind of she has in mind is on the model of Aristotle's account of moral virtue: A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual thoroughness and intellectual courage. Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a true theory, distinguishing it from reliabilist theories of Sosa and Goldman.' These latter authors use the terminology of intellectual and but in a way that, according to Zagzebski, misuses the language of virtue. In what follows below I will argue for two theses. First, there is an important way of dividing up the landscape so that the theories of Sosa and Goldman are indeed theories. On this understanding, all three of our authors are in the same broad camp; one which can appropriately be labeled virtue epistemology, and which can be distinguished from other broad alternatives concerning the nature of knowledge. The real disagreement between Zagzebski on the one hand, and Sosa and Goldman on the other, is over the nature of intellectual virtue, or that kind of which is required for knowledge. Once the question is put this way, it is possible to argue for my second thesis. Namely, reliabilists such as Sosa and Goldman are correct in rejecting Aristotle's account of the moral virtues as the model for understanding intellectual virtue. Contra Zagzebski, the cognitive character that grounds knowledge need not be acquired, need not include the strong motivational component of an Aristotlean moral virtue, and need not be an excellence in Aristotle's sense. Rather, the essential aspect of an intellectual is its success component, or in Sosa's and Goldman's terms, its reliability.

According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standings, such as intellectual virtues. Along another axis, there is the debate about whether we should understand knowledge as being exclusively defined in terms of the subject’s cognitive skills (where this category includes the intellectual virtues), or whether there need to be supplementary conditions in one’s theory of knowledge to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. This chapter will explore these topics, and in the process offer an overview of the contemporary debate regarding issues at the nexus of knowledge, skill and virtue epistemology.

Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science is the second volume of a collection on Nietzsche and the Sciences, featuring essays addressing truth, epistemology, and the philosophy of science, with a substantial representation of analytically schooled Nietzsche scholars. This collection offers a dynamic articulation of the differing strengths of Anglo-American analytic and contemporary European approaches to philosophy, with translations from European specialists, notably Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Paul Valadier, and Walther Ch. Zimmerli.This broad collection also features a preface by Alasdair MacIntyre. Contributions explore Nietzsche's contributions to the philosophy of language and epistemology, and include essays on the social history of truth and the historical and cultural analyses of Serres and Baudrillard, as well as new contributions to the philosophy of science, including theological and hermeneutical approaches, history of science, the philosophy of medicine, cognitive science, and technology.

In the second half of the 20th century, the crisis of positivism led to the rise of new directions in the philosophy of science. In the same period many economists expressed an increasing dissatisfaction with the so far dominant economic paradigms. The aim of this paper is to point out the relation between the main trends in the philosophy of science and the debate on the nature and the method of economics. The paper will review the main thesis of logical empiricism, proposed by Hutchison as research guidelines in the field of economics, and the transition from verificationism to Popper's falsicationism. It will then examine how the empirical-deductive method of positivism was interpreted by Friedman and Samuelson, who many consider the main exponents of neo-classic economics. With Kuhn and Lakatos, the emphasis of the «new» philosophy of sciences shifts from what scientists «should do» to what they actually «do» in the research practice. Another important evolution occurs with the works of Feyerabend and Rorty and the emergence of «post-modernist» trends, which deny any a kind of epistemology and maintain that a theory is acceptable only inasmuch it is endorsed by the scientific community. The relation between these radical changes in the philosophy of sciences and the debate on the methods and status of economics is complex. Heterodoxes economic theories, wishing to address the crisis of mainstream economics and the «economists' uneasiness», do not imply a refusal of positivism, and «post-modernist» approach had a limited appeal among economists. The paper presents the contributions of McCloskey and Rosenberg, two economists who particularly developed the arguments against positivist epistemology applied to economics, but it observes that, if interesting, such ideas do not provide a solid enough basis to overcome neoclassical orthodoxy. The conclusions briefly examine a still evolving and promising research approach, the «critical realism» recently promoted by the «Cambridge Group», which links criticism to the empiricaldeductive method with the proposal of alternative economic theories.

Simplicity was recently described in the philosophy of science as “perhaps the most controversial theoretical virtue” (Schindler 2018). It has been also argued that contrary to the standard view, simplicity is not merely a pragmatic virtue but also an epistemic one. Virtue epistemologists are also interested in epistemic virtues, but simplicity is usually absent in their discussions. This paper adduces several contemporary approaches to simplicity showing that in philosophy and in psychology it can be considered either as a virtue or as a vice. The paper then refers to the thought of Thomas Aquinas as an example of a premodern understanding of the virtue simplicity and suggests that his notion of simplicity as a virtue might be developed today within virtue epistemology into an interesting complement to this “perhaps the most controversial theoretical virtue” (Schindler 2018) known from contemporary philosophy.

Recent developments in the philosophy of science, particularly those falling under the rubric of “scientific realism,” have earned growing recognition among theorists of international relations but have failed to generate substantive programs of research. Consequently, the empirical relevance of much philosophical discourse, such as that centering on the agent-structure problem in social theory, remains unestablished. This article attempts to bridge the gap between the philosophy and practice of science by outlining a model of international structure based on the principles of scientific realism and by considering its implications for a structural research program in international relations theory. Appealing to Imre Lakatos's methodology of theorychoice, the article presents an ontological case for adopting a “transformational” model of structure over the “positional” model developed in the work of Kenneth Waltz. The article demonstrates that the positional approach offers no conceptual or explanatory hold on those features of the international structure that are the intended products of state action. In conclusion, the article argues that the stakes in the agent-structure debate include the capacity to generate integrative structural theory and the ability to theorize the possibilities for peaceful change in the international system.

In scholarly debates, as well as in everyday parlance, we tend to pull science and technology apart: science gives us theory, and technology applies it. In practice, however, science and technologies are highly intertwined. In Techno-Scientific Practices: An Informational Approach, Federica Russo looks at the practice of science and elucidates the role of technologies and instruments in the process of knowledge production. In this exercise, it becomes evident that technologies cannot be analyzed on their own, but always in relation to epistemic agents. Thus, Techno-Scientific Practices emphasizes the importance of analyzing the process of knowledge production in techno-scientific contexts, in which there is a triad of relations to look at: us, the instruments, and the world. The book thus builds bridges between the philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, and science and technology studies in an unprecedent way.

In scholarly debates, as well as in everyday parlance, we tend to pull science and technology apart: science gives us theory, and technology applies it. In practice, however, science and technologies are highly intertwined. In Techno-Scientific Practices: An Informational Approach, Federica Russo looks at the practice of science and elucidates the role of technologies and instruments in the process of knowledge production. In this exercise, it becomes evident that technologies cannot be analyzed on their own, but always in relation to epistemic agents. Thus, Techno-Scientific Practices emphasizes the importance of analyzing the process of knowledge production in techno-scientific contexts, in which there is a triad of relations to look at: us, the instruments, and the world. The book thus builds bridges between the philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, and science and technology studies in an unprecedent way.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.