Techno-Scientific Practices

In scholarly debates, as well as in everyday parlance, we tend to pull science and technology apart: science gives us theory, and technology applies it. In practice, however, science and technologies are highly intertwined. In Techno-Scientific Practices: An Informational Approach, Federica Russo looks at the practice of science and elucidates the role of technologies and instruments in the process of knowledge production. In this exercise, it becomes evident that technologies cannot be analyzed on their own, but always in relation to epistemic agents. Thus, Techno-Scientific Practices emphasizes the importance of analyzing the process of knowledge production in techno-scientific contexts, in which there is a triad of relations to look at: us, the instruments, and the world. The book thus builds bridges between the philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, and science and technology studies in an unprecedent way.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Misunderstanding of phenomenology and positivism as perspectives upon the philosophy and practice of science has important implications for the future of geographic research and research funding in America. Positivistic perspectives on the philosophy of science appear to be seen as fundable, whereas the scientific status and the possibilities for funding of phenomenological and other perspectives on the philosophy of science seem to be in question.

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions.

Recent developments in the philosophy of science, particularly those falling under the rubric of “scientific realism,” have earned growing recognition among theorists of international relations but have failed to generate substantive programs of research. Consequently, the empirical relevance of much philosophical discourse, such as that centering on the agent-structure problem in social theory, remains unestablished. This article attempts to bridge the gap between the philosophy and practice of science by outlining a model of international structure based on the principles of scientific realism and by considering its implications for a structural research program in international relations theory. Appealing to Imre Lakatos's methodology of theorychoice, the article presents an ontological case for adopting a “transformational” model of structure over the “positional” model developed in the work of Kenneth Waltz. The article demonstrates that the positional approach offers no conceptual or explanatory hold on those features of the international structure that are the intended products of state action. In conclusion, the article argues that the stakes in the agent-structure debate include the capacity to generate integrative structural theory and the ability to theorize the possibilities for peaceful change in the international system.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

I shall attempt to demonstrate here that the general categories of hermeneutics can be applied just as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities, and I shall explore the implications of this demonstration for both types of disciplines. In doing so, it will be necessary for me to raise some unfashionable issues about the objectivity and rationality of critical interpretations, and, as a result, I may appear to be cast in the role of advocatus diaboli. The value of lowering the critical barriers that have been set up between the human and natural sciences, however, will outweigh any incidental paradoxes that may crop up en route.

Ten years before millennium, the, journal of Leisure Research published a special issue devoted a discussion of philosophy of science. While acknowledging those in leisure research who have seriously grappled with these issues, Sylvester (1990) noted that are largely uninformed about philosophy of science or, even worse, we choose ignore (pp. 281282). Weissinger (1990) voiced a similar perspective, suggesting that leisure researchers need engage in a process of learning intelligently discuss alternative paradigms. As we enter millennium, it is worthwhile ask far leisure discipline has progressed in last 10 years. A mid-decade evaluation by Weissinger, Henderson, and Bowling (1997) suggests a dramatic increase in publication of research using qualitative approaches in comparison 19'70's and 80's when such approaches were practically absent from leading leisure journals. However, one of most recent papers in Leisure Sciences expresses a qualitative researcher's increasing discomfort with nature of this qualitative research (Dupius, 1999). And at conferences I find that some colleagues continue ask why I spend so much time talking about philosophy of science. Seemingly like Nike generation we have become at end of this millennium, they urge me (and presumably their students) do it. I believe that this do mentality is still heart of problem. It traces back tendency equate science with methodology rather than philosophy. It is tempting point finger here just at old school rationalists who maintain a belief in a single approach science of sort labelled the scientific method in biology 101, falsificationism by some social science contemporaries, and positivism by some of its critics. But Weissinger et al.'s (1997) documentation of increase in publication of qualitative approaches suggests this explanation is not adequate. We also need point a finger new generation that continues perpetuate a methodological conception of science by framing alternatives as a discussion about qualitative methods. As a basis for understanding philosophy of science, a reference qualitative methods is largely meaningless. Methodologies are merely machinery, it is underlying philosophy that guides operation of that machinery that should be focus of discussion. This point has been made previously in leisure research (Weissinger et al., 1997; Dupius, 1999), but it seems get swept away all too frequently by discussions that frame how to of science chiefly in methodological terms. We need a language and set of concepts capable of lifting us out of this methodological mentality, and like Sylvester I believe leisure discipline needs turn philosophy of science. In fact, it is with respect this issue that Thomas Kuhn made one of his most significant contributions, defining appropriate unit of analysis in study of different approaches science as macrostructure (Anderson, 1986). Patterson and Williams (1998) introduce a model describing macrostructure suitable for discussions in leisure research. It characterizes macro-structure of science as consisting of three levels: world views (broad philosophical debates concerning nature of science and concept of validity); paradigms (debates concerning normative philosophical commitments underlying specific approaches science), and research programs (empirically centered debates concerning theory and specific methods of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data). This model portrays science as pluralistic, not in sense of a collection of different methodologies, but instead as a collection of paradigms each consisting of a core set of inter-dependent normative philosophical commitments that guide practice of science. Conceiving of science in this way allows leisure researchers incorporate contemporary concepts from philosophy of science and move beyond an understanding and discussion of science as merely method. …

In this chapter, two significant connections between epistemology and philosophy of science are discussed: approaches to knowledge in traditional epistemology and in philosophy of science, and the roles played by instruments in the production of scientific knowledge. The author considers, in particular, how these roles can be illuminated by certain forms of epistemological theorizing, such as internalism and externalism. These considerations indicate the significance that internalist and externalist considerations play in the proper formulation of suitable epistemic conditions for scientific instruments. By engaging with this aspect of epistemological reflection, philosophers of science can be provided a better account of the epistemology of instruments, which produce some of the most significant pieces of knowledge in scientific practice. The author concludes that closer connections between epistemology and philosophy of science would be beneficial to both fields.

This article examines the applicability of virtue epistemology within the philosophy of science discourse. It argues that contemporary approaches in the philosophy of science often overlook the significance of subjective epistemic characteristics in scientific practice, tending to focus either on the social conditions of knowledge production (as seen in the Science and Technology Studies project) or on methodological and demarcation criteria (as emphasized in postpositivism project). Meanwhile, the recent value turn in epistemology introduces a subject-centered perspective to the philosophy of science, suggesting that disciplinary boundaries should be understood not only in terms of methodological differences, but also in terms of intellectual virtues cultivated by scientific communities. The relevance of this study arises from the need to employ conceptual frameworks from contemporary epistemology to discuss scientific disciplinary norms that encompass both value and cognitive content. The aim of this article is to propose a method for applying virtue epistemology as a theoretical framework for evaluating the role of scientists’ subjective qualities in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The author based his research on the hybrid virtue epistemology developed by Heather Battali and Christopher Hookway, which integrates reliabilist and responsibilist perspectives to defining intellectual virtue. This article discusses various levels of intellectual virtue, their impactмon scholarly activity, and the conceptual challenges associated with such integration. Theмmain findings underscore the importance of a hybrid approach to different intellectualмvirtues in achieving scientific objectives, such as obtaining verifiable truths and supportingмa shared understanding within the scientific community. Additionally, the study alsoмemphasizes the necessity of considering the values that underlie scientific inquiry, andмthe influence of personal beliefs on knowledge formation within the scientific domain.

Notes on Contributors

This chapter provides an introduction to the study of the philosophical notions of mechanisms and causality in biology and economics. This chapter sets the stage for this volume in three ways. First, it gives a broad review of the recent changes and current state of the study of mechanisms and causality in the philosophy of science. Second, consistent with a recent trend in the philosophy of science to focus on scientific practices, it in turn implies the importance of studying the scientific methods employed by researchers. Finally, by way of providing an overview of each chapter in the volume, this chapter demonstrates that biology and economics are two fertile fields for the philosophy of science and shows how biological and economic mechanisms and causality can be synthesized.KeywordsCausal StructureSocial MechanismEvolutionary Game TheoryEconomic MechanismCausal RelevanceThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

September 01 2015 Notes on Contributors Author and Article Information Online Issn: 1530-9274 Print Issn: 1063-6145 © 2015 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology2015MIT Press Perspectives on Science (2015) 23 (3): 379–380. https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_x_00178 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Notes on Contributors. Perspectives on Science 2015; 23 (3): 379–380. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_x_00178 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsPerspectives on Science Search Advanced Search Lindsay R. Craig is an assistant professor of philosophy at Temple University. She specializes in philosophy of science and philosophy and history of evolutionary biology and evolutionary developmental biology. Her research focuses include scientific explanation, scientific change, and controversy dynamics. Previous publications can be found in Philosophy of Science and Biological Theory. Pierre-Olivier Méthot is Assistant Professor in the History and Philosophy of Science at Laval University (Québec, Canada). He is also a member of the Centre interruniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie (CIRST-UQAM) and Book Review Editor for the journal History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. Alfonso Arroyo-Santos teaches philosophy of science at UNAM, Mexico’s National University, and runs a private geoprospecting firm. He specializes in evolutionary biology and the interplay between theory and scientific practice. Mark E. Olson is an evolutionary biologist at UNAM, Mexico’s National University. He studies the evolution of... You do not currently have access to this content.

In this paper I will interpret and discuss Husserl’s approach to exact sciences focusing especially on Ideas I (1913), Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), and Crisis (the 1930s). This development shows that: (1) Husserl’s phenomenology is primarily a method (rather than a metaphysical thesis); (2) the method is context-dependent and hence it is not tied to any particular philosophical approach to mathematics or physics; (3) it emphasizes practice in a manner that anticipates more recent philosophical analyses of the scientific practice; and finally (4) its aim is to reveal the metaphysical commitments of scientists, rather than to formulate an argument for any particular metaphysical position. All this conforms to the views of contemporary naturalists in philosophy of science. They hold that philosophers should approach sciences as they are, and hence take the scientific practices as the starting point of the philosophical investigations (as opposed to earlier a priori reflection of what sciences should be like). Accordingly, the paper argues that Husserl’s approach anticipates the naturalistic turn in philosophy of science: he did not engage in building models about what science should be like, instead he described the scientific practice and the normative goals that guide it. However, the task of transcendental phenomenology is to provide a critique of scientific practice as it is. Looked at from the Husserlian point of view, this is what contemporary naturalists are missing, and hence their approach remains philosophically naive. The paper thus argues that phenomenology provides tools that allow naturalist philosophers of science to make their approach critical and critically philosophical, while retaining the basic naturalist commitments not to accept appeals to the mysterious and to approach sciences as they are.