Epistemic Simplicity—A Virtue or a Vice?

While virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge consists in having beliefs appropriately formed in accordance with epistemic virtue, they disagree regarding what constitutes an epistemic virtue. Some take epistemic virtue to be a character trait. Others take epistemic virtues to be stable naturalistic dispositions which reliably produce true beliefs. There are also other virtue epistemologists who combine character traits and stable naturalistic dispositions into a “mixed” theory. All three focus exclusively on epistemic virtues, traits that lead cognizers to truth. But, the topic of epistemic vice is typically ignored. In this paper after arguing for the importance of accounting for epistemic vice, I consider dual systems theory, drawing a parallel with Ernest Sosa’s distinction between two kinds of knowledge. I argue that information supporting dual systems theory helps explain two different kinds of epistemic vice. After pointing out important advantages for including both kinds of vice in virtue epistemology and showing how virtue epistemologies can be modified to accommodate epistemic vice, I conclude by suggesting that consideration of epistemic vice favors mixed theories of virtue epistemology.

While honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue‐ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter‐day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato's Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Iris Murdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self‐delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment.

Lawyer Competence: Epistemic Virtues in Legal Ethics This article advances a virtue epistemological account of lawyer competence. It analyses how epistemic virtues (such as curiosity, courage, temperance, humility, justice, and generosity) illuminate and structure key principles of the legal profession. Focusing on the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers and the Charter of Core Principles of the Council of Bars & Law Societies of Europe, the article reconstructs their provisions through the lens of virtue epistemology, showing how they embed commitments to epistemic virtue. It argues that this framework both clarifies the normative foundations of professional competence and provides practical guidance for strengthening reliability, trustworthiness, and lawyers’ role in the fair administration of justice.

This article examines the applicability of virtue epistemology within the philosophy of science discourse. It argues that contemporary approaches in the philosophy of science often overlook the significance of subjective epistemic characteristics in scientific practice, tending to focus either on the social conditions of knowledge production (as seen in the Science and Technology Studies project) or on methodological and demarcation criteria (as emphasized in postpositivism project). Meanwhile, the recent value turn in epistemology introduces a subject-centered perspective to the philosophy of science, suggesting that disciplinary boundaries should be understood not only in terms of methodological differences, but also in terms of intellectual virtues cultivated by scientific communities. The relevance of this study arises from the need to employ conceptual frameworks from contemporary epistemology to discuss scientific disciplinary norms that encompass both value and cognitive content. The aim of this article is to propose a method for applying virtue epistemology as a theoretical framework for evaluating the role of scientists’ subjective qualities in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The author based his research on the hybrid virtue epistemology developed by Heather Battali and Christopher Hookway, which integrates reliabilist and responsibilist perspectives to defining intellectual virtue. This article discusses various levels of intellectual virtue, their impactмon scholarly activity, and the conceptual challenges associated with such integration. Theмmain findings underscore the importance of a hybrid approach to different intellectualмvirtues in achieving scientific objectives, such as obtaining verifiable truths and supportingмa shared understanding within the scientific community. Additionally, the study alsoмemphasizes the necessity of considering the values that underlie scientific inquiry, andмthe influence of personal beliefs on knowledge formation within the scientific domain.

The conceptual dichotomy of Erklaren and Verstehen (explaining vs. understanding) has a revealing dual status. On the one hand, it has something of an antiquated air to it, as we loosely associate its origins with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and other nineteenth-century German philosophers who are not widely read any more, at least not within contemporary Anglo-American history and philosophy of the human sciences. At the same time, however, remnants of the dichotomy still come up in various guises and in various areas of contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science. One example is the long-standing debate over the logical status of action explanations (“reasons vs. causes”) in philosophy of mind (Davidson 1980), and associated issues of “teleological explanations” and the explanatory status of laws of nature in the philosophy of the human sciences (Dray 1957; Hempel 1965; von Wright 1971). Another is the question of whether the subject matter of the social sciences requires a special type of interpretative, hermeneutic, or perhaps even empathetic, “access” (Collingwood 1946; Winch 1964; Taylor [1971] 1985). More recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of how to explicate our capacity to interpret another person’s actions (see the recent suggestion that the “theory-theory” vs. “simulation theory” distinction is similar to some aspects of the Erklaren/Verstehen distinction) (Kogler and Stueber 2000). And within mainstream analytical philosophy of the social sciences, one of the central topics has long been the question of whether social facts/events can be reduced to the explanations of the actions of individuals (e.g., Kincaid 1997), raising questions about the units at which explanatory and/or interpretive efforts ought to be directed. (“individualism” vs. “holism”). This question can be traced back to early twentieth-century debates in economics and other emerging social sciences (Udehn 2001).

This chapter will provide concrete examples of a number of moral and epistemic virtues and show how they can help people in general to live better lives in the modern society. By ‘better’ it should be noted that I mean both in the sense they increase their own well-being and contribute to a broader improvement of society. The account provided here draws on scientific research into the ways in which people assimilate information and form their beliefs (as explained and exemplified in Chap. 3), as well as virtue theory. Further to this, the field of ‘Virtue Epistemology’ is introduced. While it is a relatively young field much interesting and, for the purposes here, highly applicable research has already been carried out.KeywordsVirtue EthicPractical WisdomNicomachean EthicIntellectual VirtueEpistemic VirtueThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

I defend the view that charity in interpretation is both an epistemic and a moral virtue. In the first part, I examine Donald Davidson’s version of his principle of charity and question his ascription of beliefs by raising a phenomenological objection: beliefs themselves, before being ascribed, need to be interpreted when interpreters and the subjects they try to understand do not share the same cultural and historical background. In the second section, I examine the notion of epistemic virtue as discussed in virtue epistemology and question whether an epistemic virtue can be completely separated from a moral virtue. In the third section, I show how Gregory the Great, Father of the Church and Pope in the 6th century, understands the virtue of charity in interpretation not as a motivation (in a causal process of interpretation, as in virtue epistemology) but as an attraction to the good (in a teleological process) so that the interpreter is not only a technician producing an interpretation (following a “principle” of charity, as in Davidson) but a moral agent acting in a community.

How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.

Many machine learning (ML) systems operate as blackboxes and offer limited insight into their internal mechanisms. This opacity creates tension between two crucial objectives optimizing technical performance and fulfilling ethical obligations for transparency. As this tension intensifies, especially in domains that often require justifiable decisions, this paper hopes to reconcile the engineering drive toward higher accuracy and reliability with epistemic virtues emphasizing honesty, accountability, and intellectual rigor. Drawing on philosophical theories of explanation and virtue epistemology, this paper also reviews various principles that embed ethical considerations into ML development and deployment processes. This study adopts a theoretical analysis to reveal how certain epistemic virtues (as exemplified by honesty, thoroughness, clarity, and open-mindedness) can guide ML design choices. In addition, we outline criteria for a balanced framework and policies that honor ethical demands. Finally, we stress the practical relevance of virtue-based approaches to knowledge production in modern technology for ethicists and epistemologists.

In the past few years, there has been an increasing tendency in the application of formal and experimentalmethods to tackle philosophical issues.Weverymuch approve of this trend,whichweviewas part and parcel of the recent renewal of “scientific philosophy”: In our mind, the aim of a scientifically oriented philosophy is to adopt formal and experimental methods to address philosophical questions. A distinguishing feature of contemporary scientific philosophy is that the use of formal and experimental methods is not confined to areas such as the philosophy of science, of mathematics, or of physics. Quite the contrary: This research program applies its broad toolkit of formal and experimental practices to a very large range of philosophical areas. For instance, in the philosophy of cognitive science, the development ofmathematicalmodels of concepts representation has proved to be an innovative way to compare normative theories against empirical results. In the philosophy of economics, agent-based models have been used to explore the notion of causality used in economics. More generally, different areas of philosophy—from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of cognitive science, and from ethics to the philosophy of economics—have become increasingly scientific and characterized by a highly interdisciplinary approach. In tandem with this methodological turn, the dispute about whether philosophy should appeal to formal or experimental methods has made a comeback: Experimental philosophers defend the use of empirical methods as a means of exploring

The paper examines the integration of virtue epistemology into the philosophy of science, emphasizing its potential to deepen our understanding of scientific inquiry. The article begins by considering the limitations of traditional epistemological frameworks that focus on beliefs. The discussion is set in the context of the “value turn” in contemporary epistemology. Arguments are made to move towards recognizing the significance of intellectual virtues and the nature of epistemic agents. The current gaps in definitions of intellectual virtues about reliabilist and responsibilist approaches are examined and conceptual steps are proposed to bridge these gaps. It is suggested that the local and general epistemic goals of science should be clearly distinguished and then different ways of knowing should be attributed to these goals. These ways of knowing are proposed to be seen as exemplifying the realization of reliable skills and intellectual character traits. In sum, the article argues that adopting a virtue epistemology not only enriches the discourse on scientific knowledge but also promotes a culture of responsibility and integrity in the scientific community.

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent (Sosa in A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, 2007, Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, 2009, Knowing full well, 2011; Greco in Philos Studies 17:57–69, 2007, Achieving knowledge, 2010, Philos Phenomenol Res 85:1–26, 2012). In a recent set of papers, Pritchard (The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010a, Think 25:19–30, 2010b, J Philos 109:247–279, 2012, Virtue scientia. Bridges between philosophy of science and virtue epistemology, Forthcoming) has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (Erkenntnis 78:253–275, 2011, Pac Philos Q, 2014), Jarvis (Pac Philos Q 94:529–551, 2013) or Littlejohn (Synthese 158:345–361, 2006) in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency.

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces the concept of ‘epistemic corruption’ and applies it to current debates about the negative effects of education on the epistemic character of students. Epistemic corruption occurs when an agent comes to develop or exercise one or more epistemic vices due their interaction with a social environment. The phenomenon of epistemic corruption is especially important given modern enthusiasm, among virtue epistemologists and others, for the claim that education should aim to enhance the epistemic character of students by cultivating their epistemic virtues. After presenting a working account of the concept of epistemic corruption, three case studies are offered that document epistemically corrupting educational practices and policies. I conclude that study of the forms, practices, and effects of epistemic corruption should be an important dimension of virtue and vice epistemology.

AI technologies, particularly deep neural networks and machine learning models, have become increasingly integrated into knowledge production across diverse scientific domains, raising critical concerns about explainability and interpretability. Different disciplines and contexts require fundamentally different types of explanations, making universal approaches to explainable AI inadequate. Virtue epistemology offers a promising framework for addressing these challenges by focusing on how AI systems cultivate or undermine epistemic virtues within specific knowledge communities. Rather than seeking explanations in abstract terms, virtue epistemology emphasizes epistemic abilities and character traits as they manifest within particular epistemic cultures. Case studies from social science, neuroscience, medicine, and the humanities reveal that meaningful progress in explainable AI requires aligning computational reasoning with the cultivation of epistemic virtues and the mitigation of epistemic vices that characterize each scientific community’s specialized knowledge practices and norms.