INFORMATION OPERATIONS ̶ COMPARATIVE DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS

This article examines a relatively new phenomenon of domestic law enforcement practice – the arbitrability of disputes with a “public element”. Increasingly, the possibility of arbitration in disputes in which there is a so-called public element is being questioned. The courts do not disclose the concept of a public element. From the general understanding, it is only deduced that we are talking about public entities as participants in civil law relations, about the involvement of public property and budget financing in such relations. All the above relationships form an urgent problem of arbitration, which has a consequence in the form of refusal of state courts to enforce arbitral awards. This controversial judicial practice also gave rise to a controversial concept, which in the doctrine is called the concept of accumulation (concentration) of socially significant public elements. This concept raises questions from the point of view of the theoretical perception of this phenomenon: neither foreign nor domestic doctrine knew this phenomenon. Until this moment, only minor attempts were made to analyze this concept, as well as to analyze individual public elements and their impact on the legal relationship in terms of the possibility of a dispute from this legal relationship to be considered by arbitration. Bridging this gap is this article.

The article investigates and compares the contributions of NATO member states to the collective security of the organization, particularly concerning military expenditures over different periods of time. The study examines the ratio of military spending between the United States and other NATO member countries by analyzing NATO's official documentation on the military expenditures of member states across various periods of the Alliance's existence and comparing the obtained results. Open datasets related to the GDP of NATO countries, the ratio of GDP indicators of Alliance countries, and the proportionality of contributions to security through military spending were analyzed. The study compares the GDP ratios of individual NATO member states relative to the total GDP of all NATO countries, demonstrating the disproportionate contribution of the United States to the collective security of the entire Alliance. Publications from think tanks and media outlets, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Atlantic Council, CNN, and Politico, were analyzed. The study proves the critical security dependence of European NATO members on the military presence and economic power of the United States. Analytical tools were used to construct graphs that clearly illustrate the ratio of military expenditures of NATO states in absolute terms relative to GDP. The research results suggest that European countries are neglecting their obligations to ensure and maintain NATO's collective security, particularly in the matter of financing their own military capabilities. Examples of European countries that have not ignored their NATO obligations regarding military spending—specifically, the Baltic states and Poland—are provided. The article concludes with the fallacy of such policies and the necessity for European NATO members to increase their level of military spending in the face of the threat of military aggression against the Euro-Atlantic region from the russian federation.

A nation's effective integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an arduous, time-consuming, and resource-intensive task. The nine countries now aspiring to Alliance membership should heed the problems that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have encountered since accession and redouble their efforts on defense integration and civil-military reforms in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program. During the past year, MAP has become a more versatile instrument for forging defense and civil-military reform. With further strengthening, the process will help not only to inform Alliance decisions on choosing new members at the 2002 Prague Summit but also to ease post-accession challenges for invitees. Upon accession to the Alliance, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were disqualified from important bilateral assistance programs as NATO shifted attention to the nine MAP partners. After the next round of invitations, the United States and NATO need to keep the new allies eligible for and engaged in assistance programs after accession. The first MAP cycle (1999-2000) put NATO and its partners on a steep learning curve as they sought to implement a new and untested Annual National Plan program. This program, a core element in membership action planning, established standards but issued no assessments. In marked contrast, augmented NATO teams dealing with all aspects of MAP rationalized the planning process and generated real assessments that partners considered fair and frank during the second MAP cycle (2000-2001). MAP partners view the third cycle (2001-2002) progress reports as playing a critical role in the next enlargement decision. Indeed, while allied governments will rely heavily on MAP performance to begin membership negotiations, NATO should link the date of actual accession to the completion of specific (to be determined) core requirements from each of the five chapters. The MAP process has positively influenced the growth of interministerial coordination within MAP countries and enhanced international cooperation among those countries. MAP has become an increasingly important tool for member governments to build public support for NATO as well as parliamentary support for necessary resources. NATO-related educational programs are necessary to help MAP partners implement public information strategies to build public opinion support for the Alliance. NATO and the European Union need to make further efforts to help MAP members delineate the relationship between the two organizations because some partners are finding it difficult to establish priorities for NATO and the European Union. Partnership for Peace When NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, few had any notion of how important and essential PFP would become. Many aspiring members were disappointed with PFP, perceiving it as a policy for postponement of NATO enlargement. In response to persistent pressures from partners to join, NATO produced a Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995 that outlined Alliance expectations of new members. The study noted that PFP would assist partners to undertake necessary defense management reforms [such as] transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PFP exercises will introduce partners to collective defense planning and pave the way for more detailed operational planning. After the December 1995 North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial launched enhanced 16+1 dialogues with those partners interested in joining the Alliance, 12 partners expressed such an interest by early 1997. When the Madrid Summit invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in July 1997, NATO reiterated its Open Door policy, strengthened the role of partners in PFP decisionmaking and planning, and adopted new terms of reference under the enhanced Partnership for Peace to broaden cooperation beyond peace enforcement operations. …

Throughout Donald Trump's presidential campaign and into the first months of his presidency, he has warned that the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may depend on whether its partner states increase their defense spending in line with previously adopted guidelines. While senior administration officials have reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense obligation on several occasions, President Trump himself did not so until mid-June. Separately, the Trump administration signaled its support for NATO by supporting the admission of Montenegro as a new member state.

The questions of whether North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be enlarged and, if so, to what degree have been among most difficult and sensitive issues facing Alliance since end of Cold War. In shaping US National Security Strategy regarding US interests in Europe and US NATO policy, President Clinton has declared his support for NATO membership for well-qualified democracies regardless of geography or history, including those in northeastern Europe. US policy regarding NATO enlargement should seek to strengthen Alliance as well as to bolster democratic advances, deter potential threats, and increase regional stability throughout Europe. However, by promoting a policy that supports NATO membership for Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Administration is jeopardizing vital US national interests and undermining NATO's collective defense mission. [1] This article examines US strategy regarding NATO enlargement, assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and recommends changes to protect vital US interests in Europe while providing Baltic republics with a security alternative to NATO membership. NATO'S Strategic Concept and Enlargement Beginning in 1989, unexpectedly rapid political, military, and social changes resulted in end of ideological and military stalemate in Europe and breakup of Soviet Union. Those changes and regional instability caused by ethnic and religious conflict occurring within Europe prompted NATO to examine and adjust its policies, missions, and structures. NATO's new strategic concept, approved at Washington Summit in April 1999, reflects new security challenges and dangers extant in Europe. It also reflects Alliance's increased commitment to coordinate and cooperate with other international institutions in supporting out of operations (those conducted outside territory of NATO member states). [2] However, despite NATO's increasing involvement in nontraditional operations, Alliance's essential and enduring mission is to guarantee territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members. [3] It is that mission that has resulted in a flood of Central and Eastern European applicants seeking NATO membership. Article 10 of Washington Treaty provides that the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further principles of this Treaty and to contribute to security of North Atlantic area to accede to this [4] This commitment was reaffirmed by NATO leaders during 1994 Brussels Summit, where they declared that membership in Alliance remained open to those nations who could further principles established in Washington Treaty. [5] The strategic goals served by enlargement and methods used to achieve enlargement were examined following year. The product of that examination was Study on NATO Enlargement, wherein Alliance's principles for accessing new members were documented. The study concluded that enlargement of Alliance contributes to stability and security of Euro-Atlantic area. It also addressed selection and accession of new members and confirmed that accession would occur in accordance with provisions of Article 10 of Washington Treaty, with new members receiving all rights of Treaty membership. [6] However, when addressing rights of new members, study also designated their obligations by declaring that new members must be prepared to contribute to NATO's budget and support Alliance's evolving missions and its fundamental collective defense role. [7] To ensure that new members are able to contribute to NATO's collective defense as well as benefit from it, study states that before accessing new members, Alliance will evaluate effects of their admission to ensure that enlargement will not diminish NATO's military credibility. …

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE SYSTEM

Changes in the security environment after the Cold War and decreasing number of armed conflicts in NATO member states lead these countries to a gradual reduction in military expenditure. However, new security threats that these countries faced at the beginning of the 21st century brought a massive growth of military expenditure especially in the USA which lead to significant deepening of disparities between the USA and European NATO member states. The aim of the article is to investigate disproportionality of burden sharing among 28 NATO members and via multidimensional statistic methods identify free-riding in Alliances. A model based on theory of the demand for military spending provides the basis for an investigation of the disparities (identified especially in the characteristics of the economic and security environment) in determinants influencing military expenditure. Finding suggest that the Alliance is not mainly an economically homogenous body and individual economies thus allocate a significantly different amount of GDP for the needs of the armed forces in dependence on political priorities of individual governments, public finances or overall economic condition of national economies. However, the results of the classification model reveal the fact that group of countries identified as core states of the “traditional” NATO member states (with above-average values of variables) do not allocate the long-term recommended amount of military expenditure of 2% of GDP. These countries are suspected of dangerous free-riding.

Abstract: NATO is seeing something of a rebirth manifested by the Wales summit in September 2014. The summit did not fix all NATO's woes, but it did address a number of them, especially the reconfigured security situation in Europe. However, it remains unclear how NATO can add to its already full plate, especially during a time of personnel cuts and zero-growth budgets. ********** When the North Atlantic Alliance first announced in November 2013 that it would hold its next summit September 2014 in Wales, NATO watchers anticipated the meeting would be a rather ordinary affair. The summit was expected to focus largely on the concluding chapter of the Alliance's extensive involvement in Afghanistan--a kind of self-congratulatory denouement to a decade of war. Of course, all that changed in early and mid-2014, as Russia first invaded and then annexed Crimea, and later invaded the Donbas in the apparent hope of adding yet more Ukrainian territory. In so doing, Russia fundamentally altered the security situation in Europe, and during the Alliance's gathering in Wales its leaders wasted no time in noting that fact in their summit declaration--indeed, it was the second sentence: Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. (1) For several allies in Eastern Europe, this statement amounted to a regrettable I told you so, and they have since clamored for a robust, allied response. Yet to other allies in Southern Europe, the threat of Russia remains less compelling given illegal migration, smuggling, and other illicit activities across the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, some in Western Europe--especially those struggling with anemic economic growth or those interested in protecting lucrative business dealings with Russia--were hoping Moscow's actions represented a passing storm rather than full-blown climate change. For the United States, navigating these various interests has required walking the line between doing too much on the one hand--thereby negating the incentive for allies to pull their fair share--and not doing enough on the other--thereby weakening the Alliance and encouraging Moscow's adventurism. Despite these challenges, the Alliance has seen something of a rebirth due to the Wales summit. Certainly the Alliance's approach toward some of the subjects addressed in Wales--such as defense spending, or energy security--reflected tired methods or ongoing, unresolved debates among the allies. However, there were several issues--such as a renewed focus on maneuver warfare readiness, the rotational stationing of allied troops east of Germany, reversing the downsizing of NATO's command structure, and tightening the linkage between cyber-attacks and Article 5--where the Alliance appears indeed to have been rejuvenated with a sense of purpose and intent. Alliance Purpose and Missions In terms of its broad approach toward national security, NATO officials reiterated the three-fold purpose of the Alliance at Wales--collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. (2) This announcement was particularly important in the face of collective exhaustion following major combat operations in Afghanistan and the return of an aggressive dynamic Russian threat in the East. It would be easy to argue the Alliance, now returning home from Afghanistan, should refocus on strengthening itself for upholding Article 5, territorial defense. (3) However, it is clear several NATO member--especially the United States--still want an Alliance capable of contributing to collective defense and security, not only in Europe, but beyond it as well. (4) Whether to focus on one of NATO's three overarching objectives or to maintain equal emphasis on all of them is not merely a theoretical or diplomatic question. Such discussions have concrete implications for defense planners and military leaders. …

Central Asia in recent history is a vast region with five Muslim States-new actors in modern international relations. The countries of Central Asia, having become sovereign States, at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries are trying to peaceful interaction not only with their underdeveloped neighbors, but also with the far-off prosperous West. At the same time, the United States and Western European countries, in their centrosilic ambitions, seek to increase their military and political presence in Central Asia and use the military bases of the region’s States as a springboard for supplying their troops during anti-terrorist and other operations. With the active support of the West, the Central Asian States were accepted as members of the United Nations. For monitoring and exerting diplomatic influence on the regional environment, the administration of the President of the Russian Federation H. W. Bush established U.S. embassies in all Central Asian States. Turkey, a NATO member and secular Islamic state, was used as a lever of indirect Western influence over Central Asian governments, and its model of successful development was presented as an example to follow.

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.

Dateline Belgrade, 30 March 1999: At 0400, Greenwich Mean Time, NATO bombs began falling on this capital city of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). War has not been declared, and fact, neither FRY nor Serbia [1] has attacked or even threatened to attack any NATO country or ally. So why has NATO unleashed dogs of war on Serbia? This article does not attempt to assess or wrong NATO attack on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It does, however, examine factual background and legal arguments for and against that action. And it raises questions which international should address resolving appropriateness of use of force crises. Finally, it proposes guidelines which NATO and United States, if they are to be moral leaders of free world, can take to formalize a doctrine of intervention. Each NATO member and FRY are signatories to United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) of Charter prohibits member states from the or use of force against territorial integrity ... of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with Purposes of United Nations. [2] The only recognized exception to this prohibition is contained Article 51, which recognizes inherent right of a member state to use force self defense if armed attack occurs against it, until Security Council acts. [3] As a matter of international law, a treaty between states is a contract, and most cases specifically becomes law of contracting states. Even if a treaty is not supreme law of land, as it is United States, a treaty is recognized international relations as a binding obligation on parties to treaty, [4] and United Nations Charter itself specifically states that in event of a conflict between obligations of Members of United Natio ns under present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under present Charter shall prevail. [5] As a treaty binding its members, including nearly every state world, Charter is, then, supreme international law. The other exception under United Nations Charter to use of armed force is when it is authorized by United Nations pursuit of maintaining or restoring peace. This exception, contained Chapter VII of Charter dealing with peace enforcement, is limited to those situations which UN Security Council has declared that a situation is a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. [6] Under those circumstances Security Council may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security. The NATO attack on Serbia was not response to an armed attack, nor was it authorized by Security Council. Instead, NATO conducted its attack support of aims of international community and to resolve a humanitarian emergency, [7] arguing that it simply could not stand by and do nothing. [8] Apologists argue that NATO's actions were either authorized because they supported purposes of UN Charter, or that they were authorized under an emerging doctrine of humanitarian necessity. It is, however, generally acknowledged that attack was illegal; that is, it was not accordance with established procedures under Charter to launch such an act. The deeper question remains: Was this simply an anomalous event which must be expected from time to time international relations, or is there a new doctrine of international law which will permit such actions future? [9] Subsidiary questions arise: If there is a new doctrine of humanitarian necessity, what are its limi ts, and is it a positive obligation on international community, or merely a defense to be exercised selectively when parties feel like it? …

By the mid-2020s, the armed forces of most NATO member states had seen little to no growth. At the same time, NATO’s overall military power has been increasing rapidly. The political determination behind this trend and its possible consequences are examined through the example of the transition to the New NATO Force Model, initiated in July 2022. Changes in the structure and deployment of troops reflect the actor’s probable strategic intentions. These plans may not necessarily be implemented, but they must be taken into account in foreign policy forecasting – especially in the context of a shifting world order, where the importance of the use of force is growing significantly. The article traces the evolution of NATO’s permanent troop groupings from the mid-2000s to 2024. The expansion of the NATO Response Force (deployed from depth) and Forward Presence was based primarily on the use of resources from the “old” European member states. This principle also underpins the New NATO force model (NNFM). It provides the United States with built-in control over the use of European partners’ potential and greater freedom of maneuver in deploying its own forces (primarily for the containment of China and Iran). The elites of European member states have provided a practical guarantee that the Alliance will continue to function even in the event of a critical reduction in the U.S. contribution. At the same time, this has created the effect of strengthening the autonomy of European actors – though in reality, this autonomy remains closely tied to the interests of the White House. As a result, these states have found themselves on a path-dependent trajectory toward deepening confrontation with Russia.

The United States entered twentieth century as most powerful country in world. It has retained this status throughout century, although arguably German occupation of Europe in early 1940s provided brief interruption. This power has been based on large, well-educated and fairly homogeneous population, substantial and well-located territory, world's premier economy, and state supported by its people and capable of mobilizing its resources for military conflict when occasion has demanded. The purposes of American state have always provided fertile ground for intellectual debate. Unlike, say, British or French or German states, United States has rarely resorted to formulation of mere national interest when announcing its objectives. The balance of power, securing of natural frontiers, or creation of linguistic imagined community have been beneath dignity of state pursuing a world safe for democracy, Free World, or Order. Of course, critics and scholars alike have been quick to describe United States' traditional diplomatic pursuit of sphere of interest in Americas under Monroe Doctrine or its successive corollaries, and have even seen doctrines of balance of power behind its opposition to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. But to degree, this misses point. Americans believe in what Kissinger calls American exceptionalism.(1) The overarching ambition of U.S. state has marched beyond grubby confines of diplomacy of self-interest. This is state with global mission.(2) The character of this mission has been on view three times during this century after each of American defeats of rival and aspiring hegemonic powers. The key components of American mission are: free trade between states; removal of obstacles to movement of capital; creation of representative political institutions within states, or liberal democracies; and replacement of power politics by international institutions and rule of law. The American elite has believed for three generations that these conditions will produce world of economic growth and international peace from which America, among others, will greatly benefit. In 1918-19 this vision briefly emerged in guise of Wilsonian liberalism and its pursuit of liberal world order, sustained by collective security of League of Nations. It was defeated by even older American tradition of isolationism from affairs of Europe, which led to U.S. Senate's refusal to endorse League's Covenant. In 1944-48, after defeat of Axis powers, same impulses led United States to create political and economic architecture of post-war world, centred on United Nations, Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This attempt to create global liberal order was resisted by Soviet Union and its allies for next half century. As result, Free World was always partly militarized and severely compromised by needs of national security state United States was forced to create. The third American attempt to construct liberal world is that in which we are now living and which is described variously as New Order (Bush), world of freely trading democracies (Clinton), or globalization (most of rest of us). Its economic policy dimensions are often termed the Washington consensus, and its military form is NATO (North Atlantic: Treaty Organization) multilateralism, as practised through NATO in Serbia. This design springs from American defeat of Soviet bloc ten years ago and its attempt to complete mission of 1918-19 and 1944-48 - that is, to create liberal world order from which it will be major beneficiary. It should not be doubted that United States possesses power and probably determination to try to enforce this vision on rest of international system, particularly since it has powerful allies in this endeavour. …

After the collapse of the united Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the so-called “Macedonian question” was considered the strongest constraining and destabilizing factor to integration processes in the Balkans in general and the post-Yugoslav space in particular. It was an unsolvable problem in the bilateral relations between Greece and the neighboring Macedonia (recently known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM). The main value of the problem is that the Greek side considered it unlawful and immoral to use its historical, cultural and linguistic features by the current Slavic state for its own purposes, which could create sufficient preconditions for separatist manifestations not only in Greece but also in Bulgaria. Furthermore, the use of ancient symbols by the Macedonian side as its state insignia (for example, the Vergina Sun, official language or citizenship) provoked resistance from the Greeks. In addition, the unresolved Macedonian question blocked Skopje’s entry into the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union structures. The Greek government was able to enlist the support of not only the local population, but also its main partners among the EU and NATO member states. A long-awaited Greek-Macedonian agreement was signed near the Prespa border lake after lengthy and thorough negotiations in the summer of 2018. Undoubtedly, it was the result of a compromise solution on the main issues causing mutual discontent. As the Prespa Agreement outcome, the Republic of North Macedonia appeared on the political map of Europe in February 2019. In fact, immediately after the Prespa Agreement conclusion, a serious impetus and breakthrough were given not only to continue mutually beneficial cooperation between the Hellenic Republic and the North Macedonia, but also to intensify the negotiation process for Skopje’s accession to the NATO already in March 2020 and the European Union on an earlier date.

The article deals with the interaction between Ukraine and NATO in the context of russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It is worth noting that Ukraine and the Alliance are already paving the way to closer ties, as determined by the logic of war. The focus is on strengthening bilateral contacts and forging regional alliances by means of Ukrainian diplomacy. Therefore, the author highlights the role of individual member states of NATO and the organisation as a whole in helping Ukraine in the military, humanitarian, and economic spheres. Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be a reliable guarantee of the security of our state. At the same time, the author mentions the prospects of the security alliance of the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ukraine with the possible participation of the Baltic states in pursuit of European stability. Russia presents a threat to world security considering its nuclear and energy potential. Nevertheless, the author also offers an insight into the controversial views and pro-russian sentiments of foreign analysts regarding the russian full-scale attack on Ukraine and future world order and stability. Some mentioned analysts are displacing the focus to justify the russian invasion and provide narratives for the sake of russian propaganda. The author determines the main provisions of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept on the partner countries of the Alliance, approved at the Madrid Summit. The steps that the North Atlantic Alliance must take to become an effective player in international stability in Europe are listed. The conclusion comes up as follows: if these measures are not taken, NATO as an organisation for overcoming the problems of international security and deterring the aggressor will be comparable in effectiveness to the OSCE and the UN. Keywords: russo-Ukrainian war, NATO, cooperation, security, stability.