Integrating Human Factors (HF) into a Process Safety Management System (PSMS)

A comparative analysis of process safety management (PSM) systems in the process industry

With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow‐up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small‐ and medium‐sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 378–381, 2017

Chapter 19 - Gauging the effectiveness of implementation and measuring the performance of PSM activities

Process safety practices and process safety management (PSM) systems have been applied since the various incidents and accidents in the refining and petrochemical industries over many years. In the US, the Center for Chemical Process Safety created risk-based process safety as the framework for the next generation of PSM. In petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, companies are required by law to have occupational safety programs, with a focus on personal safety, as the focus of these programs is to prevent harm to personnel from workplace accidents such as fall, cuts, strains, and so on. Petroleum refineries are one of the major energy-consuming industries that contribute to a major proportion of the production cost. Energy in a typical refinery is 60% of variable costs and 1% improvement in energy equals to ~$650,000 year saving for a 100,000 bpsd refinery.

Major accidents happen in the process industries with relatively low frequencies coinciding with extremely severe consequences. The harm to workers and the public, resulting from a loss of company property and other assets, business interruptions, and environmental degradations are all possible outcomes of such events. This paper explores the human factors in occurrence of major process accidents within the last decade and offers suggestions for their prevention via process safety management (PSM) principles, risk assessment and engineering philosophies to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of major accidents. In the process industries, a major accident is an incident that typically results in numerous severe injuries and possible fatalities. In seeking to prevent these outcomes, a series of barriers in combination of human and engineering elements have been integrated into the process system designs. This study will review the broken human factors and barriers leading to the development of these events, while also highlighting key aspects of the Total Abu Al Bukhoosh (TABK) Technological Risk Assessment (TRA) processes. These assessments seek to ensure similar major accident hazards and threats are arrested through proper evaluation and systematic installment of human specific barriers.

Formal Safety Management Systems (SMS) have been required in the USA and elsewhere for the onshore refining and petrochemical industries since the mid 1980's (EU) or early 1990's (USA). While several different versions of SMS exist they are mostly similar in content. Risk based SMS are more modern in thinking than hazard based systems. The O&G and petrochemical industries have reduced occupational accidents by close to a factor of ten over the past 15–20 years. However, major accident performance has hardly improved globally. An exception is the North Sea where major accidents appear to have declined by close to a factor of ten as well as occupational safety. This paper reviews some key additional requirements in the North Sea and why these appear to address major accidents better - by focusing on risks and barrier management and verification focusing on these. The SEMS approach as mandated by BSEE is essential and will be improved by safety culture requirements BSEE is proposing. However, since SEMS is very similar to OSHA 1910, and much less than North Sea requirements, it is likely that achievements will mirror that of 1910 and unlikely that the desired order of magnitude improvement in major accidents will occur. Additional focus on risk and barrier management is still required and this is not part of SEMS. A strong culture for process safety requires a focus on risk assessment and barriers. Background to Safety Management Systems The requirement for formal safety management systems (SMS) in the process industry has been common since the 1980's with earlier development of formal SMS by leading companies. Examples of these include the DuPont SMS, Exxon OIMS - Operations Integrity Management System, BP Getting HSE Right, and the DNV International Safety Rating System. A common feature is that most of these systems were developed in response to some major accident. The insight was that accident causes are not simply technical, but have underpinning management system influences (root causes) and major accidents would recur unless improved management systems were implemented. The major accidents in the 1970's in Europe (i.e. Flixborough UK and Seveso Italy) spurred development of safety case regulations in the Seveso Directive (originally passed in 1984 and coming into force in 1986). This included a requirement for a formal SMS. Major accidents in the 1980's in the USA or affecting USA companies (i.e. Bhopal MIC release, Phillips Pasadena VCE, Marathon HF release Texas City) led OSHA to seek input for new regulations. API issued RP 750 for onshore and RP 75 (1991) for offshore and CCPS issued its Guidelines for Technical Management of Process Safety (1989). These guides were extensively used in the public process leading to development of OSHA 1910.119 - the Process Safety Management regulations (1992). About this time the UK HSE issued HSG 65 - Successful Health and Safety Management (1991). All of these systems used an element based approach to the SMS with 12–20 elements typically. Most had the same content and the differences were primarily textual. These initial processes were followed by other initiatives that continue to current times. The UK HSE Offshore Safety Case regulations (1992) were an extension of the requirements in the EU Seveso Directive and included more advanced risk thinking from the Cullen Inquiry. The EU Seveso Directive was updated on multiple occasions to address new threats as they occurred (e.g. environmental damage: pollution of the Rhine following a fire at Sandoz, and a major cyanide spill from a mining dam in Eastern Europe). A major revision increased the focus on major accidents and changed the degree of justification in the safety case (e.g. as implemented in the UK) from " describe?? the safety systems to " demonstrate?? the adequacy of safety systems. The US EPA (1996) issued the RMP regulations (Risk Management Plan). These were very similar to OSHA 1910, but required Offsite Consequence Analysis for standardized 10 minute worst case events and optional some alternative release scenarios. An RMP document had to be created describing the SMS and safety systems this had some similarity to the EU safety case document. OSHA 1910 required the SMS elements to be in place but not collected into a single document.

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

Human and organizational factors (HOFs) play an important role in electric misoperation accidents (EMAs), but research into the reliability of human factors is still in its infancy in the field of EMAs, and further investment in research is urgently required. To analyze the HOFs in EMAs, a hybrid method including the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) was applied to EMAs for the first time in the paper. HFACS is used to identify and classify the HOFs with 135 accidents, reorganized as basic events (BEs), intermediate events (IEs), and top event (TE), and develop the architecture of fault tree (FT). Fuzzy aggregation is employed to address experts’ expressions and obtain the failure probabilities of the BEs and the minimal cut sets (MCSs) of the FT. The approach generates BEs failure probabilities without reliance on quantitative historical failure statistics of EMAs via qualitative records processing. The FFTA–HFACS model is applied for quantitative analysis of the probability of failure of electrical mishaps and the interaction between accident risk factors. It can assist professionals in deciding whether and where to take preventive or corrective actions and assist in knowledgeable decision-making around the electric operation and maintenance process. Finally, applying this hybrid method to EMAs, the results show that the probability of an EMAs is 1.0410 × 10−2, which is a risk level that is likely to occur and must be controlled. Two of the most important risk factors are habitual violations and supervisory violation; a combination of risk factors of inadequate work preparation and paralysis, and irresponsibility on the part of employees are also frequent errors.

Despite the modernization and automation in marine technology and the implementation of safety-related regulations, marine accidents are still a main concern for global maritime transportation. It is well known that human error is the key contributor, but human error data is hard to be collected and classified and the factors which influence human behavior should be identified. For this reason, the goal of this paper constructed a case-based HFACS (Human Factor Analysis and Classification System) method for marine human factor data collection and classification, and the data collected produced statics for analysis and safety management.

Hot air balloons play a significant role in tourism in Türkiye. Despite offering a unique experience, they are also associated with a relatively high risk of accidents. According to the Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (2024), hot air balloon accidents account for 36% of aviation incidents, highlighting the need for closer examination of these occurrences. Since human factors constitute the dominant contributory element in aviation accidents, it is crucial to analyze hot air balloon incidents from this perspective. This study examines two serious hot air balloon accidents in Türkiye that occurred between 2021 and 2024, focusing on the human factors involved. Using a mixed methodology, including the 5 Whys Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), the research investigates systemic issues. Data were collected from official accident reports published by the Transport Safety Investigation Center under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Türkiye. The analysis reveals significant patterns in decision-making errors, insufficient meteorological assessments, inadequate training, and organizational shortcomings. The findings show that both accidents were driven by systemic failures rather than pilot error alone. These included issues with organizational processes, supervisory oversight, and safety culture. The study emphasizes the need for improved meteorological systems, better training for adverse weather conditions, and enhanced safety management practices that stress the importance of a proactive safety culture and stronger operational planning to address human factors and reduce risks in hot air balloon operations.

Many organisations operating in the high hazards industrial sectors have process safety management (PSM) systems in place; but what does PSM mean in practice when there are many safety risk reduction measures to manage, and are some more important than others? The objective was to improve capability of managing safety critical elements (SCEs) by revising the established 2nd edition industry’ technical publication ‘Guidelines for Management of Safety Critical Elements’ (Energy Institute 2007). Through a cross-company collaborative Energy Institute working group, industry was engaged in a technical development project to capture experience in SCE management since publication of the 2nd edition (Energy Institute 2007). Whilst The term SCE originates in the UK E&P sector legislation, experience is that SCE management concepts in the E&P sector have since been applied internationally across Europe through to Australasia, driven by a European Directive and national requirements, respectively. In addition, industry engagement showed that SCE management concepts also have been applied beyond the E&P sector to petroleum refining and bulk storage, and conventional (thermal) power generation. The 3rd edition (Energy Institute 2019) has updated the 2nd edition (Energy Institute 2007) so as to: capture industry experience in SCE management; make it applicable to a wider range of facilities, and recognise the range of maturity of international legislation and competent authority requirements for SCE management, which include some that mandate verification through to those with little specific requirement for MAH management. In doing so, the 3rd edition provides: new guidance on SCE development and management in project phases, from initial SCE suitability through to ongoing SCE suitability; new guidance on the role of human and organisational factors in SCE management; new guidance on management of change (MoC), which is a challenge to SCE management; additional guidance on developing performance standards (PSs); additional guidance on assurance aspects of SCE management, to address an imbalance with the amount of guidance on verification; new guidance on implementation of SCE integrity assurance, such as its interface with maintenance management; new guidance on SCE management at system, equipment and component levels; new guidance on determining SCE criticality; new guidance on SCE performance, review and continual improvement, and new guidance on SCE ageing, obsolescence and life extension. In addition, the 3rd edition provides practical examples to support the guidance. The 3rd edition (Energy Institute 2019) provides a robust and updated ‘industry’ benchmark of good practice in managing SCEs for organisations operating in the high hazards industrial sectors. Adopting its guidance should enable them to ensure initial and ongoing suitability of SCEs, and so contribute to improving their PSM capability.

In the manufacturing process, human errors will lead to defective products, even result in safety accidents. In this paper a manufacturing process risk analysis model considering human and organizational factors is built by integrating Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) with Bayesian Network (BN). The human and organizational factors (HOF) causing process failure is qualitatively analyzed by HFACS. Then risk of the HOF is estimated by BN method, with the conditional probability of BN nodes evaluated by Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy AHP) method. The proposed method is illustrated using an example study.

Reliability studies for coding contributing factors of incident reports in high hazard industries are rarely conducted and reported. Although the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) appears to have a larger number of such studies completed than most other systems doubt exists as the accuracy and comparability of results between studies due to aspects of methodology and reporting. This paper reports on a trial conducted on HFACS to determine its reliability in the context of military air traffic control (ATC). Two groups participated in the trial: one group comprised of specialists in the field of human factors, and the other group comprised air traffic controllers. All participants were given standardized training via a self‐paced workbook and then read 14 incident reports and coded the associated findings. The results show similarly low consensus for both groups of participants. Several reasons for the results are proposed associated with the HFACS model, the context within which incident reporting occurs in real organizations and the conduct of the studies.

Beach Energy Limited (referred as Beach Energy or Beach) is an ASX-listed exploration and production company headquartered in Adelaide, South Australia. Founded in 1961, Beach produces oil and gas from five onshore and offshore basins across Australia and New Zealand. During its most recent growth phase, Beach added a number of assets to its portfolio that were originally developed and operated by companies with different management systems, standards and reporting requirements. Over the past 5 years Beach has been – and continues to be – on a journey of learning, developing and refining its systems and standards for reporting process safety performance and integrating these within a ‘one Beach’ philosophy. This paper describes the current stage of this evolution in measuring, reporting and managing process safety performance at Beach, presents some of the key learnings to date, in addition to outlining the next steps Beach is taking on this journey. The paper covers the following: (1) experience with IOGP RP 456 Tier KPI model and current main KPIs in use; (2) application to projects, drilling campaigns and operating assets; (3) challenges in gathering data and event classification; (4) importance of getting safety critical equipment selection right; (5) communicating large and complex KPIs to a varied audience; (6) learning and improving process safety performance and systems based on KPIs; (7) new approaches to reporting health of process safety barriers aligned to IOGP RP544 categories using simplified bowtie Major Accident Event dashboards; and (8) integration of process safety management within the Beach Operations Excellence Management System. The key conclusions are that measuring process safety performance requires dedicated effort and consensus across all stakeholders on the most appropriate way to measure performance. Reporting needs a positive and collaborative culture to have the right impact. Managing performance must be based on objective evidence and careful analysis of the data. Achieving effective and efficient process safety measurement, reporting and management is a multi-year journey of continual improvement.

: In the chemical process industries, accidents have a high potential and large effects on catastrophic results. Therefore the safety management for accident prevention plays a crucial role to guarantee the process safety. For these reasons, many systematic methods for safety management system have been widely employed in the fields of chemical processes. PSM (Process safety management) is one of most representative methods. The audit system, which is one of PSM system components, evaluates the performance of PMS system. However, most existing safety audit systems are not systematic and these are performed based on knowledges and experiences of various specialist. Moreover, the safety audit is only performed based on each independent technical component. So, the results of safety audit are not a quantitative index but only a series of commentaries. Finally, it is very difficult to obtain the comparison with other plants or industries. In this study, the novel systematic method and index-based accident database of auditing safety management systems for quantitative assessment are proposed. First, the elements of safety audit replace technical methods to categories of accident database. The F-N curve of each category for accident database is employed to derive the index for quantitative assessment. The Accidental Factor Risk Index (AFRI) is suggested for evaluating the effect of each element in accident database and safety audit system. The safety audit can be modified according to the proposed index.