Introduction

The present study explores the impact of long-term partial sleep deprivation on the activation of moral justice schemas, which are suggested to play a prominent role in moral reasoning and the formation of moral judgments and behavior. Participants judged 5 dilemmas in rested and partially sleep deprived condition, in a counterbalanced design. In classroom and field exercises at the Norwegian Naval Academy and the Norwegian Army Academy. Seventy-one Norwegian naval and army officer cadets. The results showed that the officers' ability to conduct mature and principally oriented moral reasoning was severely impaired during partial sleep deprivation compared to the rested state. At the same time, the officers became substantially more rules-oriented in the sleep deprived condition, while self-oriented moral reasoning did not change. Interaction effects showed that those officers who displayed high levels of mature moral reasoning (n = 24) in the rested condition, lost much of this capacity during sleep deprivation in favor of a strong increase in rules-oriented moral reasoning as well as self-orientation. Conversely, officers at low levels of mature moral reasoning in rested condition (n = 23) were unaffected by sleep deprivation. The present data show that long-term partial sleep deprivation has an impact on the activation of moral justice schemas, and consequently on the ability to make moral justice judgments.

Consumer rights or unethical behaviors: Exploring the impacts of retailer return policies

An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Most of the issues addressed in the last four chapters fall within the ethics of neuroscience.This involves consideration of the benefits and risks of dif fer ent interventions in the brain and whether individuals have the cognitive and emotional capacity to consent to these interventions.It also involves the obligation of clinicians and researchers to protect patients and research subjects from harm regarding neuroimaging, psychopharmacology, or neuromodulation.This obligation consists in not exposing them to undue risk and upholding privacy and confidentiality of information about their brains.This is distinct from the neuroscience of ethics, which involves the neurobiological basis of moral reasoning and decision-making.More specifically, this branch of neuroethics involves the combination of neuroimaging and behavioral observation to assess people's cognitive and emotional capacity to recognize and respond to reasons for or against actions.Morality involves the intersection of ge ne tic, neurobiological, psychological, and social factors (Tancredi, 2005).As noted in chapter 1, the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics can overlap.The discussion of moral enhancement in chapter 5 involved both branches of neuroethics.Still, questions about rational and moral decision-making and be hav ior control require a more extended analy sis of the neurobiological basis of our mental states and actions, and I do that in this chapter.I discuss how theoretical and clinical neuroscientists attempt to explain moral reasoning by examining its neural correlates.I also discuss how they can administer brain-and mind-altering psychotropic drugs or neuromodulating techniques that can alter how we think and act.These may include individuals with neural pathologies resulting in criminal offenses.These

The relationship between visual experience and cognition manifested in thethinking/knowing/understanding is seeingmetaphor, is claimed to be the primary vision metaphor in various languages. However, only a few studies considered its extension to less central domains such ascultural values. The paper seeks to understand how the figurative usages of Hungarian vision verbs refer to the cultural values ofmorality,respect, andhospitality. Three verbs of vision are invesitaged employing Cultural Linguistic and cognitive semantic analyses, namely,néz‘look/watch’,lát‘see’, andtekint‘look/glance’. It is demonstrated that visual perception in Hungarian has a significant role in moral reasoning; however, there are substantial differences in the ways these vision verbs relate to them. To find a motivational explanation for these differences, the semantic properties of the verbs are identified through contrastive analysis and by observing their semantic profiles within thevisionscenario. As a result, a cultural model of each verb is reconstructed. The study gives a refined view on the linkage ofsightandcultural valuesin Hungarian, furthermore, the proposed methodology can be effectively applied to various areas of perception research in a cultural context.

This article highlights navigational guidance that Professor Gerard Bradley’s recent writings on the role of moral reasoning in constitutional adjudication provide for the next generation of jurists engaged in constitutional adjudication. Bradley’s most promising prescriptions relate to judicial recognition of the real goods of real persons as supplying the principled rational basis for the ongoing enforcement of enacted laws.

Call Me Irresponsible Is Psychopaths’ Responsibility a Matter of (Data) Preference? Jarkko Jalava (bio) and Stephanie Griffiths (bio) Keywords Psychopathy, responsibility, philosophers, neuroimaging The philosophical debate over psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is increasingly evidence based. However, as we noted, such arguments are misleading if philosophers only consider evidence that supports their own positions. In his response, Glannon counters our argument by introducing new evidence—neuroimaging data—and so demonstrates the exact problem we outlined; Strijbos, in contrast, offers a workable solution. Glannon’s response is a succinct summation of the strengths and weaknesses that philosophers bring to the debate. Although Glannon accurately portrays the potential role of neuroimaging data in determining responsibility as merely supplementary to behavior, he simultaneously mistakes the strength of the actual data. Glannon (2017, p. 13) cites Gregory et al. (2012) as evidence that psychopaths have reduced gray matter volume in “brain regions associated with empathic processing, prosocial emotions and moral reasoning.” In fact, the only reduction unique to psychopaths in that study was in temporal pole regions, whose relevance to empathy and moral reasoning is unclear. Of the 26 structural magnetic resonance imaging studies on psychopathy (assessed via total score on the Psychopathy Checklist or the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version) published to date, only two (Ermer, Cope, Nyalakanti, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2012; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, & Narr, 2010) found psychopaths to have reduced volumes in both the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), regions usually implicated in empathy, emotion processing, and moral reasoning. However, even these findings have caveats; in Ermer et al. (2012), the effects disappeared in peak height whole brain analysis, and in Yang et al. (2010) the results applied only to unsuccessful psychopaths. Although other studies of psychopaths reported abnormalities in amygdalae or vmPFC (but not both), the findings were not consistent: One study described reduced amygdala volume in psychopaths (Yang, Raine, Narr, Colletti, & Toga, 2009), two found increased volume (Boccardi et al., 2011; Schiffer et al., 2011), and four found no differences at all (Cope et al., 2012; de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Gregory et al., 2012; Tiihonen et al., 2008). After correcting for multiple [End Page 21] comparisons and controlling for substance abuse, three additional studies reported volumetric reduction in psychopaths’ vmPFC (Boccardi et al., 2011; Tiihonen et al., 2008; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, & Narr, 2011), but two found no differences (Cope et al., 2012; Gregory et al., 2012). A 2009 meta-analysis showed that Psychopathy Checklist-Revised scores do not moderate prefrontal cortex volume or function in antisocial individuals (Yang & Raine, 2009). Glannon’s claim about functional magnetic resonance imaging studies fares marginally better. Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, and Koenigs (2011) found reduced structural integrity in the pathway between right amygdala and vmPFC areas, and an attenuated correlation between their activation levels at rest. Juárez, Kiehl, and Calhoun (2013) used an auditory oddball paradigm (not a moral decision-making task) and found that Psychopathy Checklist-Revised total scores were correlated with lower activation in several frontoparietal areas, including the limbic-vmPFC regions, but also in regions (e.g., parietal and occipital) peripheral to emotional or moral processing. Even if we accept these unreplicated findings as reliable, one problem remains: Psychopaths do not show consistent behavioral deficits in moral reasoning. Of the four functional magnetic resonance imaging studies using moral dilemma tasks (Glenn, Raine, Schug, Young, & Hauser, 2009; Harenski, Harenski, Shane, & Kiehl, 2010; Harenski, Edwards, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2014; Pujol et al., 2012), none showed behavioral differences between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths.1 Other experiments corroborate this (for a review, see Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). In short, psychopaths do not show consistent impairments on moral reasoning tasks, nor do they show systematic abnormalities in brain areas putatively responsible for moral reasoning. Taken together, what do these results mean? One interpretation is that psychopaths have subtle moral decision-making impairments, which our current tests cannot detect. Another interpretation is that, if psychopaths show neurobiological abnormalities, but perform similarly to nonpsychopaths on moral tasks, then those abnormalities are irrelevant to moral decision making, at least in these populations. Whatever the case, these data are too inconclusive to play a meaningful role in the responsibility debate. If philosophers tend to oversimplify the...

Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking—induced by time pressure and cognitive load—in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making.

Although research has indicated that moral decisions are made during video game play, less research has examined moral reasoning during play. Using a think-aloud protocol, participants’ decisions and reasoning were recorded during game play and coded as either strategic or moral. Players’ reasoning was also coded using Moral Foundations Theory. Results indicated an almost equal percentage of strategic and moral reasoning; the salience of several individual moral foundations predicted moral reasoning during play. Video game experience was positively related to the use of moral reasoning, which can be explained by relating reasoning to rational and experiential processing during game play.

One of the debates of recent moral philosophy concerns the question whether moral judgments express internar' or external reasons.1 Ac cording to internalists, if someone knows or accepts moral judgment then she must have motive for acting on it. The motive is part of the content of the judgment: the reason why the action is right is reason for doing it. Ac cording to externalists, this is not necessarily so: there could be case in which I understand both that and why it is right for me to do something, and yet have no motive for doing it. Since most of us believe that action's being right is reason for doing it, internalism seems more plausible. It cap tures one element of our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are motivating. But some philosophers believe that internalism, if cor rect, would also impose restriction on moral reasons. If moral reasons are to motivate, they must spring from agent's personal desires and com mitments.2 This is unappealing, for unless the desires and commitments that motivate moral conduct are universal and inescapable, it cannot be re quired of everyone. And this leaves out the other element of our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are binding. Some internalists, however, have argued that the force of internalism cuts the other way. If moral reasons must motivate, and I show you that action is morally right, I have ipso facto provided you with motive for doing it. Moral reasons motivate because they are perceived as binding.3 A good person, ac cording to these internalists, does the right thing because it is the right thing, or acts from the motive of duty. Many of the moves in the contemporary debate were anticipated in the debate between the Rationalists and the Sentimentalists of the eighteenth century. At the center of their dispute was the notion of obligation, term they used primarily to refer to the normativity of duty. The term obliga tion is source of confusion, because an is sometimes used loosely as synonym for a duty, required action. But obligation refers not so much to the action as to the requiredness of the action, to its normative pull. We say that we feel obliged, or are under obligation, to express our sense that the claims of morality are claims on us. The idea that moral conduct is obligatory, like the idea that moral judgments express in

The existence of the phenomenon of Indonesian citizens who joined ISIS, the number of teens who become "bride" Islamic worshipers and teenagers orientation that supports the defense of religion by radical is an indication there is a judgment about the moral disorientation of terrorism in Indonesian teenagers. Logic exercises can embed logic values which someone can take a moral decision and act logically. That is why the researcher conducting research on the influence toward logic exercises on moral judgment disorientation terrorism case study students to design an appropriate solution to the problem of moral disorientation student judgment in the case of terrorism. Testing the influence of logic exercises against the judgment of moral disorientation of the students is done by using a quasi-experimental study used data collection techniques and tools in the form of documentation, and questionnaires. The research instrument in this study is the logic exercises student worksheets, assessment rubrics Questionnaire DIT and moral judgment. The data analysis technique used in this study is the technique of quantitative analysis using independent sample t-tes. The results showed that there are differences in moral judgment ability of PGSD UPY students which use logic exercises method. Moreover, it can also be concluded logic exercises method is effective in improving PGSD UPY students moral judgment.

Can ethical dilemmas be resolved through computational models? In this paper I propose a novel integration of the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) with a value-based framework for moral reasoning. Based on insights from neuroethics and cognitive neuroscience, I argue that moral decisions —especially under conditions of uncertainty, irreversibility, and emotional interference— can be modeled as processes of noisy evidence accumulation. I introduce the concept of an ethical balance mainly composed of three evaluative variables: sentience, intentionality, and innocence. These inputs are mapped to DDM parameters such as drift rate, decision threshold, and starting point bias. Through illustrative moral scenarios, I show how this framework can both predict and simulate moral judgments. The goal is not to replace normative ethics, but to demonstrate how scientific modeling can enhance our understanding of how moral reasoning unfolds in the brain. This maybe opens the path to a computational ethics grounded in real cognitive processes.

The purpose of ethical theory is to assist us to make concrete and specific moral decisions. This is the sense of G. E. Moore's sentence, Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. 1 The final test of every theory of ethics, whether theological or philosophical, is the pragmatic one of how well it prepares us for casuistry, for deciding what is right or wrong, good or bad. Critical reason-analyzing the data and conceptualizations and background of religious experience, moral experience and moral judgments-can formulate ethical theories that approximately fulfill this fundamental purpose. And precisely because reason has this capacity, some of the central (though in our century most neglected) questions in theological ethics are about the place of reason in the moral decisions made by religious people. For instance: (I) How can a knowledge of theological ethics assist one in making rational moral decisions ? (2) What constitutes rational deliberation in Christian ethics? (3) What theological assumptions must one make for a rational Christian ethics to be possible ? (4) How is the place of reason in theological ethics like and unlike the place of reason in philosophical ethics?

Contents: Preface. J.R. Rest, Background: Theory and Research. S.P. McNeel, College Teaching and Student Moral Development. L.J. Duckett, M.B. Ryden, Education for Ethical Nursing Practice. F-Y. Chang, School Teachers' Moral Reasoning. N.A. Sprinthall, Counseling and Social Role Taking: Promoting Moral and Ego Development. L.A. Ponemon, D.R.L. Gabhart, Ethical Reasoning Research in the Accounting and Auditing Professions. M.J. Bebeau, Influencing the Moral Dimensions of Dental Practice. D.J. Self, D.C. Baldwin, Jr., Moral Reasoning in Medicine. D.J. Self, M. Olivarez, D.C. Baldwin, Jr., Moral Reasoning in Veterinary Medicine. B.J.L. Bredemeier, D.L.L. Shields, Applied Ethics and Moral Reasoning in Sport. T. Westbrook, Tracking the Moral Development of Journalists: A Look at Them and Their Work. S. Thoma, Moral Judgments and Moral Action. J.R. Rest, D. Narvaez, Summary: What's Possible?

ABSTRACTThis article presents a psychological approach on the development of social and moral judgments that has relevance for the topics of public justification and world politics. In contrast with approaches assuming that morality is primarily determined by emotions and non-rational, the research discussed shows that moral development involves the construction of thinking about welfare, justice, and rights. In parallel with judgments in the moral domain, individuals construct judgments about conventions in the social system and areas of personal jurisdiction. Research documents that moral and social decisions involve processes of coordination, or weighing and balancing, moral and non-moral considerations and goals, as well as different moral goals. Processes of coordination are also involved in decisions about cultural practices that include social inequalities and relationships between those in dominant and subordinate positions in social hierarchies. Judgments about the fairness of practices entailing inequalities produce social opposition and moral resistance.