Moral Reasoning, Behavior Control, and Neural Interventions

Consumer rights or unethical behaviors: Exploring the impacts of retailer return policies

Call Me Irresponsible Is Psychopaths’ Responsibility a Matter of (Data) Preference? Jarkko Jalava (bio) and Stephanie Griffiths (bio) Keywords Psychopathy, responsibility, philosophers, neuroimaging The philosophical debate over psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is increasingly evidence based. However, as we noted, such arguments are misleading if philosophers only consider evidence that supports their own positions. In his response, Glannon counters our argument by introducing new evidence—neuroimaging data—and so demonstrates the exact problem we outlined; Strijbos, in contrast, offers a workable solution. Glannon’s response is a succinct summation of the strengths and weaknesses that philosophers bring to the debate. Although Glannon accurately portrays the potential role of neuroimaging data in determining responsibility as merely supplementary to behavior, he simultaneously mistakes the strength of the actual data. Glannon (2017, p. 13) cites Gregory et al. (2012) as evidence that psychopaths have reduced gray matter volume in “brain regions associated with empathic processing, prosocial emotions and moral reasoning.” In fact, the only reduction unique to psychopaths in that study was in temporal pole regions, whose relevance to empathy and moral reasoning is unclear. Of the 26 structural magnetic resonance imaging studies on psychopathy (assessed via total score on the Psychopathy Checklist or the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version) published to date, only two (Ermer, Cope, Nyalakanti, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2012; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, & Narr, 2010) found psychopaths to have reduced volumes in both the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), regions usually implicated in empathy, emotion processing, and moral reasoning. However, even these findings have caveats; in Ermer et al. (2012), the effects disappeared in peak height whole brain analysis, and in Yang et al. (2010) the results applied only to unsuccessful psychopaths. Although other studies of psychopaths reported abnormalities in amygdalae or vmPFC (but not both), the findings were not consistent: One study described reduced amygdala volume in psychopaths (Yang, Raine, Narr, Colletti, & Toga, 2009), two found increased volume (Boccardi et al., 2011; Schiffer et al., 2011), and four found no differences at all (Cope et al., 2012; de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Gregory et al., 2012; Tiihonen et al., 2008). After correcting for multiple [End Page 21] comparisons and controlling for substance abuse, three additional studies reported volumetric reduction in psychopaths’ vmPFC (Boccardi et al., 2011; Tiihonen et al., 2008; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, & Narr, 2011), but two found no differences (Cope et al., 2012; Gregory et al., 2012). A 2009 meta-analysis showed that Psychopathy Checklist-Revised scores do not moderate prefrontal cortex volume or function in antisocial individuals (Yang & Raine, 2009). Glannon’s claim about functional magnetic resonance imaging studies fares marginally better. Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, and Koenigs (2011) found reduced structural integrity in the pathway between right amygdala and vmPFC areas, and an attenuated correlation between their activation levels at rest. Juárez, Kiehl, and Calhoun (2013) used an auditory oddball paradigm (not a moral decision-making task) and found that Psychopathy Checklist-Revised total scores were correlated with lower activation in several frontoparietal areas, including the limbic-vmPFC regions, but also in regions (e.g., parietal and occipital) peripheral to emotional or moral processing. Even if we accept these unreplicated findings as reliable, one problem remains: Psychopaths do not show consistent behavioral deficits in moral reasoning. Of the four functional magnetic resonance imaging studies using moral dilemma tasks (Glenn, Raine, Schug, Young, & Hauser, 2009; Harenski, Harenski, Shane, & Kiehl, 2010; Harenski, Edwards, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2014; Pujol et al., 2012), none showed behavioral differences between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths.1 Other experiments corroborate this (for a review, see Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). In short, psychopaths do not show consistent impairments on moral reasoning tasks, nor do they show systematic abnormalities in brain areas putatively responsible for moral reasoning. Taken together, what do these results mean? One interpretation is that psychopaths have subtle moral decision-making impairments, which our current tests cannot detect. Another interpretation is that, if psychopaths show neurobiological abnormalities, but perform similarly to nonpsychopaths on moral tasks, then those abnormalities are irrelevant to moral decision making, at least in these populations. Whatever the case, these data are too inconclusive to play a meaningful role in the responsibility debate. If philosophers tend to oversimplify the...

A moral crisis poses significant challenges to the success and sustainable development of a corporation. In this context, managers’ moral decision-making becomes paramount. Managers’ moral choices and actions directly impact the corporation‘s ability to effectively address these crises, ultimately shaping its outcomes and prospects. This study employs the extended theory of planned behavior (TPB) as a theoretical framework to explore the determinants that influence the moral decision-making process of managers. Specifically, the study introduces two new variables, namely, moral climate and moral self-efficacy, to enrich the existing theory. By employing structural equation modeling (SEM), the study examines the interrelationships among moral attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, moral intentions, moral decision-making, and the two new variables. The research findings provide compelling evidence that both moral climate and moral self-efficacy have a substantial impact on the moral decision-making process of managers. Notably, moral self-efficacy emerges as a mediating variable in the relationship between moral climate and moral intention. The findings of this study hold significant value for the development of moral decision-making models and the theory of planned behavior, with practical implications that can assist organizations in achieving sustainable growth and success.

The purpose of ethical theory is to assist us to make concrete and specific moral decisions. This is the sense of G. E. Moore's sentence, Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. 1 The final test of every theory of ethics, whether theological or philosophical, is the pragmatic one of how well it prepares us for casuistry, for deciding what is right or wrong, good or bad. Critical reason-analyzing the data and conceptualizations and background of religious experience, moral experience and moral judgments-can formulate ethical theories that approximately fulfill this fundamental purpose. And precisely because reason has this capacity, some of the central (though in our century most neglected) questions in theological ethics are about the place of reason in the moral decisions made by religious people. For instance: (I) How can a knowledge of theological ethics assist one in making rational moral decisions ? (2) What constitutes rational deliberation in Christian ethics? (3) What theological assumptions must one make for a rational Christian ethics to be possible ? (4) How is the place of reason in theological ethics like and unlike the place of reason in philosophical ethics?

To investigate the relationship between ethical reasoning confidence and self-esteem among female nursing students for enhancing the quality of work life. A necessary component of professional competence and a prerequisite for high-quality care is ethical reasoning confidence competence. As well as, self-esteem is the subjective perception of one’s own worth and significance. This was a descriptive correlational cross-sectional study design. Data was collected within a month starting from December 2022 to January 2023, and 164 nursing students were recruited from one College at a governmental university in Riyadh. Respondents completed the self-administered, online questionnaires. Measures included self-esteem, and ethical reasoning confidence questionnaires. Findings investigated via descriptive and inferential statistics as well as structured equation modeling to examine the mediating effect of self-esteem on behaviors and attitudes of the nursing students toward ethical reasoning confidence. Nursing students had a moderate perception regarding their self-esteem as well as their ethical reasoning confidence (Mean = 2.99, SD ± 0.58; and Mean = 3.57, SD ± 0.55, respectively). Data revealed that self-esteem was accounted for the prediction of 54% of positive variance of nursing students’ behaviors toward ethical reasoning confidence and 78% of the variance of their attitudes toward ethical reasoning confidence. Self-esteem is a significant determinant of nursing students’ behaviors and attitudes toward their ethical reasoning confidence. Further research is required to ascertain whether this approach enhances nursing students’ moral decision-making, moral reasoning, practical considerations, and acquaintance with ethical concerns.

Can ethical dilemmas be resolved through computational models? In this paper I propose a novel integration of the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) with a value-based framework for moral reasoning. Based on insights from neuroethics and cognitive neuroscience, I argue that moral decisions —especially under conditions of uncertainty, irreversibility, and emotional interference— can be modeled as processes of noisy evidence accumulation. I introduce the concept of an ethical balance mainly composed of three evaluative variables: sentience, intentionality, and innocence. These inputs are mapped to DDM parameters such as drift rate, decision threshold, and starting point bias. Through illustrative moral scenarios, I show how this framework can both predict and simulate moral judgments. The goal is not to replace normative ethics, but to demonstrate how scientific modeling can enhance our understanding of how moral reasoning unfolds in the brain. This maybe opens the path to a computational ethics grounded in real cognitive processes.

Although research has indicated that moral decisions are made during video game play, less research has examined moral reasoning during play. Using a think-aloud protocol, participants’ decisions and reasoning were recorded during game play and coded as either strategic or moral. Players’ reasoning was also coded using Moral Foundations Theory. Results indicated an almost equal percentage of strategic and moral reasoning; the salience of several individual moral foundations predicted moral reasoning during play. Video game experience was positively related to the use of moral reasoning, which can be explained by relating reasoning to rational and experiential processing during game play.

Our use of the term imagination is usually restricted to the domain of art. Celebrated artists and their works are said to be imaginative. We speak of the imagination of a genius, and of imaginative novels, paintings, and works of music. But what about morality? The claim that imagination can and should play a role in moral reasoning may raise eyebrows. Imagination and the artistic context in which it is believed to have its home, suggest a freedom and fancy many of us are not willing to grant to moral reasoning. Moral reasoning appears to be concerned with principles, rules, restraint, and prohibition. It is unclear what it means to say that imagination plays and should play a central role in our moral decisions and judgments.

The Ethics of Climate Change: With a Little Help from Moral Cognitive Neuroscience

Any attempt to understand Hume on the respective roles of reason and passion in moral decisions is immediately confronted with several different problems. In the first place one would expect to discover Hume’s position in Book III of the Treatise. But after reading only three pages of Book III Hume points out that the conclusions presented here depend on his previous arguments in Book II, Part III, section 3. So one immediately begins to jump around in order to determine what Hume has really said with regard to the role of reason in morals. Further, there is the problem of determining what arguments Hume offers in support of his thesis that reason serves the passions, and these arguments are not always the same as the criticism directed against the rationalists. It is one thing to refute one’s predecessors, and another thing to establish one’s thesis. These considerations do not always appear distinct in Hume. Then there is the vast quantity of material, and this poses no small problem in itself. All these problems have led to various interpretations of Hume, with varying degrees of emphasis being placed on different doctrines by different commentators. Whereas one commentator may stress the utilitarian aspects of Hume’s morals, another may consider his doctrine of the moral sense paramount.These, then, are some of the initial problems one faces in studying Hume’s ethics.

Individuals diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often find it difficult to attribute mental states to others and to understand their own and others’ behaviour (Theory of Mind, [ToM]/social cognition). These difficulties can affect their moral judgements. The present article focuses on evidence on moral reasoning and ToM, with the aim of analysing theoretical and review research into autism. The weight intention has in moral reasoning and the causal relation between mental states, actions and outcomes is an essential part of this study. Evidence in the field of autism reports how autistic people would not be able to make moral judgements based on the agent’s intention. Instead, they would reason based on the outcomes of the action. For example, this can be translated into misunderstandings, malicious judgements or ‘over-blaming’ in accidental situations (ambiguous valences). These impairments can confirm the association between ToM and moral reasoning.

In today’s educational context, students frequently encounter ethical dilemmas and value conflicts, making moral instruction crucial for fostering responsible decision-making. This study explores the impact of moral instruction on the ability of ninth-grade students to make conscious moral choices in a selected school in Pune. It specifically examines decision-making across six value domains: personal, professional, social, aesthetic, humanitarian, and religious values. A descriptive survey design with a quantitative approach was employed. The sample consisted of 100 ninth-grade students, both boys and girls, who had received continuous moral instruction from the first through the ninth standard in the same school. Data were collected using a researcher-developed Moral Decision-Making Scale comprising 36 situational items with multiple response options, complemented by an opinionnaire to assess students’ perceptions of moral instruction’s influence on their decisions. Personal interviews with selected students and teachers were conducted to validate and enrich the quantitative findings. Results indicate that students exhibited varying levels of moral decision-making across different value domains, with higher levels in social, humanitarian, and professional values, and comparatively lower levels in personal and religious values. A majority of students acknowledged that moral instruction positively influenced their ability to make conscious moral decisions, although its impact differed across value areas. The study concludes that sustained, systematic moral instruction enhances moral awareness, ethical reasoning, and decision-making skills, emphasizing the importance of integrating robust moral education in secondary school curricula to foster character development and responsible citizenship.

John Dewey’s analysis of the role of emotion in moral reasoning, presented in the later Ethics, led him to conclude that our development of moral reasoning should be less focused on the secondary interest of attention to ourselves or others, and attend to the more complete interests of the welfare and integrity of the social groups in which we participate. In that analysis, Dewey identified the essential role of empathic understanding in moral decisions, referred to by neuroscientists as social intelligence. Dewey’s discussion of the essential role of emotion in these decisions is further supported by research in neuroscience which has established that general intelligence is located in an area of the brain distinct from the area that supports social intelligence, our capacity for empathic experience. These findings suggest that the presence of individuals with developed social intelligence in the groups in which we participate provide increased opportunities for growth.

A couple is presented who underwent prenatal counseling and amniocentesis for sex determination because the wife was an obligate carrier of hemophilia B. Although the fetus was determined to be male, the parents elected not to have further testing to determine if he had hemophilia or not. The difficulties in the in utero diagnosis of hemophilia B are presented and discussed. In addition, the moral reasoning and decision-making process that this couple went through regarding the decision not to have further fetal testing and to continue the pregnancy is presented and analyzed. These moral decisions appear to be based on family and personal ties, and bonding to the fetus after perception of fetal movement. They combine considerations of the duties and rights involved in such situations, and attend to the anticipated consequences as well.

Assessment of moral Reasoning Ability of the Nurses in dealing with moral dilemmas