Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules Under Borrowing Constraints

Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules

The recession following the sub-prime crisis has rekindled international interest in the field of monetary and fiscal policy interaction. However, very little has been done to appropriately estimate these dynamic policies. This paper estimates regime- switching monetary and fiscal policy rules and lays strong emphasis on mis-specification testing. We apply a Markov regime-switching model to estimate monetary and fiscal policy rules for India to highlight the evolving stance of Indian macro-policy for the period 1951–2008 and investigate the behaviour of select macroeconomic variables under the estimated policy regimes. Our results suggest that, in India, fiscal policy was largely active for the entire period except for a few periods of restraint. Monetary policy, despite achieving greater autonomy post-1990s, has largely been accommodating fiscal policy. Whenever monetary policy became active, fiscal policy undermined monetary policy’s effectiveness by not accommodating accordingly. We argue for an aggressive monetary policy and a constrained fiscal policy in India.

Regime Switching Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules and Interaction there-in: An Indian Case Study

The present paper examines the role of the mix of fiscal and monetary policy rules in determining inflation dynamics using fiscal and monetary policy reaction functions and Markov‐switching vector autoregression methods based on quarterly data in the period 1992–2007. Our results show that fiscal and monetary policies in China can be adequately described using some simple rules, and that significant regime shifts took place around 1998. Fiscal policy tended to be active and countercyclical in the pre‐1998 period, then switched to be passive and more countercyclical, whereas monetary policy was characterized as passive and procyclical in the pre‐1998 period, and switched to be active and countercyclical afterwards. The mix of fiscal and monetary policy rules can explain inflation dynamics better than the monetary policy rule alone. Therefore, price stability requires not only appropriate monetary policy but also appropriate fiscal policy.

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union

Mark-up fluctuations and fiscal policy stabilization in a monetary union

Recent events have highlighted the potential importance of nonlinear efiects of flscal variables (notably debt and deflcits) on interest rates: While in times when government solvency is not a concern the standard crowding-out efiects are of moderate magnitude, in times when default risk becomes an issue the interest rate efiects can become very large. This paper provides new evidence on the magnitude of these efiects. For the case when default risk is not a concern, it uses an arbitrage-free term structure model to estimate the dynamic efiects of flscal policy shocks on interest rates along the entire maturity spectrum. For the case when default risk becomes a concern (thereby violating a central assumption of the term structure model), I present evidence based on EMU government bond spread regressions on time-varying efiects of national flscal policies on spreads as well as the time-varying sensitivity of yield spreads to international risk aversion as a function of the state of flscal policy. JEL classiflcation: E6, H6.

We develop a model of analysing the optimal combination of macroprudential and monetary policies in a small open commodityexporting economy.Unlike a closed economy, where monetary and macroprudential policies tend to be substitutes, in a small open economy the optimal policy mix depends on the specifics of shocks and economic structure.Monetary and macroprudential policies tend to complement each other when the degree of pass-through of credit spreads into marginal costs and prices are sufficiently high, or when a credit boom is caused by a commodity boom, a fraction of consumers lacks access to financial markets, and the government follows a fiscal policy rule.The two policies are substitutes when the complementarity between domestic and imported production inputs is sufficiently high.

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

We characterize monetary and fiscal policy rules to implement optimal responses to a substantial decline in the natural rate of interest, and compare them with policy decisions made by the Japanese central bank and government in 1999-2004. First, we find that the Bank of Japan's policy commitment to continuing monetary easing until some prespecified conditions are satisfied lacks history dependence, a key feature of the optimal monetary policy rule. Second, the term structure of the interest rate gap (the spread between the actual real interest rate and its natural rate counterpart) was not downward sloping, indicating that the Bank of Japan's commitment failed to have su.cient influence on the market's expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Third, we find that the primary surplus in 1999-2002 was higher than predicted by the historical regularity, implying that the Japanese government deviated from the Ricardian rule toward fiscal tightening.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation with fiscal policy-makers. In particular, strategies involving: (a) a money supply target, (b) tracking European inflation, (c) stabilizing European nominal income, and (d) fixing the exchange rate of the Euro with respect to the Dollar are evaluated and compared with respect to the associated welfare effects. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand side shocks. Nominal income targeting by the ECB has to be regarded as inferior to inflation targeting, while fixing the exchange rate leads to quite satisfactory results in most cases.

This paper characterises the jointly optimal monetary and fiscal stabilisation policy in a new Keynesian model that allows for consumers who lacking access to asset markets consume their disposable income each period. With full asset market participation, the optimal policy relies entirely on the interest rate to stabilise cost-push shocks and government expenditure is not changed. When asset market participation is limited, there is a case for fiscal stabilisation policy. Active use of public spending raises aggregate welfare because it enables a more balanced distribution of the stabilisation burden across asset-holding and non-asset-holding consumers. The optimal response of government expenditure is sensitive to the financing scheme and whether the policymaker has access to a targeted transfer that can directly redistribute resources between consumers.

In this paper, we determine optimal budgetary and monetary policies for Austria using a small macroeconometric model. We use a Keynesian model of the Austrian economy, called FINPOL1, estimated by ordinary least squares, which relates the main objective variables of Austrian economic policies, such as the growth rate of real gross domestic product, the rate of unemployment, the rate of inflation, the balance of payments, and the ratio of the federal budget deficit to GDP, to fiscal and monetary policy instruments, namely expenditures and revenues of the federal budget and money supply. Optimal fiscal and monetary policies are calculated for the model under a quadratic objective function using the algorithm OPTCON for the optimum control of nonlinear stochastic dynamic systems. Several control experiments are performed in order to assess the influence of different kinds of uncertainty on optimal budgetary and monetary policies. Apart from deterministic optimization runs, different assumptions about parameter uncertainties are introduced; the results of these different stochastic optimum control experiments are compared and interpreted.

In this paper we argue for a new approach to monetary and fiscal policy. During the Great Moderation, the inflation targeting regime worked well. Central banks used the interest rate to stabilize inflation, and—subject to inflation being controlled—stabilized the level of demand. Fiscal policy exerted discipline over the public-sector deficits, thereby—indirectly—managing the level of public debt. Such ‘fiscal housekeeping’ worked well, because the monetary authorities were stabilizing the economy. But once private-sector deleveraging led to the Great Recession, and interest rates hit their zero bound, the outcome could no longer be managed by monetary policy. Recovery depended on the ‘automatic stabilizers’: output and tax revenues have fallen, public debt has been created, and assets have been created which a deleveraging private sector wishes to hold. But the effect has been very gradual. Recovery would have been faster if fiscal policy had been responsible for the restoration of full employment, in an environment which tolerated the necessary rises in public debt. Conversely, policies of austerity, designed to reduce public debt, have slowed the recovery. Growth will not be resumed until the private sector begins to invest strongly again, creating the financial assets which the private sector wishes to hold, thereby enabling public debt to be retired. This has not yet happened because the private sector, correctly, does not believe that macroeconomic policy is capable of sustaining a strong recovery.