Logical Consequence: Models and Modality

Parametric logic is a framework that generalises classical first-order logic. A generalised notion of logical consequence—a form of preferential entailment based on a closed world assumption—is defined as a function of some parameters. A concept of possible knowledge base—the counterpart to the consistent theories of first-order logic—is introduced. The notion of compactness is weakened. The degree of weakening is quantified by a nonnull ordinal—the larger the ordinal, the more significant the weakening. For every possible knowledge base T, a hierarchy of sentences that are generalised logical consequences of T is built. The first layer of the hierarchies corresponds to sentences that can be obtained by a deductive inference, characterised by the compactness property. The second layer of the hierarchies corresponds to sentences that can be obtained by an inductive inference, characterised by the property of weak compactness quantified by 1. Weaker forms of compactness—quantified by nonnull ordinals—determine higher layers in the hierarchies, corresponding to more complex inferences. The naturalness of the hierarchies built over the possible knowledge bases is attested by fundamental connections with notions from Learning theory and from topology. The naturalness of the hierarchies built over the possible knowledge bases is attested by fundamental connections with notions from Learning theory—classification in the limit, with or without a bounded number of mind changes—and from topology—in reference to the Borel and the difference hierarchies. In this paper, we introduce the key model-theoretic aspects of Parametric logic, justify the concept of the knowledge base, define the hierarchies of generalised logical consequences and illustrate their relevance to Nonmonotonic reasoning. More specifically, we show that the degree of nonmonotonicity that is required to infer a sentence can be characterised by the least nonnull ordinal that quantifies the weakening of compactness used to locate the inferred sentence in the hierarchies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski‘s paper ’On the concept of logical consequence’ and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some of Etchemendy’s critics have granted him that Tarski did give an argument purporting to show that the defined notion possesses certain modal properties ; but they have claimed that Tarski’s argument was not a fallacious one. I will show that both Etchemendy and his critics are wrong; in the relevant passages, Tarski did not offer (nor did he intend to offer) an argument that the defined notion of logical consequence possesses any modal properties

Domain theory is the mathematical theory underlying denotational semantics. This thesis presents a formalization of domain theory in the Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem proving system along with a mechanization of proof functions and other tools to support reasoning about the denotations of functional programs. By providing a fixed point operator for functions on certain domains which have a special undefined (bottom) element, this extension of HOL supports the definition of recursive functions which are not also primitive recursive. Thus, it provides an approach to the long-standing and important problem of defining non-primitive recursive functions in the HOL system.<br /> <br />Our philosophy is that there must be a direct correspondence between elements of complete partial orders (domains) and elements of HOL types, in order to allow the reuse of higher order logic and proof infrastructure already available in the HOL system. Hence, we are able to mix domain theoretic reasoning with reasoning in the set theoretic HOL world to advantage, exploiting HOL types and tools directly. Moreover, by mixing domain and set theoretic reasoning, we are able to eliminate almost all reasoning about the bottom element of complete partial orders that makes the LCF theorem prover, which supports a first order logic of domain theory, difficult and tedious to use. A thorough comparison with LCF is provided.<br /> <br />The advantages of combining the best of the domain and set theoretic worlds in the same system are demonstrated in a larger example, showing the correctness of a unification algorithm. A major part of the proof is conducted in the set theoretic setting of higher order logic, and only at a late stage of the proof domain theory is introduced to give a recursive definition of the algorithm, which is not primitive recursive. Furthermore, a total well-founded recursive unification function can be defined easily in pure HOL by proving that the unification algorithm (defined in domain theory) always terminates; this proof is conducted by a non-trivial well-founded induction. In such applications, where non-primitive recursive HOL functions are defined via domain theory and a proof of termination, domain theory constructs only appear temporarily.

Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it isn’t. In fact, 2FA is not conservative over n-th order logic, for all $n \geq 2$ . It follows that in the usual one-sorted setting, HP is not deductively Field-conservative over second- or higher-order logic.

The supervaluationist theory of vagueness provides a notion of logical consequence that is akin to classical consequence. In the absence of a definitely operator, supervaluationist consequence coincides with classical consequence. In the presence of ‘definitely’, however, supervaluationist logic gives raise to counterexamples to classically valid patterns of inference. Foes of supervaluationism emphasize the last result to argue against the supervaluationist theory. This paper shows a way in which we might obtain systems of deduction adequate for supervaluationist consequence based on systems of deduction adequate for classical consequence. Deductions on the systems obtained this way adopt a completely classical form with the exception of a single step. The paper reviews (at least part of) the discussion on the non-classicality of supervaluationist logic under the light of this result.KeywordsVaguenessSupervaluationismGlobal ValidityDeductive SystemsLogical Consequence

One of the main functions of legal reasoning is to determine the truth-value of legal statements, i.e., of statements that assert that certain actions are legally required or permitted. In general, the notion of legal system provides a useful framework, which allows us to distinguish between legal norms and other socially relevant norms. Two concepts of legal system are often employed in legal discourse. On the one hand, it is usually claimed that the material provided by a certain authority has systematic structure, i.e. the norms are structured by means of specific relationships. e.g. hierarchical relationships. In this sense, law is an institutional system. On the other hand, it is frequently asserted that legal norms can be reconstructed systematically starting from the notion of logical consequence. In this sense, law can be regarded as a deductive system. Legal reasoning, then, would use in an explicit or implicit way both notions of normative system in the process of establishing the truth conditions of legal statements. However, this traditional conception of legal reasoning and normative systems has been object of important challenges. In this paper. I consider two groups of arguments against the systematic reconstruction of law:

In [8] J. A. Robinson introduced a complete refutation procedure called resolution for first order predicate calculus. Resolution is based on ideas in Herbrand's Theorem, and provides a very convenient framework in which to search for a proof of a wff believed to be a theorem. Moreover, it has proved possible to formulate many refinements of resolution which are still complete but are more efficient, at least in many contexts. However, when efficiency is a prime consideration, the restriction to first order logic is unfortunate, since many statements of mathematics (and other disciplines) can be expressed more simply and naturally in higher order logic than in first order logic. Also, the fact that in higher order logic (as in many-sorted first order logic) there is an explicit syntactic distinction between expressions which denote different types of intuitive objects is of great value where matching is involved, since one is automatically prevented from trying to make certain inappropriate matches. (One may contrast this with the situation in which mathematical statements are expressed in the symbolism of axiomatic set theory.).

By a well-known result due to Büchi and Trakhtenbrot, all monadic second-order sentences over words describe regular languages. In this paper, we investigate prefix classes of general second-order logic. Such a prefix class is called regular, if each of its sentences describes a regular language, and nonregular otherwise. Recently, the regular and nonregular prefix classes of existential second order logic (Σ1 1) were exhaustively determined. We briefly recall these results and continue this line of research by systematically investigating the syntactically more complex prefix classes Σ1 k(Q) of second-order logic for each integer k > 1 and for each first-order quantifier prefix Q. We give an exhaustive classification of the regular and nonregular prefix classes of this form, and derive of complexity results for the corresponding model checking problems. We also give a brief survey of recent results on the complexity of evaluating existential second-order logic over graphs, and a list of interesting open problems.KeywordsModel CheckUndirected GraphRegular LanguagePredicate VariableWord StructureThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This paper presents a shallow embedding of a probabilistic functional programming language in higher order logic. The language features monadic sequencing, recursion, random sampling, failures and failure handling, and black-box access to oracles. Oracles are probabilistic functions which maintain hidden state between different invocations. To that end, we propose generative probabilistic systems as the semantic domain in which the operators of the language are defined. We prove that these operators are parametric and derive a relational program logic for reasoning about programs from parametricity. Several examples demonstrate that our language is suitable for conducting cryptographic proofs.

This paper introduces a new notation called S which is based on higher order logic. It has been developed specifically to support the practical application of formal methods in industrial scale projects. The development of S has occurred in the context of an investigation into the possibility of using formal specification techniques in the development of a $400 million air traffic control system. We were motivated to develop this notation after reaching the conclusion that existing notations such as Z are not suitable for use in this particular project. In addition to providing an introduction to S, this paper describes a public domain software tool called “Fuss” which has been implemented to support the use of S as a specification language.

According to Crispin Wright’s neo-logicist reconstruction of Frege’s philosophy of arithmetic, the truths of arithmetic are logical consequences, in the semantic sense, of second-order logic, augmented with an analytic axiom (Hume’s Principle). Neo-logicism thus views arithmetic truths as analytic, being the logical consequences of an analytic axiom. This chapter argues that the semantic relation of second-order logical consequence that is most naturally suited to the practice of arithmetic is proof-theoretically complete, and that given this, Gödel’s incompleteness result shows that there are arithmetical truths which are not derivable in Wright’s proof theory augmented by Hume’s Principle. The chapter thus challenges Wright’s programme of neo-Fregean logicism.

Donald Davidson has claimed that for every logical truth S of a language L, a theory of meaning for L will entail that S is a logical truth of L. Jim Edwards has argued (2002) that this claim is false if we take ‘entails’ to mean ‘has as a logical consequence’. In this paper, I first show that, pace Edwards, Davidson's claim is correct even under this strong reading. I then discuss the argument given by Edwards and offer a diagnosis of where he went wrong.

Formal theories play crucial role in mathematics and were historically defined for classical predicate (first order logic) and consequently for other first and higher order logics, classical and non-classical.

With parametric logic, we propose a unified approach to deduction and induction, both viewed as particular instances of a generalized notion of logical consequence. This generalized notion of logical consequence is Tarskian, in the sense that if a sentence φ is a generalized logical consequence of a set T of premises, then the truth of T implies the truth of φ. So in particular, if φ can be induced from T, then the truth of T implies the truth of φ. The difference between deductive and inductive consequences lies in the process of deriving the truth of φ from the truth of T.

In this tutorial we present the area of formal verification of systems on Chips. The paper discuses the following topics: different approaches of formal logic such as first order bgic, high order logic, temporal logic. A case study of object-oriented paradigm is presented. A survey of the current research status is presented. The paper concludes with a section on the future directions.Keywords:Formal verificationfirst order logichigh order logictemporal logicautomated theorem proversobject oriented paradigm