Logicism and Logical Consequence

Frege's development of the theory of arithmetic in hisGrundgesetze der Arithmetikhas long been ignored, since the formal theory of theGrundgesetzeis inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known asHume's Principledo not, however, depend upon that axiom of the system—Axiom V—which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege does prove each of the now standard Dedekind-Peano axioms, his proofs are devoted primarily to the derivation of his own axioms for arithmetic, which are somewhat different (though of course equivalent). These axioms, which may be yet more intuitive than the Dedekind-Peano axioms, may be taken to be “TheBasic Laws of Cardinal Number”, as Frege understood them.Though the axioms of arithmetic have been known to be derivable from Hume's Principle for about ten years now, it has not been widely recognized that Frege himself showed them so to be; nor has it been known that Frege made use of any axiomatization for arithmetic whatsoever.Grundgesetzeis thus a work of much greater significance than has often been thought. First, Frege's use of the inconsistent Axiom V may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establish may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establishment of Logicism), but it should not be allowed to obscure his mathematical accomplishments and his contribution to our understanding of arithmetic. Second, Frege's knowledge that arithmetic is derivable from Hume's Principle raises important sorts of questions about his philosophy of arithmetic. For example, “Why did Frege not simply abandon Axiom V and take Hume's Principle as an axiom?”

My long-standing interest in the notion of logical consequence became urgent when I was working on my recent book on higher-order logic (1991). The most common complaint is that second-order logic is out of bounds. as logic, because its consequence relation is not effective. Even though higher order logic is squarely within the prevailing model-theoretic tradition, its set of logical truths is not recursively enumerable-it is not even in the Kleene hierarchy.

This work concerns the model theory of propositional tense logic with the Kripke relational semantics. It is shown (i) that there is a formula y whose logical consequences form a complete II set, and (ii) that for 0 ≦ m < ω+ ω there are formulas γm such that all models of γm are isomorphic and have cardinality xm, where x0 = χ0, xm+1 = 2xm, and xω = lim{xm < | m ω}. Familiarity with the relational semantics for modal and tense logic ([1] or [3], for example) will be presumed. A knowledge of recursion theory would be helpful, although some background material will be provided.

There is a long-standing gap in the literature as to whether Gödelian incompleteness constitutes a challenge for Neo-Logicism, and if so how serious it is. In this paper, I articulate and address the challenge in detail. The Neo-Logicist project is to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic by deriving all its truths from logical principles and suitable definitions. The specific concern raised by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is that no single sound system of logic syntactically implies all arithmetical truths. I set out some responses that initially seem appealing and explain why they are not compelling. The upshot is that Neo-Logicism either offers an epistemic route only to some truths of arithmetic; or that it has to move from a syntactic to a semantic notion of logical consequence, which risks undermining its epistemic goals. I conclude by considering Crispin Wright’s recent attempt to address Gödelian incompleteness, which I argue is not satisfactory.

The ability to reason and think in a logical manner forms the basis of learning for most mathematics, computer science, philosophy and logic students. Based on the author's teaching notes at the University of Maryland and aimed at a broad audience, this text covers the fundamental topics in classical logic in an extremely clear, thorough and accurate style that is accessible to all the above. Covering propositional logic, first-order logic, and second-order logic, as well as proof theory, computability theory, and model theory, the text also contains numerous carefully graded exercises and is ideal for a first or refresher course.

Models of complex systems are widely used in the physical and social sciences, and the concept of layering, typically building upon graph-theoretic structure, is a common feature. We describe an intuitionistic substructural logic called ILGL that gives an account of layering. The logic is a bunched system, combining the usual intuitionistic connectives, together with a non-commutative, non-associative conjunction (used to capture layering) and its associated implications. We give soundness and completeness theorems for a labelled tableaux system with respect to a Kripke semantics on graphs. We then give an equivalent relational semantics, itself proven equivalent to an algebraic semantics via a representation theorem. We utilise this result in two ways. First, we prove decidability of the logic by showing the finite embeddability property holds for the algebraic semantics. Second, we prove a Stone-type duality theorem for the logic. By introducing the notions of ILGL hyperdoctrine and indexed layered frame we are able to extend this result to a predicate version of the logic and prove soundness and completeness theorems for an extension of the layered graph semantics . We indicate the utility of predicate ILGL with a resource-labelled bigraph model.

In this article, we develop a new and somewhat unexpected connection between higher-order model-checking and linear logic. Our starting point is the observation that once embedded in the relational semantics of linear logic, the Church encoding of any higher-order recursion scheme (HORS) comes together with a dual Church encoding of an alternating tree automata (ATA) of the same signature. Moreover, the interaction between the relational interpretations of the HORS and of the ATA identifies the set of accepting states of the tree automaton against the infinite tree generated by the recursion scheme. We show how to extend this result to alternating parity automata (APT) by introducing a parametric version of the exponential modality of linear logic, capturing the formal properties of colors (or priorities) in higher-order model-checking. We show in particular how to reunderstand in this way the type-theoretic approach to higher-order model-checking developed by Kobayashi and Ong. We briefly explain in the end of the paper how this analysis driven by linear logic results in a new and purely semantic proof of decidability of the formulas of the monadic second-order logic for higher-order recursion schemes.

A star-free relational semantics for relevant logic is presented together with a sound and complete sequent proof theory (display calculus). It is an extension of the dualist approach to negation regarded as modality, according to which de Morgan negation in relevant logic is better understood as the confusion of two negative modalities. The present work shows a way to define them in terms of implication and a new connective, co-implication, which is modeled by respective ternary relations. The defined negations are confused by a special constraint on ternary relation, called the generalized star postulate, which implies definability of the Routley star in the frame. The resultant logic is shown to be equivalent to the well-known relevant logic R. Thus it can be seen as a reconstruction of R in the dualist framework.