Measuring The Intangible: How Can An Operational Commander Know If His Information-Based Operations Are Effective?

: This study considers the question: is current doctrine on operational level intelligence adequate for development of a joint theater intelligence architecture? Two major subordinate questions are: (a) What is the current doctrine; and (b) What is 'adequate' in terms of both doctrinal support to procedures and the intelligence needed by an operational commander. The role of doctrine is first described, then existing statements of intelligence doctrine as found in JCS and Service publications are examined. Next, there is an assessment of theater intelligence procedures and organizations currently employed by some of the Unified Commands. The second question is answered by examining the relationship of current procedures to stated doctrine and by investigating the nature of operational level intelligence. The author concludes that current doctrine on operational level intelligence is not adequate for the development of a joint theater intelligence architecture. Neither published doctrine nor unified command practices meet the necessary criteria for military doctrine. But the root cause for the inadequacy is the failure to properly define operational level intelligence. Existing definitions are mere tautologies, and descriptions of the concept focus on intelligence management, not on the nature of operational level intelligence itself. An alternative approach to the problem is offered by defining operational level intelligence in terms of enemy operational level linkages instead of friendly ones, and the effect of this redefinition on future doctrinal formats is discussed.

: The purpose of this review of doctrine is to provide a background to non-fire supporters about MLRS and its potential application in MOUT. This review relies heavily on the concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) found in FM 6-60 and supporting ideas from FM 6-50. The review is not limited to the short section on MOUT in FM 6-60, but includes a summary of relevant background factors for maneuver commanders and planners to consider. It is not a comprehensive report on the overall use of MLRS. Other associated doctrinal issues, such as logistical demands, weapons maintenance, and training programs in MOUT are not addressed here. Each of those issues, however, remain vital and deserve the attention of future research efforts.

: Information Operations (IO) are rapidly becoming a new Battlefield Operating System (BOS). Until the last 3-5 years, emphasis in applying the tenets of IO remained compartmented discretely within organizations at each level of war - strategic, operational, and tactical. Given the infusion of technology and the potential merger of those levels, information has become a currency for all operations across the spectrum of conflict. With the goal for IO to achieve Information Superiority, this study examines current IO doctrine and organization in light of expectations of the future battlefield and the transformed Army. The fundamental conclusion is that to develop into a viable contributor as a warfighting domain, IO should be formally recognized as a BOS and sub-divided to encompass two types of operations: influence/perception operations focused on the message; and network/cyber operations focused on the media. In the final analysis, current IO systems require radical modification with respect to doctrine, organization, leader development, and training.

: The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction will lead to cultural and religious conflicts. Operational commanders that do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Current joint doctrine does not provide operational commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process. Culture and religion are significant factors that operational commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of Joint Doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) will mitigate the potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning and execution.

: War termination strategies are not an issue of whether or not the nation should devote sufficient military means to achieve the chosen political objectives. Conflict termination involves more than simply ending hostilities. It is a matter of effective coordination in development of objectives and strategies while at the same time linking the political leadership and the military commander to achieve the ends with the appropriate means. The American approach to military strategy has had a tendency to sever the links between military action and political objectives, and American military strategy has largely been awkward in its contribution towards achieving a better and lasting peace. This is in part due to having insufficient doctrinal guidance to achieve the ends as described by the policy maker. It is also because current doctrine and policy does not cause us to think through the implications of successfully achieving our objectives. The operational commander must be skilled in maintaining a balance of military force and diplomatic initiation to preserve and reinforce our political objectives while, at the same time working the concerns of a defeated enemy or enemies to prohibit part two of the same conflict.

: Operational level commanders and their staffs require relevant and current joint doctrine that articulates the critical function of operational design and its role in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Additionally, sound elements of operational design and a method to apply them are further required. Currently, Joint Publications (JP) 3-0 (Operations) and 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) fall short of meeting these requirements, resulting in designs that lack coherence and completeness. Systemic Operational Design (SOD), provides a source from which a new approach to operational design can be developed and integrated into the JOPP. A new Designing Based Approach (DBA) inspired by SOD principles and driven by the need to enhance joint doctrine is proposed to in this monograph. More precisely, the DBA incorporates SOD discourse, proposes sweeping changes to the current elements of operational design, and establishes a parallel design application. Thus, SOD enhances the JOPP indirectly through the DBA.

: The National Security Strategy of the United States issued in September 2002 states military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. To support this focus, the Secretary of Defense issued the final report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review which provides a framework for the services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to establish material solutions, organizational conflicts, and administrative procedures to effect transformation. Given that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is both an Air Force major command as well as the air component to USSOCOM, the command has been put into a unique dilemma of trying to support some distinct differences in how the Air Force and USSOCOM plan to transform their organization. Using transformation road maps of both organizations as well as current doctrine and force structure, the paper analyzes congruencies and inconsistencies in both plans with reference to organizing, training, and equipping AFSOC forces. Based on those comparisons, this paper looks at how the current AFSOC long range plan is postured to support both strategies. Also, the Air Force's approach to transformation of Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets will be reviewed with the goal to seek similar applications to AFSOC. Finally, this paper proposes transformation initiatives that the Air Force and USSOCOM could integrate into a joint strategy to meet the goals of DOD transformation.

: Today s Army aviation forces have the potential to provide a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or a War Fighting Commander in Chief (CINC) tremendous lethality and flexibility throughout the spectrum of conflict and operational functions. However, current doctrine for deploying and employing Army aviation forces prevents their inclusion in many Operational and Contingency plans. Therefore, new doctrine must be created to make aviation forces easier to deploy and employ. Innovative ways of overcoming strategic mobility limitations such as creating aviation prepositioned stocks, which only include the truck, tents, and other easy to maintain items to support an aviation task force, would cut the strategic air required to move an aviation task force in half. The creation of doctrine to allow Army aviation to be employed under the joint force air component commander (JFACC) would allow for the most effective and efficient use of Army aviation by an operational commander. Aviation doctrine has not changed significantly in over 25 years. Task Force Hawk s inability to rapidly assimilate into the joint air operation over Serbia and Kosovo during Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrates the need for change. Lessons learned during Operation Allied Force, which were written nearly three years ago, have yet to be incorporated into Army doctrine. The capabilities of the modern aviation fleet have out-grown the Air Land Battle doctrine of the 70s and 80s. The time for change is now.

: This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the United States' Eigth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway's command, from late December of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway's Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and reestablish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel. thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of initiative at the operational level of war. The monograph is divided into four major sections. After an introduction in Section I, Section II discusses the current doctrine concerning the tenet of initiative as described in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Section III examines the theoretical foundations of the concept of initiative as expressed in the writings of Clausewitz. Section IV describes Ridgeway's conduct of withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations in early 1951. The concluding section evaluates Ridgeway's operational design using the key concepts found in FM 100-5 -- centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points.

: Since 1991, the U.S. military has participated in Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. As a result, U.S. Armed Forces have become increasingly involved in working with a plethora of independent non-military actors during humanitarian relief operations. The unique nature of this relationship is recognized in the Military Operations Other Than War principle of unity of effort. For the Joint Task Force Commander (JFC) , unity of effort acknowledges the fact that coordination and cooperation replace command and control as guiding principles during HA operations. To Support the JFC conducting humanitarian relief operations, doctrine has been developed identifying the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the engine that drives the coordination process. However, current doctrine is incomplete. While focusing on the who, what, when, why, and how of CMOC operations, guidance discussing where is conspicuously absent. To optimize unity of effort, standardized doctrine must be developed and instituted identifying where to physically locate the CMOC during HA operations. Based on the divergent cultures of the participating military and non-military actors, parallel civil-military operations centers located inside and outside the wire offer the best opportunity for optimizing unity of effort between the Joint Task Force and Humanitarian Belief Organizations supporting HA operations.

: Operational commanders have been and will be confronted with broad, complex theaters of war. Coordinating medical treatment, patient evacuation, and blood program processes are some of the familiar tasks of the operational commander's surgeon and health service support planning staff. Other aspects of health service support that are not so closely tied to the hospital like medical intelligence and preventive medicine must also be considered and included for in the operational planning process. An additional complexity imposed on military commanders and their medical planners in future conflicts is to monitor and protect military personnel from the effects of chemical, physical and biological hazards encountered in their deployed workplaces. Occupational medicine (including medical surveillance) and industrial hygiene are professions that deal with these issues and will be part of future military operations.

: Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's template for future military operations, identifies information superiority as the linchpin of the emerging operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, precision Engagement, Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional protection. While the technical challenges to realizing these concepts are acknowledged, I contend the tasks required to successfully integrate the human and cultural side of Joint Vision 2010's information superiority are as daunting as any of the still unsolved technical hurdles. Currently, the human element of technology enabled warfare is not getting the attention it needs. The military must begin to examine whether current training and doctrine are sufficient to prepare operational commanders for the Chairman's vision of the future.

Network-centric warfare (NCW) is a concept that prioritizes integration and interconnection between combat elements to improve operational effectiveness. One approach to achieve high interoperability is ESP-NOW communication with mesh network topology. ESP-NOW technology enables fast and efficient wireless communication between devices without Wi-Fi infrastructure or routers. This research implements a mesh network topology using ESP32 modules that support ESP-NOW, where each node can function as a repeater to facilitate communication between devices beyond direct range. Reliability and network coverage testing was conducted by measuring latency and throughput parameters, which showed an average latency of 15 ms and a throughput of up to 2 Mbps, sufficient to support tactical communications in real-time. Although the performance is satisfactory, the obstacles encountered include limited coverage in dense environments and signal interference, which affects the stability of the connection. The study illustrates how the integration of ESP-NOW with mesh improves interoperability within NCW, allowing military units to share real-time data, such as position coordination, situational information, and operational commands. Thus, this implementation has great potential in future military operations, strengthening the integration of combat units and situational awareness on the battlefield.

: In response to the horrific terrorist events of September 11, 2001, America needs to reexamine what organization it charges to be the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) in Homeland Security. Currently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are the lead agencies in dealing with terrorism. The Office of Homeland Security is the coordination element established by Executive Order. The United States Military, specifically the United States Joint Forces Command, is only allowed to play a supporting role, not one of leadership. The reason most often given for not allowing the Military Operational Commander to take the lead is the Posse Comitatus Act which in general prohibits the active military forces from conducting civilian law enforcement activities. The role of the Department of Defense and that of the United States Joint Forces Command in Homeland Security should be one of leadership and not of support. USJFCOM and that of any Commander of a Joint Task Force in charge of Homeland Security provides a better trained force equipped for dealing with this national crisis. Legal and traditional obstacles can be overcome to give the American people the security and safety they need and deserve by allowing USJFCOM to take a leadership role during this national crisis of fighting and countering acts of terrorism against the United States.

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) declared cyberspace as an operational domain in 2011. The DoD subsequently formed US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct operations to achieve national and military objectives in and through cyberspace. Since that time, the DoD has implemented and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace operations, derived from traditional military C2 doctrine, to achieve unity of effort across both the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air, and space). The DoD continues to struggle to adapt its C2 methods from the physical domains to the cyber domain. Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the cyberspace domain leads to several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace from the other domains. Cyberspace presents a very different operational environment than the physical domains, where time and space are compressed. In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace different from the other operational domains and the challenges those differences impose on existing C2 constructs. We propose a campaign of experimentation, consisting of a series cyberspace C2 experiments, to address these challenges by conducting research into the taxonomy of C2 nodes, decisions, information, and relationships, which can be used to simulate and refine DoD cyberspace operations C2 constructs.