Operational Level Intelligence: An Alternate Approach

: The United States military is reviewing command and control (C2) as part of a larger transformation process underway in the Department of Defense. A key question for future C2 design is: who should make decisions for forces engaged in war? Net-centric theory questions the current concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of operational level leaders traditional generalship. Theorists of Information Age warfare contend that decision-making power should increasingly shift from operational to tactical level commanders to fully realize the potential of net-centric organization. Classic theory on war, modern decision sciences and case studies of recent net-centric environments suggest a different conclusion. Operational level commanders continue to provide a unique value added to decisions in war. This value is a product of intuitive grasp Clausewitz's genius for war and the wisdom derived from experience and education. Drawing on this intuition and experience, operational commanders are better able to perceive and act on campaign-level opportunities or dangers missed at the tactical level. Future command and control designs that reduce the scope generalship at the operational level in favor of self-synchronization.

: Current doctrine, when combined with existing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), can provide operational commanders with a measure of effectiveness for their information operations. Commanders must be able to measure the effectiveness of their information operations (IO) in order to know if they are accomplishing their purpose. Measuring effectiveness, however, is more than just a function a staff performs; it is part of the entire process of planning and executing military operations.

: War termination strategies are not an issue of whether or not the nation should devote sufficient military means to achieve the chosen political objectives. Conflict termination involves more than simply ending hostilities. It is a matter of effective coordination in development of objectives and strategies while at the same time linking the political leadership and the military commander to achieve the ends with the appropriate means. The American approach to military strategy has had a tendency to sever the links between military action and political objectives, and American military strategy has largely been awkward in its contribution towards achieving a better and lasting peace. This is in part due to having insufficient doctrinal guidance to achieve the ends as described by the policy maker. It is also because current doctrine and policy does not cause us to think through the implications of successfully achieving our objectives. The operational commander must be skilled in maintaining a balance of military force and diplomatic initiation to preserve and reinforce our political objectives while, at the same time working the concerns of a defeated enemy or enemies to prohibit part two of the same conflict.

: The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction will lead to cultural and religious conflicts. Operational commanders that do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Current joint doctrine does not provide operational commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process. Culture and religion are significant factors that operational commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of Joint Doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) will mitigate the potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning and execution.

: The effective application of operational art is critical to the successful termination of a limited war by the U.S. Despite this role, guidance regarding the application of operational art to termination in a limited war is meager. This paper focuses on the high-level bridge between the strategic and operational levels that is necessary to achieve successful termination. Theoretical synopses regarding the unique characteristics of limited war, war termination theory, and negotiating theory are provided. Practical issues/steps regarding the bridge from the strategic to the operational level are explored based upon the noted theories. The validity of the practical thought in the paper is tested through an examination of termination in the Korean War. Based upon arguments in the paper, it is clear that successful termination in a limited war cannot be achieved without the effective application of operational art at the strategic/operational level of war. It is also clear that the operational commander is uniquely positioned to review the ability of the military instrument to deliver the political object. Recommendations entail an expansion of doctrine to include a broader discussion of war termination issues. War termination, Limited war, Operational art, Strategy, Operational commander.

Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of ‘jointness’. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronising its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness ‐ a single tri‐service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter‐service rivalry ‐ and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.

: Operational level commanders and their staffs require relevant and current joint doctrine that articulates the critical function of operational design and its role in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Additionally, sound elements of operational design and a method to apply them are further required. Currently, Joint Publications (JP) 3-0 (Operations) and 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) fall short of meeting these requirements, resulting in designs that lack coherence and completeness. Systemic Operational Design (SOD), provides a source from which a new approach to operational design can be developed and integrated into the JOPP. A new Designing Based Approach (DBA) inspired by SOD principles and driven by the need to enhance joint doctrine is proposed to in this monograph. More precisely, the DBA incorporates SOD discourse, proposes sweeping changes to the current elements of operational design, and establishes a parallel design application. Thus, SOD enhances the JOPP indirectly through the DBA.

: This monograph provides an assessment of Iranian warfighting abilities at the operational level during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War. It also looks at post-war Iranian arms purchases and training exercises to predict future Iranian operational warfighting abilities. The assessment of Iranian warfighting abilities is framed within the structure established by United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield. The pamphlet details six Operational Operating Systems (OOSs): operational movement and maneuver, operational fires, operational protection, operational command and control, operational intelligence, and operational support. This monograph concludes that future Iranian warfighting abilities at the operational level will be anchored on a formidable missile capability and a growing, maturing, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) equipped and trained to conduct both conventional and unconventional warfare.

: Overcoming Ambiguity at the Operational Level. Leaders are forced to make decisions with imperfect information on a regular basis. Time constraints necessitate action before complete information can be obtained. Other decisions must be made based on ambiguous information that can be interpreted in multiple ways. Both the nature of the decision and the information used as input play an important role in determining where, organizationally, the decision should be made. Bayes formula for contingent probabilities is useful for demonstrating how organizational decisions can impact rational decision makers faced with ambiguity by demonstrating how expectations are revised with new information. When taking other operational considerations into account, it may also be useful for identifying decisions that should be made in certain locations. Once an optimal decision point is identified, the operational commander should allocate resources and establish procedures to properly align his staff.

: The culminating point is an important concept that must be understood by 21 St Century operational level commanders and planners. It is of the utmost importance that one's own, and the enemy's culminating point be identified with the highest possible degree of accuracy during the planning phase of a major operation or campaign. Failing to do so could result in a premature halt of the attack, thus benefiting the defender, or lead to the overextension of one's own force, leaving it vulnerable to an enemy counterattack. This study begins with a theoretical discussion of the culminating point, for both the attack and defense. Key definitions and related concepts provided in Carl von Clausewitz's On War, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, are discussed in detail. These sources provide many of the factors that can cause a force to reach culmination, and serve as a basis for understanding the difficulties involved in trying to determine the time and place of culmination. The historical example of the Battle of Chancellorsville is used to illustrate the importance of the culminating point concept. Other current factors attributing to culmination are discussed, and recommendations are offered to help operational commanders and planners to zero in' on this elusive point.

: The Army's Operational Logistics Doctrine For The Twenty-First Century, Major Kent S. Marquardt, USA, 42 Pages. Currently, there is no Army operational level logistics doctrine. Since Army logistics has responsibility for prompt and sustained support, operational logistics doctrine should be applicable to all areas that fall under the Army's responsibility to provide logistics support for itself, other services, allies, and agencies. Army operational logistics doctrine should link the foxhole to the industrial base and encompass the ability to anticipate and improvise based upon the situation. The methodology of this paper considers several things. First, it defines the different levels of war and logistics as specified in joint doctrine. Next, it shows how doctrine is derived and how the manuals present doctrine. Third, it compares fundamental logistics precepts presented in current Army manuals and Joint Publications. Finally, current logistics doctrine is evaluated against criteria established in TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century in order to discern the best Army logistics doctrine at the operational level. The following questions are answered: (1) What is operational logistics? (2) What are the levels of war, as they apply to Army logistics? (3) What is doctrine and how does it fit into the Army's operational context? (4) what guides the contents of Army manuals? (5) How do these manuals fit into the structure of logistics doctrine? (6) What is the difference between logistics doctrine in joint and Army manuals? (7) How does this doctrine compare against evaluation criteria established by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)? (8) What should be the operational logistics doctrine for the Army? (9) In what manual should this operational logistics doctrine reside?

: The National Security Strategy of the United States issued in September 2002 states military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. To support this focus, the Secretary of Defense issued the final report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review which provides a framework for the services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to establish material solutions, organizational conflicts, and administrative procedures to effect transformation. Given that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is both an Air Force major command as well as the air component to USSOCOM, the command has been put into a unique dilemma of trying to support some distinct differences in how the Air Force and USSOCOM plan to transform their organization. Using transformation road maps of both organizations as well as current doctrine and force structure, the paper analyzes congruencies and inconsistencies in both plans with reference to organizing, training, and equipping AFSOC forces. Based on those comparisons, this paper looks at how the current AFSOC long range plan is postured to support both strategies. Also, the Air Force's approach to transformation of Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets will be reviewed with the goal to seek similar applications to AFSOC. Finally, this paper proposes transformation initiatives that the Air Force and USSOCOM could integrate into a joint strategy to meet the goals of DOD transformation.

Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, military power remains a dominant factor in Asian regional politics. As China, operating the world's largest army, grows stronger, there are ongoing debates over the implications for Asia's regional security. This book argues that it is imperative to look beyond the empirical observations and conventional materialist reading of Chinese military development to understand its dynamics and directions in doctrinal terms and put it in a readiness context for evaluation. Military doctrine has long been under-studied and is often treated as a subject separate from force development. But, as this study contends, this factor is necessary for interpreting the making and purposes of China's military power because it forms the intellectual foundation of military structural and hardware development. When loaded with political rhetoric, it also communicates to us the intended uses of the military power. The role of doctrine is reinforced in the context of military readiness, which defines what for and how the army is getting ready. Force development is evaluated in structural, operational and directional terms.The importance of this analytical framework based on military doctrine and readiness is demonstrated in a survey of the evolutionof Chinese military doctrine and force development. As the Chinese People's Liberation Army has continued to adjust its military structure and operation to follow the doctrinal lead, its switches between the doctines of local war and total war have seen corresponding changes to the emphasis between operational and structural readiness.

<sec><title>Objective</title> The low-altitude economy covers low-altitude manufacturing, flight operations, support services and comprehensive service industries, and has the characteristics of spatially three-dimensional, regional dependence, digital ecology, industrial integration and radiation driving. With the continuous development of digitization and informatization, these characteristics increasingly affect the interaction between low-altitude activities and urban and natural environments, which provides new ideas for the development of landscape architecture, and the coordinated development of the two is an important issue in the transformation of landscape architecture. </sec><sec><title>Methods</title> The knowledge map method was used to analyze the research status of environmental low-altitude economy at home and abroad. By combing and reading relevant literature at home and abroad, the research trends of low-altitude economy in logistics, aviation, ecological monitoring and other fields were systematically analyzed by reviewing literature research, case studies and comparative analysis. </sec><sec><title>Results</title> By analyzing the domestic and foreign research, the internal mechanism of the cross research between landscape architecture and low-altitude economy is revealed four aspects. In the aspect of technology application, low-altitude aircraft tend to be transformed from perception tools to "design intelligence" which can guide ecological design and space construction. In the aspect of spatial planning, landscape architecture will realize the spatial transformation from plane extension to three-dimensional reconstruction under the development of low-altitude economy. In the aspect of ecological impact, the research focus has changed from identifying environmental risks by using low-altitude facilities to systematic assessment and control of ecology. In the aspect of humanistic experience, the combination of low-altitude economy and cultural narrative has further stimulated the vitality of landscape architecture discipline. It is found that under the influence of low-altitude economy, the development of landscape architecture faces some new problems, such as imperfect policies and regulations, insufficient adaptability of spatial planning system, systematic lack of ecological protection, technical bottleneck restriction, homogenization dilemma of cultural and tourism integration, including lack of unified standards for low-altitude facility design, traditional two-dimensional planning being difficult to meet the needs of air-space coordination, ecological destruction caused by noise and habitat disturbance, lack of ecological protection system, etc. There are technical bottlenecks in data processing and flight stability; homogenization of tourism products, focusing on tourism over cultural innovation. In order to promote the coordinated development of the two, this paper puts forward the implementation path of the integration of low-altitude economy and landscape architecture: to ensure the adaptation of policies and regulations, to improve policies and regulations and technical standards, to formulate low-altitude greening design and ecological evaluation standards, and to lay a foundation for the integration of landscape architecture and low-altitude economy; Conduct spatial value evaluation, clarify the use, development subject and income distribution mechanism of each low-altitude area, promote the market-oriented operation of public resources, and use unmanned aerial vehicles to carry out ecological background analysis and evaluate the ecological carrying capacity of low-altitude activities; Conduct functional compound planning, make landscape architecture break through the limitation of traditional ground perspective, bring low-altitude airspace into the vertical space system of landscape architecture, add low-altitude related infrastructure in the garden, and realize efficient coordinated utilization of airspace and ground resources; In ecological service monitoring, we should increase the investment in R&amp;D of UAV technology, low-altitude aircraft noise reduction technology, flight safety guarantee technology, etc., improve the intelligent level of landscape architecture monitoring and management, and establish a new ecological assessment mode; Promote the integrated development of culture and tourism, break through the homogenization dilemma from three dimensions of cultural empowerment, spatial differentiation and experience depth, and integrate garden cultural elements into low-altitude experience links, to improve the overall operation effect. </sec><sec><title>Conclusion</title> Based on the research, we have drawn conclusions in three aspects. 1) The global low-altitude economy industry will become the next development hotspot, and it should accelerate the integration with transportation logistics, cultural tourism and other formats, expand more application scenarios, promote the integration of landscape architecture and related industries, and activate the new vitality of landscape architecture. 2) Green space and parks in cities will become important carriers for low-altitude transportation in the future, and planning and design of low-altitude composite public space will be the focus of research, and research will move from two-dimensional garden aesthetic space to three-dimensional traffic spatial pattern. 3) The development of unmanned aerial vehicle and related technologies provide refined intelligent solutions for intelligent garden management, and low-altitude monitoring data provide new tools for ecological value assessments of gardens, significantly improve ecological monitoring and management levels. </sec>

: Desert Storm brought to light the potential capability of theater ballistic missiles. During the War, SCUD missiles were used by the Iraqis in an attempt to alter the strategic balance. Fortunately, coalition forces were able to negate the effect of the ballistic missiles through air attacks and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Based on the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed & theater missile defense (TMD) doctrine to serve as a guide to operational commanders for countering ballistic missiles in the future. This doctrine calls for unity of effort at the operational level by coordination of the component commanders. Past experience points to the fact that a common commander is necessary for unity of effort. Therefore, because of the large number of joint forces required to counter ballistic missiles and the need to work towards a common objective, the TXD doctrine should reflect the requirement for a missile defense commander. (MM)