Mental state attribution and the gaze cueing effect.

Observing another person's averted eye gaze led to automatic shift of attention in the corresponding direction,which facilitated subsequent early visual processing. This phenomenon was termed 'eyes gaze cueing effect',in short,'gaze cueing effect' (GCE). Many researchers tried to interpret the processing mechanism underlying GCE. However,there were controversies on this topic. Friesen and Kingstone (2003) claimed that gaze cues triggered a kind of reflexive or exogenous shift of visual attention that was normally associated with the abrupt onset of a stimulus in the periphery of vision. Whereas Vecera and Rizzo (2004) found a patient EVR with frontal-lobe damage was impaired in using eye gaze cues to allocate attention,suggesting that GCE may involve frontal-lobe processes which control voluntary,not automatic,shifts of visuospatial attention. Both viewpoints have gained some evidences. Thus,whether gaze cues shifted spatial attention reflexively (exogenously) or voluntarily (endogenously) was still in debate. This issue would be clarified in the present study in two aspects. On the one hand,how gaze cues shifted observer's attention. On the other hand,how gaze cues affected the processing of the target in the corresponding direction. Two experiments were conducted in this study,which employed the spatial Stroop paradigm and the target search task respectively. In both experiments,subjects were presented with a gaze cue to the right or left visual field (VF) before the occurrence of a lateralized target to response. There were two conditions in this non-predictive cueing task:(1) targets were presented in the VF indicated by the eye gaze direction (congruent); or (2) targets were opposite to the eye gaze direction (incongruent). In the first experiment,22 subjects were required to discriminate the direction to which the peripherally presented arrow points. While in the second experiment,another 16 subjects all were instructed to finish two different tasks:One involved the detection of single feature,and the other involved the search of feature conjunction. Stimulus presentation and data collection were conducted by E-prime software. From the first experiment,it was found:(1) The lack of GCE was due to the processing conflict between gaze cue and other endogenous cues,which indicated that the two cues had similar processing mechanism; (2) Gaze cue produced larger spatial Stroop effects for valid than invalid trials,which suggested that eyes gaze led to the generation of an internal representation of the spatial location. From the second experiment,similar facilitation effects of the gaze cue for both single feature and feature conjunction search was found,which revealed that gaze cue affected feature extraction as well as later processing stages (decision and response processes),but it did not influence feature integration directly. It was concluded that the intrinsic mechanism of GCE belonged to the endogenous attention system. Eyes gaze cue may induce observers' attention shift through the generation of an internal representation of the spatial location indicated by the cue,and facilitate target feature extraction and encoding,thus speed up the response ultimately.

Social attention is enhanced by facial emotions even for occluded faces.

Gaze cueing (i.e., the shifting of person B's attention by following person A's gaze) is closely linked with human interaction and learning. To make the most of this connection, researchers need to investigate possible moderators enhancing or reducing the extent of this attentional shifting. In this study we used a gaze cueing paradigm to demonstrate that the perceived trustworthiness of a cueing person constitutes such a moderator for female participants. Our results show a significant interaction between perceived trustworthiness and the response time trade-off between valid and invalid gaze cues [gaze cueing effect (GCE)], as manifested in greater following of a person's gaze if this person was trustworthy as opposed to the following of an untrustworthy person's gaze. An additional exploratory analysis showed potentially moderating influences of trait-anxiety on this interaction (p = .057). The affective background of the experiment (i.e., using positive or negative target stimuli) had no influence.

The gaze cueing effect is the tendency for people to respond faster to targets appearing at locations gazed at by others, compared with locations gazed away from by others. The effect is robust, widely studied, and is an influential finding within social cognition. Formal evidence accumulation models provide the dominant theoretical account of the cognitive processes underlying speeded decision-making, but they have rarely been applied to social cognition research. In this study, using a combination of individual-level and hierarchical computational modelling techniques, we applied evidence accumulation models to gaze cueing data (three data sets total, N = 171, 139,001 trials) for the first time to assess the relative capacity that an attentional orienting mechanism and information processing mechanisms have for explaining the gaze cueing effect. We found that most participants were best described by the attentional orienting mechanism, such that response times were slower at gazed away from locations because they had to reorient to the target before they could process the cue. However, we found evidence for individual differences, whereby the models suggested that some gaze cueing effects were driven by a short allocation of information processing resources to the gazed at location, allowing for a brief period where orienting and processing could occur in parallel. There was exceptionally little evidence to suggest any sustained reallocation of information processing resources neither at the group nor individual level. We discuss how this individual variability might represent credible individual differences in the cognitive mechanisms that subserve behaviourally observed gaze cueing effects.

Research on emotional modulation of attention in gaze cueing has resulted in contradictory findings. Some studies found larger gaze cueing effects (GCEs) in response to a fearful gaze cue, whereas others did not. A recent study explained this discrepancy within a cognitive resource account, in which perceptual demands of the task promote a bias toward either a local (discrimination task) or global (localization task) processing strategy. During local processing, the integration of emotional expression with gaze direction is assumed to be impaired, whereas during global processing integration is assumed to be facilitated. In the current study, we investigated the cognitive resource account in three experiments. In Experiment 1, we manipulated task demands by adopting a detection or a localization task whilst both should allow global processing. In Experiments 2 and 3, we induced either a local or global perceptual processing strategy by presenting local or global targets (Experiment 2) or by priming local or global perception prior to the gaze cueing task (Experiment 3). Results showed faster orienting in response to a fearful face cue independent of task demands in Experiment 1. Inducing local and global processing strategies in Experiments 2 and 3 did not affect emotional modulation of the GCE. In contrast, Bayesian analyses provided evidence of absence of such an effect, demonstrating that local or global processing strategies cannot explain the mixed findings obtained in emotional modulation of gaze cueing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Objectives Aging is associated with declines in theory of mind – the ability to infer the mental states of others. We examined whether priming theory of mind mindsets actively (Study 1) and passively (Study 2) improved older adults’ performance. Method Across two studies, participants completed a novel question-and-answer theory of mind task using the television show Nathan for You® in a mindset or no mindset condition. In Study 1, participants (N = 324, 18–84 years) completed a similar task related to a different show prior to the Nathan for You task (active mindset). In Study 2, young (N = 235; MAge = 20.47) and older (N = 193, MAge = 74.48) adults made continuous ratings of awkwardness of different episodes of Nathan for You before completing the question-and-answer task (passive mindset). We also measured executive function and episodic memory. In both studies, the same tasks were performed in reverse order for the control conditions (no mindset). Results Mindsets were associated with small-to-medium increases in theory of mind performance. Cognitive ability did not explain these improvements. Conclusion These findings suggest that theory of mind performance can be improved through motivation (e.g. mindsets); cognitive function (e.g. ability) does not moderate this relationship.

Background: Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment has repeatedly been found in paranoid schizophrenia. The current study aims at investigating whether this is related to a deficit in ToM (undermentalizing) or an increased ToM ability to hyperattribute others’ mental states (overmentalizing). Methods: Mental state attribution was examined in 24 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (12 acute paranoid (APS) and 12 post-acute paranoid (PPS)) with regard to positive symptoms as well as matched healthy persons using a moving shapes paradigm. We used 3-T-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to provide insights into the neural underpinnings of ToM due to attributional processes in different states of paranoid schizophrenia. Results: In the condition that makes demands on theory of mind skills (ToM condition), in patients with diagnosed schizophrenia less appropriate mental state descriptions have been used, and they attributed mental states less often to the moving shapes than healthy persons. On a neural level, patients suffering from schizophrenia exhibited within the ToM network hypoactivity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and hyperactivity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) as compared to the healthy sample. Conclusions: Our results indicate both undermentalizing and hypoactivity in the MPFC and increased overattribution related to hyperactivity in the TPJ in paranoid schizophrenia, providing new implications for understanding ToM in paranoid schizophrenia.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the evidence concerning mirror self-recognition as a measure of self-awareness and examine its applicability to schizophrenia. The evidence suggests that the ability to identify yourself correctly in a mirror is not only related to the capacity to conceive of yourself, but may also be related to your ability to take into account what other individuals may know, want or intend to do. This ability to make accurate inferences about mental states in others (known as mental state attribution, theory of mind or social intelligence) begins to emerge during childhood at the same point in time as mirror self-recognition. Species that fail to recognize themselves in mirrors fail to show any evidence that they can infer mental states in one another. Also consistent with the proposition that these phenomena go hand in hand, recent neuropsychological evidence shows that self-awareness and mental state attribution in humans appear to be a byproduct of brain activity that is related to the frontal cortex. As detailed here and elsewhere in this volume, there is growing evidence that both self-awareness and mental state attribution is impaired in schizophrenic patients and that schizophrenia may be related to frontal lobe dysfunction. Mirror self-recognition Mirrors have a number of unique psychological properties. In principle, mirrors represent a means of seeing yourself as you are seen by others. In front of a mirror you are literally an audience to your own behaviour.

Gaze behavior is an important social signal between humans as it communicates locations of interest. People typically orient their attention to where others look as this informs about others' intentions and future actions. Studies have shown that humans can engage in similar gaze behavior with robots but presumably more so when they adopt the intentional stance toward them (i.e., believing robot behaviors are intentional). In laboratory settings, the phenomenon of attending toward the direction of others' gaze has been examined with the use of the gaze-cueing paradigm. While the gaze-cueing paradigm has been successful in investigating the relationship between adopting the intentional stance toward robots and attention orienting to gaze cues, it is unclear if the repetitiveness of the gaze-cueing paradigm influences adopting the intentional stance. Here, we examined if the duration of exposure to repetitive robot gaze behavior in a gaze-cueing task has a negative impact on subjective attribution of intentionality. Participants performed a short, medium, or long face-to-face gaze-cueing paradigm with an embodied robot while subjective ratings were collected pre and post the interaction. Results show that participants in the long exposure condition had the smallest change in their intention attribution scores, if any, while those in the short exposure condition had a positive change in their intention attribution, indicating that participants attributed more intention to the robot after short interactions. The results also show that attention orienting to robot gaze-cues was positively related to how much intention was attributed to the robot, but this relationship became more negative as the length of exposure increased. In contrast to subjective ratings, the gaze-cueing effects (GCEs) increased as a function of the duration of exposure to repetitive behavior. The data suggest a tradeoff between the desired number of trials needed for observing various mechanisms of social cognition, such as GCEs, and the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance toward a robot.

Velo-cardio-facial syndrome (VCFS; 22q11.2 deletion syndrome) results from a genetic mutation that increases risk for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). We compared Theory of Mind (ToM) skills in 63 individuals with VCFS (25% with an ASD diagnosis) and 43 typically developing controls, and investigated the relationship of ToM to reciprocal social behavior. We administered a video-based task to assess mentalizing at two sites University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and State University of New York (SUNY) Upstate Medical University. The videos depicted interactions representing complex mental states (ToM condition), or simple movements (Random condition). Verbal descriptions of the videos were rated for Intentionality (i.e. mentalizing) and Appropriateness. Using Repeated Measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), we assessed the effects of VCFS and ASD on Intentionality and Appropriateness, and the relationship of mentalizing to Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) scores. Results indicated that individuals with VCFS overall had lower Intentionality and Appropriateness scores than controls for ToM but not for Random scenes. In the SUNY sample, individuals with VCFS, both with and without ASD, performed more poorly than controls on the ToM condition; however, in the UCLA sample, only individuals with VCFS without ASD performed significantly worse than controls on the ToM condition. Controlling for site and age, performance on the ToM condition was significantly correlated with SRS scores. Individuals with VCFS, regardless of an ASD diagnosis, showed impairments in the spontaneous attribution of mental states to abstract visual stimuli, which may underlie real-life problems with social interactions. A better understanding of the social deficits in VCFS is essential for the development of targeted behavioral interventions.

Numerous uniquely human phenomena, from teaching to our most complex forms of cooperation, depend on our ability to tailor our communication to the knowledge and ignorance states of our social partners. Despite four decades of research into the “theory of mind” capacities of nonhuman primates, there remains no evidence that primates can communicate on the basis of their mental state attributions, to enable feats of coordination. Moreover, recent reevaluation of the experimental literature has questioned whether primates can represent others’ ignorance at all. The present preregistered study investigated whether bonobos are capable of attributing knowledge or ignorance about the location of a hidden food reward to a cooperative human partner, and utilizing this attribution to modify their communicative behavior in the service of coordination. Bonobos could receive a reward that they had watched being hidden under one of several cups, if their human partner could locate the reward. If bonobos can represent a partner’s ignorance and are motivated to communicate based on this mental state attribution, they should point more frequently, and more quickly, to the hidden food’s location when their partner is ignorant about that location than when he is knowledgeable. Bonobos indeed flexibly adapted the frequency and speed of their communication to their partner’s mental state. These findings suggest that apes can represent (and act on) others’ ignorance in some form, strategically and appropriately communicating to effectively coordinate with an ignorant partner and change his behavior.

Can patients with schizophrenia have good mentalizing skills? Disentangling heterogeneity of theory of mind.

Impairment in social interactions is a primary characteristic of people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Although these individuals tend to orient less to naturalistic social cues than do typically developing (TD) individuals, laboratory experiments testing social orienting in ASD have been inconclusive, possibly because of a failure to fully isolate reflexive (stimulus-driven) and voluntary (goal-directed) social orienting processes. The purpose of the present study was to separately examine potential reflexive and/or voluntary social orienting differences in individuals with ASD relative to TD controls. Subjects (ages 7–14) with high-functioning ASD and a matched control group completed three gaze cueing tasks on an iPad in which individuals briefly saw a face with averted gaze followed by a target after a variable delay. Two tasks were 100% predictive with either all congruent (target appears in gaze direction) or all incongruent (target appears opposite from gaze direction) trials, respectively. Another task was non-predictive with these same trials (half congruent and half incongruent) intermixed randomly. Response times (RTs) to the target were used to calculate reflexive (incongruent condition RT—congruent condition RT) and voluntary (non-predictive condition RT—predictive condition RT) gaze cueing effects. Subjects also completed two additional non-social orienting tasks (ProPoint and AntiPoint). Subjects with ASD demonstrate intact reflexive but deficient voluntary gaze following. Similar results were found in a separate test of non-social orienting. This suggests problems with using social cues, but only in a goal-directed fashion, in our sample of high-functioning individuals with ASD. Such findings may not only explain inconclusive previous findings but more importantly be critical for understanding social dysfunctions in ASD and for developing future interventions.

Reconnaissance des expressions faciales émotionnelles et théorie de l’esprit dans la schizophrénie : la difficulté à identifier les états mentaux d’autrui serait-elle liée à un trouble de la reconnaissance des émotions faciales ?

The ability to follow nonverbal social cues is impaired in several disorders. Our aim was to collect normative data for the first psychometric test (TooN) that assesses this skill in children. The normative sample consisted of 339 typically developing children aged 6 to 10. TooN is a computerized tool that includes 120 trials in which children must press a button as soon as possible when an object appears on the right or left side of the screen. Each object is preceded by a video of a model gazing and/or pointing to the side where the object appears (i.e. congruent condition) or the opposite side (i.e. incongruent condition). Linear regression analyses were conducted for reaction times (RTs) and for gaze and pointing cuing effects (i.e. the difference between RTs in incongruent and congruent conditions). Regression analyses showed that age, sex and parental education significantly predicted RTs. Age and sex, but not parental education, were significant predictors of gaze cuing effects. However, age was the only significant predictor of pointing cuing effects. Based on these analyses, we provided the equations to calculate the z-scores for RTs and cuing effects. Accuracy scores, stratified by age and/or sex, are reported as percentiles. Based on the performances of typically developing children, we present the normative data of a new psychometric tool designed to assess nonverbal social cue-following. This tool can be valuable for evaluating children with neurodevelopmental disorders. To support this claim, its validity should be tested across various clinical populations.