Monotonicity in Electoral Systems

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly ­associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further “hybridized” electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationLiberal Democrat PartyCoalition GovernmentThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This work aims to contribute to our knowledge about the circumstances under which personal representation prevails. The main question is whether constituency orientation appears in a country where electoral rules encourage party representation. Previous research has established that electoral systems and member personalization are closely connected: candidate-centred electoral rules enhance personal-, while party-centred systems support party representation. In this sense, representation is perceived on a one-dimensional scale where personal and party representations indicate the two ends of the continuum. However, due to the party-centeredness of the system, the decisions are presumed to come from the party rather than being the result of individual discretion. In this view, party and personal representations are not mutually exclusive, but personal representation might be considered a form of party representation. In party-centred mixed member systems, the existence of the nominal tier leads parties to pursue rather person-oriented party strategies. Thus, the oft-cited causal effect between mixed electoral rules and personalization can be confirmed. However, to unravel the causal mechanism, we have to perceive the link between electoral rules and personal representation as being mediated by central party strategies. In the quest to test the above hypothesis I collect evidence from a case study on Hungary. Hungary serves as a least likely case, where member personalization is not likely to appear. The dissertation follows the neo-institutionalist approach, and establishes the link between electoral rules, member attitudes and behaviour in contemporary Hungary. It recognizes that even under party-centred electoral rules, there are serious motivations to pursue particularistic goals. These motivations can be proxied by different sets of career factors that relate to the past experience as well as the currently held positions of the legislators. The nature of the independent variables will point to three different types of motivations: (i) electoral, (ii) position-related, and (iii) habitual explanations. Personal representation is perceived from three angles. First, both focus and style of representation as the two aspects of members’ roles perceptions are investigated. Second, individual legislators’ personalized campaign strategies are explained by the pre-selected independent variables. Third, parliamentary questioning proxies constituency service carried out by members in representing the interests of their electoral districts. MP-survey data from 2010 is used to measure attitudes and campaign behaviour, while questioning data covers roughly half of the 2010-2014 electoral term, 2.5 years.

This paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods (CSMs) by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that parties’ CSMs reflect their strategies to win elections, this article offers the rationale behind why and how major parties in Taiwan and Japan adjusted their CSMs to meet the challenges posed by the transition of electoral rules in each country from single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. We argue that a party's choice of CSMs reflects its rationale for maximizing the prospects of winning under the given electoral rule, which counters the ‘no-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.

Political knowledge about electoral rules: Comparing mixed member proportional systems in Germany and New Zealand

The Arab Spring and subsequent global unrest sparked a debate about whether a fourth wave of democracy emerged in the global political arena starting in 2010. A key issue arises from these emerging democracies, or ‘countries in transition’, about what types of government institutions will be adopted by the new democracies. The previous literature on advanced democracies shows the economic structure of a nation impacted its choice of electoral rule system. This paper looks at what determines electoral rule choice in transitional nations. Using a panel database with 65 transitional countries with data for 18 years (1995 to 2012), this paper tests the argument that more coordinated market economies (CMEs) tend to adopt more proportional representative electoral rule systems during a political transition. Findings show that countries characterized as CMEs due to widespread primary education, which supports co-specific assets, and prominent industrial sectors have more proportional electoral rule systems.

ABSTRACTA classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.

The issue of unequal electoral turnout poses serious concerns for both the overall health of democratic politics, and the extent to which certain groups exert an unequal influence on the political process. This article explores the relationship between electoral rules such as: compulsory voting, electoral system proportionality, and voter registration with voter inequality in terms of age, income and education. This is examined using cross-national survey data and cross-level interactions between electoral institutions and socio-demographic variables. The final dataset is based on waves 2–4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and contains information on 133,000 individuals, within 45 countries, between 2001 and 2016. The results indicate that compulsory voting is associated with a significant reduction in turnout inequalities, while the effects of proportionality and voter registration are somewhat more mixed.

Th is paper evaluates the effect of two policy changes on the efficiency of Italian regional governments in the provision of health care services: first a change in the electoral system; second a process of fiscal decentralisation. The electoral system was changed in 1995 and replaced a pure proportional system by a majoritarian system, fostering the transition of regional governments towards a presidential regime. The process of fiscal decentralisation took effect in 1998, when intergovernmental grants earmarked for the health care sector were replaced by regional taxes. The Italian context offers a unique source of data to test the predictions of recent theoretical models that support a positive relationship between government efficiency and the electoral accountability enhanced by institutions such as electoral rules and fiscal decentralisation. The paper provides two main contributions: 1) a comprehensive analysis of the two main reforms that involved Italian regional governments and the health care sector during the 1990s; 2) the evaluation of the impact of the electoral reform in a quasi-experimental setting. The final results provide empirical evidence in line with the findings of the theoretical models.

ABSTRACTThis article explores how replacement rules for midterm vacancies affect legislative turnover in the context of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The differing electoral rules and replacement procedures for the two chambers of the Australian parliament over more than a century permit an analysis of the complex interplay between institutional rules, party strategy, and patterns of representation between 1901 and 2013. Since 1901, the Australian House of Representatives has been committed to single member electoral systems and by-elections for filling midterm vacancies, but major changes to both the electoral system and midterm replacement rules for the Australian Senate have played a critical role in enhancing party control of Senate careers.

From Ballot-Boxes to Barracks: Votes, Institutions, and Post-Election Coups

Concerns about electoral integrity are tied to debates about democracy and democratic backsliding. The potential for democratic backsliding increases with the perceived stakes of the political game. Electoral systems matter because they affect the stakes of the game. They influence how ideological polarization in the party system is produced and processed. They also influence the extent to which group differences become politicized and how peacefully politicized differences are managed. The relationship between electoral rules and electoral integrity depends on many contextual factors. High electoral integrity can be achieved under both majoritarian and proportional rules given the right conditions. Empirically, we find no consistent differences in the level of electoral integrity across majoritarian and proportional electoral systems when we average across different economic, social, and political contexts. We encourage scholars to more closely examine the contextual effects of electoral systems on electoral integrity in future work.

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