No-Contact Apprehension Policy: Overcoming its Current Impasse

In December 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments in the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, which prohibited abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, was subject to constitutional review. On June 24th, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion having held that the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a right to abortion. In doing so, the Court overruled two landmark decisions — Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey — issued by the Court in 1973 and 1992, respectively. The author of this article attempts to trace these developments chronologically and to put the Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence in both legal and political contexts. The primary part of the article is an analysis of the Dobbs decision, namely the majority opinion, several concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinion. Based on the text of the decision and points made by legal scholars in academic works and public comments, the author identifies factual and methodological flaws in the majority opinion and speculates how exactly the overruling of these landmark precedents might affect other constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court both before and after 1973. Analyzing the legal consequences of the Dobbs decision, the author concludes that the returning of the issue of abortion to the states does not simplify the situation, but, on the contrary, potentially invites a large number of jurisdictional disputes between the states, overflowing the federal court system. It is also noted that federal lawmakers could codify the right to abortion. However, taking into account the current political environment and the balance of power in the U.S. Congress, this scenario does not seem very plausible. Finally, the author discusses whether the legitimacy crisis of the Supreme Court is a part of a global trend and whether there might be a future need to reimagine the very institution of constitutional review.

Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed 10 justices to the U.S. Supreme Court - more than any president except Washington - and during his presidency from 1933 to 1945, the Court gained more visibility, underwent greater change, and made more landmark decisions than it had in its previous 150 years of existence. This collection examines FDR's influence on the Supreme Court and the Court's growing influence on American life.

Thurgood Marshall was unquestionably the greatest lawyer of the 20th century in the United States and perhaps the world. However, not too many years before Marshall successfully argued the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas case, which set the stage for the desegregation of all public education in the U.S., Marshall. himself had been denied admission to the University of Maryland Law School because of the color of his skin. Wounded but not defeated by this egregiously deliberate racial discrimination, he went on to excel as a superb law student at the Howard University Law School. There, Marshall was inspired by magnificent teachers and lawyers such as Charles Hamilton Houston. Upon obtaining his law degree, Marshall embarked on a remarkable career that included experiences as the general counsel of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the nation's leading civil rights attorney, as the Solicitor General of the United States, as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and culminating as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States for nearly a quarter of a century (Rowan, 1993).It is most appropriate that some of Marshall's most significant legal victories prior to Brown involved successful challenges to the racially discriminatory and exclusionary policies of major state public university law schools. In State of Missouri, ex. rel. v. Gaines (1938) and Sweatt v. Painter (1950), for example, Marshall achieved favorable decisions overturning the racial discriminatory and exclusionary practices of the then all-White law schools of the universities of Missouri and Texas, respectively. These victories were especially sweet ones for him given his own personal experiences of denial and rejection, based on race, in his pursuit of a legal education.It was not until 1974, fully two decades after its landmark decision in Brown, that the United States Supreme Court again faced the issue of racial discrimination in professional school education in DeFunis v. Odegaard. Significantly, and as would be expected, now-Justice Thurgood Marshall was among the dissenting voices in this case, which presented an opportunity for the Court to decide whether an affirmative action admissions policy adopted by the University of Washington Law School failed to meet the equal protection provisions of 14th Amendment. By a narrow 5-4 margin, however, the Court deemed the case moot, signalling that it was neither willing nor prepared to decide the first of the major post-Brown race discrimination cases in the realm of professional school and higher education.The DeFunis case involved a White male applicant, Mark DeFunis, who had graduated with distinction from college. After repeated unsuccessful efforts to obtain admission, DeFunis sued the University of Washington Law School and its chancellor in federal district court. He alleged that persons in recognized affirmative action classifications were admitted, despite their lower predicted first-year averages, because of their race or color.(1) As a White applicant, DeFunis claimed, he had been unconstitutionally denied admission in violation of his 14th Amendment right to equal protection. The Court, under the auspices of Associate Justice William Douglas, granted interlocutory relief to DeFunis. This allowed him to be admitted to and attend the law school while his case proceeded through the lower federal courts. By the time the matured case returned to the Supreme Court, DeFunis was in the final semester of his last and third year of the law degree program. Because his graduation was imminent and in all likelihood assured, the Court refused to hear the case on the merits, deeming it moot.By 1978, however, the situation had changed. In what has become perhaps the landmark post-Brown decision in this area of contention, at least in the public university context, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle of affirmative action in University of California v. …

2016/53 Landmark decision by Austrian Supreme Court: Face veil ban for employees is lawful (AT) The Austrian Supreme Court has ruled that the general prohibition of Muslim face veils by an employer does not constitute unlawful discrimination. In this landmark decision, Austria’s Supreme Court expresses the view that an uncovered face is a prerequisite to proper communication. Thus, termination of employment by reason of an employee’s refusal to come to work unless she can wear a face veil is not unlawful under the Austrian Equal Treatment Act. Whether this rule also applies to other religious clothing such as headscarves remains to be seen.

This chapter focuses on current understandings of performance management in the implementation of policy, with particular reference to climate initiatives. The chapter draws on research examining international experience in the development and implementation of performance systems. The focus will be on presenting the theoretical anchors necessary for effective performance management to establish an analytical framework to examine management practices for implementing climate policy by city governments. The framework will provide an analytical tool to help place city governments within a model of engagement with performance management in the implementation of climate policy. The model will help to establish insights for city governments seeking improvements to management and the measurable achievement of desired climate outcomes.

The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act - better known as the Westfall Act - was rushed into law in 1988 to avoid what was expected to be a crisis in exposing federal workers to court suits. The law was intended to overturn the Supreme Court's January 1988 decision in Westfall v. Erwin, which greatly expanded the potential liability of legislative and judicial employees as well as employees of the executive branch. Once faced by such a threat - and perhaps especially because the decision threatened congressional workers - Congress acted promptly. By November, Congress had held hearings, the House and Senate had agreed on language of a new bill, and President Reagan had signed the bill into law. Any gridlock that existed on this matter between the executive and legislative branches simply evaporated when the Court handed down its ruling. The law's purpose is ...to protect federal employees from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts of federal employees with an appropriate remedy against the United States (sec. 2[b]). The intention was to overturn the Westfall decision and thereby restore protections to executive-branch workers, extend those protections to legislative and judicial workers, and reinstitute the procedures by which persons who were harmed could bring suit against the government rather than against individual workers. Seldom is anything as easy as it seems. The law may have achieved its key purposes, but numerous other problems arose in the process. An Overview of Torts A tort is a civil wrong independent of contract, meaning that the harm did not stem from a breach of the contract. Constitutional torts involve harm stemming from violation of one's constitutional rights. Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971), federal employees can be held personally liable for violating someone's constitutional rights. In the Bivens case, narcotics officers made a warrantless search of a residence in the early morning. Cases commonly arise in which constitutional torts are alleged (see the Blohm; Krueger, Lutz; Rauccio; and Saul cases).(1) The Supreme Court ruled in 1994 that the Bivens remedy can only be used in suits against individuals and not in suits against the government (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer). A second type of tort and the one of concern in this article is the common law tort. These torts involve such behavior as negligence, defamation, harassment, and emotional distress. The third type is the federal statutory tort, in which a person's rights under a federal law are abridged (Anderson and Pellett, 1990). It is common for people to file suits that allege both constitutional and common law torts have been committed (Pelletier and Rallis). A single action or event, as in the case of assault, can be both a tort and a crime. The key mechanism for common law tort cases against the federal government is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) of 1946. The federal government has partially waived its sovereign immunity to allow suits against itself. Under this law, suits are filed in district courts which apply state tort law to the federal government as though it was an individual in the state where the alleged event occurred. As will be seen below, exceptions contained in the FTCA bar several types of suits against the government. Westfall v. Erwin All of the furor in Congress to write the Westfall Act and much of the legal maneuvering since its passage stem from William Erwin receiving soda ash burns in his eyes and throat while working as a civilian warehouseman at an army depot in Alabama. He and his wife sued Rodney Westfall, Erwin's superior, and other workers at the depot for negligence in the handling and storage of this toxic substance. Erwin contended the bags of soda ash should never have been stored in the warehouse, that the soda ash had been allowed to spill from bags, and that he had not been warned of their presence in the warehouse. …

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court's ruling on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is a landmark decision - both for constitutional law and for health care law and policy. Others will study its implications for constitutional limits on a range of federal powers beyond health care. This article considers to what extent the decision is also about health care law, properly conceived. Under one view, health care law is the subdiscipline that inquires how courts and government actors take account of the special features of medicine that make legal or policy issues especially problematic - rather than regarding health care delivery and finance more generically, like most any other economic or social enterprise. Viewed this way, the opinions from the Court's conservative justices are mainly about general constitutional law principles. In contrast, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissenting opinion for the four more liberal justices is just as much about health care law as it is about constitutional law. Her opinion gives detailed attention to the unique features of health care finance and delivery in order to inform her analysis of constitutional precedents and principles. Thus, the Court's multiple opinions give a vivid depiction of the compelling contrasts between communal versus individualistic conceptions of caring for those in need, and between health care and health insurance as ordinary commodities versus ones that merit special economic, social, and legal status.

The Implementation of PPK-BLUD is an exception in financial management in general which provides flexibility in the form of freedom to implement sound business practices to improve service to the community. Exceptions given are intended to improve service quality and performance productivity which are non profit oriented. So that not all regional apparatus or work units of regional apparatus can implement PPK-BLUD, but only regional device organizations or work units of regional apparatus whose main tasks and functions provide services directly to the community or in other terms called Quasi Public Goods, namely regional apparatus in its operations some of it is financed from the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget, partly from the results of the services provided, however, its nature is not solely for profit. The application of PPK- BLUD in the Regional Human Resource Development Agency of the Province of South Sumatra is stipulated by Governor Decree Number 201 / KPTS / BPKAD / 2017 dated March 17, 2017 with Full BLUD status. The purpose of implementing PPK BLUD is 1) Improving the quality of public services in this case education and training services; 2) Improving efficiency and Financial Performance; 3,) Increasing benefits for Stakeholders. After implementing PPK-BLUD BPSDMD, South Sumatra Province gets funding sources in the form of services from the results of cooperation with the regency / city government in Sumatra, South Sumatra, vertical agencies in the region, as well as ministries including the Ministry of Human Rights, Kemenrisdikti, Supreme Court and provincial/district governments/cities and other institutions in implementing cooperation in the implementation of education and training.Keywords: PPK-BLUD; Performance; Development

Michigan Senate Lansing, Michigan PRO-Detroit (People and Responsible Organizations for Detroit) was born on March, 1975, as an ad hoc temporary organization to serve as a coordinating and umbrella group for all the existing desegregation. Its one purpose was to work toward avoiding violence in the implementation of desegregation for Detroit and fifty-four surrounding suburbs. On July 25, 1974, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the metropolitan remedy ordered by the district court was improper because desegregation was bound to exist. Therefore, the Supreme Court recognized the remedy could not be metropolitan in scope but must be within the Detroit schools. The decision projected a certain false sense of finality. The suburbs, now no longer involved in.the situation, heaved a giant sigh of relief. Much of the furor which surrounded the original case was gone. The NAACP, which had begun the case as a single district school case, had evolved its theory to support the metropolitan remedy, while arguing that for Detroit alone would be counterproductive, and that any remedy confined to Detroit would merely expand the state-imposed black core. It didn't seem possible to many observers that the NAACP would abandon such a position and again ask for a Detroitonly remedy. On January 7, 1975, Judge Robert E. DeMascio succeeded Judge Roth who had died of a heart attack eighteen months earlier. DeMascio ordered the submission of new plans. The result was the introduction of two plans: one from the NAACP calling for the reassignment of 77,000 students and one from the Board of Education calling for the transfer of some 55,000 students. The prospects of massive in Detroit were again very much alive. Against this background, key leaders of the community from business, labor, city government, the school system and civic organizations were convened by the president of New Detroit, Inc., the city's urban coalition. There was agreement among this group that, since Detroit was faced with the inevitability of court-ordered public school desegregation, every effort had to be made to assure that an order would be implemented peacefully. All agreed that Detroit could not let the violence that had occurred during the past year in Boston in connection with court-ordered school desegregation be repeated here. The group agreed to form a new city-wide organization that would be neither for nor against busing but would seek the broadest city-wide coalition to endorse the effort for peaceful compliance with the court ruling. PRO-Detroit's first public meeting was held in 86 Theory Into Practice

Institutional Investors and Political Activism

On paper, education and equal educational opportunity are rights. In a landmark decision that echoed far beyond the nation, the US Supreme Court in 1954 found that educational opportunity, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Writing for a unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl Warren affirmed equal educational opportunity as a right and underscored the centrality of education to other rights, given the importance of education “to our democratic society” and the likelihood that no child “may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he [or she] is denied the opportunity of an education.”

Roe v. Wade has received much criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. These critiques diverge divisively but for one commonality. Specifically, commentators from both the proand anti-choice camps have expressed concern about the absence of an express constitutional right to privacy, upon which the Supreme Court in Roe based its finding of a “fundamental” right to abortion. This lack of express constitutional provision renders the Roe decision, and its resulting reproductive rights, vulnerable. Further, pro-choice advocates find fault with the privacy basis because it yields no positive rights to funding or governmental support for accessing abortion services. When based upon a right to privacy, the right to abortion is relegated to the land of negative rights. The negative right to privacy might provide some women with reproductive choice free from government intrusion, but for other women—those with limited resources—the so-called “choice” becomes nonexistent. This article investigates whether these two shortcomings—the absence of positive rights and the lack of express constitutional language—inherent in the right to privacy might be redressed by reframing Roe in the language of property, and specifically a woman’s property right in her uterus. Assuming arguendo the anti-choice tenet that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, this article sets forth an argument that the fetus is an unwanted trespasser in the woman’s uterus whom the woman has a right to eject. Further, this article posits that this property-based notion of abortion might justify government funding for abortions based on a constitutional obligation to maintain a system designed to protect women’s uterine property, similar to states’ obligations to maintain a ∗ Copyright © 2011 Rebecca L. Rausch † Teaching Fellow, Seattle University School of Law; LL.M., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2011; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, 2004; B.A., Brandeis University, 2001. For their helpful and insightful comments at various stages of this article’s development, I offer thanks to Kristin Luker, Kathryn Abrams, Stephen Sugarman, Marjorie Shultz, Molly Van Houweling, Erica Goldman, Anna Lund, Elin Sigurdson, and the members of the Workshop on Teaching and Research in Reproductive Rights and Justice at the University of California, Berkeley. Special thanks to my husband, Lior Barnoon. REFRAMING ROE 2/27/2012 11:24 AM

Although abortion was legalized in 1973 through the US Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, it is state legislatures that have ultimately acted as the final arbiters on the matter ever since. As a result, only over the course of the last decade, more than two hundred abortion restrictions have been enacted nationwide in the United States. As more and more restrictions are put in place in an attempt at policing women’s bodies, the practice that came to be known somewhat inappropriately as ‘abortion tourism’ is becoming increasingly common. More and more women travel across state lines in order to benefit from a safe procedure while evading the legal limits imposed upon them in their home states. This is even more acutely so in the case of young, under-age women, as only a few states do not have parental consent statutes covering abortion provisions. It is against this background that my article discusses two recent movies which tackle the issue of teen pregnancy and ‘abortion mobility,’ Never Rarely Sometimes Always (2020) and Unpregnant (2020). I look at how both travel narratives illustrate, in different genres and manners, the hurdles (young) women have to navigate to gain access to necessary medical care and expose the state-sanctioned obstacles to abortion in two stories about female friendship and empathy above all.

What claims to protection can be asserted by a human fetus?That question, familiar to philosophy and religion, has long haunted law as well.While the philosophical and theological issues remain unresolved, and are perhaps unresolvable, 1 I believe that we can no longer avoid some resolution of the legal status of the fetus.The potential benefits of fetal research, 2 the ability to fertilize the human ovum in a laboratory dish, 3 and the increasing awareness that a mother's activities during pregnancy may affect the health of her offspring 4 create pressing policy issues that raise possible conflicts among fetuses, mothers, and researchers.This Article probes the juridical status of the fetus, assessing what it should be in the light of recent developments in case law,5 legislation, 6 medicine, and technology.

The decision in the Montgomery Supreme Court Ruling (UK 2015) has important implications for those involved in counselling pregnant women and it is suggested it is relevant not only in relation to potential risks to the baby but also potential risks to the mother. This article aims to consider the impact of the decision of the Supreme Court in Montgomery on information disclosure to patients in the UK but the decision may also have ethical implications which will be relevant in other countries.