On bimodal logics of provability

We characterize the bimodal provability logics for certain natural (classes of) pairs of recursively enumerable theories, mostly related to fragments of arithmetic. For example, we shall give axiomatizations, decision procedures, and introduce natural Kripke semantics for the provability logics of (IΔ0 + EXP, PRA); (PRA, IΣn); (IΣm, IΣn) for 1 ≤ m < n; (PA, ACA0); (ZFC, ZFC + CH); (ZFC, ZFC + ¬CH) etc. For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions of theories these results are extended to modal logics with propositional constants.

Dynamic epistemic logic (\(\mathbf {DEL}\)) is known as a large family of logics that extend standard epistemic logic with dynamic operators. Such dynamic operators can be regarded as epistemic actions over Kripke semantics (or its variant). Therefore, \(\mathbf {DEL}\) is often used to model changes of agents’ knowledge, belief or preference over Kripke semantics in terms of dynamic operators in many literatures. As a variant of \(\mathbf {DEL}\), (van Benthem and Liu, J Appl Non-Classical Logics 17(2):157–18 2007; Liu, Reasoning about preference dynamics, Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin 2011) proposed dynamic logic of relation changers (\(\mathbf {DLRC}\)). They provided a general framework to capture many dynamic operators in terms of relation changing operation written in programs of propositional dynamic logic, and they also provided a sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatization for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\). While \(\mathbf {DLRC}\) can cover many dynamic operators in a uniform manner, proof theory for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\) is not well-studied except the Hilbert-style axiomatization. Therefore, we propose a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\). We show that our sequent calculus is equipollent with the Hilbert-style axiomatization.

The study of computational agents capable of rational behaviour has received increasing attention in recent years. A number of theoretical formalizations for such multi-agent systems have been proposed. However, most of these formalizations do not have a strong semantic basis nor a sound and complete axiomatization. Hence, it has not been clear as to how these formalizations could assist in building agents in practice. This paper explores a particular type of multi-agent system, in which each agent is viewed as having the three mental attitudes of belief (B), desire (D), and intention (I). It provides a family of multi-modal branching-time BDI logics with a possible-worlds semantics, categorizes them, provides sound and complete axiomatizations, and gives constructive tableau-based decision procedures for testing the satisfiability and validity of formulas. The computational complexity of these decision procedures is no greater than the complexity of their underlying temporal logic component.

Stig Kanger — born of Swedish parents in China in 1924 — was professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University from 1968 until his death in 1988. He received his Ph. D. from Stockholm University in 1957 under the supervision of Anders Wedberg. Kanger’s dissertation, Provability in Logic, was remarkably short, only 47 pages, but also very rich in new ideas and results. By combining Gentzen-style techniques with a model theory a la Tarski, Kanger obtained new and simplified proofs of central metalogical results of classical predicate logic: Godel’s completeness theorem, Lowenheim-Skolem’s theorem and Gentzen’s Hauptsatz. The part that had the greatest impact, however, was the 15 pages devoted to modal logic. There Kanger developed a new semantic interpretation for quantified modal logic which had a close family resemblance to semantic theories that were developed around the same time by Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Montague and Saul Kripke (independently of each other and independently of Kanger).

Provability algebras and proof-theoretic ordinals, I

This paper considers the bi-modal logic with both $$\Box $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mo>□</mml:mo> </mml:math> and $$\Diamond $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mo>◊</mml:mo> </mml:math> arising from Kripke models with crisp accessibility whose propositions are valued over the standard Gödel algebra [0, 1]. Since this logic lacks the finite model property, we study the logic $$\textbf{GW}^\textrm{c}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:msup> <mml:mi>GW</mml:mi> <mml:mtext>c</mml:mtext> </mml:msup> </mml:math> relying on witnessed Kripke models where, for each modal formula, there is an assignment where the formula without the modality takes the same value as the modal one. We provide a cut-free sequent calculus and we exploit it to prove that $$\textbf{GW}^\textrm{c}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:msup> <mml:mi>GW</mml:mi> <mml:mtext>c</mml:mtext> </mml:msup> </mml:math> is decidable and meets the finite model property. Finally, we explore a connection between the witnessed models and the well-known bi-relational Kripke semantics.

We say that a Kripke model is a GL-model (Gödel and Löb model) if the accessibility relation $\prec $ is transitive and converse well-founded. We say that a Kripke model is a D-model if it is obtained by attaching infinitely many worlds $t_1, t_2, \ldots $ , and $t_\omega $ to a world $t_0$ of a GL-model so that $t_0 \succ t_1 \succ t_2 \succ \cdots \succ t_\omega $ . A non-normal modal logic $\mathbf {D}$ , which was studied by Beklemishev [3], is characterized as follows. A formula $\varphi $ is a theorem of $\mathbf {D}$ if and only if $\varphi $ is true at $t_\omega $ in any D-model. $\mathbf {D}$ is an intermediate logic between the provability logics $\mathbf {GL}$ and $\mathbf {S}$ . A Hilbert-style proof system for $\mathbf {D}$ is known, but there has been no sequent calculus. In this paper, we establish two sequent calculi for $\mathbf {D}$ , and show the cut-elimination theorem. We also introduce new Hilbert-style systems for $\mathbf {D}$ by interpreting the sequent calculi. Moreover, we show that D-models can be defined using an arbitrary limit ordinal as well as $\omega $ . Finally, we show a general result as follows. Let X and $X^+$ be arbitrary modal logics. If the relationship between semantics of X and semantics of $X^+$ is equal to that of $\mathbf {GL}$ and $\mathbf {D}$ , then $X^+$ can be axiomatized based on X in the same way as the new axiomatization of $\mathbf {D}$ based on $\mathbf {GL}$ .

Inspired by an interesting quotation from the literature, we propose four modalities, called ‘sane belief’, ‘insane belief’, ‘reliable belief’ and ‘unreliable belief’, and introduce logics with each operator as the modal primitive. We show that the four modalities constitute a square of opposition, which indicates some interesting relationships among them. We compare the relative expressivity of these logics and other related logics, including a logic of false beliefs from the literature. The four main logics are all less expressive than the standard modal logic over various model classes, and the logics of sane and insane beliefs are, respectively, equally expressive as the logics of unreliable and reliable beliefs on any class of models. The logics of reliable and unreliable beliefs are then combined into a bimodal logic, which turns out to be equally expressive as the standard modal logic. Despite this, we cannot obtain a complete axiomatization of the minimal bimodal logic, by simply translating the axioms and rules of the minimal modal logic $\textbf{K}$ into the bimodal language. We then introduce a schematic modality which unifies reliable and unreliable beliefs and axiomatize it over the class of all frames and also the class of serial frames. This line of research is finally extended to unify sane and insane beliefs and some axiomatizations are given.

This paper, we propose a modal logic satisfying minimal requirements for reasoning about diagrams via collection of sets and relations between them, following Harel’s proposal. We first give an axiomatics of such a theory and then provide its Kripke semantics. Then we extend previous works of ours in order to obtain a decision procedure based on tableaux for this logic. Beside soundness and completeness of our tableaux, we manage to define a strategy of rule application ensuring termination by extending the usual loop test of modal logic S4 to whole sub-structures of the model being computed.

The idealizations resulting from the use of Kripke semantics in Epistemic Logic are inherited by formalizations of group epistemic notions. For example, distributed knowledge is often taken to reflect the potential knowledge of a group: what agents would know if they had unbounded means of communication and deductive ability. However, this does not specify whether/how this potential can be actualized, especially since real people are not unbounded reasoners. Inspired by experiments on group reasoning, we identify two dimensions of actualizing distributed knowledge: communication and inference. We build a dynamic framework with effortful actions accounting for both, combining impossible-worlds semantics and action models, and we provide a method for extracting a sound and complete axiomatization.

This work presents three increasingly expressive Dynamic Logics in which the programs are described in a language based on CCS. Our goal is to build dynamic logics that are suitable for the description and verification of properties of communicating concurrent systems, in a similar way as PDL is used for the sequential case. In order to accomplish that, CCS’s operators and constructions are added to a basic modal logic. Doing this, the semantics of CCS’s parallel operator allows us to build dynamic logics that support communicating and concurrent programs. We build a simple Kripke semantics for these logics, provide complete axiomatizations for them and show that they have the finite model property. This contrasts with other dynamic logics with parallel operators presented in the literature, such as Peleg’s Concurrent PDL with Channels, where either the parallel programs cannot communicate, or at least one of the properties mentioned above (simple Kripke semantics, complete axiomatization and finite model property) is missing.

Maximal Kripke-type semantics for modal and superintuitionistic predicate logics

Current Temporal Logics are all oriented towards the description of totally ordered sequences. This limits their usefulness for reasoning about systems whose computations cannot easily be mapped into totally ordered sequences. Here, we propose a temporal logic geared towards describing partially ordered sets and apply it to dynamic distributed systems. Even though the logic we define does not have the finite model property, we establish that it has a one exponential decision procedure and a complete axiomatization.

In software verification it is often required to prove statements about heterogeneous domains containing elements of various sorts, such as counters, stacks, lists, trees and queues. Any domain with counters, stacks, lists, and trees (but not queues) can be easily seen a special case of the term algebra, and hence a decision procedure for term algebras can be applied to decide the first-order theory of such a domain. We present a quantifier-elimination procedure for the first-order theory of term algebra extended with queues. The complete axiomatization and decidability of this theory can be immediately derived from the procedure.

In this paper we first develop two new STIT based deontic logics capable of solving the miners puzzle. The key idea is to use pessimistic lifting to lift the preference over worlds into the preference over sets of worlds. Then we also discuss a more general version of the miners puzzle in which plausibility is involved. In order to deal with the more general puzzle we add a modal operator representing plausibility to our logic. Lastly we present a sound and complete axiomatization.