On the intuitionistic force of classical search (Extended abstract)

Full classical S5 in natural deduction with weak normalization

We introduce new proof systems for propositional logic, simple deduction Frege systems, general deduction Frege systems, and nested deduction Frege systems, which augment Frege systems with variants of the deduction rule. We give upper bounds on the lengths of proofs in Frege proof systems compared to lengths in these new systems. As applications we give near-linear simulations of the propositional Gentzen sequent calculus and the natural deduction calculus by Frege proofs. The length of a proof is the number of lines (or formulas) in the proof.A general deduction Frege proof system provides at most quadratic speedup over Frege proof systems. A nested deduction Frege proof system provides at most a nearly linear speedup over Frege system where by “nearly linear” is meant the ratio of proof lengths is O(α(n)) where α is the inverse Ackermann function. A nested deduction Frege system can linearly simulate the propositional sequent calculus, the tree-like general deduction Frege calculus, and the natural deduction calculus. Hence a Frege proof system can simulate all those proof systems with proof lengths bounded by O(n . α(n)). Also we show that a Frege proof of n lines can be transformed into a tree-like Frege proof of O(n log n) lines and of height O(log n). As a corollary of this fact we can prove that natural deduction and sequent calculus tree-like systems simulate Frege systems with proof lengths bounded by O(n log n).

Cut-free proofs in Herbelin’s sequent calculus are in 1-1 correspondence with normal natural deduction proofs. For this reason Herbelin’s sequent calculus has been considered a privileged middle-point between L-systems and natural deduction. However, this bijection does not extend to proofs containing cuts and Herbelin observed that his cutelimination procedure is not isomorphic to β-reduction.In this paper we equip Herbelin’s system with rewrite rules which, at the same time: (1) complete in a sense the cut elimination procedure firstly proposed by Herbelin; and (2) perform the intuitionistic “fragment” of the tq-protocol - a cut-elimination procedure for classical logic defined by Danos, Joinet and Schellinx. Moreover we identify the subcalculus of our system which is isomorphic to natural deduction, the isomorphism being with respect not only to proofs but also to normalisation.Our results show, for the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logic, how to embed natural deduction in the much wider world of sequent calculus and what a particular cut-elimination procedure normalisation is.KeywordsClassical LogicIntuitionistic LogicReduction RuleNatural DeductionSequent CalculusThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This paper studies the relationship between Argumentation Logic (AL), a recently defined logic based on the study of argumentation in AI, and classical Propositional Logic (PL). In particular, it shows that AL and PL are logically equivalent in that they have the same entailment relation from any given classically consistent theory. This equivalence follows from a correspondence between the non-acceptability of (arguments for) sentences in AL and Natural Deduction (ND) proofs of the complement of these sentences. The proof of this equivalence uses a restricted form of ND proofs, where hypotheses in the application of the Reductio of Absurdum inference rule are required to be “relevant” to the absurdity derived in the rule. The paper also discusses how the argumentative re-interpretation of PL could help control the application of ex-falso quodlibet in the presence of inconsistencies.

This article aims to generate all theorems of a given size in the implicational fragment of propositional intuitionistic linear logic. It was presented at the 36th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP).

System SKS is a set of rules for classical propositional logic presented in the calculus of structures. Like sequent systems and unlike natural deduction systems, it has an explicit cut rule, which is admissible. In contrast to sequent systems, the cut rule can easily be reduced to atomic form. This allows for a very simple cut elimination procedure based on plugging in parts of a proof, like normalisation in natural deduction and unlike cut elimination in the sequent calculus. It should thus be a good common starting point for investigations into both proof search as computation and proof normalisation as computation.

This volume is dedicated to Prof. Dag Prawitz and his outstanding contributions to philosophical and mathematical logic. Prawitz's eminent contributions to structural proof theory, or general proof theory, as he calls it, and inference-based meaning theories have been extremely influential in the development of modern proof theory and anti-realistic semantics. In particular, Prawitz is the main author on natural deduction in addition to Gerhard Gentzen, who defined natural deduction in his PhD thesis published in 1934. The book opens with an introductory paper that surveys Prawitz's numerous contributions to proof theory and proof-theoretic semantics and puts his work into a somewhat broader perspective, both historically and systematically. Chapters include either in-depth studies of certain aspects of Dag Prawitz's work or address open research problems that are concerned with core issues in structural proof theory and range from philosophical essays to papers of a mathematical nature. Investigations into the necessity of thought and the theory of grounds and computational justifications as well as an examination of Prawitz's conception of the validity of inferences in the light of three dogmas of proof-theoretic semantics are included. More formal papers deal with the constructive behaviour of fragments of classical logic and fragments of the modal logic S4 among other topics. In addition, there are chapters about inversion principles, normalization of proofs, and the notion of proof-theoretic harmony and other areas of a more mathematical persuasion. Dag Prawitz also writes a chapter in which he explains his current views on the epistemic dimension of proofs and addresses the question why some inferences succeed in conferring evidence on their conclusions when applied to premises for which one already possesses evidence.

Prawitz proved a theorem, formalising ‘harmony’ in Natural Deduction systems, which showed that, corresponding to any deduction there is one to the same effect but in which no formula occurrence is both the consequence of an application of an introduction rule and major premise of an application of the related elimination rule. As Gentzen ordered the rules, certain rules in Classical Logic had to be excepted, but if we see the appropriate rules instead as rules for Contradiction, then we can extend the theorem to the classical case. Properly arranged there is a thoroughgoing ‘harmony’, in the classical rules. Indeed, as we shall see, they are, all together, far more ‘harmonious’ in the general sense than has been commonly observed. As this paper will show, the appearance of disharmony has only arisen because of the illogical way in which natural deduction rules for Classical Logic have been presented.

Intuitionistic logic encompasses the principles of reasoning which were used by L. Brouwer in developing his intuitionistic mathematics, beginning in [Bro07]. Intuitionistic logic can be succinctly described as classical logic without the law ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ of excluded middle. Brouwer observed that this law was abstracted from finite situations and its application to statements about infinite collections is not justified. One of the consequences of the rejection of the law of excluded middle is that every intuitionistic proof of an existential sentence can be effectively transformed into an intuitionistic proof of an instance of that sentence. More precisely, if a formula of the form ∃xϕ(x) without free variables is provable in the intuitionistic predicate logic, then there is a term t without free variables such that ϕ(t) is provable. In particular, if ϕ ∨ ψ is provable, then either ϕ or ψ is provable. In that sense intuitionistic logic may provide a logical basis for constructive reasoning. A formal system of intuitionistic logic was proposed in [Hey30]. A relationship between the classical propositional logic PC and intuitionistic propositional logic INT was proved by Glivenko in [Gli29], namely a PC-formula ϕ is PC-provable if and only if ¬ ¬ϕ is INT-provable. Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic was developed in [Kri65].

We present a multi-conclusion natural deduction calculus characterizing the dynamic reasoning typical of Adaptive Logics. The resulting system AdaptiveND is sound and complete with respect to the propositional fragment of adaptive logics based on CLuN. This appears to be the first tree-format presentation of the standard linear dynamic proof system typical of Adaptive Logics. It offers the advantage of full transparency in the formulation of locally derivable rules, a connection between restricted inference-rules and their adaptive counterpart, and the formulation of abnormalities as a subtype of well-formed formulas. These features of the proposed calculus allow us to clarify the relation between defeasible and multiple-conclusion approaches to classical recapture.

A natural deduction system NI, for the full propositional intuitionistic logic, is proposed. The operational rules of NI are obtained by the translation from Gentzen’s calculus LJ and the normalization is proved, via translations from sequent calculus derivations to natural deduction derivations and back.

This paper deals with automated deduction for classical and partial logics, especially for the three-valued logic L3, which has been introduced, for example, in the study of natural language semantics. Based on ideas from a Plaisted's Gentzen style system for classical two-valued logic, we present a new tree-structured proof procedure (TMPR) together with a new completeness proof using proof transformation techniques and some improvements including the generation and use of lemmata. TMPR extends SLD-resolution with a Prolog-style backward chaining to full first-order logic by a controlled use of case analysis. This is done without having to extend negative goals needed, for example, for model elimination. A classification of TMPR, model elimination and related calculi in a common tableau framework is given. Thereafter, we present our extension of the TMPR proof procedure to L3 and show its soundness and completeness. As a side result, a TMPR proof system for the four-valued logic L4 is given. Finally, the restriction of TMPR to ‘L3-Horn clauses’ is considered, and, additionally, an idea for similarly extending model elimination and related systems to L3 (and L4) is illustrated.

Quantified propositional logic is an extension of classical propositional logic where quantifications over atomic formulas are permitted. As such, quantified propositional logic is a fragment of second-order logic, and its sentences are usually referred to as quantified Boolean formulas (QBFs). The motivation to study quantified propositional logic for paraconsistent reasoning is based on two fundamental observations. Firstly, in recent years, practicably efficient solvers for quantified propositional logic have been presented. Secondly, complexity results imply that there is a wide range of paraconsistent reasoning problems which can be efficiently represented in terms of QBFs. Hence, solvers for QBFs can be used as a core engine in systems prototypically implementing several of such reasoning tasks, most of them lacking concrete realisations. To this end, we show how certain paraconsistent reasoning principles can be naturally formulated or reformulated by means of quantified Boolean formulas. More precisely, we describe polynomial-time constructible encodings providing axiomatisations of the given reasoning tasks. In this way, a whole variety of a priori distinct approaches to paraconsistent reasoning become comparable in a uniform setting.KeywordsPropositional LogicConjunctive Normal FormReasoning TaskTruth AssignmentBoolean FormulaThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This paper is the second part of a series exploring how, given a proof, we can inductively transform it into a proof that contains no irrelevancies and is as strong as possible. In the prequel paper, I defined a weaker and a stronger notion of what counts as a proof with no irrelevancies, calling them perfect proofs and gaunt proofs, respectively. There, I showed how proofs in core logic and classical core logic can be transformed into perfect proofs. In this paper I study gaunt proofs. I show how proofs in core logic can be inductively transformed into gaunt core proofs, but that this property fails for the natural deduction system of classical core logic.

A modification of natural deduction system for intuitionistic predicate logic, the extension of natural deduction system, will be defined. The main result of such modification will be that each conversion from the set of conversions of a cut-elimination procedure in the system of sequents has the corresponding conversion in the set of conversions of a normalization procedure in that extension of natural deduction.