Otherwise than quantum

Transnational information networks are a proxy for power that embody visions of futures and possibilities (Mosco 2005; DeNardis 2020). This paper looks at the topological reconfiguration of networks that comes with the development and deployment of 5G technologies. The paper argues that 5G networks exist in an apparent paradox of quantum superposition: the networks are controlled both by states and private corporations, and the intelligence is located both in the end-points as well as in the network. But just like in the thought experiment of Schrödinger's cat, if one would observe the networks in case of an incident, the control over the network resides inside the network and with the state. However, this would merely describe the topographic qualities of the network, not its topological configuration. I use the concept of a quantum state that originates in physics, but is readily used in quantum social science (ie Barad 2007; Der Derian and Wendt 2020), to explain how, in the development of the topology of 5G networks, several ‘states’ that seem exclusionary occur simultaneously. This approach helps to explore how the creation of material possibilities in transnational information networks is entangled with transnational institutions, markets, and nation-states. Through this contribution, I seek to build a bridge between constructivist and realist traditions in international relations by using approaches from quantum social science and science and technology studies to increase understanding of the role of communication networks in tussles for power.

ABSTRACTBrian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?

Rom Harré was a philosopher of science who is especially known for his contributions to psychology. But a lot of his writings can also be regarded as exercises in social theorizing and in tackling issues of the social ontology. This paper will argue that he introduced three innovations in the thinking about social ontology: (i) the primacy of conversations and speech acts as the ‘substance’ of the social world; (ii) the distinction between different epistemological realms when dealing with the social ontology and (iii) the introduction of a new way to think about the levels of the social reality. Moreover, it will be argued that throughout the many concepts and models Harré used to explain and understand the social reality, lays a remarkable unity and consistency in how he pictures and theorizes the society and social phenomena. Using the conceptual scheme developed by Maddi, a Harré inspired general social theory is presented that can also be read as an attempt to provide a synthesis/summary of his social theory, complemented with some insights developed by other scholars. It is proposed to label this theory as the Spoken World Theory. One of the distinct features of that theory is that it demonstrates that social and psychological phenomena are so entangled that it makes no sense to separate them and study them from a single social science’s disciplinary perspective.

Social Action in Quantum Social Science

The relevance of this research is due to the systemic crisis of representative models in the social sciences, triggered by the "ontological turn" and related to the reaction to the exhaustion of dominant epistemological paradigms, the influence of interdisciplinary fields of knowledge, and the striving for "new realism." Despite the declared abandonment of constructive reductionism, dominant approaches, including the strict social ontology of philosopher Brian Epstein, remain "trapped" in the paradigm of statics, reducing social reality to a set of fixed facts and relationships. Such "architectonic" models, while effective for analyzing stable states, are fundamentally unable to conceptualize the inherent processuality, creativity, and continuous becoming of the social world. Overcoming this conceptual "deadlock" requires turning to a radically different ontological tradition that is adequate to the dynamic complexity of social existence. The methodological approach of the research is built on the consistent application of the method of comparative-critical analysis. The primary object of critique is Epstein's social ontology, which is subjected to systematic analysis through the lens of key categories of the process philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. The methodology is implemented in three stages. First, the reconstruction of the epistemological architecture of Epstein's model through the prism of the opposition of the "static and the processual." Second, the transductive transfer of Simondon's categorical apparatus into the field of social ontology problems. And finally, the assessment of the heuristic potential of both paradigms through their ability to represent the dynamic aspects of social existence. This approach allows not only the comparison of the two theories but also the identification of the internal boundaries of the structural-analytical approach and the justification of the necessity of a process-oriented epistemology for an adequate description of social reality as a permanent becoming. The novelty of the article lies in the systematic critique of the epistemological foundations of Epstein's project through the lens of Simondon's processual ontology. It is argued that such key Simondonian categories as individuation, transduction, and pre-individual reveal the internal limitation of Epstein's epistemic stance, which is aimed at the "justification" and "fixation" of already established entities. In contrast, it is proposed to view the social not as a structure but as an unfinished process, where the "individuals" and "institutions" themselves are not starting points but temporary and problematic results of a continuous process of individuation.

Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology.

Philosophy of social science is a branch of philosophy where relations between philosophy and social sciences are traced and investigated. The main functions of philosophy of social science are: to work out social ontology, methodology and metatheory of social science.

In the contemporary epistemological debate on social reality, characterized by the crisis of post‐modern theories and the emergence of new forms of realism, are there any approaches not acknowledging some specific ontological character to the construction of social objects? The question is apparently rhetorical, but the implication of this problem are not obvious. In the sociological literature the opposition between reality and construction is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is considered a dichotomy, in other situations the synthesis of alternative theses in a dialectical horizon. The more systematic attempt considers reality and construction as analytical macro‐dimensions where the relation between social ontology and epistemology operates. From this stance, the acknowledgement of the role of social construction in a wider realist horizon is the true overtaking of postmodern philosophy. If it is true that facts exist beyond representations, it is also true that representations themselves have a specific effect on reality, who continually re‐structures itself around specific relations of emergent power. Stating that reality is socially constructed is an evident limit of postmodern theories. On the other hand, stating that only facts exist constitute an impoverishment of realism and its replacement in neo‐positivism. Social phenomena are real because they are based on specific properties of the inter‐subjective construction of social reality. This thesis represents the revitalization of an advanced, anti‐positivistic realism and the definition of the specificity of social objects. The aim of this essay is to search for a specific place of construction within the development of realist social ontology.

Social space has received increased interest in the social sciences and in study of religion. Studies of religion frequently use theorists like Lefebvre, Harvey, Foucault, de Certeau and Massey. Schatzki’s theory of ‘timespace activity’ has received attention in the social sciences, less so in research on religion. This article gives an interpretation of timespace activity and discusses possible implications for the understanding of religion. Schatzki understands time and space as interwoven with social practices or activities. This means that social practices are not only the ‘doing-mode’ of society and religion, but a social ontology that understands the social as nexuses of social and material practices. Social practices are stretched out in time and space, and simultaneously, social practices do or produce time and space. Schatzki understands time and space not as separate and relating, but as intertwined. This interwoven character is expressed in the concept ‘timespace activity’. Furthermore, timespace activity has a teleoaffective structure. Practices and actors have drives towards something that is emotionally valuable. The paper argues that timespace activity can contribute to the understanding of religion, in the sense that religion is fundamentally everyday, impure practices, often in nexuses with numerous other practices. On this account religion is not practiced, religion is practice. Religion as practice produce timespaces and realities and affective drives which constitute the active positioning and negotiation of the participating actors.

Review of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science: unifying physical and social ontology (2015).

Social Ontology and the Substance of the Social Sciences by Joseph B. Gittler

Journal Article Quantum mind and social science: unifying physical and social ontology. By Alexander Wendt Get access Quantum mind and social science: unifying physical and social ontology. By Alexander Wendt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 354pp. Index. £54.90. ISBN 978 1 107 08254 0. Available as e-book. Mathias Albert Mathias Albert 1Bielefeld University, Germany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 4, July 2015, Pages 872–874, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12348 Published: 15 July 2015

In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined.

This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology, the study of the nature of the social world. The subject matter of social ontology is clarified, in particular the difference between it and the study of causal relations and the explanation of social phenomena. Two different inquiries are defined and explained: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored” or set up. The distinction between these inquiries is used to clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of individualism.

This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises methodological apriorism. It uses Wittgenstein's private language argument as the basis for a critique of Mises's claim to have found apodictically certain foundations for economic analysis. It is argued instead that Mises's methodology is more fruitfully viewed as an exercise in social ontology, the objective of which is to outline key features of the socio-economic world that social scientific research ought to take into account if it is to be fruitful. The implications of this perspective for three key methodological issues, namely the relationship between theory and history, the possibility of naturalism, and the place of Austrian economics within the discipline of economics as a whole, are brought out.