Reply to Elster on “Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory”

Critics of functional explanations in social science maintain that such explanations are illegitimate unless a mechanism is specified. Others argue that mechanisms are not necessary for causal inference and that functional explanations are a type of causal claim that raise no special difficulties for testing. I show that there is indeed a special problem that confronts testing functional explanations resulting from their connection to second-order causal claims. I explain how mechanisms can resolve this difficulty, but argue that this does not provide support for methodological individualism since it is not necessary that the mechanisms be described in terms of individual interactions.

The paper aims at the reconstruction and the analysis of the opinions of Kincaid as regards functional explanations. The author attempts to answer the following questions: Are there any proper applications of functional explanations in the research? and Why do functional explanations play such a significant role in the social sciences?. In his defence of functionalism Kincaid discusses the arguments methodically, i.e. the scholar points to what emerges from the functional explanations, he discusses the ways of confirmation of the functional hypotheses and evaluates the arguments of the critics. The novelty of Kincaid’s approach to functionalism is that he treats the theory as a special case of functional explanation. Moreover, the author does not deal with determining the necessary and sufficient conditions of the functional analysis. The scholar strongly rejects the idea that linguistic issues are at the core of the functional explanation.

Ever since the appearance over ten years ago of G.A. Cohen‘s path breaking book, Karl Marx‘s Theory of History: A Defence, a number of philosophers have continued the extensive reconsideration of historical materialism launched by Cohen‘s work. These efforts have largely recast the debates about Marx‘s theory of history, and they have done so from the premise that historical materialism embodies a set of substantive claims as appropriately subject to analytical scrutiny as those of any other viable theory.

Marxists believe that an understanding of human society presupposes an understanding of the nature of the production of its material surplus and the nature of control over that surplus. This belief forms part of the “hard core” of the Marxist scientific research program. This hard core is complemented by a set of auxiliary hypotheses and heuristics, constituting what Imre Lakatos has called a scientific research program’s “protective belt.” The protective belt is a set of hypotheses protecting a research program’s hard core. Over the past century and a half, Marxists have populated the protective belt with an economic theory, a theory of history, a theory of exploitation, and a philosophical anthropology, among other things. Analytical Marxism is located in Marxism’s protective belt. It can be seen as a painstaking exercise in intellectual housekeeping. The exercise consists in replacing the tradition’s antiquated, superfluous, or degenerate furnishings with concepts, methods, and auxiliary hypotheses from analytic philosophy and up-to-date social science. The three most influential strands in analytical Marxism are, roughly: its reconstruction of Marx’s theory of history, historical materialism; its philosophical anthropology, including the theory of freedom; and its theory of exploitation, including the theory of class.

The dispute between the empiricist and interpretivist conceptions of the social sciences is properly conceived not as a matter of reduction or covering laws. Features specific to the social sciences include the following. Explanations of human behavior make reference to intentional causation; social phenomena are permeated with mental components and are self-referential; social science explanations have not been as successful as those in natural science because of their concern with intentional causation, because their explanations must be identical with the propositional content of the mind of the actor, and because a social phenomenon exists only if people believe it exists. Elements of an apparatus necessary to analyze this problematic social ontology are given and include selfreferentiality, constitutive rules, collective intentionality, linguistic permeation of the facts, systematic interrelationships among social facts, and primacy of acts over objects.

The debate about explanations in social and human sciences is multifaceted. In my view the fundamental dispute concerns deep metaphysical convictions about the relations between individuals and society and how one conceives a human being, a person. The dividing line goes between those who conceive individual human beings as basically independent of society and other persons, (which seems to be implicit in the liberal political tradition), and those who rejects this view, holding that a human being is constituted by its social relations. The former view is taken for granted by thinkers in the liberal tradition, and latter view is clearly expressed by Marx and is also stated by Aristotle. These views give rise to different methodological views regarding scientific explanations; those who conceive man to be constituted by its social relations are naturally methodological collectivists, while those who think of people as independent individuals are methodological individualists. The difference concerns what is explanans and explanandum: collectivists hold that explanans are social structures and explanandum consists of individual’s actions, whereas methodological individualists have it the other way round: explanans consists of individual’s actions and explanandum consists of social structures and facts.

In this paper we examine the question of whether complexity-like explanations can be applied to the psychology of individuals, and its implications for the scope of complexity explanations of social phenomena. We start by outlining two representational-cum-computational models of the mind—a symbolic model and a networks or connectionist one—and their pros and cons. Based on this we then outline a radical, non-representational and non-computational alternative model that has been gaining ground recently, and which has significant affinities with complexity explanations in social science. Deploying neo-Kantian considerations, we then argue that due to the discursivity, or conceptual dimension of our cognitive system, the radical alternative must be incorrect insofar as humans are concerned. Indeed, human psychology must involve, at least partly, a representational understanding of the sort provided by the symbolic model. Relatedly, we show how the discursiviry of human cognition complicates our psychology and makes it difficult to account for. Finally, we briefly address the question of how the complicated nature of individual psychology, implied by human discursivity, may affect complexity explanations of social behavior.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the nature of explanations as given in both natural and social sciences. It discusses models of explanation adopted in natural and social sciences. The author also elaborates upon naturalistic and anti-naturalistic views and other types of explanations such as functional, purposive, etc in social science. The volume elaborates upon themes like bridge principle; functional explanation; purposive explanation; teleological explanation; prediction; methodological individualism; methodological collectivism; illocutionary redescription; principle of action; and dispositional explanations to understand whether the explanations given in the realm of social sciences are the same or different from the explanations that are given in the field of natural sciences. This introductory book is a must read for students and scholars of philosophy of science, logic, science and technology studies, social sciences and philosophy in general.

As early as 1970, M. S. Archer argued that Bourdieu's sociology of education was the product of the particular conditions of the French educational system within which it was formulated. The same argument was subsequently advanced more generally by Richard Jenkins, who insisted that Bourdieu's sociology of culture, particularly the analysis contained in La Distinction/Distinction (Bourdieu, 1979, 1986), was an expression of the peculiarly French emphasis on taste as a basis for social differentiation. Bourdieu was himself interested in the relations between particular and universal explanation in social science, and in many of his later articles he focused specifically on the question of the transferability of his concepts, such as ‘cultural capital’. The English Preface to Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1988) is an explicit discussion of how the analysis presented in the text of French higher education should be read and adopted by English readers, while Practical Reason (Bourdieu, 1994, 1998) contained published lectures in which Bourdieu considered the applicability of La Distinction to Japanese society. The purpose of my proposed contribution is to trace the development of Bourdieu's sociology of education in the context of educational policy developments in France during his lifetime and, equally, to trace the ways in which his work has been used in the British context during the period between the first reception of his educational work in the United Kingdom in Knowledge and Control (Young, 1971) to the reception of his more polemical political interventions of the 1990s, many of which implicitly invoked earlier educational thinking. The intention is that this discussion should revive interest in the relevance of Bourdieu's work to the British situation by reference to many of the later texts that appeared after the emphasis of the British field of reception had shifted from education to cultural studies. La noblesse d'e´tat/State nobility (Bourdieu, 1989, 1996) and La mise`re du monde/The weight of the world (Bourdieu et al., 1993, 1999) have direct implications for British thinking about education that are different from the implications of the texts of the 1960s, and it is important to disrupt the tendency still to see the importance of Bourdieu's educational work primarily in relation to Les he´ritiers/The Inheritors (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964b; 1977) and La reproduction/Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970, 1977). Finally, the discussion will confront the question of transferability and ask whether the comparative conditions in Britain and France between 1960 and 2002 justify the transfer of his analyses and research methods across the cultures in the future beyond his death.

Darwin’s Conjecture is a bold attempt to bring evolutionary explanation to the social sciences, particularly economics. The book outlines the history of Darwinian explanation in social science then puts forward a generalized replicator account of social evolution by natural selection. The authors identify habits and routines as examples of the generative replicators necessary in order that social evolution is Darwinian. This reviewer notes that the replicator approach limits the generality of this account and suggests that habits and routines might better be seen as members of a Darwinian population in the tradition of Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) generalized account of natural selection instead. Furthermore, the existence of levels of social evolution will constrain what evolution can occur low in the hierarchy.

Laws and explanation in social sciences

The Problem of Explanation in Social Science: A Weberian Solution?

This chapter explores why and how — path dependence explanations offers us a useful way to analyze the role of history in social change. However for path dependence, to help us to achieve better understanding we must clearly specify it. For these reasons the emphasis in this chapter lies in differentiating and defining the many approaches all which are now confusingly called path dependence, even when each is based on a different set of assumptions about how the world works, and hence, embody different ontology and give us different ways in which to understand social change and conditions for change (Hall, 2003). In so doing this chapter is taking the challenge issued by Paul Pierson, Kathleen Thelen, John L. Campbell, and Colin Crouch to encourage such a debate (Campbell, 2004; Crouch, 2005; Pierson, 2000a; Pierson, 2000b; Thelen, 2004).

This article provides an overview of causal thinking by characterizing four approaches to causal inference. It also describes the INUS model. It specifically presents a user-friendly synopsis of philosophical and statistical musings about causation. The four approaches to causality include neo-Humean regularity, counterfactual, manipulation and mechanisms, and capacities. A counterfactual is a statement, typically in the subjunctive mood, in which a false or ‘counter to fact’ premise is followed by some assertion about what would have happened if the premise were true. Three basic questions about causality are then addressed. Moreover, the article gives a review of four approaches of what causality might be. It pays attention on a counterfactual definition, mostly amounting to a recipe that is now widely used in statistics. It ends with a discussion of the limitations of the recipe and how far it goes toward solving the epistemological and ontological problems.

Journal Article XI.—NEW BOOKS Get access Explanation in Social Science. By ROBERT BROWN. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. Pp. viii+198. 25s. PETER WINCH PETER WINCH Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LXXIII, Issue 291, July 1964, Pages 451–455, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXIII.291.451 Published: 01 July 1964