Small States and International Security

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

Facing Global Environmental Change

Small states, especially developed and democratic states in Europe, have been important players in international security and diplomacy. From joining NATO military operations, gaining a seat in the UN Security Council, to providing economic aid for poorer countries, small democratic states have demonstrated the inclination to acquire status and elevate their influence in international politics. But we know less about the status-seeking of small authoritarian states in the developing world. This paper fills the gap by examining Cambodia’s quest for a positive international reputation and its intended benefits for the Cambodian People’s Party’s rule. We argue that Cambodia wants to be perceived as a good state useful to the international community and this favorable international image can boost the ruling party’s political legitimacy at home. The argument is illustrated with three case studies in the areas of international peacekeeping, global health, and regional sports. Accounting for these dynamics advances our understanding of the role of small authoritarian states in world politics with important implications for democracy promotion in the developing world.

Reviews 215 Atlantic Treaty Organization in the post-World War II period. It may be argued, of course, that such relationships limit the independence of a small and vulnerable state like Greece. On the other hand, non-alignment for such a state may well prove anything but a blessing . Expectedly, Professor Barros' well-argued and balanced account of Greece's predicament in the mid-1930s is free from rash judgments. John S. Koliopoulos University of Thessaloniki Aurel Braun. Small State Security in the Balkans. Totawa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983. Pp. xi & 324. Dr. Braun attempts a study but achieves little more than a survey . To his credit, he recognizes this, and correctly attributes the incompleteness of his analysis to the limitations inherent in his subject matter. The six states he treats—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia—are too diverse in political system, economy , political alignment, trading pattern, ethnicity, culture and national self-conception to be treated systematically. As Dr. Braun points out, behavioralist, quantitative methods fail for lack of information , particularly in the cases of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. Transaction flow analysis is misleading when transactions are few and are falsely reported. Elite interviews are not useful when ideology predetermines the dialogue. The vocabulary and methodology of integration theory are barely applicable between Greece and Turkey , between Turkey and Bulgaria, or between Albania and anyone at all. Moreover, two inimical kinds of integration occur in the Balkans , the western pluralist community and what Keohane has called the eastern "Al Capone Alliance" where members pay for protection . As Dr. Braun observes, then, systems analysis, functionalism, integration theory and organization theory yield meager results, or are actually misleading if they encourage the researcher to ignore political nuances. Dr. Braun prudently avoids such methods and proposes instead a desirable standard or end toward which relations among the Balkan states could move. The process that leads to this end he labels "concordization" and defines as "the development of certain norms of conduct that place an emphasis on the mediation of intra-regional 216 Reviews disputes and make recourse to the use of force increasingly difficult. ' ' Other aspects of concordization include "increased interaction in such areas as trade and communications ... a steady encouragement of multilateralism in addition to bilateral cooperation . . . and attempts by the states of the region to limit external economic, political , military and psychological influences that would divide the region " (27). This , Braun admits, amounts to little more than a prescription for more harmonious relations in the region, and it leaves a scholar with little to do but chart the extent to which the six Balkan states are fulfilling these objectives. There is disappointingly little to chart, but the author dutifully and evenhandedly records what he can. His outline of chapters implies a judgment on the progress toward concordization , since he has adopted a "double-entry" design—Warsaw Pact/Comecon cooperation on the left and (in a separate set of chapters ) NATO/EEC cooperation on the right. The anomalous state, Albania, receives little treatment and in fact is mentioned only in short references on approximately thirty scattered pages. There are in addition two short essays, (one east, one west) one on "The Bulgarian Stumbling Block," the other on "The Greek/Turkish Dispute ". These receive the same overview treatment that is typical of the rest of the book. Since he can't be systematic with this material, Dr. Braun has settled for being comprehensive. As a result he is seldom incisive or surprising. There is a great deal of information here, and it is presented in an orderly fashion, but there is little revealing analysis. Dr. Braun's final assessment of progress toward "concordization ": "A great deal more could have been done but what has been achieved is not insignificant. Thus we would argue that the process of concordization is perceptible but we would also admit that it may be barely so" (273, the text's concluding lines). It is an honest assessment by a scholar who set himself an unrewarding task. Stephen Wrage Washington, D. C. George Thaniel. Beyond the Moment: Selected Poems 1960-1976, tr. Edward Phinney. New York: Vantage Press, 1983. Seawave & Snowfall: Selected Poems 1960-1982...

The Cold War implanted deep defence and security differences between the Nordic states, based on their strategic positions and alliance choices. The Nordic states are generally regarded as 'small states', though Sweden has had sizeable military strength and a large arms industry. The five states made an effort in the Stoltenberg Report to find the basis for common action on security matters. NATO membership meant that Denmark, Norway and Iceland - especially the first two - had increasingly close cooperation within NATO's command structures. Finland emphasized the security community side of the EU and a 'narrow notion of military non-alignment'. Sweden accepted a broad security concept - familiar from its Cold War practice - widening it to include terrorism, natural disasters and links to development and human rights. Danish foreign and security policy brought to an end the period of Denmark being a 'footnote country' in NATO.

While there is a burgeoning literature on cyber security, little scholarly work has been completed on how cyber security issues are affecting small states. This article attempts to contribute to the debate by exploring whether small states are facing unique or different challenges in enhancing their cyber security. Drawing on the extensive small states literature, the article begins by outlining three conceptual models of small state security, based on alliances, institutional cooperation and norms. These models are then applied to the small state cyber security context. It is argued that institutional cooperation on cyber security issues and the emergence of cyber security norms are being hindered by strategic rivalries between the United States, Russia and China and that military alliances are struggling to adapt to collective defence against cyber threats. The article then explores New Zealand’s cyber security strategy and outlines the various domestic and international challenges that exist for New Zealand policymakers. The article finds: that a globalised cyber security environment is eroding New Zealand’s geographical isolation; that the New Zealand government is struggling to formulate a tenable balance between security and privacy in responding to cyber security issues.

Small states, as a category of actorness, enter the discourse of empirical trends only when the post-colonial leaderships deploy the propaganda claim that their new states have been vulnerable since inception. The mandala was an inspiration from Buddhism, whose ideological footprint covered much of present-day South Asia, Southeast Asia and even parts of present-day southern China. The Cold War had indeed foisted upon much of Asia a new combination of demographic and geographical disparities with ideological insecurity. The advent of British colonialism, by the 1700s, introduced a sizable Tamil population in the northern part of the island through officially-encouraged migration from southern India. The socio-political injuries of colonialism were to be avenged by the newly enfranchised, hitherto marginalized, ethnic majority, repeating a.

Scholarship in international studies has usually tended to focus on the great powers. Yet, studying small state behavior can in fact reveal deep-seated structural changes in the international system and provide significant insights into the management of power asymmetries. Overcoming the methodological limitations of gigantism in scholarship and case study selection is another epistemological benefit. Rather than conventional assumptions of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, research on small states has moved in fascinating directions toward exploring the various strategies and power capabilities that small states must use to manage their relationships with great powers. This means, even in some cases, attempts to forcibly shape their external environments through military instruments not usually associated with the category of small states. Clearly, small states are not necessarily hapless or passive. Even in terms of power capabilities that often define their weaknesses, some small states have in fact adroitly deployed niche hard power military capabilities and soft power assets as part of their playbook. These small states have projected influence in ways that belie their size constraints. Shared philosophies and mutual learning processes tend to underpin small state strategies seeking to maximize whatever influence and power they have. These include forming coalitions, principled support for international institutions, and harnessing globalization to promote their development and security interests. As globalization has supercharged the rapid economic development of some small states, the vicissitudes that come with interdependence have also injected a new understanding of vulnerability beyond that of simply military conflict. To further complicate the security environment, strategic competition between the major powers inevitably impacts on small states. The return of conventional interstate war to Europe with Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 serves up a stark reminder of small states’ perennial concerns that “might makes right” in international relations. How small states boost their “relevance” vis-à-vis the great powers has broader implications for questions that have animated the academy, such as power transitions and the Thucydides Trap in the international system. While exogenous systemic variables no doubt remain the focus of analysis, emerging research shows how endogenous variables such as elite perceptions, geostrategic locations, and availability of military and economic resources can play a key role in determining the choices small states make.

Book Review: Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond

Alexandre Kostov, ed. <i>Contemporary Balkans. The Challenges of the 21st Century</i>

Export diversification in low-income countries and small states: Do country size and income level matter?

The term of energy security has evolved since the oil shocks of the 1970s and the concept of environmental security was used in the political debates and the scientific discourse since 1989 when the Cold War was winding down. The key thesis of this chapter is that since the early 1990s the concept of security has been fundamentally reconceptualized: It was widened (from the narrow political and military focus to include also the economic, societal and environmental dimensions), deepened (by broadening the reference object from the state [in national and international security] to human beings and humankind [in human security]) and it was sectorialized [by creating many sectoral concepts of food, water, health, soil, climate security et al.].This chapter primarily reviews this reconceptualization of the security concept that has direct implications for the understanding of the notions of environmental security (a new dimension) and energy security (a sectoral concept). This chapter also briefly discusses potential applications for the European cross-border energy supply infrastructure (e.g. of oil and gas pipelines) linking Russia, the Central Asian states and the MENA region with energy-deficient European countries. Oil and gas pipelines face a dual challenge of both geophysical (earthquakes) and hydro meteorological (e.g. forest fires) natural disasters as well as deliberate attacks on them by terrorist groups (e.g. in Iraq and in Algeria), and new political problems between Russia, the Ukraine and NATO countries. This chapter addresses selected environmental security challenges and impacts of both globalization and global environmental change (GEC), environmental security tasks and tools and possible environmental security applications and conceivable forms of institutionalization; it will conclude with a brief discussion of the potential contribution of integrated environment monitoring systems for the cross border energy supply infrastructure. The contextual change of the implications of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula for pan-European energy security will remain a key political and security challenge for the future relations between NATO countries and Russia.KeywordsEnvironmental and energy securityCross-border energy supply infrastructureEurope

This paper analyzes the differing policy responses of Southeast Asian countries – such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines – to the US–China competition over critical mineral resources. It also examines how these countries prioritize various national interests, including economic development, resource security, and policy autonomy. The study finds that Malaysia primarily adopts a light hedging approach, balancing economic cooperation with both the United States and China to maintain the stability and development of the rare earth supply chain. Simultaneously, it leverages external resources to drive industrial modernization, demonstrating high flexibility and policy independence. In contrast, the Philippines, as an upstream supplier of nickel resources, employs a heavier hedging strategy. While deeply embedded in China's supply chain, it gradually attracts investments from the United States and its allies to reduce dependence on a single market. The differences in these strategies reflect how resource‐based Southeast Asian countries adjust their policies to balance economic development and security needs amid geopolitical rivalries based on their resource endowments and supply chain positions. Malaysia's approach emphasizes balance and economic benefits, while the Philippines' strategy highlights dual objectives of resource security and industrial upgrading. Indonesia has also maintained a light hedging strategy in response to US–China strategic competition, prioritizing the development of a critical mineral industry centered on nickel. This approach aims to promote foreign trade and industrial growth in a rational and strategic manner, thereby maximizing economic gains. Vietnam, by contrast, occupies an intermediate position among the three countries, adopting a moderate hedging strategy that leverages its advantage in rare earth and other mineral resources to strengthen cooperation with major powers. However, due to ongoing tensions between China and Vietnam, their cooperation on critical minerals remains uncertain and warrants further observation. With Trump's re‐election and the increasingly intense trade war between China and the United States, critical mineral resources are bound to become a core and crucial point of competition between the two countries in the coming period. Whether it is Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, or the Philippines, adopting relatively independent mineral policies not only helps safeguard their own economic security but also offers valuable lessons and inspiration for other resource‐rich small states in Southeast Asia.

This article examines the theoretical foundations of balancing strategies in international relations and their relevance for the security of small states, with particular reference to Mongolia. The study situates the concept of balancing within classical and neo-realist traditions, while also exploring liberal and constructivist perspectives that highlight the agency of small states. It reviews key theoretical approaches-balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interests-and contrasts them with related strategies such as neutrality, bandwagoning, hedging, and alliance-building. By integrating comparative insights from leading scholars, the article shows that balancing remains a vital framework for small states to navigate geopolitical competition and safeguard sovereignty. Mongolia’s foreign policy practice, notably its “third neighbor” policy and multivector diplomacy, reflects a hybrid form of external and soft balancing combined with hedging. The analysis underscores both the academic significance and practical applicability of balancing strategies for ensuring Mongolia’s national security in an increasingly complex and uncertain international environment.

From the exploratory case study method that is also qualitative, this article provides a conceptual understanding of Liberia’s bid for the seat as UNSC NPM with an emphasis on its influence on the global stage. Based on the conceptualization of how small states can leverage their influence on the UNSC to substantially contribute to international peace and security, this paper doubts not the possibility for small states to leverage their influence at the UNSC but is particularly skeptical about the leverage of Liberia's influence as a small state on the UNSC. The paper argues that Liberia's prolonged absence from the UNSC since 1961 coupled with its peripheral position in the international system raised a legitimate concern that resonates with the conceptual framework adopted by this paper. Conclusively, the paper argues that if elected as UNSC NPM, Liberia's position will be similar to the ceremonial role of most African countries that exit the UNSC without a mark of significance difference. It recommends that to make a significant difference, Liberia could take a cue from Estonia and Lithuania experiences cited in this paper as small states that meaningfully impacted the UNSC.