Special Operations Mission Planning and Analysis Support System

S ince the late 1980s, and especially since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, two phenomena, both known for their pragmatic and controversial nature, have come together to pose challenges for US policymakers.The first phenomenon is the rise in importance of special operations forces (SOF).This is evident in the 1987 creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) later followed by the Bush Administration's 2004 decision, through the Unified Command Plan, to assign USSOCOM the primary responsibility for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism.In light of the need for anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency expertise and the asymmetric nature of many current threats, SOF have been described as a "logical military response," one that, for General Peter Schoomaker, provides "an array of expanded options, strategic economy of force, [and] 'tailor to task'capabilities." 1 Despite the logicality, however, such an approach threatens to exacerbate divides, real and perceived, between the conventional and unconventional military communities.In addition to aggravating concerns related to shares of limited resources, the skimming of individuals with high leadership potential, and differing opinions regarding how military organizations should look and act, there is the possibility of antagonism as SOF are often presented as a panacea or a "silver bullet." 2 In the United States and other Western countries, these concerns regarding the utility and implications of SOF vis-à-vis their conventional brethren have existed since the creation of special units in World War II; it is not surprising that they continue today.Parameters

Evidence from recent operations shows an increasing tendency of employing Special Operations Forces (SOF) with General Purpose Forces (GPF). The larger degree of cooperation and mutual support necessitates Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services change current planning and training framework to better reflect present and future operational employment expectations. Previously SOF and GPF planners primarily focused on deconfliction of operations when needed, but Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have demonstrated a need for

: Designated by the Department of Defense as the lead for planning and synchronizing operations for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) now has the significant challenge of prosecuting a global campaign without owning any global terrain. What organizational changes within SOF would allow USSOCOM to achieve increased efficiency and greater responsiveness to both global and theater requirements within the boundaries of its authorities as a functional combatant command? This monograph analyzes USSOCOM's current organization and command and control (C2) for employment of forces in its role as both a supporting and supported combatant command within the framework of joint operations doctrine. The fundamentals of joint operations provide a common doctrinal framework for examining command structures and functions in the joint environment and, more importantly, it explains the joint environment in which SOF operates and to which it must adhere. This monograph provides three recommendations for organizational change within SOF to enhance USSOCOM's ability to achieve unified direction in the prosecution of the GWOT.

: The purpose of this paper is to analyze and suggest possible roles for special operations forces in homeland security and homeland defense. The paper reviews the obstacles to the use of military forces in the domestic environment under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and then introduces special operations and special operations forces competencies. The paper then analyzes the current National Strategy for Homeland Security and injects suggestions for using special operations forces to bolster the Strategy. After an overview of United States Northern Command, the Department of Defense's supported command for the homeland defense mission, the paper recommends establishing a sub-unified organization under Northern Command to provide special operations command and control, planning, and mission execution. Underlying the entire discussion is the critical need to incorporate special operations forces early in the campaign plan, rather than waiting for mission execution to blend them into the force structure. Regardless of the role special operations forces play or the structure that exercises their command and control, commanders will reap the benefits these highly specialized forces provide only if they understand who they are, what they do, and how to integrate them into the missions of homeland security and homeland defense.

: Special Operations Forces (SOF) within a Joint Task Force are controlled by a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Presently, JSOTF headquarters are formed around the core of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), a service SOF headquarters, such as a Special Forces Group, or from a composite staff. These methods have significant shortcomings; the TSOCs ability to support SOF throughout the theater is reduced, a Special Forces Group is not trained or staffed to run a JSOTF at the component command level, and a composite staff element requires a substantial amount of time to operate effectively. This paper suggests an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters that avoids these pitfalls. The recommendation is to establish a standing JSOTF headquarters within each TSOC. Included is an analysis of the major benefits and drawbacks of the proposal, an examination of alternative and interim solutions, and a proposed organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters. Forming standing JSOTF headquarters is a controversial issue. No unit or service is anxious to give up personnel to support an organization whose role is invisible to most except during a crisis. Some will contend that there is no real problem. JSOTFs formed in the past where ad hoc and they managed to get the job done. Our country, though, has now been attacked on its own shores and as a consequence, the nation is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism. Winning this war is our military's top priority, but to win it, we must be agile and global in depth. Standing JSOTF headquarters would give SOF an almost immediate command and control capability that is effective at the earliest moments of a crisis. They could provide this capability without detracting from the TSOCs ability to support other, perhaps simultaneous SOF operations in the theater. SOF will lead the military's war on terrorism.

: The nature of the Global War On Terror (GWOT) has driven U.S. Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to unprecedented levels of cooperation on the battlefield, and the historical conventional mistrust of SOF is being overwritten today by successful combined SOF/CF operations. The joint force and the Services must continue to improve the ability of SOF to conduct C2 and integrate C2 with their own capabilities. Integrated SOF and CF command and control is a base requirement for maximizing SOF effects in the irregular and asymmetric environments characteristic of the GWOT. This paper will analyze the C2 integration between SOF and CF in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the current main effort of SOF and the U.S. military, and make recommendations for force-wide changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities as appropriate. Command and control of all aspects of SOF is too broad of a subject to explore in this paper. This paper concentrates on the C2 issues that most pertain to units conducting integrated ground operations, primarily Army Special Forces (SF), Navy SEALs, and U.S. Army and Marine conventional forces.

ABSTRACTThis case study describes the unconventional warfare techniques used by Allied special operations forces during their campaign against Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1945. The Yugoslavia campaign was destined to be among the first in a series of twentieth-century unconventional warfare efforts, culminating in the campaign conducted by the United States and United Kingdom covert and special operators. This region of the Balkans was extremely active with occupying German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and various client government militaries pitted against largely unconventional forces to include Soviet backed partisans under Tito and loyalist Chetniks backed by Allied Forces. The planning considerations, preparation, and precise military actions conducted during this conflict continue to reemerge in contemporary discussions on special operations theory. The experiences of the past continue to enable successes in the evolution of modern special operations forces that began with the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS and employment of special operations forces in Yugoslavia during World War II.

For most of the Cold War, Special Operations Forces (SOF) occupied an odd niche in the US military. Marginalized by their respective services, they survived by offering civilian policymakers capabilities that the core services did not and often disparaged. Dependent on the imperfect and intermittent protection of civilians, and lacking a unified organizational structure or budget authority, SOF survived by maintaining a very broad portfolio of undesirable missions. No community underwent greater transformation during the second interwar period than did Special Operations. Several major changes propelled Special Operations Command (SOCOM) from a marginal role to the status of a “fifth service.” The rising power and autonomy of SOCOM led it to reprioritize its mission areas. While increased funding has expanded opportunities for nearly all groups in the Special Operations community, SOCOM has invested more heavily in direct action (DA) than in unconventional warfare (UW). The global war on terrorism (GWOT) heightened SOCOM’s autonomy and capability, but these changes, paradoxically, led it to discard many of the missions that policymakers need most in combating terrorism. A strong internal preference for direct action, amplified by early civilian enthusiasm for direct action strategies, skewed the American approach to counterterrorism, leaving national decision-makers long on direct action assets and short on unconventional warfare options. This chapter proceeds in five parts. The first section briefly describes the various US SOF units and their organizational histories. The second presents the rise of joint SOF organizations from 1979 to the end of the Cold War. The third section discusses the experience of SOF during the second interwar period. The fourth section describes the challenges and successes of SOF after September 11. The final section analyzes the problems and prospects for this fifth service and their implications for transformation.

: The article introduces the United States as the sole superpower. As such the U.S. is obligated to assist other countries in need or threatened by adversaries, as long as it's in our national interests. Future U.S. military involvement will not necessarily be driven by what our armed forces perceive to be a threat to our national security or interest, but how American society at large and our elected officials view threats, determine our national interests and how we wage war as a nation. Special operations forces today are global, joint and versatile. They operate world wide, with little fanfare, often in parts of the world where disease, poverty and civil strife riddle the countryside. They serve in extremely harsh, as well as permissive, environments, under the cover of darkness and increasingly, in the high-tech realm of cyberspace. They can operate as a cohesive joint service team or as a single service unit. A hallmark is frequent operations with coalition forces and other foreign militaries. Special operations forces support conventional forces in major conflicts, and they respond to conflicts or crises such as insurgencies, subversion, sabotage, narcotics trafficking and terrorism. They are not structured or expected to win wars single- handedly, but they can help prevent and deter them. As part of a theater joint task force, they can enable conventional forces to achieve victory. By anticipating changes in world development, analyzing our special operations force employment trends and examining American societal and cultural trends, will help prepare special operations forces for the future. Also in preparing for the future means considering what DoD's expectations will be for the use and role of special operations forces. General Shelton expects we will need special operations forces more th% ever in traditional roles, but they must also prepare for nontraditional environments and more sophisticated threats.

: Thermal extremes can have a significant impact on mission performance. Small boat operations present unique thermal protection problems due to the combinations of cold temperature, high wind speed, and water exposure. Successful mission performance requires the most satisfactory thermal protection available. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) identified a need to evaluate the suitability of thermal protection garments currently in use in small boat operations during cold-weather exposures (USSOCOM Tasking 2-93). The specific aim of the research project concerned the evaluation of thermal protection garments currently in use as well as several commercially available garments with potential for use in small boat operations. The evaluation consisted of determining the relative efficacy and characteristics of the garments in terms of mission-related performance as a result of cold exposures. Thermal protection garments evaluated included the Naval Special Boat Unit 12 Kokatat dry suit, the Poseidon dry suit, the British Fire Retardant Immersion Suit.

ABSTRACTIn the post-9/11 era the United States’ (US) Special Operations Forces have become an increasingly prominent feature amongst the country’s vast military options. This article is the first to examine US Special Forces through a critical discursive lens. The article examines the conditions of possibility that US security discourse constructs for its Special Forces, who use some methods of warfare which are more commonly associated with US enemies in constructed notions of US warfare. The article argues that the Special Forces’ representation as an ‘elite’ fighting force in popular US discourse acts to stabilize the Special Forces within the wider discursive structures of US security. This is supplemented by a narrative of mystique and the willingness of the Special Forces to ‘fight fire with fire’ against imagined radical threats. In doing this it is possible to highlight the damaging effect of the Special Forces on understandings of the US Self, which constructs its identity in part through how the US ‘should’ fight wars. Despite the difficulty in articulating the Special Forces as part of the ‘American way of war’, US security discourse has proved remarkably flexible in reconciling the Special Forces within its existing structures.

The level of balance can play an essential role in a soldier’s performance. For a Special Forces soldier, the footwear used or extra weight may be important factors affecting their balance level during combat operations or trainings. Therefore, the purpose of the study was to assess the level of static balance of Special Forces Operators and to determine the influence of select elements of a soldier’s combat uniform and equipment on balance levels. The study group consisted of 37 Polish Special Forces Operators. To assess the level of static balance, the Romberg test was used in three variants (barefoot, with shoes, and with shoes, helmet, and vest). The measurements were made using the AMTI AccuGait portable force platform. The results of the analysis showed that the calculated average values of selected static balance parameters of soldiers differed depending on the variant of the Romberg test used, and in most cases, those differences were statistically significant (α<0.05). The lowest average values of parameters characterizing the level of static balance of Special Forces soldiers were calculated for barefoot measurements. The measurements with shoes and additional loads showed a statistically significant increase in almost all analysed parameters compared to barefoot measurements.

The United States and its partners have begun a program to extend human presence in the solar system, beginning with a return to the Moon. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is the first step in this endeavor, an unmanned mission to create the comprehensive atlas of the Moon's features and resources necessary to design and build a lunar outpost. LRO focuses on the selection of safe landing sites, identification of lunar resources, and the study of how the lunar radiation environment will affect humans. In order to achieve its objectives LRO carries a payload comprised of six instruments and one technology demonstration. In addition to its scientific mission LRO will use new technologies, systems and flight operations concepts to reduce risk and increase productivity of future missions. As part of the effort to achieve robust and efficient operations the LRO Mission Operations Team (MOT) will use its Mission Planning System (MPS) to manage the operational activities of the mission during the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) and operational phases of the mission. The MPS, based on GMV’s flexplan tool, will receive activity and slew maneuver requests from multiple science operations centers (SOC), as well as from the spacecraft engineers. flexplan will apply scheduling rules to all the requests received and will generate conflict free command schedules in the form of daily stored command loads for the orbiter and a set of daily pass scripts that help automate nominal real-time operations. The MPS will also track the status of onboard flight software load files in the various onboard memory locations. The LRO mission is using a new Flight Software architecture, the Core Flight Executive (cFE), in which all onboard memory is managed as a file system. The MPS will interact with the ITOS real-time system to receive messages whenever changes are made to the memory content. The MPS will further interact with the real-time system in a closed loop mode to monitor the progress of planned activities. The LRO mission will use this feedback to provide continuous visibility of the status of daily operations to all of its team members via flexplan web-based interface, which includes a timeline of upcoming operations. By using a single MPS system to schedule multiple mission elements and generate automation products, the MOT will be able to reduce the risk of operator errors, while maintaining a high level of mission operations awareness among all mission elements. This in turn, achieves safer and more efficient flight operations at low cost.

: Building the capacity of Afghan special operations forces (SOF) is a key goal of the United States and its coalition partners. In February and March of 2013, RAND analysts conducted extensive battlefield circulations in Afghanistan and visited multiple training sites for Afghan SOF. The mentors at these sites hailed from a variety of International Security Assistance Force contributing nations, including the United States, Lithuania, Romania, Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom. This report summarizes key partnering practices across these international partners and presents findings from SOF partnership case studies in Iraq and Colombia. The goal is to identify best practices for SOF partnership that can benefit the development of the Afghan special operations capability. These best practices also have broader applicability for special operations partnerships beyond Afghanistan.

Features of selection of Military Special Operations Forces personnel of foreign countries by the criterion of physical preparedness are considered. Scientific, methodological literature on the research topic was studied, specialists were interviewed. Selection of candidates for special operations forces is consists of several stages. It has been established that the physical fitness of candidates is checked at all stages of selection. Determining the aerobic and strength endurance of candidates is a mandatory element of testing their physical preparedness. Tests are selected based on the requirements of the future professional activity of the fighters. Also take into account how these tests correlate to injury risk or professional tasks performance. The main tests for determining strength endurance choose exercises with local load distribution. Long-distance running is the main exercise for determining the level of aerobic endurance of military personnel. Swimming exercises is included in the selection programmes for most special operations units. The speed and coordination abilities of servicemen are tested with the help of various variants of the shuttle run. There is no gender or age differentiation when assessing candidates. The selection of candidates is made from several phases and involves complication of standards. The selection program also includes applied physical exercises that are performed in uniform, namely: swimming, marching, overcoming an obstacle course, etc. The system of selection is based on the motivation of servicemen. They tend to score more points than their competitors.