Terminating sequent calculi for two intuitionistic modal logics

The purpose of the research presented in this paper is to extend the author's results on sequent forms of Herbrand theorems for classical and intuitionistic logics onto classical and intuitionistic modal sequent logics. It was found that the technique reported at the SYNASC 2008 symposium and based on the original notions of admissibility and compatibility can satisfactorily be applied for proving Herbrand theorems for the logics under consideration in the sequent form.

This paper characterizes the admissible rules for six interesting intuitionistic modal logics: iCK4, iCS4≡IPC, strong Löb logic iSL, modalized Heyting calculus mHC, Kuznetsov-Muravitsky logic KM, and propositional lax logic PLL. Admissible rules are rules that can be added to a logic without changing the set of theorems of the logic. We provide a Gentzen-style proof theory for admissibility that combines methods known for intuitionistic propositional logic and classical modal logic. From this proof theory, we extract bases for the admissible rules, i.e., sets of admissible rules that derive all other admissible rules. In addition, we show that admissibility is decidable for these logics.

Some modal logics based on logics weaker than the classical logic have been studied by Fitch [4], Prior [7], Bull [1], [2], [3], Prawitz [6] etc. Here we treat modal logics based on the intuitionistic propositional logic, which call intuitionistic modal logics (abbreviated as IML’s). Let H be the intuitionistic propositional logic formulated in the Hilbertstyle. The rules of inference of H are modus ponens and the rule of substitution. The IML L0 is obtained from H by adding the following three axioms,

The main results of the paper are the following: For each monadic prepositional formula φ which is classically true but not intuitionistically so, there is a continuum of intuitionistic monotone modal logics L such that L+φ is inconsistent. There exists a consistent intuitionistic monotone modal logic L such that for any formula φ of the kind mentioned above the logic L+φ is inconsistent. There exist at least countably many maximal intuitionistic monotone modal logics.

Previous intuitionistic justification logics included explicit justifications for all admissible rules of intuitionistic logic in order to get completeness with respect to provability semantics. We present the justification logic iJT4, which does not have these additional justification terms. We establish that iJT4 is complete with respect to modular models and that there is a realization of intuitionistic S4 into iJT4. Hence iJT4 can be seen as an explicit version of intuitionistic S4.

We consider a general format for sequent rules for not necessarily normal modal logics based on classical or intuitionistic propositional logic and provide relatively simple local conditions ensuring cut elimination for such rule sets. The rule format encompasses e.g. rules for the boolean connectives and transitive modal logics such as S4 or its constructive version. We also adapt the method of constructing suitable rule sets by saturation to the intuitionistic setting and provide a criterium for translating axioms for intuitionistic modal logics into sequent rules. Examples include constructive modal logics and conditional logic $\mathbb{VA}$ .

Full classical S5 in natural deduction with weak normalization

Intuitionistic logic encompasses the principles of reasoning which were used by L. Brouwer in developing his intuitionistic mathematics, beginning in [Bro07]. Intuitionistic logic can be succinctly described as classical logic without the law ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ of excluded middle. Brouwer observed that this law was abstracted from finite situations and its application to statements about infinite collections is not justified. One of the consequences of the rejection of the law of excluded middle is that every intuitionistic proof of an existential sentence can be effectively transformed into an intuitionistic proof of an instance of that sentence. More precisely, if a formula of the form ∃xϕ(x) without free variables is provable in the intuitionistic predicate logic, then there is a term t without free variables such that ϕ(t) is provable. In particular, if ϕ ∨ ψ is provable, then either ϕ or ψ is provable. In that sense intuitionistic logic may provide a logical basis for constructive reasoning. A formal system of intuitionistic logic was proposed in [Hey30]. A relationship between the classical propositional logic PC and intuitionistic propositional logic INT was proved by Glivenko in [Gli29], namely a PC-formula ϕ is PC-provable if and only if ¬ ¬ϕ is INT-provable. Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic was developed in [Kri65].

Automatic reasoning tools play an important role when developing provably correct software. Both main approaches, program verification and program synthesis employ automated reasoning tools, more specifically, automated theorem provers. Besides classical logic, non-classical logics are particularly relevant in this field. This chapter presents calculi to automate theorem proving in classical and some important non-classical logics, namely first-order intuitionistic and first-order modal logics. These calculi are based on the connection method, which permits a goal-oriented and, hence, a more efficient proof search. The connection calculi for these non-classical logics extend the calculus for classical logic in an elegant and uniform way by adding so-called prefixes to atomic formulae. The leanCoP theorem prover is a very compact PROLOG implementation of the connection calculus for classical logics. We present details of the implementation and describe some basic techniques to improve its efficiency. leanCoP is adapted to non-classical logics by integrating a prefix unification algorithm, which depends on the specific logic. This results in leading theorem provers for the aforementioned non-classical logics.

In this paper, intuitionistic modal logics which do not admit the law of the excluded middle are studied. The main result is that there exista a continuum of such logics.

The present paper studies two approaches to the expressiveness of propositional modal logics based on first-degree entailment logic, FDE. We first consider the basic FDE-based modal logic BK and certain systems in its vicinity, and then turn to some FDE-based modal logics in a richer vocabulary, including modal bilattice logic, MBL. On the one hand, model-theoretic proofs of the definability of connectives along the lines of [McCullough, “Logical connectives for intuitionistic propositional logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 36, 1 (1971): 15–20. DOI: 10.2307/2271511] and [[17] Wansing, “Logical connectives for constructive modal logic”, Synthese 150, 3 (2006): 459–482. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-5518-5] are given for various FDE-based modal logics. On the other hand, building on [Odintsov and Wansing, “Disentangling FDE-based paraconsistent modal logics, Studia Logica 105, 6 (2017): 1221–1254. DOI: 10.1007/s11225-017-9753-9], expressibility is considered in terms of mutual faithful embeddability of one logic into another logic. A distinction is drawn between definitional equivalence, which is defined with respect to a pair of structural translations between two languages, and weak definitional equivalence, which is defined with respect to a weaker notion of translations. Moreover, the definitional equivalence of some FDE-based modal logics is proven, especially the definitional equivalence of MBL and a conservative extension of the logic BK□×BK□, which underlines the central role played by BK among FDE-based modal logics.

«-> -1Λ/-1. However if we work on anintuitionistic nonmodal base logic, then some properties of the negation areweakened, the duality disappears, and it is commonly admitted that both equiv-alences cannot remain valid, because they lead to conclusions stronger thanwished (see [4]). Of course one could ignore one of the two modal operators,but we think this pointless, because the dual interpretation of one of them givesnatural birth to the other one.

The mathematical treatment of the concepts of vagueness and approximation is of increasing importance in artificial intelligence and related research. The theory of fuzzy sets was created by Zadeh [Z] to allow representation and mathematical manipulation of situations of partial truth, and proceeding from this a large amount of theoretical and applied development of this concept has occurred. The aim of this paper is to develop a natural logic and set theory that is a candidate for the formalisation of the theory of fuzzy sets. In these theories the underlying logic of properties and sets is intuitionistic, but there is a subset of formulae that are ‘crisp’, classical and two-valued, which represent the certain information. Quantum logic or logics weaker than intuitionistic can also be adopted as the basis, as described in [L]. The relationship of this theory to the intensional set theory MZF of [Gd] and the global intuitionistic set theory GIZF of Takeuti and Titani [TT] is also treated.

The system of intuitionistic modal logic $\textbf{IEL}^{-}$ was proposed by S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu as the intuitionistic version of belief logic (S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu. Intuitionistic epistemic logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9, 266–298, 2016). We construct the modal lambda calculus, which is Curry–Howard isomorphic to $\textbf{IEL}^{-}$ as the type-theoretical representation of applicative computation widely known in functional programming.We also provide a categorical interpretation of this modal lambda calculus considering coalgebras associated with a monoidal functor on a Cartesian closed category. Finally, we study Heyting algebras and locales with corresponding operators. Such operators are used in point-free topology as well. We study complete Kripke–Joyal-style semantics for predicate extensions of $\textbf{IEL}^{-}$ and related logics using Dedekind–MacNeille completions and modal cover systems introduced by Goldblatt (R. Goldblatt. Cover semantics for quantified lax logic. Journal of Logic and Computation, 21, 1035–1063, 2011). The paper extends the conference paper published in the LFCS’20 volume (D. Rogozin. Modal type theory based on the intuitionistic modal logic IEL. In International Symposium on Logical Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 236–248. Springer, 2020).

With help of a compact Prolog-based theorem prover for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic, we synthesize minimal assumptions under which a given formula formula becomes a theorem. After applying our synthesis algorithm to cover basic abductive reasoning mechanisms, we synthesize conjunctions of literals that mimic rows of truth tables in classical or intermediate logics and we abduce conditional hypotheses that turn the theorems of classical or intermediate logics into theorems in intuitionistic logic. One step further, we generalize our abductive reasoning mechanism to synthesize more expressive sequent premises using a minimal set of canonical formulas, to which arbitrary formulas in the calculus can be reduced while preserving their provability. Organized as a self-contained literate Prolog program, the paper supports interactive exploration of its content and ensures full replicability of our results.