The Warm-Sector Thunderstorms Triggered by Mesoscale Boundary-Layer Convergence over the DPRK

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we have proposed a method of sea fog prediction using model sea surface wind (SSW) data and hourly optical satellite data with 500 m spatial resolution. Three sea fog cases in the Yellow Sea were selected from Geostationary Ocean Color Imager (GOCI) images, and their shifts were determined from the fog cluster centroid displacements at successive hours. The 4 km resolution Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model SSW were used to predict sea fog shifts. The sea fog prediction results were verified using validation indices like probability of detection (POD), false alarm ratio (FAR), and critical success index (CSI). The predictions started with high initial skill scores (POD = 0.76, FAR = 0.18, and CSI = 0.66), and showed values 0.59, 0.30, and 0.46 for POD, FAR, and CSI, respectively for predictions after two hours. After three hours their values still remained close to the medians though decreased, but afterwards decreased considerably for POD and CSI. Thus the method is found suitable for short-term prediction of sea fog. Additionally, trajectory sensitivities were compared between 20 and 4 km resolution WRF which, in general, resulted in less errors for 4 km WRF model SSW.

The core questions addressed by Noland (2019) are how, and whether, engagement could foster market-orientation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and reduce direct state control over the country's economy. Noland presumes that the DPRK regime's objective is to obtain revenue with minimum changes to its internal practices and associated risks to political stability, and argues that the nature of engagement is important in inducing desired changes in the country. Noland highlights the modality of economic exchange in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and analyzes whether the KCI model could serve as a means of transformative engagement. Through his analysis, Noland demonstrates that the labor practices in the KIC appear to be both exploitative and limit the extent the DPRK workers are exposed to new ways of organizing work, and concludes that it is unlikely to generate the desired changes. In order to encourage real institutional change, Noland concludes that the DPRK's partners must emphasize “more transformative approaches,” especially by means of introducing international norms and voluntary codes into the country. Otherwise, Noland assesses that the economic growth would merely enable the DPRK to achieve its status of “a de facto nuclear state.” In order to promote “effective transformative engagement,” Noland focuses on the means to expose DPRK workers to “new ways of organizing work.” To advance this argument further, it is also necessary to address the broad question of how the empowerment of workers could lead to real institutional changes in the country. As Babson (2019) notes, for the DPRK's economic growth, the regime would need to reform the economic system by embracing the role of markets, stimulating private initiative, and transforming international relations. The reformative measures include (but are not limited to) building institutions for legal and financial systems, trade and macroeconomic management; state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform; and shaping the economic leadership and core agencies as well as the role of the international financial institutions. Additionally, it should be noted that “animal spirits” among the empowered workers and entrepreneurs are an essential ingredient for any market growth. What options are available for external partners to affect such a reformative process? How can these countries help the empowered DPRK workers challenge state control over the economy and promote a desired realignment of the incumbent domestic coalition? These broader questions may deserve scrutiny as well. In this regard, experts are debating the extent to which the SOE reform since 2014 and the increasing level of private business activities could affect the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its external partners. Sakai (2018) argues that the DPRK regime does not intend to pursue a Chinese-style of economic reform and continues to oblige all DPRK citizens and entities to obey absolutely the “leadership,” while emphasizing the importance of “self-development spirit,” as opposed to international cooperation. Sakai offers a cautious view with regard to the opportunities for external partners to affect the DPRK's reformative process. To the contrary, Mimura (2017) highlights a possible window of opportunity to affect the DPRK's thinking about foreign partnership by focusing on the internal debate surrounding the new economic strategy since January 2018. Mimura observes that SOE autonomy is a key subject in the debate and focuses on the increasing autonomy for SOE managers, as opposed to the state planners, in making decisions on issues related to human resource management and production and sales of excess commodities. Babson (2019) also points to an increasingly blurred boundary between SOE and private business activities, referring to the emergence of successful entrepreneurs in both SOEs and private ventures. Babson recommends to explore options for enterprise organization models that would best support the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its partners. Such endeavor would complement Noland's proposal on the empowerment of DPRK workers. The DPRK's new line of economic policy is surely intended to secure the survival of the regime which would reject any external pressure if it felt threatened. The transformative engagement approach could succeed so long as the DPRK leadership became confident of its merits, which would likely require a prolonged period of adjustment, at a minimum. The DPRK's future decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, if it ever happens, would be affected by the regime's confidence in the security environment in which the economy is a crucial, but not necessarily the sole, factor. Political rapprochement is also another essential element in undertaking effective transformative engagement.

On August 8th, 2022, an extreme rainfall event (the 88ER) occurred over South Korea's metropolitan area and resulted in immense losses of human lives and properties. Previous study has attributed the rainfall event to the intersection of warm and cold air induced by a Northeast China Cold Vortex (NCCV) and the persistently northward displacement of the West Pacific Subtropical High (WPSH). However, in addition to dynamic drivers, understanding the moisture transport of the 88ER is likewise crucial for developing effective strategies to prevent rainstorm disasters. In this study, based on the output from a WRF model, the primary moisture sources and transport pathways of the 88ER are investigated in a Lagrangian view. The Yellow Sea and East China Sea (YSECS) are identified as the most significant moisture source region (84.42%), followed by South Korea (KR), the eastern China (EC) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which contribute 12.52%, 1.52% and 1.43% of the released moisture, respectively. Furthermore, to assess the sensitivity of moisture fluxes and heavy rainfall to the sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies in the YSECS, an additional WRF model experiment is conducted in which the SST anomalies are replaced by the average SST over the past 30 years. It is found that the SST anomalies in the YSECS cause differences in atmospheric circulation, and therefore exert a strong influence on moisture transport. The SST anomalies finally enhance the moisture contribution of the YSECS by 1.72%, but decrease that over KR, EC and DPRK by 1.03%, 0.35% and 0.33%, respectively.

A nationwide nutrition survey began when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) requested assistance from international relief organizations in 1997 due to flooding in 1995-1996, followed by the worsening food shortage peak in 1997. According to reported data for the 15 years since the active intervention and assistance from international societies, the malnutrition and mortality rates of children in the DPRK have improved. However, the prevalence of the stunting reported in the latest 2012 report is 27.9%, which is still a moderate-severe level, and worrisome in terms of international standards. In particular, the prevalence in Ryangangdo, which is regarded as the worst region in the DPRK, is 39.6%, which is a very high level of stunting. To alleviate such regional deviation will be a major task for future assistance. In addition, one cannot emphasize too highly the importance of early nutritional assistance for pregnant women and infants, considering that the recovery from stunted growth is low after two years of age, and the aftereffects would continue for the rest of their lives.

Making Sanctions Smart Again:Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea Robert Huish (bio) Following a period of escalating tension between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in which the Kim regime conducted a series of ballistic missile and nuclear tests and the Trump administration pursued a policy of maximum pressure, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un met for a historic summit in Singapore on June 12. What changed to bring the two leaders together? The main reason North Korea sat down at the bargaining table was not sports diplomacy at the Winter Olympics or Trump's Twitter barrages. It was that the country is out of resources as a result of the international maritime sanctions.1 These sanctions have worked, and worked well, by targeting the environment on which the Kim regime depended to acquire belligerent materials. The 2017 maritime sanctions against North Korea, particularly U.S. Executive Order 13810 and UN Security Resolution 2397, worked for three reasons.2 First, owing to its unique geography, North Korea was almost entirely dependent on illicit maritime trade for its weapons programs, which stands in contrast to long-held claims that most military hardware came overland from China.3 Second, some argue that North Korea's already hollowed-out, authoritarian economy created an "inner isolation" among most of the country's nearly 26 million inhabitants.4 Sanctions are often responsible for increased suffering; however, most North Koreans survive through limited self-sufficiency or black markets that are often unaffected [End Page 42] by formal sanctions or the country's international economic environment. Third, sanctions that targeted foreign companies, in particular maritime insurance companies that may have provided protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance to North Korean vessels, provoked a swift reaction by the insurers to absolve themselves from dealings with North Korea. The important message of the sanctions imposed in 2017 is that this focus on pressuring the maritime industry led to a noticeable behavioral change in North Korea. The remainder of this essay examines what lessons about the efficacy of smart sanctions can be drawn from the case of maritime sanctions against North Korea. The next section will describe the 2017 sanctions from a maritime standpoint and analyze why they worked. The essay concludes by considering the potential to effectively apply similar sanctions to other targets. Have You Been to Sea? To understand why maritime sanctions worked so well against North Korea, two issues must be discussed. First, what are effective sanctions? And second, what role does China play in enabling North Korea to outsmart sanctions? For years, the international community made two major errors in dealing with North Korea. Many experts believed, first, that any sort of sanction would be a good measure against the Kim dynasty and, second, that China is the sole provider of resources, including military resources, to North Korea. Both of these claims are problematic. Sanctions aim to encourage a behavioral change of a target nation or its leadership. Traditional, or "dumb," sanctions either prohibit the target from any financial dealings with the issuer's market or seize the target's assets in the issuer's territory. Such ham-fisted sanctions often do more to further the suffering of the population than apply pressure on the leadership. In the 1990s, then secretary-general of the United Nations Kofi Annan encouraged the use of "smart" sanctions in order to overcome such blunders. Speaking in hindsight of the tragedies in Iraq, the Balkans, and East Africa, Annan argued that economic policy could be crafted so that despotic leaders are pushed toward behavioral change given that their own personal assets were at risk.5 In the 1990s this logic made sense because many dictators had offshore assets that could be directly targeted. Even so, many tyrants, including members of the Kim dynasty, managed to acquire [End Page 43] luxury goods and odious resources through shady networks involving fake currency production, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, and insurance scams. Moreover, sanctions did not deter the Kims from pursuing nuclear tests or overseeing brutal human rights violations. One of the faultiest assumptions about North Korea in the international relations literature was that North Korea...

The article assesses the efforts of the DPRK—a country which has experienced significant industrial development under central planning—to develop a more open economy, having probably reached the limits of inward‐looking growth ('Juche') and having recently experienced a dramatic change in its traditional trading partnerships. It describes the nature of the DPRK state management system and the growing dissatisfaction with its performance in recent years. From its relatively isolated position, the DPRK is taking advantage of UNDP technical assistance to implement its change strategy in three areas: diversification of international trade, foreign investment promotion through joint ventures with state enterprises and modernization of industrial management. Implementation of the UNDP programme has thrown into relief some of the institutional obstacles to the internationalization of the economy inherent in the central planning system. Against a background of relative lack of foreign investor interest—recent legislation notwithstanding—the article describes remedial efforts being undertaken. On the trade front, the government has made modest successes in diversification, but these will need to be reinforced by multilateral assistance with trade information, marketing and other skills needs of trade officials. The article concludes with a review of the DPRK's prospects in the context of the Korean unification issue, other regional cooperation such as the Tumen River Project and international debates over regime survival in the DPRK. Prospects for spreading management change through technical assistance in the DPRK are conditioned by a number of factors, including the extent to which a new management culture can be disseminated from pilot enterprises to the economy as a whole and whether the enclave approach to investment promotion in enterprise zones is also helpful in this regard. Though the DPRK political economy is robust and resourceful, the question that remains is whether the cautious or reluctant government strategy for change can bring results in time.

North Korea's Objectives and Activities in Cyberspace Daniel A. Pinkston (bio) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is a centralized, authoritarian, personalistic dictatorship under the third generation of the Kim dynasty. Despite having suffered a terrible famine and long-term economic deprivation, North Korea has developed its cyber capabilities into a significant and persistent threat and gained notoriety for its past hacking activities, most remarkably the attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment, cryptocurrency and bank heists, and ransomware attacks. Pyongyang has seriously cultivated its cyber capabilities since the mid-1990s and now possesses the full range of capabilities to conduct computer network operations, including computer network attack, computer network exploitation, computer network defense, influence operations (military information support operations, information operations, and propaganda), cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and probably physical cyberweapons.1 Kim Jong-il recognized the value of cyber capabilities in the 1990s, which gave North Korea ample time to recruit and train human resources and invest in institutions to develop and sustain the country's assets in cyberspace.2 North Korea's priorities in the realm of information and communications technology (ICT) are embedded in the leadership's national strategy, which is composed of two main parts: national security and economic development. This is no different from any other state, except that the type of regime, division of the two Koreas, and external environment present a number of threats, challenges, and opportunities that affect North Korea's cyber posture and activities. This essay seeks to put North Korea's cyber activities in the context of the leadership's political goals and the country's science and technology policy. [End Page 76] After explaining Pyongyang's national strategy and the role of cyber, this essay will turn to the regime's demand for hard currency and the persistent attraction of cybercrime. While North Korean hackers successfully have demonstrated their skills, they also present a dilemma for the leadership. Who is to monitor these expert technicians? To help mitigate this problem, the regime has replicated its "coup-proofing" institutional design found in the security apparatus and the military. Finally, the essay speculates that in the future North Korea might try to employ its cyber capabilities more extensively in the realm of influence operations. Cyber Capabilities in North Korean Strategy When North Korea's cyber infrastructure took off in the mid-1990s, the country's survival was at stake. The economic shock and famine in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and the death of founding leader Kim Il-sung led Kim Jong-il to adopt military-first politics that served as a type of public administration and crisis management system for regime survival.3 Kim Jong-il emphasized national security and military affairs with the aim of achieving a strong and prosperous country.4 To accomplish this goal, Kim Jong-il envisioned North Korea being strong in three dimensions: ideology and politics, military power, and the economy. He stated that "science and technology is a strong impetus for building a strong and prosperous country," while emphasizing "science as an important part of his strategic line to build a powerful socialist state."5 Kim Jong-un has continued his father's emphasis on science and technology. Under his rule, North Korea has been following the pyongjin line, which seeks the simultaneous development of nuclear technology (both military and civilian) and the economy. After Kim declared in his 2018 New Year's address that North Korea had "perfected the national nuclear forces," Pyongyang—at least nominally—shifted its emphasis to the economic portion of pyongjin.6 Science and technology, including ICT, are considered critical foundations in the leadership's effort to boost economic [End Page 77] output and efficiency.7 In his report to the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, Kim called for breakthroughs in advanced technologies such as information technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology, new materials technology, new energy technology, and space technology.8 North Korea's current five-year economic plan (2016–20) calls on science and information technology as instruments to normalize production in strategic industries.9 To foster the development of human resources in ICT, North Korean schools now introduce ICT into the curriculum...

Lightning is a naturally occurring phenomenon with significant socioeconomic and environmental impacts, underlining the need for the application of advanced methods to predict it. This study aims to evaluate the performance of the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model in the prediction of the lightning potential index (LPI), the lightning threat index (LTI), and the product of convective available potential energy (CAPE) and precipitation (CAPE × P). Based on the intensity of convection and the number of lightning flashes, we simulated seven thundercloud events that occurred in Tehran between 2008 and 2013. The simulated LPI, LTI, and CAPE × P values are compared both qualitatively and quantitatively against ground‐based lighting data obtained from the world wide lightning location network (WWLLN). LPI, LTI, and CAPE × P predict the location of lightning with relatively good accuracy, although LPI outperforms LTI and CAPE × P. We also compared the simulated area‐averaged LPI, LTI, and CAPE × P against the number of lightning flashes from the WWLLN data, based on which LPI shows a better performance. Overall, LPI can be used as an effective index for the prediction of lightning. As LPI is based on cloud microphysics and LTI and CAPE × P are thermodynamic‐based methods, a better performance of LPI implies that a method based on the microphysical approach can better predict lightning. The performance of LPI, LTI, and CAPE × P is also sensitive to the horizontal resolution of model simulations, with a considerable improvement in simulations with higher horizontal resolutions.

Simulation of an extreme heavy rainfall event over Chennai, India using WRF: Sensitivity to grid resolution and boundary layer physics

Any evaluation of life in the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea can be only tentative because of the great difficulty in obtaining reliable information. Almost all information coming out of North Korea is strictly official and tailored for foreign readers, including reports submitted to UN agencies such as FAO and UNESCO. The land has been described as a terra incognita in the western consciousness. 1 The difficulties are especially daunting to an enquiry into the fate of religion under the cult of Kim Il-song, North Korea's leader since 1946. This is somewhat surprising for Koreans historically have been (and in the South still are) extremely religious people, while up to 1945 the northern provinces had been vibrant centres of, in particular, Protestant Christianity. The silence regarding Christianity since 1953 is at least deeply disturbing and, in human terms, may enshroud a tragedy. But before attempting to peer beneath this shroud, I would like to provide a brief view of the religious and socialist/communist developments and relationships preceding Korea's partition at the 38th parallel in August 1945.

IntroductionTo let all people eat rice with meat soup, as a common propaganda slogan has it, has been an objective of the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea.1 Yet contrary to official proclamation, nutritional stress has lingered in North Korea ever since its foundation in 1948, which was brought about by the emerging Cold War (1945-1991). As a manifestation of food calamities, mean final height of North Korean men, taken as a proxy for nutritional and epidemiological stress in early life,2 merely stagnated for all decades of the Cold War.3,4 In stark contrast, contemporary South Korean men are by now the tallest in all of East Asia because of healthy and wealthy living conditions in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.5Worst of all, by the 1990s, North Korea experienced a great famine.6,7 Massive starvation of North Koreans occurred with the downfall of socialism and the geopolitical disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. Food, fertilizers, and energy could no longer be afforded on the basis of world market prices. Lacking these necessary inputs, North Korea's economy collapsed in the 1990s.8 More important, in the previous Cold War era, the socialist government inefficiently focused on heavy industrialization and symbolic mammoth projects of marginal economic use in addition to overspending up to one-third of its budget on the military.9 This leftNorth Korea without comparative advantages in exports in the post-Cold War era to raise the levels of living and revive its economy.Though macroeconomic shocks and long-term strategic malinvestments are the underlying causes for North Korea's decline after the Cold War, the food crisis of the 1990s itself was triggered by two consecutive floods in 1995 and 1996 that devastated large parts of the country and evolved into a major famine.10 The floods in turn were a result of the El Nino weather anomaly at that time, although deforestation accelerated the crisis. However, by the early 2000s, North Korean living standards improved thanks to international assistance. In the early 1990s, North Korea joined the United Nations, and after the first floods in 1995, it officially appealed for aid. Ever since then, international food aid has been pouring into the DPRK, with peaks from 1997 to 2005 (Figure 1). Another important factor for North Korea's revitalization in the post-Cold War era was liberalization reforms. These were officially introduced in 2002 (July First Reforms) and led to a paradigmatic shift, including marketization and decentralization.11,12,13 Table 1 demonstrates that probably 78 percent of North Koreans were participating in the informal economy by the time they were interviewed from 2004 to 2005.This article investigates the trends in underweight of children in North Korea from 1987 to 2012 to explore how the nutritional status of the North Korean people developed in the critical decade of the 1990s and beyond. First and foremost, the starting point of this study is the year 1987, which is a prefamine period when North Korea was still integrated into the Eastern Bloc. The last year of observation is the post-famine year 2012, which is over a decade after the great famine of the 1990s. Hence, this study offers very rare evidence on the long-term development of North Korean biosocial living standards. Previous statistical analysis on North Korean child malnutrition focused on cross-sectional evidence during the peak of famine14,15 or after the famine16,17 as well as on the regional effects of the food crisis.18,19 What is more, this paper compares underweight rates of children in North Korea to that of their peers in South Korea by drawing on recently released statistics based on a nationally representative anthropometric survey carried out from 2003 to 2004. This is another intriguing comparison because both Koreas share the same genetic and cultural ancestry and were also not affected much by migration over the last centuries. …

This chapter presents first theories on legitimation and delegitimation, and then briefly reviews the history of the legitimacy struggles between the Koreas since they were established in 1948. It deals with the issue of the Koguryŏ tombs and the current historical debate - the borders and origin of the monarchy and the policy with which South Korea has decided to tackle the Koguryŏ issue. The chapter examines the background of the change in Republic of Korea (ROK) policy on this issue and its implications for the essence of relations between the Koreas today. In June 2004, United Nations educational, Scientific and cultural Organization (UNESCO) held a conference in china and approved the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s application for recognition of the Koguryŏ tombs on its territory as World heritage Sites. Keywords: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); Koguryŏ tombs; Korea; legitimacy struggles; UNESCO

Plutella xylostella and Pieris rapae are the key components of a pest complex that attacks Brassica crops in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). We examined the spatial distributions of these insects within crops both as individual species and when combined as a standard insect that was derived from their relative feeding rates. The influence of standard co‐operative management practice and an integrated pest management (IPM) strategy on the dispersion of the standard insect was tested. Iwao's m* − m relation was then used to describe the distribution of standard insects by management categories and of Pieris rapae using all data. Pest management practices only affected the distribution of the species when they were combined into standard insects. Enumerative sampling plans were therefore designed for standard insects based on population data derived from IPM‐managed fields and for Pieris rapae from population data from all experimental fields. The presented plans have the potential to make a significant contribution to managing lepidopteran pests in the DPRK. The approach will be useful in the design of sequential sampling plans for other geographical regions where these pests co‐occur and can also contribute to the development of sequential sampling plans for other pest complexes for which standard insects can be derived.

The evaluation and usefulness of lightning prediction for the Indian subcontinent are demonstrated. Implementation of the lightning parameterizations based on storm parameters, in the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model, with different microphysics schemes are carried out. With the availability of observed lightning measurements over Maharashtra from the lightning detection network (LDN), lightning cases have been identified during the pre-monsoon season of 2016–18. Lightning parameterization based on cloud top height defined by a reflectivity threshold factor of 20 dBZ is chosen. Initial analysis is carried out for 16 lightning events with four microphysical schemes for the usefulness in lightning prediction. Objective analysis is carried out and quantitative model performance (skill scores) is assessed based on observed data. The skills are evaluated for 10- and 50-km2 boxes from the 1-km domain. There is good POD of 0.86, 0.82, 0.85, and 0.84, and false alarm ratio (FAR) of 0.28, 0.25, 0.29, and 0.26 from WSM6, Thompson, Morrison, and WDM6, respectively. There is an overestimation in lightning flash with a spatial and temporal shift. The fractional skill score is evaluated as a function of spatial scale with neighborhoods from 25 to 250 km. These high skill scores and high degree of correlation between observations and model simulation gives us confidence to use the system for real-time operational forecast over India. The skill for 2019 and 2020 pre-monsoon are calculated to address the predictability of operational lightning prediction over India. Significance Statement A high-resolution model, namely, the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model, with multiple microphysics parameterization schemes and lightning parameterization is used here. The objective analysis is carried out for the lightning cases over India and the quantitative performance is assessed. The results highlight that there is fairly good probability of detection (POD) of 0.86, 0.82, 0.85, and 0.84 and false alarm ratio (FAR) of 0.28, 0.25, 0.29, and 0.26 from four different microphysical schemes (WSM6, Thompson, Morrison, and WDM6, respectively). These high skill scores and high degree of correlation between observations and model simulation gives us confidence to use the system for real-time operational forecast. The validation of lightning forecast system deployed over India for five pre-monsoon months in real time is carried out, which gives POD of 0.90, FAR of 0.64, hit rate of 0.57, and POFD of 0.50 for the whole Indian region.

Russia has had a consistent policy of promoting a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, opposing resolution of the nuclear issue through pressure or sanction, supporting a multilateral process and solution, promoting adherence to Non-Proliferation Treaty rules, and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Moscow suggested initiating a six-party process regarding a solution to the divided Korean peninsula in 1994. North Korea is generally positive about Russia's suggestions. The United States has belatedly and reluctantly recognized Russia's positive role in the process. Russia hopes the Six Party Talks (6PT) will gradually evolve into a multiparty security and cooperation system including a peaceful DPRK. This will be facilitated by international economic assistance to the DPRK and institutionalization of the 6PT. Successful Russia-U.S. cooperation may have much wider implications. Key words: Russian foreign policy in Korea, North Korea, multilateral security - East Asia, nuclear weapons Early Russian Efforts to Promote Collective Security in Korea On March 24, 1994 the Russian foreign ministry made public a suggestion for a six-party involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also supposed to join the discussion on Korea for finding a compromise solution to the first North Korean nuclear crisis. That crisis began in March 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), suspected of nuclear-weapon development, left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 The proposed comprehensive solution in Korea was meant to include: * promoting nuclear nonproliferation in Korea; * guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two Korean states; * military confidence-building measures; * replacement of the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a new peace treaty; and * normalization of bilateral relations between certain members of the talks (U.S.-DPRK, DPRK-Japan).2 The idea itself was not new. After the end of the Korean War the armistice agreement of 1953 recommended that the governments of the countries concerned hold a to solve the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and reach a peace agreement. The idea of a six-party consultative conference raised during the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly was proposed by South Korea and was supported by Japan.3 Russia's support for the process was based on the presumption that the Korean security issue (including the nuclear problem) was rooted in the long history of relations between the four powers (Japan, USSR, United States, and China) on the Korean issue. Historically, imperial Japan was the colonial master of Korea and only its defeat in World War II by the United States and the USSR brought about Korean independence. The United States and the USSR agreed on the division of Korea at Yalta in 1945. Soon after, however, they became adversaries in the course of the Korean War, which also involved China. The cold-war confrontation was the product of the global competition between two systems: the USSR and China, both of which, although at odds with each other, had alliance treaties with the DPRK and supported Pyongyang, versus the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc. This system provided the security balance on the peninsula. Thus, the 1994 Russian suggestion was not spontaneous and was prompted by Russia's attempt to protect its national interests. However, at that time it was ignored. As Samuel Kim puts it: Being left out of the Chinese bilateral approach and marginalized by US hegemonic sanctions, Russia was attempting to get back into the game. . . . Washington dismissed the Russian proposal as a harmful distraction while Beijing scuttled it as deviating from its declared party line.4 Instead, a 2+2 formula (the two Koreas, the United States, and China) formula was implemented, in 1996, rebuffing Russian attempts to be involved. …