True and False DRM Memories: Differences Detected with an Implicit Task

This study investigated whether true autobiographical memories are qualitatively distinct from false autobiographical memories using a variation of the interview method originally reported by E. F. Loftus and J. Pickrell (1995). Participants recalled events provided by parents on 3 separate occasions and were asked to imagine true and false unremembered events. True memories were rated by both participants and observers as more rich in recollective experience and were rated by participants as more important, more emotionally intense, as having clearer imagery, and as less typical than false memories. Rehearsal frequency was used as a covariate, eliminating these effects. Imagery in true memories was most often viewed from the field perspective, whereas imagery in false memories was most often viewed from the observer perspective. More information was communicated in true memories, and true memories contained more information concerning the consequences of described events. Results suggest repeated remembering can make false memories more rich in recollective experience and more like true memories. Differences between true and false memories suggest some potentially distinct characteristics of false memories and provide insight into the process of false memory creation.

We investigated the extent to which activation of specific information in associative networks during a memory task could facilitate subsequent analogical problem solving in healthy older adults as well as those with early onset Alzheimer’s disease. We also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the critical solution term during the memory task occurred when the item was actually presented (true memories) or when this item arose due to spreading activation to a related but nonpresented item (false memory). Older adult controls (OACs) and people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were asked to solve 9 verbal proportional analogies, 3 of which had been primed by Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as a word in the list (true memory), 3 of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures were spontaneously activated during list presentation (false memory), and 3 of which were unprimed. As expected, OACs were better (both in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving problems than people with AD and both groups were better when false memories were primes than when true memories were primes or there were no primes. There were no reliable differences between unprimed and true prime problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies in OACs and people with AD, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories.

In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants falsely recall or recognize a nonpresented word (critical lure), highly associated with previously studied words. As numerous DRM studies have found a robust false memory effect at the behavioural level, event-related potentials (ERPs) studies have searched for possible overlapping in brain electrical activity between true and false memory. Using the DRM paradigm, the present experiment manipulated the sensory modality of stimulus presentation (auditory vs. visual) in the study phase to analyse the effect of modality match between study and test on true and false recognition. Words were therefore presented either visually or auditorily at study and always visually at test. True recognition was found to be significantly higher in the modality 'match' condition (visual-visual) than in the 'mismatch' condition (auditory-visual), whereas there was no modality-match effect on false recognition of critical lures. A general, overlapping was found between ERP correlates of true and false recognition: FN400 (300-500 ms), left-parietal (400-800 ms) and late right-frontal (1000-1500 ms) old/new effects were similar for both studied words and critical lures. No sensory modality-match effect was associated with FN400 or left-parietal old/new effects. Only the late right-frontal activity was modulated by modality manipulation, with significantly more positive ERPs in the modality-match condition. Sensory modality match of stimulus presentation, therefore, dissociated true and false recognition memory only at the behavioural level but not at the ERP level. Overall, true and false recognition memories seem to share common underlying processes.

False memories have been extensively investigated over the past few decades using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In this paradigm, participants study lists of words associatively related to a non-presented critical lure. During a memory test, these critical lures are falsely recalled or recognized. Most studies have focused on false memories that arise when both encoding and retrieval are conducted in the same language (i.e., within-language conditions), which is typically the participant's native or first language (L1). However, much less is known about false memories when critical lures appear in the memory test in a different language than the studied lists (i.e., between-language conditions), being one of them the participant's second language (L2). The main objective of this exhaustive review was to provide an overview of the current state of research on false recognition using the DRM paradigm in between-language conditions, where languages are switched between encoding and retrieval (i.e., L1L2 versus L2L1). The results revealed a language dominance effect in between-language false memories. In other words, false recognition rates were dependent on the study language, with a trend toward higher false recognition when words were enconded in the L1 (L1L2) compared to when words were encoded in the L2 (L2L1). This review enhances our understanding of how studying words in a first or second language affects false memory in the DRM paradigm, emphasizing the significance of investigating false memory in second language speakers and the necessity for further research in the field.

Neural correlates underlying true and false associative memories

False memories refer to falsely remembering something that did not happen or that happened differently. The effects of age on episodic memory underlie both the decline in real memories and the increase in false memories. But, what is the richness and what is the feeling of reality of false memories in the elderly? This mini-review on false memory in young and older adults presents the results from the literature using one of the most used paradigms in the laboratory to study false memories - the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. This paradigm generally consists in the presentation of semantically associated items-lists (words or images) related to a non-presented critical lure (e.g., bed, rest, awake …, the critical lure is sleep). During free recall or recognition tests, the participants regularly produce false memories (intrusions or false recognitions of the critical lures), increasingly with aging. We specifically ask the question of the richness of the false memory trace in young and older adults in terms of contextual associations (What-Where-When-Details binding) and phenomenological characteristics (remembering, knowing, guessing). We propose to examine this issue using a naturalistic episodic memory task via navigation in a virtual environment enriched with series of associated elements (e.g., vegetables stand) linked to non-presented critical lures (e.g., carrots). Based on preliminary results, we propose an integrative model of memory trace which can explain the differences observed between young and old people on the richness of their false memories.

In this study, the number of semantic associates in Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists was varied from 4 to 14 in a modified Sternberg paradigm. The false alarm (FA) and correct rejection (CR) reaction time (RT)/memory-set size (MSS) functions of critical lures showed a cross-over interaction at approximately MSS 7, suggesting a reversal of the relative dominance between these two responses to the critical lure at this point and also indicating the location of the boundary between the sub- and supraspan MSS. For the subspan lists, FA to critical lures was slower than CR, suggesting a slow, strategic mechanism driving the false memory. Conversely, for the supraspan lists, critical lure FA was faster than its CR, suggesting a spontaneous mechanism driving the false memory. Results of two experiments showed that an automatic, fast, and a slow, controlled process could be error-prone or error-corrective, depending on the length of the DRM memory list. Thus there is a dual retrieval process in false memory as in true memory. The findings can be explained by both the activation/monitoring and the fuzzy-trace theories.

In two experiments we investigated whether older adult controls (OACs) and people with mild and moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD) benefit from false memory priming effects in subsequent problem-solving tasks. In addition, and unlike in previous false memory priming studies with older adults, we examined latency measures in the recognition phase. In Experiment 1 participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures (CLs) were also the solutions to those problems. In Experiment 2, we used a similar paradigm but investigated whether CLs could prime solutions to subsequent analogical reasoning problems. In this latter experiment, we also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the CL term occurred during the memory task (was presented as part of the list; i.e., true memories) or when these items were not presented but arose during encoding due to spreading activation (i.e., false memories). We found that all three groups' performance on these tasks was facilitated only by false memories spontaneously generated from the prior presentation of DRM lists. That is, performance on CRATs and analogical reasoning tasks was better (greater accuracy and faster speed) when those problems were preceded by DRM lists whose CLs also served as the solution to those problems. These findings are consistent with previous results from studies with children, young adults, and older adults and extends them to people with more moderate AD.

Insight accompanied by an 'aha!' experience has a mnemonic effect. Previous studies of insight have often focused on the mnemonic effect of insight on veridical memories, while the effect of insight on false memories is not known. More understanding of the mnemonic effect of insight on false memories could have implications for the mechanism of insightful mnemonic effects. The present research examined whether insight has a mnemonic effect on false memories. Participants were asked to perform Chinese verbal compound remote associate (CRA) tasks and then complete the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, the critical lure of which was also the solution to the Chinese CRA problem. Compared to non-insight, insight was associated with a lower critical lures rate in Experiment 1 and with lower critical lures and unrelated words rates in Experiment 2 when the presentation of DRM list words was random. Giving a warning before DRM tasks could reduce the critical lures rate of non-insight but had little effect on insightful solutions in Experiment 3. These findings indicate that insight can reduce false memories.

False memories are not surprising: The subjective experience of an associative memory illusion

Reviewed by: Remembering Abraham: Culture, Memory, and History in the Hebrew Bible Ziony Zevit Remembering Abraham: Culture, Memory, and History in the Hebrew Bible, by Ronald Hendel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 200 pp. $35.00. There are true memories and there are false memories, as in the case of false memory syndrome. True memories are constructed, a mélange of facts and [End Page 186] partial recollections, of reexperiences (since they are recalled) filtered through perceptions of the past. False memories are a mélange of fictions, construed the same way. Think "The Manchurian Candidate." To talk of memory is to evoke the presence of Freud and Nietzsche and to raise the possibility of the unreal as real. To talk of true memories is to talk of the past but to address it through ethereal, gossamer filaments of fact, interwoven with shafts of maybes, wafting in breezes of time. And that is what Ron Hendel undertakes in this interesting book. In this collection of six short studies, four of which were previously published, Hendel inquires whether or not historical-like narratives in the Bible, dependent largely on Israel's national and/or cultural memories, were true or false memories of real persons and events. And if true, in what way or with regard to what may they be considered historical. Chapter 1 situates ancient Israel in the cultural context of the Ancient Near East and illustrates well how the Bible's presentation of Israel as a people set aside, somewhat different from its neighbors, despite objective indicators that this was not necessarily the case, created a narrative framework through which Israel perceived the world and comprehended its evolving present and its evolving past. Chapter 2, "Remembering Abraham," written for this book, leads directly into chapter 3, "Historical Memories in the Patriarchal Narratives." The first of this pair explores how Israel's memories of Abraham function in the literature and how the earlier compositions in Genesis attracted later comments and reactions in texts that were composed later. The second focuses on the question of how much of what is predicated about Abraham may be considered factual. Hendel concludes that patriarchal names can be considered historical, that the "El" religion that they practice can be considered historical, and that an Egyptian "Fort Abram" mentioned by Pharaoh Sheshonk, the biblical Shishaq of 1 Kings 14:25–26, as being somewhere in the Negev ca. 925 BCE, imports a vague historicity to an actual heroic Abram, the self-same Abram/Abraham portrayed in Genesis. But when it comes time to parse the literary and archaeological data in order to discern when this character actually lived in the past, Hendel dates the patriarchal era to "the time forever recreated in the biblical narratives of Genesis 12–50. This era consists of myth and memory, mingled in a way far more compelling than ordinary history. It is an era in sacred time" (p. 55). Chapter 4 explores "The Exodus in Biblical Memory," and concludes on the basis of both biblical and extra-biblical data that some veracity may be assigned to the memories linking bondage and Egypt, even though there is no necessary truth to the Bible's claim that all of Israel was in Egypt and that all Israelites in the Central Highlands of Eretz Israel during the divided [End Page 187] monarchy were descendents of former Egyptian slaves. Some of them, however, may very well have been individuals with direct or indirect memories of Egyptian slavery (p. 62). Nevertheless, when the plague narratives and the signs and wonders are factored into the equation and the extant Exodus narrative is comprehended as a memory, Hendel concludes that "the memory of the Exodus is not just a memory of historical events, but a conflation of history and memory that suits the conditions of different qualities of time" (p. 73). In chapter 5, Hendel searches for Solomon in history and memory. Using literary hints and archaeological clues, he disentangles the shadowy historical figure barely discernible behind the elaborate Biblical narrative text from the fictional one. In chapter 6, a well-composed encapsulation of "The Biblical Sense of the Past," Hendel ties together the threads from...

Eyewitness identification has been shown to be fallible and prone to false memory. In this study we develop and test a new method to probe the mechanisms involved in the formation of false memories in this area, and determine whether a particular memory is likely to be true or false. We created a seven-step procedure based on the Implicit Association Test to gauge implicit biases in eyewitness identification (the IATe). We show that identification errors may result from unconscious bias caused by implicit associations evoked by a given face. We also show that implicit associations between negative attributions such as guilt and eyewitnesses' final pick from a line-up can help to distinguish between true and false memory (especially where the witness has been subject to the suggestive nature of a prior blank line-up). Specifically, the more a witness implicitly associates an individual face with a particular crime, the more likely it is that a memory they have for that person committing the crime is false. These findings are consistent with existing findings in the memory and neuroscience literature showing that false memories can be caused by implicit associations that are outside conscious awareness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Introduction Although sleep has long been known to benefit memory consolidation, recent studies demonstrate that even a brief period of eyes-closed waking rest can similarly benefit a wide variety of memory types, including declarative, procedural and spatial. But sleep is argued to not only quantitatively strengthen memory traces, but also qualitatively transform them over time. The present study tested whether post-encoding waking rest affects the formation of false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, which are thought to arise from a “gist extraction” transformation of memory. We hypothesized that rest would increase false memory as measured by recall, but decrease false memory as measured by recognition. Methods In a within-subjects, counter-balanced design, N=51 participants auditorily encoded 8 DRM word lists. Each list consisted of 15 semantically-related words, all of which were derived from a central “critical lure” not heard by participants. After encoding, participants either sat quietly with their eyes closed for 15 minutes or spent an equivalent period of time completing a distractor task. Afterwards, participants were tested on their memory via both recall and recognition. False memory was defined as the false recall or recognition of “critical lure” words that had not been included on the list. Scores on the recall test were adjusted for incorrect responses, by subtracting the number of words incorrectly recalled (not including the lure words) from the number of words correctly recalled. Results Paired samples t-tests revealed that there was no significant effect of rest on false memory using either recall (t(50)=.26, p = .796) or recognition (t(50)=1.20, p = .237) tests. There was also no significant effect of rest on memory for studied words (recall: t(50)=1.32, p = .194; recognition: t(50)=0.51, p = .612). Conclusion This study indicates the possibility that waking rest does not affect certain types of qualitative memory transformation thought to occur during sleep. This includes the gist-extraction type processes underlying false memory. Potentially, rather than acting independently of each other, waking rest and sleep may act in coordination, each with distinct roles in the consolidation process. Support (if any) Intramural funding from Furman University.

Research on false memory in bilinguals using the DRM task has shown that false memories transfer across languages, but comparisons to within-language conditions have yielded mixed results. In two experiments, Spanish-English bilinguals completed standardized language assessments and a DRM task. Experiment 1 (N = 96) had several study-recall cycles before a final recognition test, and Experiment 2 (N = 72) only tested recognition. Relative to within-language conditions, more critical lures were recalled when the language changed from study to test and when words were studied in mixed-language sequences. With no prior recall test, the rate of critical lure recognition did not differ across language conditions. Language proficiency was not associated with the false-memory effects. Associations of false and veridical memory were negative in recall and positive in recognition. Overall, the findings indicate that proficient bilinguals can integrate information across their languages via a shared semantic network to form false memories.

False memories represent distorted memories which are remembered incorrectly or didn’t happen at all in reality. In the present study, the period of time between encoding and testing has been manipulated, in order to explore the effects of delay on implicit and explicit false memories. Two groups of subjects were tested, using the DRM paradigm, for false implicit and explicit memories. One group had no delay period between encoding and test phases, the other group was tested at one week delay after the encoding phase. Results showed no significant differences between implicit and explicit false memories. The delay had significant effect only for true memories, which were significantly lower after one-week delay. Conclusions and future directions of research are discussed. Keywords: False memories, implicit false memories, explicit false memories, true memories, delay