United States Communist History Bibliography 2019

On September 21, 2010, delegations of political officials from Cambodia and faculty from Bangladesh joined more than half a million people to celebrate the annual festival of the Caodai Mother Goddess at Toa Thanh Tay Ninh, the Caodai Holy See,1 located approximately a hundred kilometers northwest of Ho Chi Minh City. This was the first year since 1975, when religious institutions in southern Vietnam fell under the strict control of the communist regime, that visitors from outside Vietnam were formally invited by the Holy See to attend this most popular and important Caodai celebration. Vietnamese Caodaists in both Cambodia and the United States were instrumental in organizing the international exchange, but the latter group was ostracized by coreligionists back home for their involvement. Whereas Vietnamese Caodaists in the Cambodia have reestablished ties with their Holy See at the turn of the twenty-first century, nearly all coreligionists in the United States have refused to recognize the religious center. Instead, they have largely remained staunchly critical and distant from the Caodai Holy See, shunning anyone who exhibits any form of connection or sympathy toward it. Caodaism is a Vietnamese syncretistic indigenous religion that is now being practiced in many countries, with the largest groups in Vietnam (3.9 million), the United States (20,000), and Cambodia (3,000).2

The strategic stalemate that prevented a direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union displaced violent superpower competition to areas of the Third World where the two blocs could invest in local and regional wars without risking direct confrontation. The Soviet Union tended to approach such conflicts cautiously even when they involved other Communist states. The United States, by contrast, adapted its security policies to a containment doctrine that defined the political complexion of every non-Communist government in the world as a matter of potential strategic interest. Local opposition to foreign rule in the US and European colonial empires, and social movements aiming to displace traditional elites elsewhere, confronted a strong US preference for reliably anti-Communist (and thus conservative to right-wing) regimes. Even moderate to conservative regimes that sought to advance national interests by constraining US influence came under assault from Washington. Governments that collaborated closely with the United States often had to ignore or suppress local interests opposed to US policies. In its prosecution of the Cold War in the Third World, the United States enjoyed formidable advantages over its Soviet rival. Economic strength gave US leaders a decided financial and material advantage over the Soviets. Military bases projected US power into regions bordering on Communist states throughout the world. US ideological and cultural assets also helped. Alliances with local elites eager to reduce domestic challenges proved especially helpful. The United States deployed all of these resources in response to perceived affronts to its regime and policy preferences wherever they occurred.

Historians of modem Taiwan history generally ignored the problem of the history of National Taiwan University (Taidai), especially during the transition period from the end of Japanese colonialism to the loss of the Mainland to the Communist regime. The history of Taidai and her Liberal Arts College is not only about one university, one college, but also an important issue of Chinese academic history and the cultural history of Taiwan. This article focuses on the second president Lu Chih-houng's (陸志鴻) administration of Taidai, and the evolution of the Liberal Arts College affairs. The main discoveries are: first of all, Lu's appointment as the President was supported by Governor Chen-yi (陳儀), the ruler of Taiwan province, and the political power extended thus to the campus of Taidai. Second, ”the February twenty-eighth incident” happened during this period, and professor Lin Mu-shen (林茂生), acting dean of the Liberal Arts College, was arrested and killed by political authorities. What was the role of President Lu and Taidai in this tragic affair? Third, Chien Ge-chuan (錢歌川), the first dean of the college, took office just after the incident. What were his administrative ideas and practical methods? Fourth, the instruction and research works of the time is rarely mentioned, as this was a transition period of considerable turmoil.

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”

Yugoslavia has developed a form of communism very different from that found in other communist nations, yet it has faced problems of health manpower distribution not unlike those existing in other countries, both communist and non-communist. Recruitment and training patterns are in some respects similar to those found in the United States: medical students tend to come from high-status, urban families and specialization has increased very dramatically over the past thirty years, in marked contrast to the pattern in the United States. Moreover, though there are continuing discrepancies in physician distribution among urban and rural communes and developed and underdeveloped republics and provinces, these differences are not widening as they have in the United States when similar regional units are observed. It is suggested that physician distribution has been controlled more effectively in Yugoslavia than in the United States, in large part because of the control over available positions exercised by health workers and representatives of social insurance and other institutions.

The purpose of this article is to provide a new perspective on the historiography of Korean War studies in American academia. Unlike previous studies that comprehensively cover the research of American academics, this article examines how the American Korean Studies community, which is part of the American academic community, has dealt with the topic of the Korean War, and explores historically how the Korean War could be transformed from a ‘forgotten war’ to an ‘unknown war’ in American academia. Initially, the focus of Korean War studies in the United States was on the ‘war’ in the Far East/Northeast Asia, and the Korean War was analyzed as part of the Soviet Union’s global strategy. To focus on the matter of ‘Korea’, several conditions had to be met. First, an intellectual climate had to emerge in which Asian nationalism was understood separately from communism. Next, American Korean studies had to grow to provide and interpret information about Korea in the United States. Through the growth of Korean studies in Amercia, the political dynamics of the Korean people in the Korean War began to receive attention. Paradoxically, the work of American Korean scholars has simultaneously enabled reflective questions about America’s role in the Korean War. Serious discussions began to take place about why the Korean War has been forgotten in the United States and what more needs to be learned about it if it is indeed an ‘unknown war’. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ‘international turn’ in U.S. academia to study the Korean War at an international level, with a focus on declassified documents from the former communist regime. But there is much more to learn about this ‘unknown war’ than what is in the archives. Through collaborations and connections with South Korean scholars, who have grown rapidly since democratization, American Korean studies has sought to pursue a different dimension of the study of the Korean War: a ‘socio-cultural turn’, or ‘humanistic turn.’ Through these activities, the ‘unknown war’ is remembered in new ways, and new questions are still being asked today.

This paper deals with the role of so-called “Jewish jokes” in Russia and in the United States and the relationship between them. It shows that Russian and American Jewish jokes have much in common. Many Russian winged words that go back to quotes from Jewish jokes have counterparts in American English, which indicates the popularity of those jokes in the United States. These jokes presumably appeared in shtetls and were originally told in Yiddish and translated into Russian and English later (one can find the sources of these jokes in Yiddish folklore). Yet there are certain differences between Russian and American Jewish jokes. The differences have to do with the linguistic form of the jokes (e. g., ways of referring to their characters) as well as their “cultural” component. Some jokes are closely related to the corresponding language and defy translation. In addition, some Jewish jokes reflect the specific features of life in Russia or the United States, local realities and customs, which are often incomprehensible to people of different cultural backgrounds. In particular, relationships between the characters and the communist government are only relevant to some Russian jokes; differences between the three Jewish movements (Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform) are only relevant to some American jokes. There is a character that only occurs in American jokes, namely, Jewish American princess . The article concludes by discussing Israeli jokes, which are sometimes told in Russian or English.

Background : Our aim was to describe the socio-demographic factors and selected clinical characteristics of patients diagnosed with nodules of the thyroid gland in Albania, a former communist country in the Western Balkans which is currently undergoing a rapid transformation and deep reforms. Methods : A case-series study was conducted in Tirana during the period September 2016 – September 2017 including 212 patients examined at the Center of Nuclear Medicine of the University Hospital Center “Mother Teresa” in Tirana, the capital city of Albania. Based on clinical indications, all the patients underwent scintigraphy, FNA-cytology and a histo-pathological examination of the thyroid gland. Furthermore, other useful clinical data and socio-demographic information was collected. Results : 32 (15.1%) patients were men and 180 (84.9) were women. The overall mean age was 51.2±13.6 years. Mean age was significantly higher in men compared to women (55.3±15.6 years vs. 50.5±13.2 years, respectively; P=0.016). Overall, 80 (37.7%) of participants were born in Tirana, and 113 (53.3%) of individuals were currently residing in Tirana. The overall prevalence of preexisting conditions was 33.2%. It was significantly higher in men than in women (56.3% vs. 29.1%, respectively; P=0.004). Among individuals who had evidence of preexisting diseases, 74.3% of them had cardiovascular diseases and 25.7% had diabetes. A positive family history of nodules of the thyroid gland was more prevalent in women than in men (40.0% vs. 18.8%, respectively; P=0.028). Conclusion : This study provides useful evidence on the distribution of socio-demographic factors and clinical characteristics in Albanian patients with nodules of the thyroid gland. Keywords: Albania, endocrinology, nodules, thyroid gland

Teachers of foreign languages in the United States have a number of obstacles to overcome, the most massive being, perhaps, the fact that ours is a one-language-oriented society. That language, of course, happens to be English. While it is true that to know an elegant language such as French was at one time considered to be aesthetic, nice, or a status symbol, the study of that language was never truly widespread; and neither was the study of any other foreign language. On the other hand, people in other lands have a broader outlook on this form of communication. European countries, for instance, perhaps due in part to geographical circumstances, have always been multi-language oriented. Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, due to their long subjugation to the British Empire, were (and are) to a great extent, bilingual.China, under a communist regime, has included the teaching of English in the curriculum, but the study of the language was introduced into the country along with our large trading interests and many missions long before the communist take over. Reports on President Nixon's trip to Russia have disclosed that in Russian schools the teaching of English as a second language is begun at the second grade of elementary school. In Latin American countries the study of English is fairly general; and in Mexico, our closest neighbor to the South, the presence of American tourists boosting the national economy has also encouraged its study. Instructors of foreign languages in the United States have to fight, then, the indifference towards other languages that is so deeply embeded in our culture. Nevertheless, Spanish, French, German, Latin, Italian, and Russian are taught in many high schools, colleges, and universities. At the high school level, the study of a foreign language is sometimes encouraged, but more

FOURTEEN YEARS AGO, in January i949, Peking surrendered to the besieging People's Liberation Army; ten months later the People's Republic of China was established with Peking as its capital; by the end of the year the Communist regime was in full control of the mainland of China, the Nationalist government having withdrawn to Taiwan. The fierce controversy which these events caused in the West, particularly in the United States, has lost some of its heat. It is now perhaps appropriate to give a new assessment of what they have meant for China and for those countries which had in the past a close relationship, whether hostile or friendly, with the China of pre-Communist times. China in i949 was a ruined land. Communications were almost wholly disrupted, currency inflation was fantastic, many cities were still half derelict from war damage, industry was negligible, commerce was a gamble, starvation was widespread, agriculture was reduced to subsistence level. The first task of any government acquiring full authority was sheer rescue work, a restoration of internal order, a resuscitation of basic economic activity. It is accepted by all, critics and friendly observers alike, that these tasks were tackled and these ends attained by the new Communist government with resolution and speed, far exceeding anything which could be expected or was foreseen. It is certain that had such achievements been to the credit of any regime but a Communist one they would have received worldwide acknowledgement and admiration. But from the very first the new government showed plainly that it was indifferent, even contemptuous, of outside opinion. Foreign journalists, who would have reported these facts, were not allowed to operate and soon withdrew. Breaches of diplomatic practice resulted in the withdrawal of foreign missions, and ultimately reinforced the decision of some major states (including above all the United States) to refuse recognition. China turned a hard and flinty glare upon her former friends and seemed to rely wholly upon the Soviet Union. In i962 the situation of China is greatly transformed but some features remain constant. Industry, in spite of setbacks to the more optimistic programmes of a few years ago, has progressed in fourteen years further than in the previous century since its small modern beginnings. Communications are excellent, if still inadequate; the economic life of the country has been

On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter Infiltration" against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter Infiltration" plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations in Mainland China.This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRO. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRO started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRO interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to send Japanese agents into Macao. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U.S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U.S. to set up a “high command" on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.

The meaning of the terms “left” and “right” in 1945-9 regarding Israel were quite different than what they came to mean in global politics during the Cold War. The conclusion recalls that “Israel’s Moment” was the brief two years of 1947-9 marked by a conjuncture of liberal and left-leaning sentiment in the United States and France, and Western Europe with support for the Zionist project by the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In these two years and in the four years following World War II and the Holocaust, the United States State Department, Pentagon, and the CIA shared the views of the British government that a Jewish state in Palestine would endanger Western access to Arab oil, foster Arab antagonism to the Britain and the United States, and would facilitate expansion of Soviet and communist influence in the Jewish state and thus in the Middle East. By contrast, those who supported the Zionist project did so with the language of antiracism, anticolonialism, and antifascism. As important as President Harry Truman’s support for the new state of Israel was, the diplomatic and military support from the Soviet bloc for that goal was far more persistent and emphatic than was often thought to be the case during the decades of the Cold War.

IntroductionAssistance from United States to Korea has fallen sharply over past few years, as shown in Table 1. Food aid has been scrutinized due to restrictions on donor agencies by Korean government. Furthermore, two most important donors of food aid to Korea, South Korea and China, have little or no monitoring system in place (Manyin, 2006). This may explain why, in summer of 2005, Korean government announced that it would no longer need humanitarian assistance from United Nations, channel for U.S. food aid.Furthermore, United States, its allies, and United Nations have increasingly imposed tougher economic sanctions against Korea in recent years, as communist country has developed more advanced weapons of mass destruction. On September 12, 2005, U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau at which Korean entities maintained accounts, as a primary money laundering concern and proposed rules to restrict U.S. financial institutions from engaging in financial transactions with it. On October 9, 2006, Korea set off its first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap Korea with trade, travel, and other sanctions as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test.To overcome economic problems caused by falling humanitarian assistance and economic sanctions, Korea has worked very hard in recent years to improve business climate for foreign companies and individual investors, in an effort to boost its sagging economy. Although improved business climate by itself is not sufficient reason for doing business, it is a necessary ingredient for business relations. No external investors or traders will do business with Korea or any other country unless reasonable opportunities exist for making money.Evidence indicates that Pyongyang will continue to improve its business climate so that foreign companies and investors can make money in this impoverished country. If business climate in Korea continues to improve, as expected, several reasons surface for doing business with country. First, in July 2002, Korea introduced most significant liberalization measures-called the July 2002 Economic Reform-since start of communist rule in 1948. Second, denuclearization agreement of February 13, 2007, is expected to lead to easing of a number of stringent economic sanctions against Korea imposed by United States, its allies, and United Nations. Third, Korea has recently established four special economic zones as its survival strategy. Fourth, there are a number of favorable factors for foreign investment in Korea.The July 2002 Reforms in KoreaOn July 1, 2002, Korea carried out an all-out of its economic system in order to manage its economy better. Given drastic changes in economic management prescribed by government in internal document sent to state bodies at all levels on June 1, 2002, North Korean style economic reform is expected to have an enormous impact on not only economy but also regime itself. The comprehensive initiative toward practical and decentralized policies for economic recovery was indeed a historic decision for socialist country, which had adhered to its inflexible centrally planned economic policies despite worst economic crises ever in food, foreign currency, and energy in years following 1995.Five years have now passed since Korea introduced its historic economic reforms, and there are already signs that reforms have improved country's economy and investment climate (Nam, 2007). First, overall price increase of all products has given masses a new recognition of money. Although prices have soared 18 times higher on average, wages have been raised discriminately, according to different occupations. …

Over eight years, the Reagan administration's policy on human rights shifted dramatically. At the outset, some in the administration repudiated promoting human rights internationally as a foreign policy goal of the United States; others argued that the United States should condemn abuses by hostile totalitarian governments but not by friendly authoritarian governments. By the time the Reagan administration left office, it accepted that promoting human rights was a major goal and that the United States should be evenhanded in condemning abuses. Despite the seeming headway, much remains to be done. The Reagan administration equated elections and democracy with human rights and failed to condemn abuses by ostensible democracies such as the Philippines and Guatemala; it promoted human rights in high-profile countries such as Chile while ignoring abuses in obscure countries such as Somalia; and it failed to condemn abuses by Communist governments, such as Yugoslavia and China, that had broken with the Soviet Union. In the Bush years, the task of the human rights movement is to secure implementation of principles that are now accepted.

Three issues divide Russia and China: organiza tion, decision-making, and leadership in the Communist world; revolutionary tactics and strategy in mid-twentieth century; content and form of intrabloc assistance. The Chinese, to protect their minority status and advance their political power, emphasize the sovereignty and independence of each Com munist party and advocate a commonwealth theory of inter national Communist organization. The Soviet Union pays homage to the equality and independence of each party but believes that power must go with responsibility and does not intend to relinquish international Communist leadership to Peking. The Chinese, dissatisfied and unable to compete nation-to-nation with the United States, advocate pushing global revolution, particularly in the non-Western world. The Soviet Union bases its strategy on nation-to nation competition with the United States and unification of the total Socialist camp. The Russians reject any equal-development theory that might disperse Soviet resources too widely. They insist upon the validity of economic co-operation among Communist states. The Chinese, resentful of Soviet preoccupation with Russian power and development, attack Soviet imperialism, the use of aid for political pressure. Thus far, the dispute has passed through five tactical phases. This escalation has been delib erate, after repeated failures of agreement. The underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the basic paradox between pluralism in the Communist world and monolithism in Com munist ideology.