Using an Assurance Case Framework to Develop Security Strategy and Policies

In this paper, the authors discuss the ways in which national governments, firms, and individuals respond to policy related to food safety, environmental protection, and trade. These responses must be considered in the development of policy to ensure the best possible outcomes. It accounts for uncertainty about policy impacts and scientific knowledge and incorporates stochastic environmental factors. The authors argue use of such a model in the development of health and environmental policy can overcome capture by domestic forces opposed to trade liberalization. The effectiveness of policy, of course, is dependent upon firm and consumer response to policy. Section one describes the impacts of international transfer of species and genetic material, paying particular attention to the introduction of alien invasive species. Section two discusses issues surrounding trade in environmental amenities. Food safety and environmental regulations are reviewed in section three, along with mechanisms by which such policy can serve as a proxy for protectionists. Section four develops a risk assessment model that can be used in policy design. Section five considers the role of institutional, firm and individual behavior in the development and effectiveness of policy. Section six summarizes our analysis in offering an agenda for trade talks.

More than a decade after the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, its affirmation that development and security policy should work together is still one of its most discussed features. The vision of a more comprehensive — if not integrated — approach to security and development was underwritten by substantial changes to the EU’s external relations bureaucracy following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. This ambition raises several important questions regarding the potential ‘securitization’ of EU development policy and foreign aid. Have security concerns had a growing influence on EU development policy and aid allocation? Do key concepts that have become prominent since the ESS was launched, such as ‘fragile states’ and ‘comprehensive approach’, reflect how European policymakers perceive the new reality of global development? Are resources that are supposed to support socioeconomic development being diverted for other purposes? This chapter addresses these questions by discussing the evolution of EU policies and aid practices at the interface of security and development since the turn of the 21st century. We are interested in how the EU manages tensions between security and development objectives, whether this can properly be understood as ‘securitization’ in the critical sense, or whether we should see it as a positive trend towards greater coherence.

Serbia has important role in the regional peace and stability in South Eastern Europe. Over the last three decades Serbian security policies have been directly shaped by numerous turbulent political, social, and economic circumstances. In order the better to understand what determines the patterns of development and perceptions of Serbian security strategy and defence policies, a comprehensive overview of the legislative and institutional mechanisms of Serbian security and foreign policy in combination with content analysis of the key strategic security documents and analysis of the socio-political developments in Serbian society were conducted. After a period of confrontational discourse and abuse of the security system, the democratic changes in Serbia in the beginning of 2000s resulted with reforms in the security system as well. However, many of them were not undertaken systematically. Serbian security and foreign policy priorities are mainly determined by the EU accession process and the status of Kosovo.

Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles<br><br>"A Scenario-Based Test Case Generation Framework for Security Policies"<br>by Chen Yan and Wu Dan<br>International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security, 2009. CIS '09 December 2009, pp. 489-493<br><br>After careful and considered review of the content and authorship of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE's Publication Principles.<br><br>This paper contains significant portions of original text from the paper cited below. The original text was copied without attribution (including appropriate references to the original author(s) and/or paper title) and without permission.<br><br>Due to the nature of this violation, reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper, and future references should be made to the following article:<br><br>"Model-based Testing Using Scenarios and Event-B Refinements"<br>by Qaisar A. Malik, Johan Lilius and Linas Laibinis<br>Methods, Models and Tools for Fault-Tolerance, Lecture Notes in Computer Science series, Springer, March 2009, pp. 177-195<br><br> <br/> Security policy system is critical to the security sensitive implementation systems. To increase confidence in the correctness of the security policies, policy developers can conduct policy testing to ensure security policies are correctly implemented in these systems. In this paper we present a novel framework for security policy testing. The framework takes the security policy as a support for the secure operation of the functional systems and seizes the dynamic characteristic of the security policies which change with the refinement of functional systems. The testing framework is model based and includes three parts. They are security policy integration; refinement based testing scenario acquisition and risk-based testing organization. The framework covers all elements for the model-based testing and provides a comprehensive solution for the security policy testing.

The EU security policy was a leap in the dark. It was constructed under an agreement that the EU should have such a policy, but not what it should be about. On 12 December 2003, the leaders of the European Union approved the first-ever European Security Strategy, the ESS, proclaiming an intention to ‘share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.1 The ESS summons up the EU’s external dimension, in a manner that transcends the metaphorical ‘pillars’ intended to visualize the workings of the Union. It encapsulates foreign and security policy—from the development and neighbourhood policies of the European Commission, via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), under the auspices of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to police and judicial cooperation.KeywordsSecurity PolicyHuman SecuritySecurity AgendaLisbon TreatyJudicial CooperationThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Decentralized Critical infrastructure management systems will play a key role in reducing costs and improving the quality of service of industrial processes, such as electricity production. The recent malwares (e.g. Stuxnet) revealed several vulnerabilities in today's Distributed Control Systems (DCS), but most importantly they highlighted the lack of an efficient scientific approach to conduct experiments that measure the impact of cyber threats on both the physical and the cyber parts of Networked Critical Infrastructures (NCIs). The study of those complex systems, either physical or cyber, could be carried out by experimenting with real systems, software simulators or emulators. Experimentation with production systems suffers from the inability to control the experiment environment. On the other hand the development of a dedicated experimentation infrastructure with real components is often economically prohibitive and disruptive experiments on top of it could be a risk to safety. In this paper, we focus on the implementation of a Cyber-Physical (CP) testbed which includes physical equipment. We illustrate and the cyber security issues on the communication channel between the Critical Infrastructures(CIs), such as a power grid, a nuclear plant and the energy market. We simulate the power grid network (including nuclear plant), but we emulate the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) part which is the focus of our work. Within this context we assume that we are able to implement scenarios, which produce consequences on the normal operation of the power power grid and the financial area.

The article provides a comprehensive overview of occupational accidents in the Republic of Slovenia between 2013 and 2022, based on official statistical data. Special attention is given to fatal accidents, their frequency, causes, and trends over the observed period. The study examines the key factors contributing to workplace accidents and identifies high-risk sectors where such incidents are most prevalent. Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of compliance with occupational safety and health regulations, presenting the current normative framework governing this area in Slovenia. Comparative analysis with previous years is conducted to identify progress or persistent challenges. The findings emphasize the need for continuous monitoring and improvement of safety measures in the workplace. Recommendations for preventive strategies and policy development are also discussed, aiming to reduce the number of serious and fatal injuries in the future. The article presents statistics on occupational accidents in the Republic of Slovenia from 2014 to 2023 according to official statistical records with an emphasis on fatal accidents. It also discusses the normative regulations in the field. The findings based on the statistical data and conclusions on occupational accidents are presented

Security weaknesses often stem from users trying to comply with social expectations rather than following security procedures. Such normative conflicts between security policies and social norms are therefore undesirable from a security perspective. It has been argued that system developers have a meta-task responsibility, meaning that they have a moral obligation to enable the users of the system they design to cope adequately with their responsibilities. Depending on the situation, this could mean forcing the user to make an ethical choice, by conflicts. In this paper, we ask the question to what extent it is possible to detect such potential normative conflicts in the design phase of security-sensitive systems, using qualitative research in combination with so-called system models. We then envision how security design might proactively reduce conflict by (a) designing out conflict where possible in the development of policies and systems, and (b) responding to residual and emergent conflict through organisational processes. The approach proposed in this paper is a so-called subcultural approach, where security policies are designed to be culturally sympathetic. Where normative conflicts either cannot be avoided or emerge later, the organisational processes are used to engage with subcultures to encourage communally-mediated control.

The development of information technology and the digitalization of higher education demand a more efficient, flexible, and secure network infrastructure. Software Defined Networking (SDN) offers a new paradigm in network management by separating the control plane and data plane, enabling more centralized and adaptive network management. This study aims to analyze the implementation of SDN in campus networks, specifically at Ichsan Sidenreng Rappang University, and identify its benefits, challenges, and implementation strategies. The method used is a systematic literature review of 15 scientific publications from 2020-2025 that discuss the implementation of SDN in the context of campus networks. The results show that SDN provides significant network performance improvements, with a decrease in latency from 37.7 ms to 18 ms, jitter from 40.3 ms to 2.7 ms, and an increase in throughput from 95 Mbps to 98.2 Mbps compared to conventional networks. SDN also increases flexibility through centralized management and automation, strengthens security with adaptive firewall integration, and improves service redundancy and availability. Key implementation challenges include the need for human resource training, the development of comprehensive security policies, and testing on more complex topologies. This study concludes that implementing SDN on campus networks is strategic for supporting the digitalization of higher education, with recommendations for thorough planning, ongoing human resource training, and the development of policies that holistically integrate technical and security aspects.

ABSTRACTBACKGROUND:Traumatic head injuries (THIs) are one of the major causes of death in forensic cases. The aim of this study was to investigate the characteristics of patients with fatal THIs.METHODS:In this study, a total of 311 patients with fatal THIs, who underwent postmortem examinations and/or autopsies, were retrospectively analyzed. Cases were evaluated based on sex, age group, incident origin, cause of the incident, presence of skull fracture, type of fractured bone (if any), fracture localization and pattern, presence and type of intracranial lesion (if any), and cause of death.RESULTS:Out of the patients, 242 (77.8%) were male and 69 (22.2%) were female. Accidents accounted for 235 (75.6%) of the incidents, with in-vehicle traffic accidents causing 117 (37.6%). In 221 cases (71.1%), intracranial lesions and skull fractures were observed together. The most common fractures were base fractures (171 cases) and temporal bone fractures (153 cases). The rate of intracranial hemorrhage was lower in the adult age group (69.7%) compared to the older age group (92.6%).CONCLUSION:The results obtained in this study indicate that the cause of the incident, type of fracture, presence of skull base fracture, and multiple skull fractures increase the likelihood of fatalities. The occurrence of skull fractures reduces intracranial pressure, thereby decreasing the incidence of intracranial lesions. The development and effective enforcement of road traffic safety policies and regulations will reduce the incidence of fatalities.

A security policy which includes the appropriate phases of implementation, enforcement, auditing and review is vital to protecting an organisations information security. This paper examined the information security policy of a government organisation in response to a number of perceived shortcomings. The specific issues identified relating to the organisations security policy as a result of this investigation were as follows: a culture of ignoring policies, minimal awareness of policies, minimal policy enforcement, policy updating and review ad hoc at best, policy framework, lengthy policy development and approval process, no compliance program, no formal non-compliance reporting and an apparent inconsistent enforcement across the whole of the organisation. In response to these identified issues, the following recommendations were made to improve the information security of the organisation: changing the organisations culture, creating an awareness mechanism for policies, improving the organisations culture, create an ICT policy awareness programme, review and re-write existing policies, policy enforcement, policy compliance, policy noncompliance reporting, policy updating and review, improve the policy development and approval process, policy compliance checking and uniform policy enforcement. Whilst it is also likely that a lack of governance contributed to these issues, this aspect was not addressed in this paper. It is hoped that timely implementation of the remedies presented here will increase the organisations information security.

This article reviews the development of security policy in Northern Ireland since the outbreak of the current ‘troubles’ in 1969. Following an examination of the three principal categories of actor directly involved on the state side ‐ politicians, civil servants and security agency personnel ‐ the problems accompanying the fust phase of security policy, from 1969 to the mid‐1970s, are discussed. Particular attention is paid to intelligence aspects of the situation. The second part of the paper is devoted to security policy as it has developed since the government's policy review of 1975–76. The re‐emergence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the primary security agency is described, together with what is called the ‘Hermonization’ of the force in the 1980s. The development of the police under Sir John Hermon (Chief Constable 1980–89) has reflected three main trends in security policy: Ulsterization, professionalization, and the de‐politicization of the force. The article ends with a consideration of the...

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike that both foreign/security policy and development policy are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Similar to international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union has commenced to emphasise the need for forging a closer link between these ‘distinct’ policy arenas. In its 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, for example, the European Council maintained that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (European Council, 2008, p. 8). As security and development policy face different time horizons and sometimes enshrine different objectives, this affirmation touches upon one of the core questions in development policy: under which conditions can development assistance fulfil its goals? With a view to fragile states, in particular, recent studies have confirmed that rapid and sustained donor engagement is likely to ‘significantly increases the chances of a […] turnaround’ (Chauvet and Collier, 2006, p. 14). Thus far, the EU’s response to emerging political crises in third countries has been criticised as slow, cumbersome and, as a result, ineffective; it was lacking a single and unified instrument at the EU level that could have been initiated on very short notice and implemented rapidly.

Airport image analysis using machine learning is an efficient way to diagnose security. However, the sharing of in-formation across airports is usually constrained due to national security policies. The menace of cyber-attacks on airport secu-rity and surveillance systems continues to pose major threats to national security. Also, the protection and privacy preservation of information and technology assets are growing in complexity and importance. Airport image analysis (e.g., remote sensing, UAV screening, etc.) using deep learning emerges as the new methodology to perform surveillance tasks. Nevertheless, the major concern continues to be safety regulations and privacy issues for data sharing. Thus, causing insufficiency in dataset availability for training any computer vision application model. To improve data availability, security, performance, and communication efficiency, we propose a novel fusion-based feder-ated learning approach for airport surveillance through object detections using remote sensing images. The proposed archi-tecture serves as a guide for the Federated learning system design that preserves privacy by generating an independent global model based on local model updates from different clients without revealing the data itself. Secondly, a real-time fusion method is proposed to decide the participating clients according to their local model performance. Based on critical parameters like training time, dataset size, client system configuration, etc., at the participating clients, we schedule the model dynamically. A custom dataset annotated for 6 object categories, character-izing the real-world scenario with airports across the world is generated at different spatial resolutions. We evaluate the model for the object detection tasks using two benchmark algorithms (YOLOV3 and Faster R-CNN). Our experiments indicated that this methodology is robust to unbalanced and non-IID (Indepen-dent and Identically Distributed) datasets. Besides, this method can be used to reduce the round of communication needed to train a deep network on decentralized data.

Research Highlights and Abstract This article Contributes to the debate on British Foreign and Security Policy; Contributes to the literature on the British National Security Strategy; Links international relations literature with domestic policy formation literature; Introduces the concept of ‘legitimacy’ to foreign and security policy analysis. The publication of the Britain's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 marked a formal shift away from the secret state of the Cold War to the highly public protective state of today. This article is interested in the question of why the NSS and related framework have taken this particular public and explicit form. Both mainstream and critically minded academics have argued that contemporary security discourses and policies are techniques of power and governance and that the public nature of the policies is vital to this function. In this article, I argue that there has been a transformation in the nature of the British state from a representative state in which the state's authority was legitimated through a number of political mechanisms of representation, to one in which state elites and institutions need to forge new kinds of relationships with the governed. This is a key development that has been noticed in political, sociological and legal theoretical literature but as yet hardly addressed in international relations and security studies. This transformation of the state, I will argue, is intimately linked to the form and content of contemporary security policies. The contemporary state is undergoing a process of an erosion of legitimacy, which has a direct impact upon the capacity of the state to govern. In this context, policies take on the role of trying to bridge the legitimacy gap. I will argue that this shift in the state leads to a different understanding of contemporary security policies as representative of a decreasing ability to govern security, a state that is losing legitimacy and authority; that is in effect, losing its sovereignty. This article argues that British national security strategies and policies are representative of this.