Na gruncie teorii proces podejmowania decyzji jest rozpatrywany z dwóch punktów widzenia.W pierwszym przypadku szuka się metod dochodzenia do rozstrzygnięć optymalnych,

The goal of the present paper is to review recent theoretical models and empirical studies on the role of numeracy (i.e., cognitive ability in processing numerical information) in decision making under risk and uncertainty. The research conducted in the last decade points that numeracy is the most robust predictor of making good decisions, which predictions are independent of other psychological constructs or cognitive abilities (such as fluid intelligence or cognitive reflection). The pivotal role of numeracy has been described in at least three theoretical models: Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Skilled Decision Theory, and Multiple Numeric Competencies model. Furthermore, the results of numerous research indicate that better decisions made by people with high numeracy are underpinned by various psychological mechanisms of the cognitive, motivational, and affective nature. Findings related to the performance of people with high and low numeracy served to develop both immediate (e.g., visual aids or an experience-based format of risk communication) and long-term (e.g., cognitive training) methods of improving the decision-making process. Based on these decision aids, we can effectively support people with low numeracy in an accurate risk assessment, risk comprehension, and making better decisions

The entire assembly of Israelites gathered at Shiloh and set up the tent of meeting there. The country was brought under their control, 2 but there were still seven Israelite tribes who had not yet received their inheritance. 3 So Joshua said to the Israelites: "How long will you wait before you begin to take possession of the land that the Lord, the God of your ancestors, has given you? 4 Appoint three men from each tribe. I will send them out to make a survey of the land and to write a description of it, according to the inheritance of each. Then they will return to me. 5 You are to divide the land into seven parts. Judah is to remain in its territory on the south and the tribes of Joseph in their territory on the north. 6 After you have written descriptions of the seven parts of the land, bring them here to me and I will cast lots for you in the presence of the Lord our God. 7 The Levites, however, do not get a portion among you, because the priestly service of the Lord is their inheritance. And Gad, Reuben and the half-tribe of Manasseh have already received their inheritance on the east side of the Jordan. Moses the servant of the Lord gave it to them." 8 As the men started on their way to map out the land, Joshua instructed them, "Go and make a survey of the land and write a description of it. Then return to me, and I will cast lots for you here at Shiloh in the presence of the Lord." 9 So the men left and went through the land. They wrote its description on a scroll, town by town, in seven parts, and returned to Joshua in the camp at Shiloh.

In this article we attempt to summarize the findings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not entirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The changes in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.

Empirical data suggest, that in many situations people are not able to estimate the probability of events on the base of available information in a way consistent with the normative model. This fact infl uences the choice of conclusions which are considered to be rational. The article outlines the factors that may affect the assumed value of a priori probability and – indirectly – the value of a posteriori probability. All these factors will be collectively referred to as the parameter j. Its value depends on the context in which the reasoning is made. In the article I show, that a critical assessment of our reasoning is not always justified.

Baruch Fischhoff, amerykański psycholog urodzony 21 kwietnia 1946 roku w Detroit (stan Michigan), karierę naukową rozpoczął na Wayne State University, gdzie w 1967 roku zdobył tytuł Bachelor of Science z matematyki oraz psychologii jednocześnie. Jeszcze tego samego roku przeniósł się do The Hebrew University w Izraelu, gdzie w 1972 roku obronił tytuł magistra psychologii, a w 1975 uzyskał stopień doktora psychologii. Obecnie jest profesorem Uniwersytetu Carnegie Mellon na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych i Decyzji oraz na Wydziale Inżynierii i Polityki Publicznej1. Jest autorem i współautorem 11 książek oraz ponad 300 artykułów naukowych. Baruch Fischhoff jest także członkiem ponad 30 organizacji, między innymi National Academy of Sciences oraz National Academy of Medicine, jak również byłym prezydentem Society for Judgment and Decision Making oraz Society for Risk Analysis.

Systems of proportional division of seats between parties, based on the results of the election, and between constituencies on the basis of demographic data, are usually judged on the basis of the compatibility of the final divisions with the criterion of proportionality. In certain situations, moving away from a straightforward proportionality towards degressive or progressive proportionality is intentional and should not be considered as a form of error. This issue has already been analyzed with regard to the degressively proportional distribution of seats, primarily in the context of the distribution of seats between the national delegations in the European Parliament. In this paper, however, I focus on the question of the progressive proportionality of division of seats between parties and propose a tool for measuring the strength of progressivity of division. I use the new measure to describe electoral systems in European countries, as well as to assess the impact of the size of the constituency and the apportionment method used (d'Hondt or Sainte-Lague) on the progressivity of the distribution of seats.

Studies show that people perceive income inequality differently than most popular income inequality measures and axioms (postulated properties of inequality) indicate. This article synthesizes and reviews different results on income inequality perception. It presents basic income inequality axioms and analyses the level of support found in multiple studies. The paper shows that while answers to particular questions seldom perfectly agree with income inequality measures, the general pattern of respondents' answers is strongly correlated with these measures. It also argues that the observed differences can be partially explained by following Amartya Sen’s suggestion that income inequality is a multidimensional concept (1973, p. 48).