The relationship between image and text has been a topic of debate since the Ancient Greek era. Plato considered image as more natural than text, therefore the image is readily understood. Simónides de Ceos has begun the sister arts tradition between image and text, by his phrase ut pictura poesis (as is painting, so is poetry). In contrast to the Ancient Greek, Modern thinkers tend to sharply distinguish between image and text. We can trace modern philosophical discourse on image and text from Leonardo da Vinci's superiority of painting over poetry, Lessing's distinction of painting and poetry, Burke's words as the sublime medium, Clement Greenberg's and Michael Fried's medium specificity, to Rosalind Krauss's grid of modern art. This study examines discourse on image and text relationship in the historical analysis view. Eventually, the researcher attempts to answer the problem of image and text relationship, in the light of contemporary and multimodality theories.

This paper has the following goals: 1) to prove that the contract of usury suffers from a self-contradiction, both from the viewpoint of the lender and the borrower; 2) to demonstrate the self-contradictory nature of the contract of usury by means of the Fisher model of the inter-temporal choice; 3) to prove that both the lender and the borrower pronounce the consent to the basic contract involuntarily because the former as well as the latter is acting under the indirect coercion; 4) to respond to Paretian objection that the Pareto improvement implies the mutual voluntariness, which is why there is no justification for the state to not enforce the contracts of usury. The author contends that from a subjective viewpoint, the contract of usury is a complex of two contracts which contradict each other: the basic contract and the super-contract. From the lender’s perspective, the basic contract is a loan and the super-contract is a sale of the loan. Since the lender negates his will to give a loan by the sale of the loan, the lender’s consent to the contract of usury as whole is self-contradictory. From the borrower’s perspective, the basic contract is a gift to the lender and the super-contract is a sale of this gift for a loan. Since the borrower negates his will to give a gift by the sale of the gift, the borrower’s consent to the contract of usury as a whole is self-contradictory. Next, the author contends that from an objective viewpoint, the contract of usury is an example of a non-equal “exchange”, i. e. a complex of an exchange (loan) and a transfer (usurious interest). Since the borrower does not give the transfer voluntarily, the lender violates the commutative justice by the contract of usury. To the Paretian objection that since both the lender and the borrower move onto a higher indifference curve thanks to the contract of usury, it must be a voluntary exchange, the author responds that the Pareto improvement does not imply the mutual voluntariness. The way how both the lender and the borrower move onto a higher indifference curve is not a voluntary exchange. There is no way to move onto a higher indifference curve in the contract of usury through a voluntary exchange. The contract of usury is neither an exchange, nor voluntary. It is not an exchange because it violates the equality in exchange. It is not voluntary, either, because it suffers from a double self-contradiction and voluntariness cannot be predicated to a self-contradictory (i. e. non-being) act of will. The author concludes that the state cannot and must not enforce the contracts of usury. It cannot because these contracts suffer from a double self-contradiction. It must not, either, because these contracts violate the commutative justice and it is the purpose of the state to protect the justice.

Contractual moralists, such as Bowie and Donaldson, have argued that contractual agreement explains why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society in which they operate. They argue that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a hypothetical social contract that establishes its legitimacy to operate in society. Their assumption appears to indicate a logically necessary relationship between a corporation’s moral obligation and contractual agreement that establishes the corporation. We argue that there is no such relationship: a corporation’s moral obligation does not necessarily emerge from a social contract. We suggest that instead of assuming that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a social contract, it should be said that a corporation’s moral obligation is sustained by a social contract. This helps answer the question of why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society where they operate in a better light.

The aim of this study is to clarify Spinoza's concept of freedom and outline the meaning of this concept in Spinoza's philosophical system as a whole. First, I outline the position of the topic of freedom within the framework of Spinoza's philosophical teachings and its reception. Then I gradually turn to how Spinoza's topic of freedom appears in the context of ontology, ethics and political philosophy. Spinoza's philosophy is ontological - ethics and political philosophy are the application of his ontology. That is why I will start with the interpretation of its basic metaphysical notions - substance, attributes, and modes. In an ethical context, it is possible to speak of Spinozism of freedom with regard to the concept of so-called power of mind over affects, which will be the next center of interpretation. I will conclude with a summary of Spinoza's political-philosophical views on freedom.

V rámci této stati je publikován první český překlad dopisu, který v létě roku 1663 (nebo 1664) napsal B. Spinoza svému příteli P. Ballingovi. Obsahem dopisu je Spinozovo vysvětlení původu lidských snů a imaginace. Vysvětluje tento problém v souvislosti s událostmi kolem smrti přítelova syna.

Pojmy data, informace ci metadata jsou vazany k teorii informace, ktera je v nejobecnějsi rovině soucasti novověke vědecke tradice a v mnoha ohledech vychazi z tradice analyticke tradice. Přispěvek přinasi rekapitulaci těchto východisek i vývoje analyticke filosofie vcetně vyustěni v jazykový relativismus daný obratem v teto filosoficke tradici. Jazykový relativismus je v přispěvku nasledně vztažen i na problematiku dat a metadat. Metadata nejsou v žadnem ohledu absolutnim popisem datových objektů, vždy jsou zavisla na dalsich metadatech v pozadi a danem kontextu. S daty a metadaty je třeba pracovat cistě instrumentalně. Metadata jsou nastroj pro praci s datovými objekty a jejich možnosti použiti a tedy i omezeni jsou dany pravě touto instrumentalitou.

Clanek se zabýva některými problematickými castmi Kuhnovy slavne publikace Struktura vědeckých revoluci, ktera byla ve druhe polovině 20. stoleti patrně jednou z nejcitovanějsich knih filozofie a historie vědy. I přesto, že se bez pochyb jedna o významný a proslulý text, některe jeho casti obsahuji vagni a dvojznacne formulace, ktera byly (a stale jsou) zdrojem kritiky. Tato studie identifikuje problemy Kuhnovy Struktury, představi jejich dosavadni řeseni a navrhne řeseni nova. Hlavnimi tematy jsou Kuhnova teorie paradigmat a rozsah vědeckých revoluci.

The judicial system is essential for resolving disputes peacefully, reducing conflict and maintaining social order. It is a system established by a political and legal structure which, if rational and legitimate, operates in such a manner which coheres with the basic societal structure and produces reasoned decisions by judges who apply the law to the relevant facts of the case. A rational society, which must include a rational judiciary, is one which must choose the most efficient means to achieve its ends, here assumed to be that of a representative democracy similar to that outlined by John Rawls and others. These necessary means to achieve these goals are the rule of law, meritocracy, stability and legitimacy.

Článek představuje druhou a přitom relativně uzavřenou část série, která je věnována analýze chápání jazyka ve vybraných dílech Francise Bacona a Jana Amose Komenského. Předkládá textovou analýzu dvou pozdních Komenského děl o vzdělání a představuje pokus nechat vystoupit specifikám jeho pojetí jazyka, tak jak se v textech ukazují a jsou kultivovány.

V ramci teto stati jsou publikovany prvni ceske překlady dopisů, ktere si na jaře roku 1665 vyměnili B. Spinoza a Willem de Blyenbergh. Obsahem dopisů jsou Blyenberghovy otazky, ktere vyplynuly z jejich osobniho setkani a týkaly se vztahu mysli a těla. Spinozův dopis je vysvětlenim toho, proc na dane otazky nemůže odpovědět.