Abstract Street harassment is a widespread urban experience—particularly but not exclusively for women—yet marked by isolation from bystanders and other victim-survivors. Given this isolated dimension, what might a collective response look like? This paper examines a successful case of feminist street art protest in Brussels: posters claiming “laisse les filles tranquilles,” a demand which was swiftly extended on behalf of other groups by similar posters, and copied, commented, and modified both approvingly and disapprovingly by graffiti. Developing a novel critical phenomenological approach based in Sartre’s concept of seriality, this paper argues that the posters’ ingenuity lies in appropriating the infrastructure where harassment occurs, thus exploiting the spatially and temporally dispersed character of these intrusions. This article proceeds in three parts. First, drawing on empirical research on street harassment, I contextualize feminist protest and individual coping strategies within the postcolonial metropole of Brussels. Secondly, I reconceptualize street harassment through Sartrean seriality, combined with phenomenological insights from Beauvoir and Fanon, to underscore the dynamic between material objects, object-like social routines, and anonymity. Thirdly, I show that posters and their responses enable the formation of social antagonism between strangers who are not in a direct, physical relation, thereby politicizing the broader Brussels public.

Abstract There has been significant interest in addressing the underrepresentation of various demographic groups in philosophy. Indeed, many have proposed remedies at the disciplinary level. However, underrepresentation is an issue that varies by subfield in philosophy. Women, for example, are especially underrepresented in subfields considered formal (e.g., logic). As has already been argued in the existing literature, addressing underrepresentation, even within subfields, is not as simple as recruiting more students from underserved populations. Instead, we advocate for a student-centered approach, promoting inclusive pedagogy. In this paper, we share a case study in which we implemented feminist and trauma-informed interventions in two undergraduate formal logic courses and investigated their impact with respect to elements of structural injustice. We found that our interventions successfully eliminated existing gender-based differences in perceptions of self-efficacy and largely diminished students’ perceptions of the objectivity of logic, but were unsuccessful at changing students’ impressions of the broader applicability of logic. By sharing our interventions, we hope to provide educators with practical tools and ideas for implementing similar approaches in their classrooms. By sharing our results, we invite educators to reflect on the potential impact of similar approaches in formal philosophy courses and on tools for measuring that impact.

Abstract Original accounts of feminist standpoint theory emphasize its fundamentally critical stance toward situated knowledge (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986). The function of a critical standpoint is not to carelessly accept the beliefs of marginalized people, but instead to interpret those beliefs in light of thoroughgoing and pervasive ideological distortions. Some formulations of standpoint theory capture this critical function in the achievement thesis. It claims that a standpoint is not obtained automatically but must be achieved through a struggle against a dominant ideology. Contrary to the standard acceptance of the achievement thesis, Bright has recently argued that the requirement of achievement can warrant the dogmatic exclusion of some perspectives from becoming standpoints. In turn, he advances an account of standpoint theory which abandons the achievement thesis. Against Bright’s non-achievement account of standpoint theory, I argue that doing away with the achievement thesis abandons standpoint theory’s original aim of being critical of the social structures which construct and legitimize situated knowledge. Further, I argue that Bright’s concern with the possible dogmatism of the achievement thesis is better addressed by a commitment to the classic account of standpoint theory rather than a revision of it.

Abstract In most areas of philosophy, the typical paper is written impersonally, as if its author occupied what Henry Sidgwick calls “the point of view of the universe” or what Thomas Nagel calls “the view from nowhere” or what Donna Haraway (more skeptically) calls the “god’s-eye view.” In critical social traditions, however—feminist philosophy, philosophy of disability, philosophy of race—personal writing is widely embraced. I argue that there is more at stake here than mere style, and that we have good reasons, both political and epistemic, to abandon the “view from nowhere” pretense and write more openly about the ways in which our lived experiences inform our work. In the words of Eva Kittay, the personal is philosophical.

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to problematize how the wave narrative maintains and reinforces the hegemony of Western-dominant feminisms while silencing, excluding, appropriating, and/or diluting Othered feminisms and gender-related perspectives. As Western-dominant feminist historicizations travel to the wave narrative, they become the points of reference to all, while Othered historicizations are either erased or Westernized and whitewashed as they travel to the wave narrative. First, to present these problematizations, I will articulate with Edward Said’s travelling theories, Santiago Castro-Gómez’s zero-point hubris, and Linda Alcoff’s speaking for the other. Secondly, I will argue the wave narrative is embedded in Western myths that reinforce its supremacy, including the myths of: (i) true-universal feminisms; (ii) neutral locus of enunciation; (iii) linear-progressive feminist historicization; and (iv) white feminist savior. Finally, I seek to contribute with the theoretical perspectives presented in this paper by focusing on: (1) the importance of understanding from-to/how-by theories and historicizations travel; (2) how Othered epistemologies are located, according to zero-point hubris logics, within hyper-surveilled points of no-observation; and (3) how the dilution and appropriation of Othered stories and epistemologies by Western-dominant feminisms is not simply speaking for Others, but speaking above Others.

Abstract This paper engages with a series of recent literatures that examine how feminist and queer movements have become agents of nationalism, neoliberalism, and global wars. I argue that, while the critique of intersectionality has attempted to curtail the reproductions of such violence within feminism, it too has not been able to resist cooptations into nationalist and capitalist forms of power. Developing an epistemological critique of intersectionality, I arrive at an analysis of identity politics as an elemental identification with phallic power that erases the feminine. Building on the works of Elizabeth Grosz, Wendy Brown, and Luce Irigaray, I suggest that at the core of such feminist alliances with domination lies an unresolved relation to feminine desire as the desire for a non-identitarian politics.

Abstract This dialogue between Prof Claire Colebrook (Pennsylvania State University) and Asijit Datta is based on an online discussion, “Ecology, Extinction, and Posthumanism” which took place on the 1st of August, 2020 during the raging days of the COVID-19 pandemic. The transcript echoes Colebrook’s sentiments that the ethical demands of the climate hazard or the imminent extinction cannot be addressed to a particular subject or ‘we’. The predominant tension is concealed in the idea of the human and its values. As humans, we refuse to ask whether there is a future where life continues with endless possibilities for us. For Colebrook, the inability to adopt such a stance emerges from the historical condition that we as language-beings have always been the ones to define life, the ones that are essentially racing towards extinction. Following the extinction experiments of Husserl and Bergson, Colebrook contends that only the death of the ethical and political subject can provide us with alternate modes of survival in this world. This conversation engages with issues like the COVID-19 pandemic, American politics, and post-apocalyptic cinema to arrive at an imagination that requires the annihilation of the human as we know it.

Abstract The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept woman, in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relationship with stereotypes and paradigmatic examples of women. It is further shown how present-day attempts to extend the application of the concept of woman beyond human females may be made sense in terms of a change of hinges—that is, of the rules of evidential significance, which a community of speakers brings to bear on the determination of whether a person is a woman. Finally, it is argued that, despite Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical quietism, such an account is politically significant. This in turn shows that in fact Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical pronouncements far from being inimical to political and societal change may in fact be conducive to it.