Because psychotherapists are not moral teachers, they ought not to advise their clients about evaluative questions. This means that their advice must be limited to a concern with the client's view of reality. It happens that in our times, there are prefabricated views of reality on offer from a variety of ideologies-Marxism and feminism being currently the most influential. Ideologists not only offer prefabricated realities-called consciousness- but also present a set of arguments to show that because choice is unreal, consciousness is all that matters. Adopting the ideological concept of consciousness thus becomes a backdoor variant of the ultimate sin against scientific method: namely smuggling unsubstantiated, indeed undiscussed, values into therapy.

Major Polish authors writing on the philosophy of medicine in the period under discussion are briefly presented, namely Tytus Chalubinski Wladyslaw Bieganski, and Edmund Biernacki. General background of their work and possible influences are described. The views of the above authors on the meaning, scope and importance of the philosophy of medicine are outlined.

In this paper are explored the ethical implications of the answers to three questions: Whether or not a diseased state is discrete; the criteria by which that question is answered; and how the diseased state is to be identified. Examples are given showing that some states appear to be clearly discrete, and others equally clearly not discrete. The nature of the pertinent evidence will be affected accordingly. It is shown that a slavish and inappropriate concern with categories leads to anomalous ethics. Finally, it is suggested that many of these problems may be avoided by centering the ethics of medicine on optimizing the welfare of the patient rather than by thinking in terms of categorical disease.

This article assesses what standards of safety and certainty of diagnosis need to be met in the determination of brain death. Recent medical, legal, and philosophical developments on brain death are summarized. It is argued that epistemologically adequate standards require the finding of whole-brain death rather than destruction of the cortex. Because of the possibility of positive error in misdiagnosing death, a tutioristic approach of ‘being on the safe side’ is advocated. Given uncertainties in diagnosis of so-called vegetative states like the apallic syndrome, anything less than whole-brain death, especially given the present state of diagnostic capability, should not qualify as an argument for removing therapy specifically on grounds that the patient is dead.

Moore and Hutchin's [1] assertion that the application of classical logic as the method of diagnostic reasoning may result in three paradoxes is critically examined.

On the basis of a ten-place comparative value relation, artificially reduced to a binary relation, some human value structures are studied and a concept of value kinematics is proposed. A miniature value logic is outlined, making it possible with precision to handle several explicated value notions and to analyze interrelations between them. Finally, the question is discussed whether health can be said to be an absolute and an intrinsic value.

For eight years Medical Psychology has been an integral part of medical pre-examination as well as of research and teaching in the Federal Republic of Germany, and a great deal of psychological knowledge is taught to the medical student under this heading. Besides mere theory the medical student is supposed to acquire behavior based on psychological findings which will be important to him in medical practice. Nevertheless, students often complain that teaching is too far from reality, due to the fact that Medical Psychology is part of the first, more theoretical, period of medical eduction, even though one of the main objects of this new field is the analysis of the interaction between patient and physician.

The multidimensional environments providing the stimuli for normal and abnormal human behavior have been characterized by a variety of environmental tensors, the time rates of change of which yield quantitative measures of various aspects of environmental dynamics. A general response tensor is introduced to describe the behavior of living organisms to any desired degree of complexity. Tensor measures of such psychiatric concepts as reactivity, adaptability, responsiveness, instinctiveness and suggestibility are mathematically defined in terms of the response and environment tensors. Based on clinical and experimental observations, postulates are then made regarding the dynamic relationships between the external responses and the internal drives of the self-system at different levels of consciousness. Lemmas and theorems are deduced pertaining to behavioral and environmental interactions in a psychomedical context, and a nonlinear mechanism for stochastically learned behavior patterns is proposed.

Medical decision making often utilizes subjective observations to arrive at concrete judgments. The decisions frequently affect who receives scarce medical treatments and, thus, who lives or dies. In this paper, a model health status index is described. It is specific for the problem of choosing patients for hemodialysis or transplantation. Such a health status index may be designed for any medical decision involving such issues as drug treatment priorities, identification of salvageable patients, and selection of patients for scarce medical treatment. This index (1) incorporates a physician's own medical criteria and values, (2) can be modified as the data base improves, (3) assures consistency from decision to decision, and (4) can be developed and used without the help of a mathematician or computer.