Abstract Lookism, wrongful appearance discrimination, is prevalent and impactful, and yet largely neglected. This paper explores why this form of discrimination is ignored, when other forms of discrimination which have similar impacts in, for example, employment and education, are taken seriously in policy, practice, and everyday life. It offers five possible reasons for why lookism is neglected; that it is unfamiliar, that people believe lookism should not be prevalent, that people believe lookism is natural, that lookism is not legislated against and that shame attaches to experiences of lookism. The paper seeks to offer an account of the reasons that underpin the otherwise confusing neglect of lookism. The paper argues that far from being an acceptable form of discrimination, lookism is a serious form of discrimination that all, irrespective of political and ideological commitments, have reasons to address.

Abstract Historians of philosophy widely concur that Galileo Galilei (re)introduced the metaphysical dichotomy of primary and secondary properties into philosophical discourse. However, his conceptual distinction appeared muddled, resulting in frequent misinterpretations or disregard over time. This paper aims to demonstrate that the apparent vagueness of the dichotomy stems from a common misunderstanding shaped by the subsequent distinction between two kinds of properties, primary and secondary. Accordingly, the central argument advanced here is that Galileo did not intend to differentiate between two kinds of properties inherent in external things. Instead, he sought to distinguish between the perception of spatial properties and the concurrent internal bodily sensations evoked by the mechanical impacts of external objects. Focusing on his isolation of an aspect of sensory experience, namely sensible qualities, it is suggested that Galileo recognised the phenomenal aspect of experience and thereby contributed to the early modern development of the concept of perceptual consciousness.

Abstract This paper discusses a deflationary theory of human action developed by John Hyman. His theory of human action comprises two central claims, one about the general nature of action, another about the mark of human agency. An action is the causing of a change by a substance. A human action, as opposed to sub-personal actions, is one that results from the integrated operations of our cognitive and motor systems. Taken together these two claims offer a minimalist theory of human action that does not appeal to intention, the will or the power to choose. The first claim is by now familiar in the literature, not so the second one. This paper offers a critical discussion of this second claim. I shall argue that it sits uncomfortably with certain kinds of mental action. As a fix, I argue that we should appeal to the functional role of the executive system to specify the relevant kind of integration characteristic of human action. I proceed to show how the revised proposal shares the appeal of Hyman’s view while avoiding its difficulties.

Abstract Cosmopolitans who take principles of distributive justice to apply globally have long struggled with the legacy of Rawls. Some parts of Rawls’s view seem to support cosmopolitanism although he rejects this position himself. Samuel Scheffler and Miriam Ronzoni have each identified resources in Rawls’s work that open the door to cosmopolitan conclusions but differ from those traditionally cited by cosmopolitans. Scheffler and Ronzoni argue that changing social circumstances, like those involved in globalization, may affect the scope of principles of distributive justice. But they also both take it to be an open question whether such principles have global reach presently. I argue that this reticence is not justified. Their arguments suggest that principles of distributive justice have long applied globally. Indeed, the view so strongly favors cosmopolitanism that further argument is needed to secure any room for unique domestic principles of distributive justice. I follow Rawls’s lead and draw on Kant to indicate how such an argument might go. Finally, I argue that although the scope of principles of distributive justice is less historically contingent than Scheffler and Ronzoni suggest, there is still considerable room in this view for the evolution of institutions to shape the content of such principles.

The term realism has multiple meanings in the study of pictures. Roughly speaking, it concerns both what pictures depict—that is, “realism-what”—and how pictures depict, or “realism-how.” Realism-what reflects a particular interest in the selection of a picture’s subject matter, which is self-consciously championed by the 19th-century Realist school of painting but can also be found throughout the history of art. Realism-how, on the other hand, deals with a special way of depiction that is characterized by the accuracy and informativeness of pictures. Although both of these aspects of realism are of historical and theoretical interest, but it is realism-how that has received more attention in the philosophical discussion and is considered a central topic in the philosophy of pictorial representation within the analytic tradition. There are three widely accepted features of pictorial realism, as I shall call it. First, pictorial realism is a property that can be attributed to individual pictures, pictorial systems, styles, genres, and techniques. It makes perfect sense to say that the Mona Lisa is a realistic picture and color photography is a pictorial system that is realistic. Second, realism is comparative and a matter of degree. For example, arguably, Picasso’s last self-portrait (1972) is less realistic than his first (1896). Third, realism can be relative in the sense that the judgment of realism can vary due to different factors, such as cultural conventions, contexts of use, etc. In the contemporary literatures, there are at least three kinds of theories of pictorial realism: resemblance theories, information theories, and habituation theories. Both resemblance theories and information theories spell out pictorial realism in terms of the depiction of properties. The difference is that resemblance theories appeal to the concept of resemblance, or the sharing of properties between pictures and their subjects, whereas information theories focus on how the properties a picture depicts its subject as having can convey information about its subject. Nelson Goodman rejects both kinds of theories and proposes instead the habituation theory, which claims that realism is just a matter of familiarity or habituation. There are also accounts of pictorial realism that are hard to categorize which appeal to perception and make-believe theories but are closely related to one or other of these kinds of theories in various ways. (For theories of pictorial representation in general, which would shed light on the understanding of pictorial realism, see the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entries “Depiction” and “Images.” For realism in film or photography, see the section “Film Realism” in the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entry “Philosophy of Film”).

Abstract The relationship between political philosophy and real-life politics is one that is heavily contested. On the one hand, it has been argued that political affiliation is a biasing force that stands in the way of our ability as political philosophers to maintain an objective perspective (Van der Vossen, 2015; 2020). On the other hand, it has been argued that political philosophers run the risk of bias whether they are politically active or not (Jones, 2020). In this paper, I nuance the debate at hand: I specify what kind of activism we should be concerned with as a biasing force, elaborate on what biases we should aim to mitigate as political philosophers, as well as what tools we have at our disposal in combatting biases within the discipline. This allows me to argue that participation in certain forms of political activism can be a powerful method for avoiding the most pernicious and pervasive biases we are prone to, namely biases against marginalised groups, and in favour of the political status quo. This has the implication that we must avoid a blanket ban on political activism within political philosophy, and instead recognise the epistemic merits of political activism where it is due.

Feminist aesthetics is the evolving study of both the explicit and the implicit role of gender and sexuality in the activities of creativity, the aesthetic experience of art and nature, and resulting value judgments. The perception, interpretation, and evaluation of occasions of aesthetic appreciation are infused with cognitive preconceptions, implicit biases, emotions, skills, and knowledge based on past lived experiences. In practice, feminist aestheticians have paid close attention to the role of race, class, age, ability, and other social factors in the creation and evaluation of artworks. Whereas modern western European aesthetics deemed an artwork’s contextual factors peripheral to the essence of a viewer’s purely aesthetic, noncontextual, disinterested, or “distanced” experience, 20th-century feminists pioneered a radical break with norms of “good” art by invoking the familiar adage, “The personal is the political.” Attending to the situatedness of who creates and how one judges “art”—a contested concept like “craft,” “quality,” and “genius”—leads to recognition and care about the persons involved: the intersectionality of their personal, racial, sexual, and other identities; their perceived and real positions within the power strata of patriarchy; and the indisputable legitimacy of their voices. For example, artists who engaged in 1970s performance body art expressing female agency held that disinterested aesthetic experience was neither truly possible nor desirable. They rejected the model of the neutral, objective man of taste who claimed to value dispassionately only the formal properties of an artwork while ignoring content that expressed relationships of friendship, love, and, possibly, oppression. The social activity of art inspired by Linda Nochlin’s 1971 question, “Why have there been no great women artists?” (see Nochlin 2021, cited under Foundational Texts) led to the feminist critique: an activist agenda based on uncovering gender biases in notions of truth and rationality as well as excellence in art. Feminist aesthetics often anticipated and prefigured key ideas under discussion today, such as the ethical and political nature of art, embodiment in representation, gender identity, the role of emotions, and testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. “Feminisms” reflects a multiplicity of approaches—Indigenous, Black, Asian, African—that have led to the rediscovery and recognition of neglected artists, writers, musicians, filmmakers, and performers. Their insights on beauty, emotions, and “the male gaze” upend traditionally narrow aesthetic categories of taste, beauty, and excellence, and expand the study of art and its attending rewards into multidisciplinary scholarship that involves artmaking, art theory, history, and criticism, as well as corresponding practices within the disciplines of literature, music, theater, dance, film, and other performative arts. Transnational feminisms highlight common international insights into gendered arts while yet acknowledging differences in power, wealth, and opportunities, while avant-garde feminists challenge traditional concepts, definitions, and arguments. In so doing, they continue to rewrite the canon in aesthetics.

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