Abstract Howard Robinson has criticized the contemporary revival of hylomorphism for, on the one hand, accepting the causal closure of the physical, while, on the other, ascribing a real and irreducible causal role to forms or structures. If the world is causally closed under physics, it makes no sense to postulate a structure that actively affects the distribution and motion of matter. After carefully formulating what I call Robinson’s causal closure argument against hylomorphism , I demonstrate that the argument fails because it presupposes an overly strict conception of causal closure of the microphysical, according to which every physical effect is completely determined by, and has a complete explanation in terms of, bottom-level microphysical entities and their interactions governed by fundamental physical laws. Based on two case studies – one from physics (the Fractional Quantum Hall Effect), the other from microbiology (information control in microorganisms) – I argue that the argument fails, yet a more modest (and scientifically defensible) version of closure remains intact. This version of closure secures that no non-physical forces supplement the inventory of fundamental physics while allowing higher-level constraints to be causally efficacious by constraining which among multiple microphysically compatible possibilities is actualized. This means that a reformulated version of closure, capable of dealing with those cases, is also perfectly compatible with the hylomorphist (or generally anti-reductionist) claim that higher-level structures are causally efficacious and an irreducible part of physical reality.

Abstract Dominant psychiatric explanations, i.e., explanations of why mental disorders or specific collections of psychiatric symptoms occur that are popular and widely adopted in a given community or society, can influence the self-narratives of people with psychiatric diagnoses. In this article, I resort to the literature on master narratives to systematically examine how dominant psychiatric explanations shape the self-narratives of people with psychiatric diagnoses and how these self-narratives are valued and perceived. To illustrate my claims, I use biomedical explanations of depression as a case study. When we experience mental ill-health, we may formulate a psychiatric self-narrative thread to understand these experiences, do justice to the changes in our embodied and affective experiences, and make our experiences understandable to others. In daily life, psychiatric explanations are frequently extended into psychiatric explanatory narratives that support claims about the lives of people with psychiatric diagnoses. The explanatory narratives of dominant psychiatric explanations can be characterized as master narratives that shape psychiatric self-narrative threads and how we and others value and perceive them. This characterization provides new insights into the relationship between dominant psychiatric explanatory narratives and two narrative values: the coherence of self-narratives and our ability to imagine possibilities for reducing our mental suffering. Hence, this article sheds new light on how dominant psychiatric explanations in general, and biomedical explanations of depression specifically, influence self-understanding.

Misogyny online is not simply offensive speech at scale—it is a coordinated, systemic practice of silencing. Drawing on feminist analyses of misogyny as the “law enforcement branch” of patriarchy Manne (Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford: Oxford University, 2018), and extending work in speech act theory (Langton 22 (4): 293–330, 1993; McGowan 29 (2): 458–473, 2014; Caponetto 40 (1): 191–202, 2021), this paper argues that the sheer volume of online misogyny silences women. Platform affordances, especially algorithmic amplification and the rapid formation of ad hoc hostile groups (Barnes 25 (2): 251–281, 2023), transform misogynistic hostility into an environment where women’s speech is not merely contested but actively erased. We identify three systematic modes of silencing: locutionary silencing (women are deterred from speaking at all), illocutionary silencing (women’s speech is not recognised as what it is), and sincerity silencing (women’s speech is recognised but discredited as inauthentic). We argue that far from being side-effects of individual prejudice, these forms of silencing are built into the architecture of digital discourse. We proceed by showing how online hostility is made frictionless and rewarding for misogynists, producing predictable patterns of silencing. This phenomenon raises urgent normative concerns: when half the population is structurally constrained from full participation, public discourse itself becomes an echo chamber for patriarchal norms. We conclude that counter-speech, though important, is insufficient without structural reforms to platform design.

Abstract We discuss Georg Kreisel’s perception of Hilbert’s Programme, paying particular attention to his post-Gödelian perspective .

Abstract This article argues that enactivism, integrated with feminist and posthumanist perspectives, provides a unified framework for addressing both the ecological crisis and the ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence. Current debates—from the Anthropocene to human-centered AI—call for a critical redefinition of the human, yet they often evolve in parallel, producing a “split gaze” that neglects the profound hybridization of humans, environments, and technologies. With its relational understanding of cognition, sense-making, and agency, enactivism offers conceptual tools for overcoming the human versus Nature dualism as well as the human versus machine dualism. By reassessing intelligence as embodied, emergent, and environmentally embedded, it enables a shift toward relational ecological ethics grounded in interdependence and care. Applied to AI, this perspective treats digital technologies as components of an evolving human niche rather than external tools, thereby reframing responsibility in terms of socio-material practices rather than abstract principles. The article concludes by proposing a “networked humanity” and an “ecologically expansive community” as guiding concepts for multispecies and technological coexistence.

The concept of narrative is widespread in the philosophical literature on dreams. Although several works have examined the putative narrative character of dreams by drawing on narratology, literary theory, and semiotics, there has been virtually no investigation of how preconceptions about the resemblance between fictional narratives and retrospective dream reports have shaped the philosophical debate on dreams and dreaming. This paper aims to address this gap. We argue that there is a pervasive tendency to metonymically assimilate fictional narratives first with dream reports and then with dreams themselves. As a result, features and devices typically associated with literary fiction are frequently used as a speculative explanatory framework to understand dreams and the processes underlying their formation, encoding, and retrieval. To illuminate this tendency, we focus on two central categories in the philosophy of dreaming: authorship and composition. By examining relevant cases in which these categories are employed to support divergent ontological and epistemological claims, we argue that similar accounts rest on a shared—yet frequently unacknowledged—assumption: that dreams exhibit a narrative structure and that dreaming is, at its core, a process of narrative construction. Through our conceptual analysis, we aim to lay the groundwork for further exploration of the emergence of narrative thinking in spontaneous thought, encompassing both wakefulness and sleep.

Abstract This paper examines the paradoxical decline in engagement with philosophy of science among engineers precisely when machine learning (ML) systems are increasingly performing complex epistemological functions in engineering practice. We identify how philosophical naivety , characterized by the uncritical adoption of reductive frameworks regarding consciousness, intelligence, and ethics, creates tangible organizational and technical liabilities. We then demonstrate how conceptual limitations in engineers’ philosophical foundations lead to three primary flaws: 1) ontological misclassification of system capabilities, 2) ethical blind spots in ML system design and application, and 3) inadequate epistemological approaches and hidden philosophical commitments for interpreting model outputs. Thus, we argue that renewed engagement with the philosophy of science is not merely academic but necessary for engineers to maintain epistemic authority and responsibility in an era where engineering judgment is increasingly delegated to or mediated by ML systems. In response, we propose a technical-philosophical framework integrating perspectives from philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology, and engineering to address these shortcomings systematically.