Building Japanese deterrence and response capabilities – defence and diplomacy

This study analyzes the utilization of Ho Chi Minh's ideas on people's war and all-people's national defense in the development of Vietnam's National Defense Strategy and Military Strategy in the present day. The study highlights the significant theoretical and practical importance of Ho Chi Minh's ideology, which is a useful resource for the Party, people, and military forces in protecting the socialist Vietnamese country. The paper emphasizes the necessity of acquiring a thorough comprehension of Ho Chi Minh's ideologies, their fundamental principles, and the significance of innovatively implementing them in the formulation of defense and military strategies, in accordance with the Party's directives, policies, and the unique conditions of the nation. Furthermore, it emphasizes the imperative of safeguarding and enhancing Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary philosophy during the formulation of these policies. The research highlights the vital significance of Ho Chi Minh's ideas in tackling important matters concerning national defense, military matters, and the readiness for possible wars or armed conflicts, while maintaining alignment with Vietnam's talents and resources. The primary objective of the study is to provide a meaningful contribution to the preservation and progress of Ho Chi Minh's intellectual legacy in the pursuit of establishing a robust national defense and military strategy for Vietnam.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

This paper examines the realist turn of US foreign policy under the Trump administration and how it will reshape the North Korean policies of the United States. As the US grand strategy under the Trump administration has shifted to decline denial under retrench ment, the dynamics of US-China relations of competition and coop eration will further intensify. While the priority of North Korean issues has been elevated with regard to US-China bilateral relations, it has become the issue of opposing interests, due to divergent expec tations on the geostrategic landscape in the case of denuclearization on the peninsula. As President Trump’s willingness to resolve the North Korean issue becomes salient, the tension between the US and China is expected to be amplified and a more coercive approach toward denuclearizing the North is anticipated. Also, the Maximum Pressure and Engagement is likely to be adopted as a part of regional balancing strategy vis-a-vis the revisionist rising states in the region to build an architecture of peace through strength in Northeast Asia.

The Indo-Pacific will be the primary focus of American grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Politically, economically and militarily China challenges the hegemonic position of the United States in the region and its liberal vision of a Pax Americana underwritten by a system of Washington-centred alliances. Before this background of a dawning era of great power competition and strategic rivalry, this chapter explores the role of American grand strategy in Asia and its theoretical-conceptual foundations, historical trajectory, and political performance since the end of the Cold War. First, the chapter will demonstrate how different theoretical approaches haver underwritten competing strategic visions of Washington’s role in the world. This ongoing debate in US political, expert and media circles has pitted a broad bi-partisan elite consensus on liberal hegemony against proponents of an alternative grand strategy of restraint. The subsequent historical evaluation then mainly explores the post-Cold War era and how US grand strategy in Asia was anchored in the pursuit of liberal hegemony through diplomatic, military and economic means. In this context, the chapter will touch on US relations with China and Japan, the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation with North Korea, and US initiatives for closer economic integration. A particular focus lies on comparing the strategic visions of Barack Obama (‘pivot to Asia’) and Donald Trump (‘America First’) and their practical implications for the US. The chapter concludes that the United States has increasingly struggled to match its enduring strategic aim of regional leadership with its actual investment in the Indo-Pacific.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

The maritime domain has become an area of increasing importance for global security and defense strategies. Maritime trade accounts for over 90% of global trade, and more than half of the world’s population lives within 60 kilometers of the sea. As such, the maritime domain has significant implications for national defense strategies, including potential threats, prioritizing defense programs, and maintaining a balance between defense and economic interests. The aim of this research is to examine the implications of maritime policy on national defense strategies. The research will address factors including assessing and prioritizing potential maritime threats, coordination and communication between various agencies and governments involved in maritime defense, maintaining a balance between defense and economic interests in maritime policy, the allocation of resources and investment in maritime defense programs, and the effectiveness of maritime defense strategies in achieving their intended outcomes. The research will also explore the changing nature of maritime threats and challenges, the relevance of a strong naval fleet in implementing a country's national defense strategy, the impact of maritime disputes, and the role of new technologies. A qualitative methods approach will be utilized, including a literature review, analysis of government policies and strategies, and interviews with government officials and experts in the field of maritime security. The study will focus on a range of countries with varying levels of maritime interests, including the United States, China, Japan, and Australia. The research findings will provide insights into the implications of maritime policy on national defense strategies and highlight key considerations for policymakers in assessing and prioritizing potential maritime threats, coordinating and communicating between various agencies and governments involved in maritime defense, and maintaining a balance between defense and economic interests in the maritime policy. The research will contribute to the understanding of the changing nature of maritime threats and the role of new technologies in national defense strategies. The limitations of this study are the limited scope of available data on maritime policy and the potential challenges to accurately measure and apply these policies to national defense strategies. In addition, the various interpretations and applications of maritime policy in different countries can further complicate the analysis and generalization of the findings.

Making Sanctions Smart Again:Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea Robert Huish (bio) Following a period of escalating tension between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in which the Kim regime conducted a series of ballistic missile and nuclear tests and the Trump administration pursued a policy of maximum pressure, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un met for a historic summit in Singapore on June 12. What changed to bring the two leaders together? The main reason North Korea sat down at the bargaining table was not sports diplomacy at the Winter Olympics or Trump's Twitter barrages. It was that the country is out of resources as a result of the international maritime sanctions.1 These sanctions have worked, and worked well, by targeting the environment on which the Kim regime depended to acquire belligerent materials. The 2017 maritime sanctions against North Korea, particularly U.S. Executive Order 13810 and UN Security Resolution 2397, worked for three reasons.2 First, owing to its unique geography, North Korea was almost entirely dependent on illicit maritime trade for its weapons programs, which stands in contrast to long-held claims that most military hardware came overland from China.3 Second, some argue that North Korea's already hollowed-out, authoritarian economy created an "inner isolation" among most of the country's nearly 26 million inhabitants.4 Sanctions are often responsible for increased suffering; however, most North Koreans survive through limited self-sufficiency or black markets that are often unaffected [End Page 42] by formal sanctions or the country's international economic environment. Third, sanctions that targeted foreign companies, in particular maritime insurance companies that may have provided protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance to North Korean vessels, provoked a swift reaction by the insurers to absolve themselves from dealings with North Korea. The important message of the sanctions imposed in 2017 is that this focus on pressuring the maritime industry led to a noticeable behavioral change in North Korea. The remainder of this essay examines what lessons about the efficacy of smart sanctions can be drawn from the case of maritime sanctions against North Korea. The next section will describe the 2017 sanctions from a maritime standpoint and analyze why they worked. The essay concludes by considering the potential to effectively apply similar sanctions to other targets. Have You Been to Sea? To understand why maritime sanctions worked so well against North Korea, two issues must be discussed. First, what are effective sanctions? And second, what role does China play in enabling North Korea to outsmart sanctions? For years, the international community made two major errors in dealing with North Korea. Many experts believed, first, that any sort of sanction would be a good measure against the Kim dynasty and, second, that China is the sole provider of resources, including military resources, to North Korea. Both of these claims are problematic. Sanctions aim to encourage a behavioral change of a target nation or its leadership. Traditional, or "dumb," sanctions either prohibit the target from any financial dealings with the issuer's market or seize the target's assets in the issuer's territory. Such ham-fisted sanctions often do more to further the suffering of the population than apply pressure on the leadership. In the 1990s, then secretary-general of the United Nations Kofi Annan encouraged the use of "smart" sanctions in order to overcome such blunders. Speaking in hindsight of the tragedies in Iraq, the Balkans, and East Africa, Annan argued that economic policy could be crafted so that despotic leaders are pushed toward behavioral change given that their own personal assets were at risk.5 In the 1990s this logic made sense because many dictators had offshore assets that could be directly targeted. Even so, many tyrants, including members of the Kim dynasty, managed to acquire [End Page 43] luxury goods and odious resources through shady networks involving fake currency production, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, and insurance scams. Moreover, sanctions did not deter the Kims from pursuing nuclear tests or overseeing brutal human rights violations. One of the faultiest assumptions about North Korea in the international relations literature was that North Korea...

N uclear nonproliferation has served as a core pillar of U.S. grand strategy throughout the atomic age.Since 1945, U.S. policy-makers across the ideological political spectrum have actively sought to inhibit nuclear proliferation through a variety of means, ranging from diplomatic negotiations to more coercive measures such as sanctions and threats of preventive military attacks. 1 In many respects, the United States has succeeded in stymieing the spread of nuclear weapons through these policy tools. 2 Given the range of threats that nuclear-armed states pose to U.S. national security and crisis stability, the effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts appears to be a significant success for U.S. grand strategy. 3ecent debates, however, suggest that U.S. foreign policy is at least partially responsible for the continued interest in nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea and Iran. 4 For instance, after North Korea successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of targeting the U.S. homeland in 2017, scholars and practitioners alike cited U.S. involvement in post-Cold War regime change operations as a cause of North Korea's determination to maintain a nuclear arsenal. 5Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats noted that North Korea would not negotiate away its nuclear arsenal because the deposal of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi taught North Korea that "if you [have] nukes, never give them up." 6 This example suggests that the United States may be subverting its own strategic objectives inadvertently by relying on regime change as a mainstay of its foreign policy.Indeed,

This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease—rather than increase, as many believe—the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant—albeit less grave—risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability.

We live in a challenging geoeconomic environment. Economic resilience and economic security have replaced globalization, yet Covid-19 and Deepseek have shown that the world is borderless. Geopolitically, tensions between the like-minded states of the West and Russia, China, and North Korea have been described as “World War III.” Changes in US leadership also signal shifts in the German-US relationship, challenging Germany’s security environment. In this complex landscape, it is imperative for Germany to formulate an appropriate response – a grand strategy – that articulates the interests of the country, recognizes the intertwined dynamics of economics and security, and is informed by a global perspective that extends beyond Europe. A comprehensive review of regional policies and issue specific policies is essential.

Chapter 6 applies the framework of strategic delinquency to the revealing behaviour of North Korea during the US administration of Donald Trump, placing particular focus on the period from 2017 to 2019. In so doing, it examines how North Korea’s accelerating nuclear ambitions and pursuit of international status were heavily influenced by the unprecedented foreign policy of the Trump administration, the declining stability of the nuclear order, and a waning US commitment to the nuclear order during this time. This chapter emphasizes how, during this time, North Korea’s initially provocative behaviour, marked by the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2017, was followed by feigned compliance with nuclear norms and the United States’ demands. It highlights how North Korea sought to leverage the unusual disposition of President Trump in order to compel the United States to abandon its ‘hostile policy’, ease unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed upon the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), and gain international recognition as a nuclear state. Despite three presidential-level summits between Kim Jong Un and Trump and the same number of meetings between Kim Jong Un and his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in, North Korea failed to reap its desired outcomes, in no small part owing to its reluctance to concede on its increasingly sophisticated nuclear programme. As a result, by 2020, the DPRK had lost interest both in the global nuclear order and in dialogue with the United States. Relations between Washington and Pyongyang had reached a nadir.

D. Trump's republican administration has substantially modified US strategic estimation of security challenges and threats, facing the country. The "National Security Strategy – 2017" became a fundamental basis of the security policy. The authors of the "Strategy…" believed Russia and China to be the main security policy problems, threatening the world status of the U.S.A. and a challenge for it's interests. The answer to the challenges should include deployment of the ABM system, capable of neutralizing threats, created by N.Korea and Iran. Opposing China and Russia, called "revisionist states", seeking to change the international status-quo, requires building up and modernizing arms and Armed Forces, in particular, security predominance in nuclear forces, space and cyber-space. An active role was designed for diplomacy and reconnaissance community, involving an increase of their efficiency. On the regional level, priorities included Indo-Pacific region, where the United States had to contain Chinese expansion, and Europe, where Washington intended to counter Russian subversive activity and aggression and to support NATO's defense efforts. Nuclear Posture Review (2018) was one of the key foreign policy strategic documents for the administration of 45th US President Donald Trump. In the context of increasing political and economic confrontation with the People's Republic of China and the aggravation of relations with Iran and North Korea, which were caused by the nuclear component itself, this strategy returned to the methods of confrontation and the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War era. It emphasized the complementarity of the power potential of the armed forces and the diplomatic levers of the international struggle. In the period of new aggravation in the international system caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, these very components of the doctrine can become prognostically effective for the current and future American administrations. This article is designed to analyze the key aspects of the National Security Strategy-2017 and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that relate to foreign policy and highlight the special aspects and tools that are still relevant for application by the current administration of Joseph Biden in the crisis of the international system.

A Study on Trump Administration’s Policy on Iran and North Korea - the legal basis for the U.S. exit from the JCPOA and the limitations of the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime -

During the Trump administration, official daily newsletters served as an important form of communication between the President and his constituents. These newsletters provided an overview of how the Trump Administration perceived conflict in the international system, the role and characteristics of the United States and other actors, and policy priorities. These newsletters, 1600 Daily, West Wing Reads, and Resolute Reads, provided a unique and important data source for understanding the Trump administration’s strategic narratives on the international system, especially in the realm of conflict. This article analyzes 810 daily newsletters from March 2017 to March 2020 to assess the administration’s narratives about the international system and several areas of conflict including relations with North Korea, Russia, and China. As the past four years of the Trump presidency saw tensions increase in many areas of American foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the narratives that shaped the Trump administration’s combative approach to diplomacy. The authors find that the strategic narratives of the Trump administration took a unilateral, transactional, and zero-sum approach to foreign policy. The newsletters reflected a prioritization of conflict with long-held allies and a focus on competition with enemies who undermine US dominance in the international system, mainly China and Russia. Within this discussion of foreign policy, this research additionally found a significant emphasis on trade policy, set within a conflictual, mercantilist framework. These newsletters set out conflictual strategic narratives that sought to shape the international system.

This article analyzes the denuclearization negotiations with North Korea and recommends options to compel North Korea to denuclearize, focusing on the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (batna) concept. President Trump’s recent denuclearization summit meetings with North Korea failed because he did not employ a batna in his negotiations. A few candidates for the batna are compared and evaluated using criteria of effectiveness and feasibility. This article concludes that military strikes or economic sanctions cannot be relevant as batna s because of North Korea’s success in developing its second-strike nuclear capabilities and probable Chinese support. While South Korea’s nuclear armament does not seem feasible in the short term, another nuclear-sharing arrangement in Northeast or East Asia could be a viable and practical batna. The United States and South Korea should implement this batna gradually, reflecting the degree of the nuclear threat from North Korea.