Electoral systems, ethnic diversity and party systems in developing democracies

Party System Nationalization and Ethnic Conflicts

The Nationalization of political parties and party systems in post-communist Eastern Europe

Methods. The following methods were used during the research process: general and special – while clarifying the specifics of the institutional environment of the production of local public goods in Ukraine; economic and mathematical modeling – while determining the influence of the parameters of social capital on the effectiveness of the local communities functioning; analysis and synthesis – while identifying institutional mechanisms of increasing the efficiency of production of local public goods. Results. The features of the institutional environment of production of local public goods in Ukraine are analyzed. The essence of institutional locality as a result of the existing unity between people living in a certain territory is considered. There is studied the relationship between the state of the institutional environment of production of local public goods, which is based on the achieved level of social capital of a certain community, on the one hand, and the level of its financial results, on the other hand. Measures of strengthening the civil control over the producers are proposed as mechanisms of increasing the efficiency of local public goods production. Novelty. On the basis of economic-mathematical modeling of the relationship between the indicators of the financial condition of the united territorial communities of Ukraine and the parameters of social capital, there is proved the influence of those parameters on the effectiveness of provision of local public goods on a certain territory. Institutional mechanisms of improvement of the efficiency of production of local public goods in terms of strengthening the civil control over the activities of producers of these goods are proposed. Practical value. The proposed methods of stimulating civil activity of the population aimed at increasing the efficiency of the process of production and consumption of local public goods can be used in the activities of public authorities and public associations in order to improve the living standards of the population living in a certain area.

A small number of players are in a situation involving the possible production of public goods which may benefit all of them. The situation involves a finite number of private goods, owned individually, which can be used for the production of the public goods and for exchanges and sidepayments in an overall compromise. The paper defines a noncooperative game for the participants whose outcomes are compromises in the exchange situations. When played optimally, the game yields outcomes which are in the core of the change situation.

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly ­associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further “hybridized” electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationLiberal Democrat PartyCoalition GovernmentThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

JON FRAENKEL At first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems were more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multipleparty systems. The PR using territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation around the issue of independence. Some firstpast-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a two round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, and the third a block voting system in two-member constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-thepost electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR system but has a two-party centred system, as did Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature has consequently been aimed at heavily revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of intervening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political process.3 It is in situations where a single salient political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order that distinct electoral laws may work in different directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on party systems exerted considerable influence over the success or failure of compacts aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation. Discussion Paper 2005/8 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Party politics in India display numerous paradoxical features, which reveal the blending of Western and modern forms of bureaucratic organization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions. India's leading political party, the Indian National Congress, is one of the oldest in the world, yet it has not succeeded in providing the nucleus for an institutionalized party system which can be fitted easily into any one of the conventional categories of party systems known in the West. There has been a strong Marxist and Communist revolutionary tradition in modern Indian political history. However, unlike other such traditions in most parts of Asia, its dominant parties and movements have neither succeeded in threatening the stability of the Indian state nor been threatened with physical extinction as in Indonesia, but have instead been integrated in the form of reformist political parties within routine politics in the country. The diversities and social fragmentation of Indian society have produced a proliferation of regional and other political parties which often give to each state in the Indian Union a unique party system imperfectly integrated into the “national party system.” Some characteristically Indian features pervade virtually all parties in the country — factionalism, dynastic succession to leadership, and the presence of ideological differences among the parties without ideological cleavage in the party system.

While many studies of party system nationalization examine the effects of various institutional factors, few take into account the impact of party formation cost. This paper aims to fill the empirical gap by focusing on the interactive effect of electoral systems and party registration rules. I argue that the effect of electoral systems on party system nationalization is conditional on spatial registration rules, a requirement that requires a party to collect signatures or organize local branches in a specified geographical manner to maintain the party’s legal status. Based on data for 97 legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011, the empirical analysis demonstrates that a country with an electoral system that encourages a personal vote tends to have a much lower level of party system nationalization when that country does not have spatial registration requirements. The result is robust across different model specifications and estimation techniques.

Legislative policy-making authority, party system size, and party system nationalization

This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Concerns about electoral integrity are tied to debates about democracy and democratic backsliding. The potential for democratic backsliding increases with the perceived stakes of the political game. Electoral systems matter because they affect the stakes of the game. They influence how ideological polarization in the party system is produced and processed. They also influence the extent to which group differences become politicized and how peacefully politicized differences are managed. The relationship between electoral rules and electoral integrity depends on many contextual factors. High electoral integrity can be achieved under both majoritarian and proportional rules given the right conditions. Empirically, we find no consistent differences in the level of electoral integrity across majoritarian and proportional electoral systems when we average across different economic, social, and political contexts. We encourage scholars to more closely examine the contextual effects of electoral systems on electoral integrity in future work.

This article explores the impact of decentralisation on countries’ fiscal outcomes paying attention to one aspect usually neglected in the literature: the relevance of local politics, proxied by party system nationalisation. Based on a wide sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2011, our findings are threefold. First, both fiscal and political decentralisations have a virtuous effect on fiscal performance, improving general government primary balances. Second, there is no strong evidence that nationalisation by itself enhances national fiscal outcomes. Nevertheless, when fiscal decentralisation is coupled with a certain level of nationalisation, the former improves government fiscal balances. However, when nationalisation of party systems is extremely weak, all the disciplining effects of decentralisation tend to disappear.

Using electoral data from a nearly comprehensive set of the world’s electoral democracies (1992–2014), including 131 independent countries and one non-sovereign territory, this article develops an explanatory model of legislative fragmentation that incorporates electoral fragmentation, the territorial patterns of party support, district magnitude, specific electoral system effects, and the balance of personal and party vote components within the incentive structures generated by electoral rules. The analysis proves that there is a strong negative association between the territorial homogeneity of the vote and legislative fragmentation, and shows that those varieties of electoral rules that increase the salience of personal component in party-centred elections tend to enhance legislative fragmentation. Due to its statistical properties, the model allows for establishing the impact of each of the factors, as well as their relative weights, with a high degree of certainty.

E LECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS character electoral districts, election mechanisms, and proportion votes needed to win have been credited with influencing party systems in various ways. Bi-partyism generally is related to use single-member district, plurality election system (SMD/PE). While some assert that party dualism is caused, or at least reinforced, by use this election system, others simply note that bi-partyism is associated or coexistent with SMD/PE. Multi-partyism is held to be related similarly to use multi-member district, proportional representation election system (MMD/PR). Two eminent students party systems Schattschneider and Duverger appear to have been especially influential in securing acceptance for these interpretations. Schattschneider, writing in 1942 about Party Government, left no doubt that to his mind party system is direct consequence American election system, or system representation, explaining that widespread use in this country SMD/PE operates to exaggerate representation winning party and to give second party a monopoly opposition by discriminating harshly against third parties.' Duverger, on basis a much broader survey party systems, came to a similar set conclusions in his Political Parties.2 Saying that the party system and electoral system are two realities that are indissolubly linked, he offers formulae that MMD/PR encourages multi-partyism while SMD/PE encourages two-partyism. In oft-quoted statement, Duverger writes that the simplemajority single-ballot system favors two-party system. Of all hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps a true sociological law. An almost complete correlation is observable between simplemajority single-ballot system and two-party system; dualist countries use simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist. He persists by stating that SMD/PE is capable maintaining established dualism in spite schisms in old and birth new parties and of re-establishing dualism when it has been destroyed by appearance a third party. Similarly Duverger asserts that MMD/PR favors multi-partyism, its multiplicative effect being such that it puts an end to any tendency toward a two-party system... . Cautions have been raised against unqualified acceptance association SMD/PE with two-party systems. Wildavsky has voiced criticisms and doubts on

Taking into proper account the geographic distribution of ethnic groups and the operation of electoral systems within individual countries reveals that the impact of ethnic diversity and electoral systems on the number of parties has been underestimated. Contrary to earlier findings, this study reveals that ethnic diversity spurs party proliferation in countries with both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, though the effect is stronger in the latter. The insights gained here provide a theoretically derived measure of ethnic diversity that is useful for estimating its effect on specifically political phenomena and generating an improved holistic measure of the impact of electoral systems. More crucially, the results indicate that electoral system designers have a greater capacity to structure electoral outcomes. The results rely on multivariate models created using a new database with election results from 1990 through 2011 in sixty-five free democracies.