Party systems, electoral systems, and legislative fragmentation

This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Considerable evidence suggests that social diversity increases the number of political parties. While a vast literature examines this relationship by measuring social diversity as ethnic fragmentation, the convenience of capturing the level of social heterogeneity by using alternative indicators has been traditionally overlooked. In this article, I offer new evidence that documents the impact of social diversity on party system size by proxying the former as the number of social classes. Using both objective class positions and subjective class identifications and employing two different datasets that cover democratic legislative elections around the world between 1981 and 2015, I find that the effective number of social classes has a positive effect on party system fragmentation when the average district magnitude in a democracy is high. Given the difficulty to test these effects in a cross-country environment net of unobserved heterogeneity, I examine the robustness of the findings in Spain between 2000 and 2016, an ideal case due to large differences in district magnitude and a changing party system. Overall, the results suggest that high levels of social diversity are likely to increase party system fragmentation when the electoral system is permissive enough.

JON FRAENKEL At first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems were more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multipleparty systems. The PR using territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation around the issue of independence. Some firstpast-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a two round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, and the third a block voting system in two-member constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-thepost electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR system but has a two-party centred system, as did Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature has consequently been aimed at heavily revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of intervening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political process.3 It is in situations where a single salient political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order that distinct electoral laws may work in different directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on party systems exerted considerable influence over the success or failure of compacts aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation. Discussion Paper 2005/8 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

What causes corruption? Most literature on corruption take into account the role of culture and socio-economic development though few studies have not even begun to look for another explanation such as institutions in explaining this corruption menace. Within institutionalist literature, there are generally two strands which center upon two different concepts in explaining corruption - accountability and personal vote. Yet, the theoretical framework in this study will rely exclusively on the concept of personal voting since it would be more compatible with the nature of research used in this study - within country analysis. By exploring Thailand's three general elections for the lower house (1992, 1995, 2007) with the same type of electoral rules- block vote, the study aims to examine the impact of district magnitude (elements of electoral rules: ballot structure, district magnitude, electoral formulas) as a key determinant of the level of corruption. The effect of district magnitude on corruption will be analyzed against the backdrop of the block vote system controlling for year and region. Based upon the personal vote argument, the study contends that in the context of block vote, large district magnitude would put more pressure on a candidate to distinguish himself/ herself from his/her party’s teammates as well as candidates from different parties, which in turn provide the likelihood for the use of corruption as one of their electoral strategies. The findings from this study show that the levels of corruption at a nationwide level for all three years are relatively the same. More importantly, the study found that district magnitude is related with corruption, that is, a large district magnitude is associated with a greater degree of corruption. Finally, the study shows that region is strongly associated with the level of corruption - highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South and in Bangkok. Keywords: Thailand; electoral corruption; personal vote; candidate-centered electoral rules; block vote; district magnitude DOI: 10.3860/apssr.v10i2.1901 Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 10:2 (2010), pp. 43-58

The relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations is analysed in this article. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed-list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, it is demonstrated here that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying this study draws on work on ‘the personal vote’ that suggests that the incentives to amass resources – and perhaps even to do so illegally – increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, it is shown that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold – the estimates here are that this is as low as fifteen – corruption is greater under open lists than closed lists. Only at small district magnitudes (below fifteen) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. These results hold for alternative measures of corruption, for different sets of countries analysed, for different measures of district magnitude and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, and of the number of parties.Using an objective measure of corruption in public works contracting, corroborating evidence is also presented from Italian electoral districts. In Italy's open-list environment in the period prior to 1994, larger districts were more susceptible to corruption than smaller ones.

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly ­associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further “hybridized” electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationLiberal Democrat PartyCoalition GovernmentThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Concerns about electoral integrity are tied to debates about democracy and democratic backsliding. The potential for democratic backsliding increases with the perceived stakes of the political game. Electoral systems matter because they affect the stakes of the game. They influence how ideological polarization in the party system is produced and processed. They also influence the extent to which group differences become politicized and how peacefully politicized differences are managed. The relationship between electoral rules and electoral integrity depends on many contextual factors. High electoral integrity can be achieved under both majoritarian and proportional rules given the right conditions. Empirically, we find no consistent differences in the level of electoral integrity across majoritarian and proportional electoral systems when we average across different economic, social, and political contexts. We encourage scholars to more closely examine the contextual effects of electoral systems on electoral integrity in future work.

Constituency service, addressing the nonpolicy grievances of constituents or looking out for their nonpolicy interests, provides legislators an opportunity to enhance their personal reputations. Electoral incentives are the primary explanation suggested for the amount of constituency service carried out by representatives. Variation in electoral rules, such as ballot type and district magnitude, can increase personal vote-seeking incentives, increasing the utility of constituency service as a means of winning re-election. In our opinion, measures of constituency service remain underdeveloped, and while there is widespread agreement on electoral incentives as the key determinant of constituency service, the consequences of constituency service remain elusive.

This chapter examines the empirical relationship between electoral systems, party system characteristics, cabinet stability and the fate of pluralist democracy in interwar Europe. Its main objective is to test basic notions in a literature which has been characterized by Lawrence Mayer (1980b: 335) as follows: The collapse of parliamentary democracies in Europe prior to World War II generated a search for the internal weakness of such systems. Out of this search came a suggestion from several quarters that multiparty parliamentary democracies were more prone to cabinet instability than were two-party systems. Parliamentary democracies, beset with such cabinet instability, cannot govern effectively. Therefore, it was suggested, such unstable systems were readily replaced by more authoritarian political regimes that appeared better able to provide for the efficient functioning of that system. KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationParliamentary DemocracyInterwar PeriodThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The seminal work of Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (1994), limits the definition of electoral reforms to those affecting electoral formulas, district magnitudes, assembly size, or electoral thresholds. Following this definition, studies on electoral reform have put political parties and their motivations at centre stage. Expanding the definition of electoral reform, however, requires a move beyond parties to explore the multiple possible sources of change. This article examines the most common reforms ofrecent years, electoral gender quota policies, and points to at least four explanations for the adoption of gender quota laws. Based on extensive data from gender quota campaigns, the article suggests that the literature on this topic would benefit from efforts to broaden the analytical focus to include the role of agency, group interests, anddiscursive struggles, and to call attention to the possibility of causal diversity by revealing different routes to electoral reform.

For a given electoral system, what average number and size distribution of parties can we expect? This book makes specific predictions that agree with world averages. The basic factors are assembly size and district magnitude (the number of seats allocated in the district). While previous models tell us only the direction in which to change the electoral system, the present ones also tell us by how much they must be changed so as to obtain the desired change in party system and cabinet duration. These are quantitatively predictive logical models. Combined with known particularities of a country, these models can be used for informed institutional design. Allocation of seats among countries in the European Parliament is also put on a logical basis.

Coordination failure and the politics of tribes: Jordanian elections under SNTV

Political scientists have not paid sufficient attention to the driving forces of ruling party stability, although other areas of political stability, such as democratic stability, leadership stability and cabinet stability have been studied extensively. This research fills a significant gap. It focuses on electoral rules and political party systems to explain ruling party durability. It demonstrates the following: (1) ruling parties’ hazard rates under the first-past-the-post systems are initially lower than those under proportional representation rules, but this tendency reverses over time, and (2) ruling parties’ hazard rates under two-party systems are initially lower than those under multiparty systems, but this too reverses.

The structural logic approach put forth in this book predicts the most likely policy outcomes on the basis of the government type, party strength, and district magnitude. This chapter applies the logic to explain why Japan's social protection system began to change fundamentally in the post-1996 period. At first sight, there appears to be little difference between the pre-1996 and the post-1996 periods: the government type remained the same – that is, coalition governments. This apparent continuity, however, masked a tidal shift in Japanese politics that occurred after the electoral and legislative rules were changed in the latter half of the 1990s. In October 1996 the Lower House adopted a SMD-dominant mixed electoral system, requiring the typical Lower House politician to compete for a single seat in her district. This chapter covers the period from the 1996 Lower House elections through to 2006.

Electoral systems, ethnic diversity and party systems in developing democracies