Japan Fair Trade Commission

When retailers must commit to shipment quantities prior to resolution of demand uncertainty, manufacturer stipulation of a minimum retail price is likely to be profitable for the manufacturer and not damaging to the retailers. The reason is simple: if demand turns out to be low, the unfettered market‐clearing price can lie below the price that maximizes total sales revenue. A minimum retail price that is binding in the low‐demand state can thus increase total revenue even though it saddles retailers with unsold merchandise. The ubiquity of full reimbursement for returns in Japan, even though it is in theory merely a second‐best way of achieving minimum retail price stipulations, reveals important aspects of manufacturer maintenance of retail prices having to do with enforcement problems, the allocation of risk‐bearing, and economic incentives. These aspects of resale price maintenance (RPM) are relevant to the normative evaluation of the special exemptions for RPM that Japan's Fair Trade Commission has long maintained but is now phasing out.

Viewed historically as the lapdog of business, bureaucratic and political interests, Japan's Fair Trade Commission has had mixed success in promoting its agenda for stronger antimonopoly policy since the early 1970s. Dr. Beeman unravels antimonopoly politics in Japan through an analysis of the diverse interests of industry, government, and other parties to reveal how and why antimonopoly policy has made important inroads yet ultimately failed to gain deep acceptance in Japan.Employing extensive use of primary research materials and numerous interviews, Dr. Beeman finds predictable patterns of change as well as themes of continuity in the development of Japan's antimonopoly policy. By addressing a broad array of industry sectors and policy issues, the book provides fresh insight into an agency and a policy that have often been criticized from within Japan as too stringent and from outside Japan as too lax.

일본 공정거래위원회의 구글 사건: 주요 내용과 의의 (The Japan Fair Trade Commission’s Google Case: Key Issues and Implications)

We study the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’s opt-in requirement in a model with a firm that provides a digital service and consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuations of the firm’s service and the privacy costs incurred when sharing personal data with the firm. We show that the GDPR boosts demand for the service by allowing consumers with high privacy costs to buy the service without sharing data. The increased demand leads to a higher price but a smaller quantity of shared data. If the firm’s revenue is largely usage based rather than data based, then both the firm’s profit and consumer surplus increase after the GDPR, implying that the GDPR can be welfare improving. But if the firm’s revenue is largely from data monetization, then the GDPR can reduce the firm’s profit and consumer surplus. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Australian Research Council [Grant DP210102015], the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [KAKENHI Grants JP20H05631, JP21H00702, JP21K01452, JP21K18430, JP23H00818, JP23K20593, and JP23K25515], the Nomura Foundation, the International Joint Research Promotion Program at Osaka University, and the program of the Joint Usage/Research Center for “Behavioral Economics” at the ISER, Osaka University. Although N. Matsushima serves as a member of the Competition Policy Research Center at the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the views expressed in this paper are solely ours and should not be attributed to the JFTC. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06653 .

The Saitama Saturday Club Case: Political Meddling, Public Opinion, and Antitrust Enforcement in Japan at a Turning Point

Comment on the Japan Fair Trade Commission's Draft Partial Amendment to the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act

View Comments of the Government of the United States of America on the Japan Fair Trade Commission’s Draft Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices in Sole Import Distributorship Contr by - World Competition

Uniform Pricing Regulation in the Japanese Newspaper Industry

This chapter will review competition policy and law (CPL) in ASEAN and provide some lessons for improving legal technical assistance (LTA) on CPL to ASEAN and intensifying intra-ASEAN cooperation in competition law enforcement. In 2021 Cambodia finally enacted its competition law and all ASEAN Member States have established respective competition law regimes. While they share various common features in the texts of the laws, the degree of implementation varies. The independence of competition authorities is one of the underlying causes of this difference and the lack of enforcement resources and expertise is crucial, particularly for CLMV Countries. The chapter will propose Japan Fair Trade Commission to extend LTA based on its experiences of the Antimonopoly Act enforcement for 75 years. Intra-ASEAN cooperation on CPL could support the efforts by young competition authorities in CLMV Countries to implement respective competition laws and coordinate enforcement activities to address anticompetitive mergers and other practices with regional dimension. In this context, the chapter will also examine the future developments of ASEAN-wide CPL, comparing with EU competition law and its institution.

Determinants of Individual-Firm Markup in Japan: Market Concentration, Market Share, and FTC Regulations

This paper examines the completed administrative system of ”Rule of Origin” (ROO) in Taiwan's imported agricultural products. The goal is to improve the current traceability system for imported agricultural products, the mechanism in the origin labeling and application for the import goods. Hence, it is necessary to establish the standards for domestic and imported agricultural products, traceability, origin labeling, comprehensive identification and the keeping of production records. A traceability mechanism has to be established for the sale and distribution of food, thereby increasing the dependability of transaction information, and improving food security and operating efficiency. In establishing these standards, the technological aspects, economic information management and public regulations are all very important factors. They should also encompass the coding and uncoding inspections in production. The ”Products Labeling Act” could be applicable to voluntary labeling in agricultural products, but it's difficult for some agricultural products to be labeled. Still, the agricultural Products Labeling Act is essential and needs to be enhanced. In the competitive agricultural market, although there are some governmental acts to support, active examination of these acts is lacking. At the same time, the ”Fair Trade Commission” regulates competition, but other agricultural authorities are actively responsible for enforcing compliance. For the purpose of strengthening ROO, the tariff rules and classification system for some imported agricultural products has to be amended further in the future. Finally, it's not enough for the ROO regulations and administrative measures to be implemented. Some imported agricultural products still have ambiguous origins. In particular, those measures lack the clear regulatory authorization and inter-departmental cooperation mechanisms to regulate domestic sales distribution. The ability to trace the origin of some products is ineffective, damaging the normal development for agriculture in Taiwan.

최근 정부는 공정거래법상의 다양한 문제점을 개선하고자 공정거래법 전면개정을 입법예고 했다. 구체적으로는 과징금 부과상한을 상향하고, 경성담합에 대한 전속고발제를 폐지하며, 불공정거래행위에 대해서는 사인의 금지청구제도를 도입하는 등 민사, 행정, 형사적 규율수단을 종합적으로 개선하고, 경제력 집중 억제시책을 합리적으로 보완·정비하여 대기업집단의 일감 몰아주기와 같은 잘못된 행태를 시정하고 기업집단의 지배구조가 선진화될 수 있도록 하는 것 등이다. 특히 대기업집단의 잘못된 지배구조나 거래행태를 개선하고 중소기업의 정당한 경쟁 기회를 보장하기 위하여 편법적 지배력확대 수단 등에 대한 규율을 강화하며, 4차 산업혁명 시대의 도래에 따라 기업의 혁신생태계 기반을 마련하기 위해 벤처지주회사 제도, 기업결합 신고제도 등 관련 규제를 개선함으로써 혁신성장, 공정경제구현 등을 제도적으로 뒷받침하려는 것이다. 이번 공정거래법의 개혁은 대기업 내지 시장지배적사업자의 지위남용과 과도한 경제력의 집중을 방지하고, 소상공인이나 중소기업 등 경제적 약자의 지위를 보호하는 한편 이 법의 목적인 실질적이고 공정한 경쟁과 국민경제의 균형있는 발전 및 경제정의의 실현을 더욱 공고히 하기 위한 것으로 이를 위해 경쟁 및 경제활동의 자유에 대하여, 한편에서는 불필요한 제한을 풀고, 다른 한편에서는 규제를 더욱 강화하는 것을 내용으로 한다고 볼 수 있다. 우리 헌법상의 경제질서는 사유재산제도와 경제상의 자유와 창의 및 자유경쟁을 바탕으로 하면서도, 재산권에 대한 사회적 기속과 규제 및 경제질서에 대한 국가의 조정과 간섭을 가미하는 사회적 시장경제질서라고 할 수 있는데, 현행 공정거래법상의 경제규제조항들, 최근 입법 예고된 개정내용들 및 기타 관련 법규의 내용들은 바로 이러한 사회적 시장경제질서와 헌법상의 사회국가원리 및 헌법 제9장의 경제조항들에 의하여 정당화될 수 있다. 그러나 다른 한편 이러한 경제질서에 대한 규제와 간섭은 자기 목적적인 것이 아니고 어디까지나 사유재산제도의 보장과 경제상의 자유와 자유경쟁적 경제질서의 확립을 위한 수단이라는 점이다. 즉 각자의 능력과 창의를 바탕으로 하는 자유경제질서가 제 기능을 발휘하지 못하고 궤도를 이탈했을 경우에 이를 회복시켜서 경제질서를 원궤도에 올려놓기 위한 불가피한 수단으로서 제한적이고 보충적으로 경제질서에 대한 국가의 규제와 조정이 이루어져야 한다는 것이다. 경제영역에 대한 국가개입은 앞서 열거한 바와 같이 관련 경제주체들의 경쟁의 자유를 비롯한 다양한 기본권을 제한하게 된다. 따라서 국가개입과 규제는 비례의 원칙, 신뢰보호의 원칙, 평등의 원칙, 포괄적 위임입법금지의 원칙 등 다양한 헌법상의 원칙과 한계들을 준수해야 한다. 따라서 최근 거론되는 공정거래법의 전면개정과정에서 그리고 그의 세부시행령 등을 제정ㆍ개정하는 과정에서 이러한 제한 및 한계원칙들을 준수하도록 하는 세밀한 검토가 이루어져야 할 것이다.Recently, the Government preannounced the complete revised bill of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The bill includes, concretely, raising of the upper limit of penalty surcharges, restriction of the exclusive complaint system by the Fair Trade Commission, introduction of the right to request prohibition by private individuals against unfair trade practices, supplement of prevention policy measures of excessive concentration of economic power, advancement of corporate governance, etc. It, especially, plans to reform the wrong governance system of conglomerates, to guarantee fair competion opportunity of small and medium-sized businesses, and to improve the venture holding company system and report system of business combination for realization of fair economy. In short, the purpose of the reformation is to prevent any abuse of market-dominating positions by enterprisers and any excessive concentration of economic power, to protect the positon of small and medium-sized businesses, to promote fair and free competition, and to strive hereby for balanced development of the national economy. The diverse regulations of the Act including the reformation and other relating statutes can be justified by the economic order of the Constitution, namely so called the social market economy order, and economic the povisions of the chapter 9 of the Constitution. On the other hand, they, however, should obey a number of principles of the Constitution which function as a limitation and restriction of legislation to regulate the freedom of competition and economic activity, because the regulation restricts the free market system and the relating constitutional rights, for example the right of property, the freedom of occupation, the right of consumers, etc. They comprise the principle of proportionality, the principle of equality, the principle of trust protection, ban on inclusive delegated legislation, etc. In the process of the revision of the Act, therefore, these principles should be complied.

In December 2023, the Fair Trade Commission announced that it would introduce the tentatively named ‘Platform Fair Competition Promotion Act’ to pre-designate ‘dominant online platforms’ and prohibit abuse of their market dominant position. The fundamental question is whether online platforms’ self-preferencing can be considered subject to regulation under competition law, and what are the standards for judging its illegality. These controversies include what is the basis for recognition of market dominant position in the online market under the current legal system and whether self-preferencing can be included as a regulatory type of abuse of market dominant position. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prohibits abusive practices of market dominant Position in the relevant market, resulting in the effect of restricting competition. But, it is not easy to determine whether a market dominant position exists or whether there is a competition restriction effect in online platform market. Despite this situation, the Fair Trade Commission is establishing legislative policies to preemptively determine dominant online platforms and prohibit their abusive practices. However, the limitations of the use of the SSNIP test in online platforms did not overcome in ‘the Naver shopping case’, and the theory of monopoly leveraging, which is intended to be applied to determine the effect of restricting competition, has virtually lost its value in the United States, and the related discussions in the EU are different from the judgment standards established in ‘the Posco case’ in Korea. Considering the characteristics of the online platform market, which has the possibility of infinite competition in a multi-sided market without regional restrictions due to technological development, and the efficiency enhancing effect that the various services provided by online platforms will bring, regulation of the online platforms must be cautious.

Firms of oligopoly market usually behave similarly, because of the particular structure of the market in which firms interact with each other intensely. When one firm behaves, the others react immediately, and therefore, as one firm raises prices, his rivals, in their rationality, bound to behave in the way which is parallel to what the firm did. And this situation can be justified by ”Game Theory”. Even the conscious parallel behavior ends up in noncompetitive circumstances, but without any agreement by the firms, there's no reason to punish them. So it's difficult for Fair Trade Commission to prove that there exists agreement between firms in the oligopoly market. The theory of Facilitating Devices is exercised in practice due to the difficulty of proving. When facilitating devices exist, Fair Trade Commission regards them as evidence to prove that there is cartel agreement between firms, and concludes that the firms violate the Competition Law. However, there are some doubts whether facilitating devices could be immediately regarded as the existence of agreement or mutual understanding. CPC Corporation and FPCC have similar price in recent years. Does this situation results from the preannouncement of price changes or just because the unique structure of oligopoly market? The Fair Trade Commission considered it as concerted action because of the mutual understanding of these two companies. But what does mutual understanding mean? Could preannouncement of price changes be regarded as mutual understanding? And why are the similar behaviors of these companies not conscious parallel behaviors? Those are problems worth to be discussed.

This report, prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD was the basis for a peer review examination of Chinese Taipei at the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition on 9 February, 2006. Competition law in Chinese Taipei has been an important element of the program of economic reforms that moved the economy from centrally directed emphasis on manufacturing and exports to a market-driven emphasis on services and high technology. The competition law follows mainstream practice about restrictive agreements, monopolies and anticompetitive mergers, with a particularly clear statutory basis for concentrating enforcement attention on horizontal collusion. The rules about market deception and unfair practices connect the competition law to consumer interests. There is a risk, though, that rules based on a cultural tradition of fairness might lead to interventions to correct differences in bargaining power, which could dampen competition rather than promote it. The competition enforcement agency, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), is now a stable, experienced administrative agency. It followed an appropriate sequence in introducing competition policy, emphasising transparency and guidance to encourage compliance before undertaking stronger enforcement measures. General reforms are in process that would clarify the independence of the FTC. To improve enforcement against hard-core cartels, a leniency programme should be adopted, and the special treatment for agreements among small businesses should be limited. Some other aspects of the enforcement tool-kit should be revised, such as the cap on fines and the use of market share as a merger notification test. The most visible regulatory reforms to promote competition have been in telecoms, although an independent regulator for that sector is just now being set up. The government retains holdings in privatised firms that could have implications for market competition, so FTC vigilance about the risk of cross-subsidy or other distortion remains warranted.