Non-Rational Considerations Towards Conflict Termination

: The effective application of operational art is critical to the successful termination of a limited war by the U.S. Despite this role, guidance regarding the application of operational art to termination in a limited war is meager. This paper focuses on the high-level bridge between the strategic and operational levels that is necessary to achieve successful termination. Theoretical synopses regarding the unique characteristics of limited war, war termination theory, and negotiating theory are provided. Practical issues/steps regarding the bridge from the strategic to the operational level are explored based upon the noted theories. The validity of the practical thought in the paper is tested through an examination of termination in the Korean War. Based upon arguments in the paper, it is clear that successful termination in a limited war cannot be achieved without the effective application of operational art at the strategic/operational level of war. It is also clear that the operational commander is uniquely positioned to review the ability of the military instrument to deliver the political object. Recommendations entail an expansion of doctrine to include a broader discussion of war termination issues. War termination, Limited war, Operational art, Strategy, Operational commander.

Purpose: is to anticipate the termination of the Russia-Ukraine war considering the underlying causes on the basis of main war termination theories. Method: comparative analysis, and synthesis. Findings: The length of a war is typically unpredictable due to the intricate interplay of elements that affect its duration. Initial assessments often underestimate the enemy's capabilities, resolve, and adaptability. Understanding these factors can help in devising strategies to prevent or shorten wars. In historical records, the majority of military operations, campaigns, and wars have exceeded their anticipated duration. What causes the wars to linger longer than anticipated? What variables or elements, in general, affect the duration of wars? These are some of the most frequently considered questions by the researchers. In this regard wars need to be categorized based on their features in order to make sense of how long they should last. The scale and ferocity of wars differ. Some wars lasted only a few days, while others lasted for years or even decades. Some wars were fought between two nations, while others involved multiple nations, some others had a worldwide scope. Limited engagements occurred in some wars, while others left massive amounts of destruction in their wake. While many nations rally their entire population for war, some do not believe it is necessary. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, the article illustrates the main points of war theories concerning the origins and end of a conflict, supports the connection between them, and emphasizes the variables and elements that influence the duration of the war. The authors try to anticipate the termination of this war based on various factors. Theoretical implications: The paper enhances our understanding of key concepts of theories of war provide a framework to understand the various dynamics and outcomes of conflicts, including how they begin, unfold, and eventually end. The Russia-Ukraine war serves as a contemporary case study to explore these theories in practice. The paper provides new insights for understanding the variables and elements that influence the duration of the war and offer various lenses to comprehend and address the war, suggesting a multifaceted approach that includes military, diplomatic, economic, and socio-cultural strategies. Practical implications: Examining the practical implications of the theories of war in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war involves understanding how these theories translate into real-world strategies and actions that can lead to the termination of the war. The paper highlights that military, diplomatic, economic, and socio-cultural strategies must be integrated to address the complex dynamics of the conflict and pave the way for a sustainable peace. Value: The study offers significant value in understanding, predicting, and potentially resolving wars in the example of Russia-Ukraine war and provides multiple lenses through which to analyze the war, devise strategies, and anticipate outcomes.

: The United States is the lone superpower left in the world. No other military can match the technology and lethality which American armed forces bring to the battlefield. Above all else, our military culture measures itself on annihilation of the enemy. But far too often in our history, battlefield victory has led to a failed peace because of a lack of foresight in planning on both the strategic and operational levels of war. The operational commander sits in a unique position to bridge the gap between national objectives and tactical actions. Armed with copious joint doctrine, he is charged with militarily defeating chosen enemies and creating conditions as a result of combat to achieve a strategically desired end state. In order to keep operational commanders focused on the aftermath of war, he needs to look no further than in his own doctrine and apply the principles of operational design to the post-hostilities phase of war before getting bogged down in combat planning. This will stimulate interagency cooperation early in the planning effort, create a synergistic effort of all the elements of national power, discover unique critical factors and operational objectives that may not be addressed in combat planning, derive what leverage may be required for peace negotiations, and give the operational commander a clearer understanding of transition issues. This ensures that conflict termination criteria are realized early in the planning stages of war and not after combat has started. Using the Gulf War as an example, the problems with how that war ended and could have ended will be explored. Had General Schwarzkopf applied this method to planning Desert Storm, we may have never had to fight Saddam Hussein again twelve years later in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

: War termination strategies are not an issue of whether or not the nation should devote sufficient military means to achieve the chosen political objectives. Conflict termination involves more than simply ending hostilities. It is a matter of effective coordination in development of objectives and strategies while at the same time linking the political leadership and the military commander to achieve the ends with the appropriate means. The American approach to military strategy has had a tendency to sever the links between military action and political objectives, and American military strategy has largely been awkward in its contribution towards achieving a better and lasting peace. This is in part due to having insufficient doctrinal guidance to achieve the ends as described by the policy maker. It is also because current doctrine and policy does not cause us to think through the implications of successfully achieving our objectives. The operational commander must be skilled in maintaining a balance of military force and diplomatic initiation to preserve and reinforce our political objectives while, at the same time working the concerns of a defeated enemy or enemies to prohibit part two of the same conflict.

Recent theory in social evolution has been mainly concerned with competition and cooperation within social groups of animals and their impact on the stability of those groups. Much less attention has been paid to conflicts arising as a result of solitary floaters (outsiders) attempting to join groups of established residents (insiders). We model such conflicts over group-membership using a demographically explicit approach in which the rates of births and deaths in a population determine the availability of group-vacancies and the number of floaters competing over these vacancies. We find that the outcome of within-group competition, reflected in the partitioning of reproduction among group members, exerts surprisingly little influence on the resolution of insider-outsider conflict. The outcome of such conflict is also largely unaffected by differences in resource holding potential between insiders and outsiders. By contrast, whether or not groups form is mainly determined by demographic factors (variation in vital rates such as fecundity and mortality) and the resulting population dynamics. In particular, at high floater densities territory defense becomes too costly, and groups form because insiders give in to the intruder pressure imposed on them by outsiders. We emphasize the importance of insider-outsider conflicts in social evolution theory and highlight avenues for future research.

: Civilians accompanying and supporting military forces is a time honored tradition the world over. Under the recent label of Contractors on the Battlefield (CoB), American military doctrine has blossomed over the previous decade to include joint and service level doctrine, policy and procedures for the effective employment of CoB. Unless contractor support is considered and built into the logistic support plan from the beginning of planning, the operational commander may not gain the maximum advantage available from all his resources. Reality dictates full integration of the CoB tool to give maximum flexibility to the operational commander's plans and operations. This paper examines many aspects of CoB relevant to the operational commander including its: historical perspective; need; doctrine; and effects on the operational commander. This paper will also list specific recommendations relating to CoB for the operational commander's consideration based on research findings and government agency reports.

: This work examines the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the United States Ambassador during contingency operations conducted by the United States. The work examines the impacts of this relationship on operations conducted for regime change and how it influenced conflict termination in the 20th century. The work examines two historic case studies: Operation Just Cause and Operation Uphold Democracy. Moreover, the work examines communication and integration between the strategic policy makers, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and how they are linked to the Joint Task Force to answer the primary research question. The Operation in Haiti is an example of international institutions working to achieve clear termination criteria, which are necessary to ensure successful war termination or conflict resolution. Though vastly different in scope, duration, and international support Operations Just Cause and Uphold Democracy highlight the best and worst examples of United States military intervention. The drastically different cases highlight the differences in the types of conflict termination and the stark differences in the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the in country ambassador. Numerous aspects about collaborative planning and integration of the Department of State and Department of Defense could improve, but the focus of the conclusions and recommendations will be on Department of Defense led initiatives.

A 5-day diary study examined if and how conflict behavior moderates the association between mode integration and relational and conflict outcomes among individuals in romantic relationships. Participants recorded daily conflict, conflict behavior, mode integration, relational satisfaction, and conflict resolution. In line with the communication interdependence perspective, the more mode integration individuals reported in constructive conflict, the more relational satisfaction they experienced. The data also revealed that the less mode integration individuals reported in low destructive conflict, the more conflict resolution they experienced. The results highlight the importance of examining conflict behavior and media use in tandem when studying romantic conflict.

Relationships provide the context for conflict resolution. Rubin and Brown (1975) hypothesized that equal power and high trust situations would induce participants to choose more cooperative strategies and to attain more satisfactory outcomes than low trust or unequal power situations. Gaylard (1994) postulated that personal and situational variables could have both direct and indirect effects on conflict outcomes. This study was designed to test these hypotheses, with 40 pairs of management students participating in a negotiation simulation. Results supported Rubin and Brown's hypotheses. A path analysis indicated the beneficial effect of trust was indirect and could be accounted for by greater use of the integrating strategy. The effect of the power differential was direct and not based on an increased use of a particular conflict resolution strategy. These results suggest that enhanced trust might be considered one marker of success of conflict resolution training in a particular social context, such a...

This paper presents a random discrete mathematical population model for immigration. This model incorporates not only rational factors, such as the economic gradient between destination and origin countries, geographical factors, and regulatory laws but also hidden intentional factors, such as the political interests of governments and the involvement of migrant smuggling by criminal organizations, which exploit immigration as a strategic tool. These non-rational factors are modeled as sudden, random arrival flow waves, represented by a Poisson distribution. The study’s time frame is short to ensure the reliability of economic forecasts for the coming years. Although the study focuses on Spain, the proposed approach is applicable to other geographic areas with appropriate data. The results obtained from this model can be applied to predict the national budget necessary for host countries to address this complex social phenomenon.

PATH DEPENDENCE IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: RESOURCES, REGIMES, AND INTERVENTIONS Ivan Medynskyi Old Dominion University, 2015 Director: Dr. David C. Earnest This dissertation investigates the patterns of path dependence in intrastate conflicts. It is motivated by three research questions: What factors determine a particular outcome of a civil war? How strong is their impact? What are the causal mechanisms in play? To examine these questions, this study introduces a theory of path dependence to the study of intrastate conflicts that bridges the gap between analyses of the phases of contention. First, it examines the broad understanding of path dependence that highlights the impact of initial conditions on civil war outcomes. Then, this dissertation explores the narrower notion which focuses on the role of timing and sequence of internal factors and intervening events in shaping different resolutions to intrastate conflicts. Using multinomial logistic regression and event history models to analyze initial conditions, intrinsic features, and intervening factors in influencing the probability of particular civil war outcomes, this study identifies relevant agencies that can be utilized to shape solutions for current and future instances of armed civil conflicts. Finally, three case studies test the applicability of the path dependence theory through outlining the narratives, incorporating quantitative findings, and identifying causal mechanisms. The empirical findings of the initial conditions models emphasize the relevance of conflict spillover, non-lootable resources, and structure of bipolarity. An investigation into the factors that ‘lock in’ a particular civil war outcome highlights the role of UN and regional intergovernmental organizations in accelerating a compromise outcome; explains the variation in dynamics behind democratic and autocratic regimes; but surprisingly finds no support for the relationship between the size of the armed forces and conflict outcome. Although case study analysis supports the validity of the empirical results, it also points at the potential limitations of the quantitative design. Since this study follows a mixed methods approach, it effectively compensates for the drawbacks of different types of analysis.

: Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has found itself in unexplored territory similar to the days of early sailing ships crossing uncharted oceans. The captains of those ships of yore typically only plotted courses through waters familiar to them. Similarly, commanders today plan for conflict in terms familiar to them: combat of arms with a clearly defined enemy. With the recognition that we frequently deal in operations other than war, a paradigm shift is required to ensure planning the transition between war termination and conflict resolution. This is new and unexplored territory containing many lessons from operations conducted in the last decade. After achieving the military objective, what should be the CINC's responsibilities for deliberate and crisis planning for the transition to the strategic desired end-state? This paper proposes fundamental tenets, extrapolated from case studies of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, for the consideration of the operational commander during initial war/other than war planning to achieve enduring results. These include determination of a desired end state, training, centralized command and control, and synchronization of forces, in order results to achieve enduring.

Children with language impairment (LI) experience social difficulties, including conflict management. The factors involved in peer-conflict progression in pre-school children with LI, and which of these processes may differ from pre-school children with typical language development (TL), is therefore examined. To describe the relationship between opponents interacting before conflict, aberrant conflict causes, the conflict-resolution strategy reconciliation (i.e. friendly contact between former opponents shortly following conflict termination), and conflict outcome in the form of social interaction after a conflict has run its course. It is hypothesized that without social interaction before conflict, children with LI will experience increased difficulties attaining reconciliation. Unstructured play of 11 boys with LI (4-7 years old), at a specialized language pre-school, and 20 boys with TL (4-6 years old), at mainstream pre-schools, were video filmed. Conflicts were identified and recorded according to a validated coding system. Recorded conflict details include social interaction between conflict in the pre-conflict period, behavioural sequences constituting conflict cause (conflict period), reconciliatory behaviours in the post-conflict period, and social interaction between former opponents in the succeeding non-conflict period. The group's mean proportion of individual children's conflicts in which specific behavioural sequences occurred were calculated and compared between and within the groups. When conflicts with and without pre-conflict social interaction were analysed separately, aberrant caused conflicts occurred more often in LI group conflicts than in TL group conflicts. However, in conflicts without social interaction in the pre-conflict period, boys with LI exhibit reconciliatory behaviours in, and reconcile a comparatively smaller proportion of, conflicts. Social interaction in the succeeding non-conflict period was proportionately less for boys with LI. This appears to stem from lower reconciliation rates in LI conflicts that do not begin with social interaction in the pre-conflict period. It was also confounded by the larger number of aberrant caused LI conflicts that were rarely reconciled. In turn, non-reconciliation and aberrant caused conflicts were independently associated with comparatively less social interaction in the succeeding non-conflict period. The results suggest that in addition to traditional psycholinguistic training, children with LI may gain from interventions that support concluding behavioural turns, as in aberrant caused conflicts; and in initiating contact in conflict situations, even when a frame of reference is not immediately available, as was the case when opponents have not established social interaction in the pre-conflict period.

How do young children negotiate conflicts with peers that result in mutually beneficial resolution and peaceful interaction after conflict? A few studies suggest that when children use conciliatory strategies in conflict, socially adaptive outcomes are more likely to be achieved. The present study explores the relative associations of types of children's conciliatory conflict resolution strategies (i.e., prosocial, compliance‐oriented, solution‐oriented, and verbal clarification/apology) with conflict outcomes to contribute to knowledge of the discrete behaviors that might have salience for conflict resolution training. Socially adaptive conflict outcomes were expected to strongly relate to children's resolution strategies of a prosocial nature as well as to teacher or peer interventions encouraging prosocial behavior or empathy. Sampled conflicts (N = 521) were collected through field observations of 107 ethnically/racially and socioeconomically diverse four‐ to seven‐year‐old children. Logistic regression analyses with bootstrap‐based inference suggested that children's prosocial behaviors in conflict were most strongly tied to mutually beneficial resolution and peaceful postconflict interaction, when controlling for relevant covariates. Other conciliatory strategies varied in their association with socially adaptive outcomes. The hypothesis regarding third‐party interventions encouraging prosociability or empathy could not be examined due to infrequent occurrence. Insights for future research on children's socially adaptive conflict negotiations are discussed.

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.