Our National Information Infrastructure; An Immediate Concern in National Security Policy

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

Conclusions * Nuclear weapons will continue indefinitely to play an indispensable role in U.S. national security policy: as a hedge against uncertainties, to deter potential aggressors who are both more diverse and less predictable than in the past, and to allow the United States to construct a more stable security environment. Recent tests by India and Pakistan make it clear that weapons remain part of the security setting. The aggressive pursuit of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by states such as Iran and North Korea underscores the role of deterrence as a central component of U.S. security strategy. * The United States requires a credible deterrent posture, broadly defined to include forces-in-being; capabilities for weapon system design and production; and the ability to assure the safety and reliable performance of the stockpile--a fundamental challenge in the absence of underground testing. Because this posture must be both adaptable and responsive to new threats, the national deterrent infrastructure must be treated as a strategic resource. The posture must also incorporate a greater role for defenses in future deterrence calculations. All of this requires trained and motivated people, as well as new ways of thinking and considerable agility and foresightedness on the part of U.S. leaders. * A force that is not backed by the perceived ability and willingness to maintain and, when necessary, reconstitute important elements will increasingly be seen as hollow. The decisions and actions that the United States takes concerning the total force posture in the years ahead will influence decisively how both allies and adversaries perceive the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. In turn, this holds important implications for the overall capacity of the United States to shape the security setting at the outset of the new millennium and to provide for the nation's defense in a world of change and turbulence. Setting a New Paradigm Recognizing the need for a fresh, long-term look at national security strategy and requirements, and specifically at U.S. policy in the 21st Century, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University and the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory brought together a group of experts with extensive experience in security policy and military affairs. The participants examined the broad trends in the international environment and considered how the United States could both shape and respond to them. A forward-looking paradigm for the dimension of U.S. security policy emerged that builds on the lessons of the past while addressing the opportunities and challenges of the future. The paradigm is based on five elements: 1. Sweeping positive changes have occurred. The bilateral nuclear balance that occupied center stage in the past no longer dominates the strategic calculations of the United States or Russia. Yet, there remains a continuing need for deterrence and for the retention of weapons as an essential component of U.S. national security strategy. 2. Nuclear weapons will remain part of the global security setting. The knowledge to build them will continue to exist; they cannot be disinvented. Even if the United States were to divest itself of its arsenal, other nations would be unlikely to follow suit. To the contrary, some states would gain incentives to retain or acquire weapons against a conventionally superior but nuclear-free United States. If weapons were somehow eliminated, a serious deterioration of the international environment could engender strong incentives for rearmament. A rapid and competitive race to rebuild arsenals could increase prospects for a devastating war. 3. In the changing security setting, the weapons infrastructure--broadly defined to include both the operational forces and the development and production capabilities that can bring new forces into being when needed--takes on a heightened strategic prominence. …

Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in January of 2007. Joining the EU is expected to promote the candidate country's economic growth, provide access to western technology, increase employment and attract foreign investments, the collective result of which is expected to be social, economic and technological advancement. In a perfect world where all factors contribute favorably those goals can be achieved. However, the detrimental impact of corruption on achieving national goals must also be addressed. This article examines linkages between information infrastructures and social development in Bulgaria and Romania as well as investment needs and financing were addressed with the objective to improve National Information Infrastructures (NII), expected payoffs from NII improvements were identified; the role of corruption in retarding information infrastructure development was also investigated. Using regression analysis the relationship between information infrastructures, social development, corruption, and economic development in Bulgaria and Romania were compared to those of the EU10 countries admitted into the EU in 2004 as well as to those in the original EU15 countries. It is concluded that given present conditions in Romania and Bulgaria development financing will have to come from internal and from World Bank sources rather than from foreign direct investment.

For every opportunity presented by the information age, there is an opening to invade the privacy and threaten the security of the nation, U.S. businesses, and citizens in their private lives. The more information that is transmitted in computer-readable form, the more vulnerable we become to automated spying. It's been estimated that some 10 billion words of computer-readable data can be searched for as little as $1. Rival companies can glean proprietary secrets ...anti-U.S. terrorists can research targets ...network hackers can do anything from charging purchases on someone else's credit card to accessing military installations. With patience and persistence, numerous pieces of data can be assembled into a revealing mosaic. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society addresses the urgent need for a strong national policy on cryptography that promotes and encourages the widespread use of this powerful tool for protecting of the information interests of individuals, businesses, and the nation as a whole, while respecting legitimate national needs of law enforcement and intelligence for national security and foreign policy purposes. This book presents a comprehensive examination of cryptography--the representation of messages in code--and its transformation from a national security tool to a key component of the global information superhighway. The committee enlarges the scope of policy options and offers specific conclusions and recommendations for decision makers. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society explores how all of us are affected by information security issues: private companies and businesses; law enforcement and other agencies; people in their private lives. This volume takes a realistic look at what cryptography can and cannot do and how its development has been shaped by the forces of supply and demand. How can a business ensure that employees use encryption to protect proprietary data but not to conceal illegal actions? Is encryption of voice traffic a serious threat to legitimate law enforcement wiretaps? What is the systemic threat to the nation's information infrastructure? These and other thought-provoking questions are explored. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society provides a detailed review of the Escrowed Encryption Standard (known informally as the Clipper chip proposal), a federal cryptography standard for telephony promulgated in 1994 that raised nationwide controversy over its Big Brother implications. The committee examines the strategy of export control over cryptography: although this tool has been used for years in support of national security, it is increasingly criticized by the vendors who are subject to federal export regulation. The book also examines other less well known but nevertheless critical issues in national cryptography policy such as digital telephony and the interplay between international and national issues. The themes of Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society are illustrated throughout with many examples -- some alarming and all instructive -- from the worlds of government and business as well as the international network of hackers. This book will be of critical importance to everyone concerned about electronic security: policymakers, regulators, attorneys, security officials, law enforcement agents, business leaders, information managers, program developers, privacy advocates, and Internet users.

The article analyzes the existing legal mechanisms for managing critical information infrastructure in Ukraine. The instruments for their improvement are proposing in this article. An important component of critical infrastructure is its information component – a critical information infrastructure. The sphere of protection of critical information infrastructure in Ukraine is at the initial stage of formation. The current legislation defines only certain objects of socio-economic sphere, in which extraordinary events can lead to socially dangerous consequences. In view of the fact, that the term “critical information infrastructure” does not having a consistent interpretation in different countries, we propose our opinion. “Critical information infrastructure is a system of information management of critical facilities and information and communication networks that provide defense capabilities and security of public and private institutions, whose operation may flow to the national security of Ukraine” (KII). In the KII we can identified information and network components. Information environment of KII is a system for information management of critical objects, including computing and information resources that form automated control systems (ACS). The network component of KII consists of a set of telecommunication devices, communication lines and network equipment, systems of open protocols for the exchange of information between elecommunication devices, global system of digital addresses and digital identifiers, software. The Internet network can be considered as a technological add-on over a telecommunication network that provides the provision of data transmission and processing services (e-mail, teleconferencing, file transfer, access to computing and information systems in local area networks). The main threat to the safety of ACS of critical information infrastructure objects is targeted actions on information systems, information and telecommunication networks by software and hardware. KII legal security include two main components – national and international. The national component may be forming by a set of principles, legal institutions and norms, which are enshrined in the national legislation regulating public relations in Ukraine in the area of counteracting the security threats of the ACS of critical objects. In order to protect the most important objects of KII, it is necessary to identify these objects. The current legislation defines such categories of objects, for which special conditions for ensuring their protection and functioning are established. Some of them, in whole or in part, may be classifying as objects of critical infrastructure. The specificity of providing information security was reflecting in such Ukraine laws like “On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, “On the Concept of the National Program of Informatization”, “On the National Program of Informatization”. As well as the Concept of Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Strategy of Cybersecurity Of Ukraine. The National Security Strategy identifies actual threats to national security and sets priorities for information security, cyber security and security of information resources and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the implementation of the state policy in the field of security of KII requires the further development of legal principles and norms governing the relevant social relations, that is, the national component of the legal security of KII. Ukraine should ensure the establishment of a nationwide system for assessing risks and threats to critical infrastructure, and after the legislative definition of the main terms, the implementation of the Identification of Critical Information Infrastructure objects. Identification of objects of critical information infrastructure can be accomplishing by introducing the certification of objects of critical information infrastructure. Such passports must contain general data about the facility, data on the main sources of danger, data on hazardous natural conditions, technological processes and response to threats. The international component of the legal security of KII provides for the regulation of a set of principles and norms defined by international treaties and recognized by the state, regulating issues of international cooperation in this area. Ukraine has signed the Convention on Cybercrime together with the member states of the Council of Europe and other States. It is aiming at stopping actions against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data, as well as abusing such systems, networks and data by installing the criminal responsibility for such behavior, the provision of powers sufficient to combat criminal offenses, and the conclusion of agreements on rapid and reliable international cooperation. In addition, the plan of measures for 2017 on implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine provides for the implementation of Directive 2008/114/EC on the protection of critical infrastructure, in particular on cybersecurity and cyber defense of critical infrastructure objects. Development of the system of international information security, the following main groups of international relations that requirenormative legal regulation within the framework of the legal security of KII: definition of the boundaries of the national KII in the global information and communication infrastructure and fixing signs of computer incidents in the control system of critical objects information infrastructure. The absence of generally recognized borders of state sovereignty of States in this space is a significant obstacle to the application of international law to the actions of other states. In particular, this impedes the establishment of limits of responsibility of states for violating the security of the KII and organizing international cooperation in the field of countering computer crime. The urgency of the legislative consolidation of signs of computer incidents in the automated control system of critical information infrastructure objects suggests the widespread use of the concept of “incident” in international law. An incident in cyberspace usually associated with a violation of the functioning of the components of cyberspace – an electronic collection environment and automated processing of information that determines the processes of the implementation of these operations, as well as information systems and automated control systems. The essence of the general definition of the “international incident” in the field of KII will be determining, firstly, by the nature of international relations between states that are violating by the “incident”. This event may be the result of unforeseen actions of the state, including actions that harm the interests of public bodies of one or more states, or, conversely, be one of many intentional but minor provocations carried out by agents of one state against another state. Given that international relations in the field of incidents in the field of KII are not regulating by international treaties, the main and, in fact, the only source of international law in this case serves as an international custom, however, its application to the sphere of KII is accompanying by considerable difficulties. For Ukraine, it is possible to introduce the positive experience of other states in the security of the KII. In particular, the problem of security of information technologies has been enshrined in the international standard ISO / IEC 15408 “General criteria for assessing the safety of information technology”.

In the introductory part of the paper, the author defines the terms of policy and strategy for national security. Furthermore, the author determines the national security policy of Montenegro in accordance with the National Security Strategy of Montenegro from 2006, 2008, and 2018, as well as the components of the national security policy, such as national security interests and goals with special reference to strategic interests, overview of the global and regional environment, and security risks and threats. At the end of the paper, the author outlines the external components of national security policy – cooperation with European countries in responding to modern challenges, risks and threats, Montenegro's possible response to security risks and threats, and developing a crisis management system and participation in missions. The content will be based on an analysis of foreign literature and the use of electronic content. The subject of research in this paper is the national security policy of Montenegro in modern global conditions. The purpose of this study is to focus on the importance of national security and global security in the scientific literature. Keywords: national security policy, national security strategy, security interests and goals.

Information infrastructure development: International comparison between the United States and Japan

Research Highlights and Abstract This article Contributes to the debate on British Foreign and Security Policy; Contributes to the literature on the British National Security Strategy; Links international relations literature with domestic policy formation literature; Introduces the concept of ‘legitimacy’ to foreign and security policy analysis. The publication of the Britain's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 marked a formal shift away from the secret state of the Cold War to the highly public protective state of today. This article is interested in the question of why the NSS and related framework have taken this particular public and explicit form. Both mainstream and critically minded academics have argued that contemporary security discourses and policies are techniques of power and governance and that the public nature of the policies is vital to this function. In this article, I argue that there has been a transformation in the nature of the British state from a representative state in which the state's authority was legitimated through a number of political mechanisms of representation, to one in which state elites and institutions need to forge new kinds of relationships with the governed. This is a key development that has been noticed in political, sociological and legal theoretical literature but as yet hardly addressed in international relations and security studies. This transformation of the state, I will argue, is intimately linked to the form and content of contemporary security policies. The contemporary state is undergoing a process of an erosion of legitimacy, which has a direct impact upon the capacity of the state to govern. In this context, policies take on the role of trying to bridge the legitimacy gap. I will argue that this shift in the state leads to a different understanding of contemporary security policies as representative of a decreasing ability to govern security, a state that is losing legitimacy and authority; that is in effect, losing its sovereignty. This article argues that British national security strategies and policies are representative of this.

This article presents basic issues related to the theoretical assumptions of state security policy and strategy. The aim of this article is to present basic problems related to the doctrinal assumptions of the national security strategies of the Republic of Poland. During its preparation, theoretical research methods were applied. The considerations presented in the article indicate that security of The Republic of Poland, which is the case of most countries in the world, is conditioned by external and internal factors and should be treated as a key goal of the state's security policy and strategy. They also indicate that the high level of military and non-military threats in various parts of the world makes everyone aware of the complexity of broadly understood security and the tools that the state has at its disposal for the sake of it.

In this paper, the possibilities of developing the national information infrastructure by applying the Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) are discussed. Confirmation of the legitimacy of using the LADM within the (Spatial) Information Infrastructure (SII) context is illustrated with the case of Poland. Creating the information infrastructure is an immense challenge because its components are usually dispersed among various institutions responsible for their maintenance and dissemination. Co-existing spatial and non-spatial components of the information infrastructure require their proper integration. Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of the SII results in combining objects from physical and legal world in one computer environment. The process of standardisation is the first step to refine land administration system and to make it more understandable and transparent for involved parties. The LADM, being officially adopted as an international standard ISO 19152, gives a basis for building national profiles and supports creating the European information infrastructure, enabling communication based on common terminology. This paper provides a brief overview of the current land information system in Poland emphasising the main issues in creating the national information infrastructure. Then, the general concept of the country profile for Poland with the adaptation of the LADM is described. With respect to the users’ expectations and requirements, the conceptual model is extended to information being outside the scope of LADM. As a final point, several technical aspects of implementing the complemented LADM country profile are explored. The results indicate that effective functioning of the information infrastructure requires proper integration of data, proceeded by analysing the contents of existing data sets, indicating key registers and defining a linkage system between them.

human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security. --Winston Churchill Europe, as identity and union, has undergone an extraordinary transformation since the end of Cold War. In recent history, much of this remarkable change has only accelerated, both with the expansion of membership in the European Union (EU), a growing independence in terms of foreign policy, and an emerging recognition (particularly with the votes of both France and the Netherlands in 2005 regarding support for the European Constitution) that disagreements about Europe's future and identity are inevitable. The cultural and political philosopher J. Peter Burgess has aptly summarized, nonetheless, a major European shift--especially regarding the concept of security: In New & Old Wars Mary Kaldor argues that a new type of organized violence has developed, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, as one aspect of the globalized era. The new wars are, according to Kaldor, characterized by a blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime, and wide-scale violations of human rights. In contrast to the geo-political goals of earlier wars, the new wars are about identity politics. Kaldor argues that in the context of globalization, ideological and territorial cleavages of an earlier era have increasingly been supplanted by an emerging political cleavage between cosmopolitanism, based on inclusive, universalist multicultural values, and the politics of particularistic identities. The evolution of the European Defense and Security Policy has evolved in the shadow of this mutation. European culture with dubious historical reputation for cosmopolitanism is being thrust upon the global stage at the very moment when its geopolitical concepts are poised on the precipice of desuetude. With Solana's Thessaloniki Summit document A Secure Europe in a Better World the European community of values is being transformed into a security community. (1) Reflecting this recognition, the document Secure Europe in a Better World--most commonly known as the European Security Strategy--stands in somewhat notable contrast to the 17 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2) Specifically, the European Union strategy emphasizes the notion of cooperative engagement, relying on the strength of 450 million members and the recognition that no one country--perhaps in direct contrast to the US national strategy--can go it alone. Although the concept of hegemony between the United States and Europe seems immensely sensible, reality equally dictates that this sharing is unlikely to occur in the near future. (3) Collectively, documents and policies regarding the development of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emphasize the necessity for Europe to have the ability for independent action. Especially with the 2001 Helsinki and the call for a 60,000-member European Rapid Reaction Force, Europe has recognized a need for independence from powerful allies (such as the United States) and from powerful alliances (such as NATO). (4) Moreover, the evolution of the European defense responsibility has focused on the so-called Petersberg tasks, which concentrate on and crisis response capabilities that nonetheless fall short of a full-scale intervention force with the ability to sustain combat over prolonged time. As drawn from Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, and originally stated in the (now defunct) Western European Union Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, these responsibilities entail humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. …

This RAND Arroyo Perspective updates previous analysis published by the RAND Corporation about Russia as a source of military competition and potential conflict with the United States and its allies. It is one of several summary assessments produced to support development of the 2016 Annual Report of the RAND Arroyo Center. The annual report focuses thematically on the major drivers of U.S. national security policy and strategy.

: The United States is an information and information systems dominated nation. Because of its dependence on information and information technology, the United States has become one of the most vulnerable nations to information warfare attacks. This study examines vulnerabilities in the global, national and defense information infrastructure and information operations attacks (information warfare) in the context of the national strategy for protecting the information infrastructure. It reviews directives, regulations, and policies currently in place to protect the information infrastructure and recommends the part government should play in this effort. It concludes with recommendations regarding a coordinated government and private sector office at the national level to provide the leadership required for such an effort.

The Role of the Government in the Internet and Its Implications for Technology Policy

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.