US-China Relations: The Mar-A-Lago Retreat and Implications for Bilateral Ties

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) pervasive presence in Africa is sometimes highlighted by an image of the Chinese flag draping an outlinemap of the entire continent. Such a depiction does not imply that China is seeking to occupy the entire African continent by surpassing the scale and actions of the old colonial powers.1 Chinese President Xi Jinping may also not like to emulate US President Donald Trump in his reported bid to extend American sovereignty over Greenland and perhaps Gaza too. Furthermore, Africa is not known to be China’s long-lost ancient “province” for Xi to seek its “reunification” with the Chinese “mainland” sooner or later. Beijing’s grand strategy vis-à-vis Africa should, therefore, be understood in today’s realpolitik terms rather than any colourful imagery.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

Editor's Notes: In November 2011, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the President of the United States, Barack Obama, almost at the same time put forward the Chinese Dream and the American Dream, a...

Chapter 6 applies the framework of strategic delinquency to the revealing behaviour of North Korea during the US administration of Donald Trump, placing particular focus on the period from 2017 to 2019. In so doing, it examines how North Korea’s accelerating nuclear ambitions and pursuit of international status were heavily influenced by the unprecedented foreign policy of the Trump administration, the declining stability of the nuclear order, and a waning US commitment to the nuclear order during this time. This chapter emphasizes how, during this time, North Korea’s initially provocative behaviour, marked by the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2017, was followed by feigned compliance with nuclear norms and the United States’ demands. It highlights how North Korea sought to leverage the unusual disposition of President Trump in order to compel the United States to abandon its ‘hostile policy’, ease unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed upon the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), and gain international recognition as a nuclear state. Despite three presidential-level summits between Kim Jong Un and Trump and the same number of meetings between Kim Jong Un and his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in, North Korea failed to reap its desired outcomes, in no small part owing to its reluctance to concede on its increasingly sophisticated nuclear programme. As a result, by 2020, the DPRK had lost interest both in the global nuclear order and in dialogue with the United States. Relations between Washington and Pyongyang had reached a nadir.

China has come under increasing American pressure to lean on North Korea to curtail its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes. But Chinese President Xi Jinping's priority is to maintain the domestic and international status quo to ensure the Communist Party's smooth transition behind him at the 19th Party Congress next autumn. Until that process has been completed, major change in Beijing's behaviour towards Pyongyang is unlikely.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

Subject New developments in relations between Taiwan, China and the United States. Significance On February 28, the US Senate unanimously passed a bill, the Taiwan Travel Act, which -- when the president signs it into law -- will allow for high-level visits by government officials between Taiwan and the United States. China immediately criticised the measure, arguing that it undercut the ‘one-China’ principle on which China-US relations are based. China threatened vague retaliatory measures against Taiwan. Impacts China will ramp up pressure on Taiwan through military activities, such as airspace violations. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will lose support within her party as she resists calls to pursue formal independence from China. Chinese President Xi Jinping's removal of presidential term limits and other illiberal policies will deepen suspicion of China in Taiwan.

Politeness is the practical application of good manners or etiquette so as not to offend others and to put them at ease. It is a culturally defined phenomenon, and therefore what is considered polite in one culture can sometimes be quite rude or simply eccentric in another cultural context. Brown and Levinson suggested four different politeness strategies that can help to make successful conversation by avoiding face threatening acts. Aim of the present study was to explore politeness strategies proposed by Brown and Levinson [4] in the speeches of the American and Chinese presidents at UNGA 78th session. The study was a comparative analysis of politeness strategies used by presidents in their speech at UNGA. The study used mixed methods research approach for the detailed analysis and comparison of politeness strategies in the speech. In present study both quantitative and qualitative analysis were used. Both speeches were analysed qualitatively by applying Brown and Levinson theory of politeness. Excel sheets were used to analyse data quantitatively. Findings showed that American president used more politeness strategies as compared to Chinese president. It was also observed that cultural difference was the reason of difference in the use of politeness strategies by American and Chinese president in their speech.

On April 30 the United States and the World marked the 100th day in office of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The first 100 days are considered as a key indicator of the fortunes for a new President’s program. This article briefly reviews the 2016 campaign and election, the 11 week transition period, his first 100 days, a brief examination of both American-Russian relations and Sino-American relations, and lastly, what the future bodes for each under a Trump Presidency. The 100 Day period has been chaotic, shifting, and at times incoherent. He has made 180 degree shifts toward many major issues, including Russia and China, which has only confused numerous world leaders, including Presidents Putin and Xi. There has been a definite disconnection between what Trump says about Russia, and what his advisors and cabinet officials say. So far Trump has conducted a highly personalized and transactional foreign policy. All is up for negotiation at this a huge turning point in American foreign policy, the greatest one since 1945. Given all the world’s instabilities today, a rapprochement between the United States and Russia is a truly worthwhile objective, and should be strongly pursued.

Making Sanctions Smart Again:Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea Robert Huish (bio) Following a period of escalating tension between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in which the Kim regime conducted a series of ballistic missile and nuclear tests and the Trump administration pursued a policy of maximum pressure, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un met for a historic summit in Singapore on June 12. What changed to bring the two leaders together? The main reason North Korea sat down at the bargaining table was not sports diplomacy at the Winter Olympics or Trump's Twitter barrages. It was that the country is out of resources as a result of the international maritime sanctions.1 These sanctions have worked, and worked well, by targeting the environment on which the Kim regime depended to acquire belligerent materials. The 2017 maritime sanctions against North Korea, particularly U.S. Executive Order 13810 and UN Security Resolution 2397, worked for three reasons.2 First, owing to its unique geography, North Korea was almost entirely dependent on illicit maritime trade for its weapons programs, which stands in contrast to long-held claims that most military hardware came overland from China.3 Second, some argue that North Korea's already hollowed-out, authoritarian economy created an "inner isolation" among most of the country's nearly 26 million inhabitants.4 Sanctions are often responsible for increased suffering; however, most North Koreans survive through limited self-sufficiency or black markets that are often unaffected [End Page 42] by formal sanctions or the country's international economic environment. Third, sanctions that targeted foreign companies, in particular maritime insurance companies that may have provided protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance to North Korean vessels, provoked a swift reaction by the insurers to absolve themselves from dealings with North Korea. The important message of the sanctions imposed in 2017 is that this focus on pressuring the maritime industry led to a noticeable behavioral change in North Korea. The remainder of this essay examines what lessons about the efficacy of smart sanctions can be drawn from the case of maritime sanctions against North Korea. The next section will describe the 2017 sanctions from a maritime standpoint and analyze why they worked. The essay concludes by considering the potential to effectively apply similar sanctions to other targets. Have You Been to Sea? To understand why maritime sanctions worked so well against North Korea, two issues must be discussed. First, what are effective sanctions? And second, what role does China play in enabling North Korea to outsmart sanctions? For years, the international community made two major errors in dealing with North Korea. Many experts believed, first, that any sort of sanction would be a good measure against the Kim dynasty and, second, that China is the sole provider of resources, including military resources, to North Korea. Both of these claims are problematic. Sanctions aim to encourage a behavioral change of a target nation or its leadership. Traditional, or "dumb," sanctions either prohibit the target from any financial dealings with the issuer's market or seize the target's assets in the issuer's territory. Such ham-fisted sanctions often do more to further the suffering of the population than apply pressure on the leadership. In the 1990s, then secretary-general of the United Nations Kofi Annan encouraged the use of "smart" sanctions in order to overcome such blunders. Speaking in hindsight of the tragedies in Iraq, the Balkans, and East Africa, Annan argued that economic policy could be crafted so that despotic leaders are pushed toward behavioral change given that their own personal assets were at risk.5 In the 1990s this logic made sense because many dictators had offshore assets that could be directly targeted. Even so, many tyrants, including members of the Kim dynasty, managed to acquire [End Page 43] luxury goods and odious resources through shady networks involving fake currency production, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, and insurance scams. Moreover, sanctions did not deter the Kims from pursuing nuclear tests or overseeing brutal human rights violations. One of the faultiest assumptions about North Korea in the international relations literature was that North Korea...

In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested—especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018—a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China's traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to ‘solve’ the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea—as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates—has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing's risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit.

D. Trump's republican administration has substantially modified US strategic estimation of security challenges and threats, facing the country. The "National Security Strategy – 2017" became a fundamental basis of the security policy. The authors of the "Strategy…" believed Russia and China to be the main security policy problems, threatening the world status of the U.S.A. and a challenge for it's interests. The answer to the challenges should include deployment of the ABM system, capable of neutralizing threats, created by N.Korea and Iran. Opposing China and Russia, called "revisionist states", seeking to change the international status-quo, requires building up and modernizing arms and Armed Forces, in particular, security predominance in nuclear forces, space and cyber-space. An active role was designed for diplomacy and reconnaissance community, involving an increase of their efficiency. On the regional level, priorities included Indo-Pacific region, where the United States had to contain Chinese expansion, and Europe, where Washington intended to counter Russian subversive activity and aggression and to support NATO's defense efforts. Nuclear Posture Review (2018) was one of the key foreign policy strategic documents for the administration of 45th US President Donald Trump. In the context of increasing political and economic confrontation with the People's Republic of China and the aggravation of relations with Iran and North Korea, which were caused by the nuclear component itself, this strategy returned to the methods of confrontation and the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War era. It emphasized the complementarity of the power potential of the armed forces and the diplomatic levers of the international struggle. In the period of new aggravation in the international system caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, these very components of the doctrine can become prognostically effective for the current and future American administrations. This article is designed to analyze the key aspects of the National Security Strategy-2017 and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that relate to foreign policy and highlight the special aspects and tools that are still relevant for application by the current administration of Joseph Biden in the crisis of the international system.

US President Donald Trump's naming of Mike Pompeo as secretary of state and John Bolton as national security adviser reflects his determination to align his foreign-policy team more closely with his own political inclinations. But the new appointees may face resistance to disruptive moves involving Iran, North Korea and other major international security challenges from the Pentagon – in particular, Secretary of Defense James Mattis.

Subject Politics in South Korea. Significance President Moon Jae-in has hailed the second summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump due to be held in Hanoi on February 27-28 as a “remarkable breakthrough” for peace on the Korean peninsula. Moon hopes the meeting will lead to an easing of sanctions on Pyongyang, enabling inter-Korean cooperation such as the relinking of roads and railways to progress, and that this will boost his waning popularity. Impacts US pressure on Seoul to pay more for US troops in South Korea may stoke anti-US sentiment. Rising tensions with Japan will ultimately cause problems for both countries, and their currently indifferent US ally. Pinning hopes on the unpredictable Kim and Trump is risky; failure with North Korea would galvanise the conservatives.